



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












MOSLEM EGYPT

AND

CHRISTIAN ABYSSINIA;

OR,

MILITARY SERVICE UNDER THE KHEWIVE, IN HIS
PROVINCES AND BEYOND THEIR BORDERS, AS EXPERIENCED
BY THE AMERICAN
STAFF.

BY

WILLIAM McE. DYE

(Formerly of the U. S. Army, and late Colonel of the Egyptian Staff).



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DEDICATED TO
MY BELOVED AND AGED MOTHER,
From whom I have received more than life.
THE AUTHOR.

P R E F A C E .

Over and above the interest which the reading public, in general, have always taken in the land of classic inspiration,—the cradle of that religion which is to-day the synonym of civilization,—there is—to encourage the offer of this volume—the fact that Americans ever manifested a special interest in all that concerned their countrymen who were sojourning in Egypt as instruments of the first systematic, though inadequate, attempt to utilize the ethnical product of the Great Republic in the military service of a foreign power. This call upon the youngest, freest and most progressive of great nations, to help lift, as was generally supposed, the most enslaved of peoples out of ruts worn with the depths of ages, was in reality, these pages will disclose, an attempt to rejuvenate hoary age by the process of engrafting.

To produce a general idea of the service performed by these officers, as a body, is essayed in the book ; also to portray something of the character, and to depict a little of the life, of the interesting people with whom they came in contact, from Zanzibar to Alexandria in Egypt, and from Alexandria to the Victoria Nyanza, including the Niam-Niam country, Darfour and Kordofan. This service embraces that which was performed by some of them, as members of important armed expeditions, into a land which has, for a decade and a half of centuries, had the honor of remaining the outpost of Christianity, and which enjoys the glorious distinction, quite as rare, of being the African rock that scattered the tidal wave of Mohammedanism. The result of these expeditions into Abyssinia was hardly needed to demonstrate, to the mind of the most visionary or of the most obtuse, the folly of sending children to war ; but even the intelligent reader may need the result to learn that the Egyptian as a soldier is only a child. The reports which have hitherto appeared in print, respecting these expeditions, have been very meagre. Indeed, the battle of 'Gura Plain,' ending the most important one of the series of expeditions, was, as described in these reports, just near enough the real to be distinguished from a thunder-storm. The desire in my labors has been, above all, to produce true impressions. If I succeed, also, in awakening some interest in the future welfare of the book's central figures—the down-trodden fellah and the imprisoned Abyssinian—it will be pleasant to think that part of the subject matter presented stood high enough in the reader's estimation to beguile one of his leisure hours, and to cast a shadow over some of the many literary faults of the unpracticed hand, which the critical reader will certainly find—the matter, in large part, being made up from letters and notes (inserted necessarily almost verbatim, and without the benefit of editorial pruning) writ-

ten in the excitement of the field when the mind was severely taxed with more practical affairs. While these facts account for some of the repetitions and for much of the crudeness in the volume, they promise also a degree of reality in the descriptions and in the relation of events, little as it may be, which the work would not otherwise have.

As to the form of the volume's contents, the existing arrangement of chapters was adopted with the view of bringing relative matter in juxtaposition, and of presenting at the same time the events as nearly as may be in chronological order. However, before entering upon the main part of the work—that is, upon the description of certain expeditions with which the Americans were identified—it was considered not inappropriate to say a word about Egypt's sovereign during their sojourn, something upon the condition of society in Cairo during his Khedivial reign, and more especially in relation to the fellah and his fitness for a soldier, as well as about the Egyptian army in general.

Many of the incidents of the Abyssinian campaign so attached themselves to me, that the impracticability of hiding my personality is to be regretted. Did they more particularly concern other than myself, they would be related with more pleasure and with less reserve.

All the latest available information from the most trustworthy sources has been used in the construction of the general map accompanying the volume. For much of the geographical knowledge contained in the special map of Abyssinia I am indebted to a map by Professor L. H. Mitchell, of the Egyptian service. Names, whether Arabic or Abyssinian, which I have taken the liberty to have changed or inserted in these maps, or which are employed in the work, have the usual spelling when it gives the proper pronunciation, or nearly so.*

W. MCE. D.

* It should be remembered that Arabic names in most common use by foreigners have, in general, the French spelling—a having (mostly) the sound of a in rat, c having the sound of s, and i the alphabetical sound of e, as in Rachid (Rasheed). Among the exceptions remembered to this rule are: the word Achmed, in which c is hard and h has a guttural sound; the word syce, in which y has the natural sound of i; and Nieb, whose French spelling is Naïb. Also, the names Sabry. Arraby, Ruchdy, Ruby and Guddy, should each have the letter i (short) instead of y, for the French spelling.

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CHAPTER I.

ENGAGEMENT OF AMERICAN OFFICERS—THE MANNER OF THEIR SELECTION—A FIVE YEARS' CONTRACT, AND PAY OF OFFICERS—THE NUMBER EMPLOYED—THE CHIEF OF STAFF—GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN IN CAIRO—VALUABLE SUGGESTIONS.

At the close of the ceremonies inaugurating the Suez Canal, at the very height of his prosperity—political as well as financial—while rollicking in the glory shed around by crowned heads, and dreaming, no doubt, of independence and distant conquests, the Khedive of Egypt sought and obtained for his army from across the Atlantic the services of individuals, who, nationally, he knew were in nowise compromised by any of the political complications of Europe; gentlemen whose loyalty, when once in service under His Highness, would be as free from suspicion as their country was from "entangling alliances." These gentlemen were most of them educated and experienced soldiers, who had seen much instructive service on land and sea, in command of armies or cruisers, at the desk or in the field, on one side or the other during the war of 1861-5. Perhaps a few of them were "Soldiers of Fortune"—men ready and willing to seek the "bubble reputation" under any flag so long as the service was honorable and attractive; but with two or three exceptions they were men of established reputation, who went abroad as educators anxious to assist in the great work of civilizing the natives of the classic land of the Nile. Prompted by an earnest desire to acquire knowledge while imparting it, these Americans, while serving under the banner of the Prophet, left no opportunity unimproved for learning the traditions and present customs and condition of the people among whom they had elected to live for a period of years.

The first of the officers engaged was Captain Mott, son

of the celebrated surgeon of that name, of New York city, and commander of a battery in the Army of the Potomac during the civil war. He was received by the Khedive into his military service, with the rank of Ferik-Pacha (Major-General) secured for him through the influence of his brother-in-law, Blacque Bey, at that time Turkish Minister at Washington. In a short time, Mott Pacha began by authority to engage other Americans. Their contracts (in general) stipulated that they should serve for five years, leaving it optional with the Khedive to re-engage them or not for the same period of time, as he saw fit. There was also a proviso that officers could resign in case of sickness, receiving at the same time two months' extra pay; and that the Viceroy could discharge them at short notice after giving them six months extra pay. In all cases, transportation was to be paid both ways between Cairo and New York. The contract also obliged the officer to serve against any power with which Egypt might be at war, excepting always the United States. The pay of each individual engaged was to be the same as that of officers of the same grade in the United States Army (for the year 1869), including commutation of forage for two horses and of quarters. While serving in any of the distant provinces of Egypt, each officer was to receive additional pay equal to one-fifth his salary; also rations, or money in lieu thereof. In case of death in the service, the heirs of the deceased officer were entitled to one year's pay. Should death occur in battle, or from wounds received therein, his wife and children were entitled, until her marriage, or until the youngest child should become of age, to his full or half pay, according to the time when death should occur. From first to last there were forty-eight of these Americans in the service of the Khedive, of whom twenty or more were engaged by Mott Pacha. Those not named in the body of the work are named in the appendix. Only one of the number need be specially noticed in this place. This one is Gen. Charles P. Stone, of Massachusetts, who graduated from West Point in the class of 1845, along with Fitz John Porter, Gordon Granger and Thomas G.

Pitcher. He served with credit under General Scott in the Mexican war. Later he commanded the Benicia Arsenal in California, where he indulged in land speculation, in which he was so successful that he resigned his commission as an officer in the United States army to engage in banking. He soon failed, carrying down with him many friends and army officers. He afterward became connected with the Sonora Survey under Lieutenant Isham, formerly of the United States navy, and became involved in the political troubles of that border, and was ejected with his party. He was in Washington looking after a claim against the Mexican Government, based on his ejection from its territory, when the civil war broke out. Upon the organizations of the new regiments at that time being added to the army, Stone was made a Colonel, through the influence of a General then reaping laurels in Western Virginia. He was detailed upon Gen. Scott's staff as Inspector of the defenses of Washington. Soon after he was made a Brigadier-General of Volunteers, and given a command on the Potomac, by Gen. McClellan, on the retirement of his aged chief. Later on, the battle of Ball's Bluff occurred, and the death on the field of Senator Baker, who was at the front acting in a military capacity. This disaster, and certain imprudent correspondence brought down upon General Stone the political power of his State—that of Governor Andrew, and Senators Sumner and Wilson—also of Secretary-of-War Stanton. Fort Lafayette followed; but after some eight months of imprisonment he was selected as Chief of Staff, by Major-General Banks, then commander of the Department of the Gulf. He was at the siege of Port Hudson, and participated in the Red River campaign. Subsequently he was deprived of his volunteer rank, and ordered to his regiment, then with the army of the Potomac. He obeyed the order, but feeling that a wrong had been done him, and that his services and ability were not appreciated, he soon resigned. He was next heard of as in charge of a coal mine in Virginia. Unsuccessful in this venture, he sold out, and soon after—in the fall of 1870—became Brigadier-

General (Pacha), and nominally chief of staff in the military service of the Khedive. Among the officers who preceded him in the service were Brigadier-Generals Loring and Sibley. They, as well as Mott (who was aide to the Khedive) were, consequently, his superiors in rank. Difficulties arose between General Mott on the one hand, and Chahin Pacha, Minister of War, and General Stone on the other, which ultimately ended in General Mott's discharge from the service. Stone, as chief of staff, then secured full sway. The Khedive, as an exhibition of his confidence and favor, soon elevated him to the rank of Ferik-Pacha, attached him to his person as an aide, and decorated him, thus launching him with the most brilliant prospects into the Egyptian service. Shortly after this, his friend General W. T. Sherman visited Egypt. The distinguished American soldier was treated with great consideration. He expressed much interest in the country, and made some valuable suggestions with a view to lightening General Stone's labors and anxieties. Indeed, on General Sherman's return to the United States, he very graciously assumed the task of selecting, in a confidential way, Americans for the Khedive's military service. By way of parenthesis it may be said, years afterward, on the marriage of one of the General's family, His Highness showed in a very marked manner his high appreciation of the distinguished character of his American friend, by sending the bride a diamond necklace, the most magnificent ever seen in the United States.

CHAPTER II.

AN ORIENTAL PRINCE—HIS FRIENDSHIP FOR NAPOLEON III
—ARRANGING FOR AN HEIR—THE TITLE OF KHEDIVE—
HIS AIMS AND INTENTIONS—AT HEIGHT OF POWER—
HOW HE GAINED LANDS.

The Viceroy, giddy in the height of his prominence as an Oriental prince, and as the protégé of Napoleon III., not only joined the Emperor against Mexico, where he was coquetting with fortune, but contributed, in most part, the means to complete that sovereign's canal scheme, thus depriving his own country of the commerce then passing through, to and from the East. His future seemed compromised. First Sedan, and then the loss of his own iron-clads—seized by the Sultan—determined what it should be. The "Empire of Egypt" was not now to be a reality; but there was room for the play of a reasonable ambition within his own realm. Like an Eastern coaster who, though unable to buffet the billows of an Atlantic, can tack to every changing breeze of a Pacific, his eyes had ever been on home, and his attention was now turned in that direction. An opportunity to strike for independence had not occurred. But that which his heart was most set upon, namely, a change in the succession from the elder male of the family to the direct line from father to son, had been accomplished against diplomatic intrigue, by that wand which an Oriental prince knows so well how to wield. Gold, representing the fellah's sinew and blood, purchased in 1866 the firman necessary to secure the succession in his own family as against the rightful heirs. The amount paid is in yearly installments, and represents the ordinary interest of about fifty millions of dollars.* In

*The total amount of tribute paid annually by the Khedive to the Sultan, including the amount paid to secure the succession, is not far from £800,000. This excludes the irregular sums sent in the way of presents, etc.

This is an appropriate place to ask, why the fellah should toil and bleed to change his master?

order to consolidate his power, he deported his uncle, Halim, and his brother, Mustapha, and despoiled them of their large estates. In this reprehensible scheme he was ably assisted by Sultan Abdul Aziz, who also issued a firman declaring his eldest son the successor to the Turkish throne. The yearly tribute, to secure the succession, pledged and now for some years paid in London, by the Viceroy, direct into the hands of the Turkish creditors, became under the manipulation of this shrewd prince a powerful double-support to his son's succession.*

In 1868 the Viceroy received the Persian title of Khedive. It is an ill-defined title, meaning more than Viceroy but less than independent ruler. At this time his country would have seemed a dependency of Turkey only in name, were it not for the annual tribute, and the contingent of military force to the Sultan's army in case of war, and the fact that iron-clads were excluded from the Egyptian navy. The Khedive, however, did not give up all hope of independence, as is known by his eliminating and excluding Turks in his new army organization. But the material prosperity of the State, plans for improvement, and schemes of aggrandizement received his more immediate attention; and the Americans thereafter engaged were selected more for the purpose of ascertaining and developing the natural resources of the country and of the annexed provinces, than for improving the condition of the army.

At this time Ismail was at the zenith of his greatness as an Oriental prince. Inheriting an immense estate, which consisted in great part of thirty-five thousand acres, Ismail increased his wealth by the cultivation of cotton during the blockade of the Southern ports, while the civil war in the United States was in progress. Upon succeeding to the Viceroyalty—on the death of his uncle, Said Pacha, January 18th, 1863—his fortune grew to colossal proportions by the purchase, at his own valuation, of the estates of his uncle (Halim Pacha) and his brother (Mustapha Pacha), and the lands of many of the fellahin (peas-

* Ismail, at his fall, was succeeded by his son Towfik.

antry), until his and his family's landed interest had swelled to the enormous proportions of about one million of the best of the cultivated acres of Egypt. Much of this acreage was obtained in the following manner: The Khedive ordered the land throughout the country to be graded, and a new assessment made according to its value in such grade. This was done ostensibly to regulate the land tax on a basis of justice. The commissioners whose duty it was to ascertain the grade—good, medium or indifferent—created the impression among the proprietors that their lands would be taxed according to the new assessment of the value as indicated by the grade in which they were to be registered. Moreover, under pretext of saving time and trouble, they often, if not generally, left the grading to the proprietor as the one having the best knowledge of his own land. Now, the fellah, who can seldom read or write, and has through centuries of oppression and cruelty been driven almost out of the pale of humanity, fell into the ways of man to circumvent the tax extorter, whose habit he knew by experience was to come around without any rule or regularity, so long as a para could be whipped from the soles of his feet.

It was natural that the fellah should have his land registered a grade below its real value in order, as he thought, by the only possible means to free himself from some of the unjust taxes. Sometimes, when the fellah could neither read nor write, the commissioner would, without inspection of the land or knowledge of its value, register its grade to suit his purposes. Not long afterward there came forward other representatives of the Khedive, who, forgetting that "it takes two to make a bargain," seized on the land at its assessed valuation. Thus was there built up from the sweat and blood of this wretched people an estate in part composed of lands, canal shares, and gorgeous palaces, in magnitude worthy of this modern Cræsus, who, in court intrigues, pomp and display, in visionary schemes and thoughtlessness, in turn squandered it with the magnificence of a Lucullus and wantonness of a Sardanapalus.

CHAPTER III.

THE EX-KHEDIVE'S MANNER OF BANKRUPTING HIS PRIVATE
• ESTATE AND IMPOVERISHING HIS COUNTRY—A MAG-
NIFICENT ORIENTAL FANTASIA—ISMAIL'S ENTERTAIN-
MENTS, PALACES AND ZOOLOGICAL GARDENS—PRINCE
ARTHUR'S VISIT—A MOTLEY THROG—A PRINCELY
BANQUET.

An inkling of the ex-Khedive's manner of bankrupting, within a few years, a private estate of three hundred millions of dollars, and burdening his impoverished and wretched country, during the same time, with a debt of nearly five hundred millions, will be found in the following descriptions of some of the many entertainments given by him—when his credit was good—to enliven his capitol, and to attract and entertain foreigners. The like of these entertainments will not, perhaps, ever be seen again.

Begin
In the winter of 1873-4, three of the children of the reigning Khedive were married. The *fantasia*, which lasted throughout the three occasions, stands, in lavish expenditure and Oriental magnificence, perhaps without a parallel in modern days. It eclipsed even the festivities at the inauguration of the Suez Canal, in which Ismail is said to have expended ten millions of dollars. The grounds where the *fantasia* took place covered about one square mile. This was filled with tents, and silk and satin lined pavilions. Theatres, buffoons, story-tellers and jugglers were distributed round for the amusement of the multitude. The most brilliant and profuse pyrotechnic displays were given each night, and the city was illuminated throughout. There were dinners and feasting for all in wanton luxuriance day and night, and which, with the music intermingled with salvos of artillery, continued for six weeks. A holiday was over all the city, and only the absolutely unavoidable business was attended to, and this

with more than the Pacha's usual repulsiveness and leisure, and in keeping with his distinctive ideas of pleasure and repose. The nation were made guests, and the countless foreigners who thronged the city that winter were invited to attend. Care and the morrow were driven from the land, and there was one universal rejoicing. The processions on the occasion of these separate marriages, as they wound through the streets of the city, were all that a vivid imagination may picture of Eastern pageantry. They were made up of all the hundreds of harem carriages, polished till they shone like mirrors, attended each one by dusky postilions, the drivers and footmen in livery, horses gaily decorated, the harness shining like gold and silver, and the ladies in laces and gorgeous colored silks and satins, adorned with their richest and brightest gems and jewels; military organizations dressed in different colors, arms and accoutrements glistening in the sun; Pachas and Beys in tarboush and showy uniforms, on prancing steeds; and here and there, like brilliants distributed on a long chain, were many fancy organizations, clad, men and horses, in shimmering mail. The wondering and bedazzled populace surrounded the long, meandering line; for the like had never been seen before. Here and there throughout was measuring music, but all trod on a higher plain. In concert, but inspired by the grandness of the occasion, the magnificence of the scene, were pride and stateliness in each, and, in all, harmonious and overwhelming pomp. It has been estimated that the cost was not short of fifteen million dollars. But the foreigner, looking on with his disciplined mind, caught little enthusiasm—an American none whatever. All was so unusual, there was no sympathy. At first glimpse one's mind was filled with wonder; it became confused in following the ever changing uniforms and scenes as the procession moved slowly by; and one grew more bewildered at the *fantasia*, by the varied phases of the scene, their profuseness and dazzling splendor. Finally the limits of the imagination were reached, every thing dancing before the mind like a vision, one found himself in the heart of

Orientalism, the home of the thousand and one nights, and forgot the wanton extravagance, the rod and the kourbach in the overpowering magnificence before him.

The ex-Khedive had grand entertainments on the anniversary of his birth, and on that of his accession to power, but others more *recherché* occurred from time to time. Besides the harem palaces he had three others—the Gezireh, Shoubra, and Kasr-en-Nousa—which were kept more especially for the entertainment of crowned heads and princes and other distinguished foreigners. His grand entertainments were held at the palace of the Gezireh, just in front of which the placid Nile moves sluggishly on its way to the sea. Several hundred acres, formerly an island, now constitute the pleasure grounds surrounding this palace. It was here that the Empress Eugénie sojourned during her visit to Ismail, and later, the palace was occupied by the Emperor of Austria; also by the Prince of Wales when he invested Prince Towfik with the grand cross of the Star of India. The grounds surrounding this palace are arranged with the most cultivated and artistic taste. Shaded avenues or carriage roads for Victoria and coupé lead around and through the gardens, and are crossed and re-crossed by a net work of by-paths, to lakelets and (Alhambra) Kiosks, shades and retreats from the noon-day sun; or to more secluded spots to whisper the tender passion to listening ears, in the balmy air of an Egyptian moon. Between the walks are lawns and groves, with Venetian lamps hanging from every limb, clusters of palms, the tamarind and almond, orange and lemon trees, magnolias in full bloom, gum acacias and spice trees, frankincense, and a profusion of tropical flowers and sweet-scented shrubs, kept fresh by the mist of fountains—all emitting throughout the park an eternal fragrance sweet as holy love. Nor are the lotus, papyrus, bamboo or jungle of the tiger missing. As one strolls round when the moon is dark, the spot becomes intensely interesting and weird, when one is welcomed by the prattling monkey, or repelled by the deep roar of the forest king. Nearly all the denizens of the African wilds, and

many from the plains and jungles of India, tamed by kindly hands, parade here, sleek and fat as if in holiday attire. Here began in 1876, under the tutelage of several Indian elephants, presented to Ismail by the Prince of Wales, a system of instruction of the African species, which in proper hands would materially modify the transport problem in the equatorial regions, and thus hasten the dawn of civilization. These animals, including an educated one of the African species, are now on the Upper Nile.

The exterior of this palace, like that of all the others, is without ornamental pretensions. It is because of a belief that there was no design of architectural display that its aspect is not quite forbidding. But the contrast of the interior is only the more striking. Here are Parian marbles and granite reflectors, beautiful mosaics and Italian frescoes, fine statuary in niches and on pedestals—our own Franklin drawing the lightning from the clouds is in the most conspicuous place—chambers and salons, with curtains and doors of silks and satins, spacious corridors—all, in brief, furnished and ornamented in the highest style of Parisian art, and in pure Oriental taste and Eastern magnificence. The avenue from the City, the highways leading to the other palaces and out toward the towering pyramids, all approaches in fact, to the palace gardens, were illuminated one evening of the winter of 1874-5, during Prince Arthur's sojourn in Egypt. From early evening to nearly dawn, victorias and coupés, horses and donkeys, with their living burdens, and men afoot, could be seen hurrying and crowding the way to the palace. All the transportation of the city was kept in motion during the night, carriages and donkeys depositing one load only to return in swift haste for another. Invited guests from all the cities, pachas and beys, bim-bashis and effendis, and tourists on their way up the Nile in dahabiah, returned in hot haste, by the railway, to enjoy the entertainment, thus swelling the number to many thousands. En route one passed the gardens. Here the myriads of Venetian lamps shed modest rays of light;

roses and japonicas in full bloom perfumed the air; the savage growl of wild beasts disturbed in their slumber was heard, and twitches of adventure would steal electrically over the flesh. One vied for an instant at the gateway, then entered the court-yard where carriages, donkeys and foot people mingled promiscuously. An avenue lined with police in full dress led to the portal of a brilliantly lighted salon. Ladies were ushered in amidst royal splendor. Ismail in the center of the great hall, surrounded by his court in gorgeous uniforms, affably received the earlier guests. To the fair ones he extended his hand in welcome, while a gracious word and military salute was bestowed on the foreign gentlemen. Turks and Egyptians were met with the usual salaam. On all these occasions the ladies of the harem were noticeably absent.

At the time I write of, the assembled throng was of the most motley kind, being composed of all shades, from Circassian white to negro black. The most gorgeous toilette was worn by a lady of a very captivating African shade. Because of her color and nationality, all the more noticeable and striking was her superb train, bespangled with virgin gold and silver, and intermingling clusters of gems and brilliants, the whole resplendent in polarized rays. The guests soon filled the salons, chambers, corridors and divans. It was not long before music was heard and Ismail led to the dance the wife of the Italian Consul-General—the dean of the diplomatic corps. The princes with their partners, joined by a few guests, also hastened to pay homage to Terpsichore. But this amusement, so many were the attractions, was only a smile, coming and going, on the face of the great multitude. Soon could be seen one continuous line of jovial faces crowding along, descending and ascending, to and from the salon where a banquet was spread all night long. Some were there only to marvel at its magnificence, others to partake of the luscious viands, the fruits of delicate flavor from the Mediterranean isles, of sparkling Burgundy, Chateau Yquem, and other choice beverages. Some were in groups on the balconies wondering when the stream of coming

guests would cease to flow. Others, entranced by the ever-changing scene, stood at open windows, while their satin robes and silken locks kissed the zephyrs that whispered by. Here and there were other groups, in nook and corner, criticising toilettes made splendid by Khedivial munificence. But only for a few brief moments did these groups linger; for in the fullness of the multitude they were drawn into the passing stream of gaudy uniforms, jeweled decorations, flowing silks and fleecy laces, crowned with radiant smiles, and all promenaded in couplets from salon to corridor, to the music of universal harmony. In every room were great chandeliers, with prismatic pendants, themselves like sparkling gems, casting halos of opal-like light over the magnificent scene. So enraptured did one become with this spectacle that he swelled with pride and pomp because of his being one of the multitude.

end

CHAPTER IV.

THEATRICAL SELECTIONS—A PROFLIGATE COURT—THE OPERA A NON-PAYING VENTURE—THE FIRE DEPARTMENT—OPERATIC TALENT AND THE BALLET—AIDA—HAREM LADIES AND STRANGERS—THE MUSIC—THE DANCE OF THE GHAWAZZI—HORSE RACING.

The more *recherché* affairs were generally given at one of two other palaces—at the Abdin, or the Kasr-en-Nil. Operatic selections were performed by the best artists of the Cairo troupe; theatrical entertainment was usually a part of the programme. But there was not much discrimination in making these theatrical selections.* They were offensive to the sense of modesty of the more fastidious. The public plays in Cairo are generally of the most pronounced French type. A choice from these, with all the unwholesome flavor in a nut-shell, could but be highly satisfactory to a profligate court. On one of these evenings it was a piece entitled "The Antiquarian." Ever curious, always in search of antiquities, the supreme moment of his rapture as a scientist, and the close of the play, was when he found the pottery of a French imagination!

The opera was the pride of Ismail's heart, outside of the harem! He sustained the opera so long as he could borrow the money to pay the several hundred thousand francs annual deficit which the box-office receipts failed to meet. The building, during the performances, was brilliantly lighted; and, in consequence of the Khedive's apprehensions of fire, or in order to produce a feeling of security among the audience, a fire-engine with steam up was always at the side of the house ready for instant use. This was another evidence of His Highness' magnificent intentions, his confounding *fiat* with *fait*. Now that the

* Or was there, perhaps, too much (?); for the ex-Khedive's Court was very profligate.

building receives no more timorous audiences, it may be disclosed that the engine, under the management of un-mechanical Arabs, was indeed a very insignificant affair. This assertion would hardly be necessary if the reader had seen this engine, as I did, arrive with steam up at the scene of a fire, on the bank of a canal full of water, and yet not get to work for two or three hours; not until a score or more of buildings were burned down. Then, instead of combating the fire, the hose was taken around to the fire's wake, away from the heat, and water poured on the embers. Excepting in one instance, when a police officer handled one, the hose from the hand-pumps were managed with even more stupidity; every man at the nozzles standing on tip-toe to get a reach of water that would keep him out of the flame. The Khedive was present on this occasion. The thoroughfares leading to the scene were lined with soldiers and policemen. All save the insubordinate fire stopped to do him honor. The fire increased in fury. The whole vicinity was thronged with gaping people, yet the fire was permitted to exhaust itself from its sheer inability to leap across an alley. There was no appearance of organization, if we except one line of water-carriers (with goatskins), who were kept moving by a negro boy who seemed to have imposed upon himself this task. He performed it with a long rod, with which he belabored the tardy carriers.

The very best talent, such as Herr Wachtel and Madame Parepa-Rosa, was always procured for the Opera. The orchestra was unrivaled; the *corps de ballet* exquisite; the scenery fine, and the costumes gorgeous. Indeed, all the appointments were as magnificent as lavish expenditure could procure. The repertoire was unsurpassed. This included the opera of *Aïda*, written by Signor Verdi at the special request of the Khedive. Nowhere else has it ever been put on the stage with equal truth, with the same effect. On a night when this opera was played, the house was soon filled to overflowing; all standing-room even being occupied. Tourists could not usually obtain seats, as the wealthy residents held the most of them for the season. Among the foreigners, both sexes were well

represented. Opposite the boxes of the Khedive and the princes were veiled ones, set apart for the exclusive use of their harem ladies. These latter, although they know little or nothing of music, are so fond of pomp and show that during the run of the opera they were always out in full force and attire, filling their boxes, which were mostly vacant at all other times. The moment a stranger entered the building and observed the veils in front of these boxes, the swarthy faces throughout the audience, and the scenes on the drop curtain, his imagination was turned to the land of Isis, the rival of Ethiopia. The mind soon became fixed upon the scene of the opera, and the audience became impatient for the overture. The music began, and was listened to throughout in rapt attention, with mingled curiosity and wonder. The changing scene and characters soon placed one indeed in the land of the Pharaohs; he found himself threading the labyrinth, in the temples, among the palaces, and visiting the sepulchre of kings. Then came on the stage the great procession, surging through every aisle, with its holy ark, bull and other sacred animals and symbols, mailed horse and chariot, and weapons of ancient war, all glittering in Egyptian splendor, and borne by men of that ancient visage, priests and soldiery, with no paint nor wig—nothing to divide but all to rivet attention to the scene. One in the auditorium did not question the fidelity of all this to truth. He seemed to see and hear the original. He was at the religious rites, assisted the priests, and joined in triumphal marches; was with the judges of the dead, saw the bodies ferried beyond the river, and wandered among the tombs. When the procession on the stage passed by, with that ostentatious pace, measured by the grand march, with the pomp and display of certain symbols so peculiarly Egyptian, there was a reality, found in no other representation of the opera—the symbol of the festivities exported to Greece as Bacchanalian was not forgotten. But when the procession had moved round once or twice, his eyes all eagerness, ears attentive, and mouth agape, he became bewildered in the confusion of

ideas (of Egyptian history) suggested by the passing objects. Fairy-like houris of graceful form and most bewitching attire now darted in upon the scene. The spectator was soon lost in rhapsody. They danced to the most charming music, wreathing gracefully, as they pirouetted, tender chords round his enchanted heart. It seemed to him a dream. It was reality. As if to awaken him from reverie and loosen the tender threads entwining his heart, *la charmeuse*,* with her cobra, mingled among the houris, and by her rude reality of representing poison and death-struggles, cast a gloom over the weird and fascinating scene. But the entranced spectator was not yet to escape. The *Ghawazzi* † also appeared in the ballet. Their dances, now seen only up the Nile or under roof in the purlieus of the city, were until a few years past common in the streets of Cairo; upon the stage only an inkling of the real could be given. Those who have not seen it, but have seen the similar dance in Spain or in the interior of Mexico, will have no difficulty in understanding its influence on the morals of an audience, when informed that although it exhibits little of the *abandon* of a Cubas, none of her towering passion, no such varied, eccentric and graceful postures, yet the motions, uniform and monotonous though they become, are of the most suggestive character. Their indecorum often drove ladies from the opera-house. Cruder than its Spanish offspring, it has the regularity and placidity of ease and satisfaction, rather than a Cubas' engulfing passion and transports of delight. It is the quieting of the waters rather than the upheaval of the earthquake. The Harabie (or Arabie) going with the Moors through Spain into Mexico, has lost here quite all the significant character of the original. It still preserves about the same cadence and accompanying music (strange to say), but the movements are mostly with the feet instead of the hips—they are shuffles rather than wriggles.

* Female snake-charmer. In all the cities throughout the country, snake-charming boys are seen. The singular part about their profession is, not that they are not poisoned, for the fangs may be taken out, but that the reptile does not bite—does not strike.

† The *ghawazzi*, or dancing girl, is of foreign blood; and, singularly enough, the dancing girl of Japan is known by the same name—at least, as near the same name as the Japanese vocal organs permit.

The operas generally were attended by very few of the native population. If they attended at all, it was, with rare exceptions, to see the ballet.

The annual races were a part of Khedivial life. These were well attended by ladies of the harem, as well as by all those who could in any way make their way to the courses. These ladies, though not very demonstrative in their sympathies, favored the stables of their master against those of their overseers; for the contests of speed were generally between horses belonging to Ismail and others owned by eunuchs. The management of these races, as did the clubs, naturally fell into the hands of the English. As a rule, they were satisfactory exhibitions, the exceptions being when the tardiness of the Khedive delayed the sport. An interesting feature of the meeting was the races between dromedaries, they going six miles in twenty minutes. Another novelty was the races between syces,* when the interested public found excitement in the struggles for the long-distance championship of footmen—dressed in their most picturesque style. The day's sport concluded with a sweepstakes between donkey-boys,—that peculiarly Egyptian character—with their donkeys, which always created uproarious laughter.†

* *Sycc* means a groom, dressed in very picturesque style, who runs in front of, and clears the way for, the carriage or horse of a titled or wealthy person, or one of exalted station.

† These donkey-boys are clever rascals. I have seen twenty or thirty of them struggling around a gentleman for his patronage, when suddenly one of them would dexterously get his donkey between the man's legs, just when he thought himself straddling another beast.

CHAPTER V.

POPULATION OF CAIRO—THE TEXAS OF EUROPE—THE FOREIGNERS—STREET BEGGARS—PANCAKE PEDDLERS—SMALL COIN—WOMEN FROM THE HAREMS—THE NATIVES ALMOST NAKED—YOUNG WOMEN IN BATHING—CUTTING OF THE KHALIG—CLIMATIC EFFECT ON MODESTY—STAPLE ARTICLES OF FOOD—AMUSEMENTS—THE PRAYER OF THE DERVISH—HONORING DEPARTED SHEIKS AND SAINTS—THE GREAT RELIGIOUS FAST—THE SPECTACLE OF THE DOSEH.

Cairo is made up of the most heterogeneous population, taken from every quarter of the globe. Egypt itself is sometimes called the Texas of Europe. At the time I write of, the better class of Europeans were connected with the government, and generally dwelt in the Ismailiah quarter. This is a part of the city added by Ismail Pacha, and built somewhat in the European style. Here are broad and well-shaded avenues, running between rows of so-called palaces, surrounded by tropical floral gardens, kept green and fragrant by the fountain's refreshing spray, quite in contrast with, although less interesting to tourists than, the Arab part of the city, with its one or two story rubble-stone and mud buildings, its narrow streets, dirt, and squalor. Here it is, upon the borders between filth and the better part of the city, where most other foreigners make their stay. Some of them are mechanics; others are engaged in trade and commerce, and in ministering to the appetites and amusements of the mixed population.

The native poor of the city may be seen daily, from early dawn to late at night, going their rounds from house to house, gathering the refuse of the table, or from one rubbish heap to another, picking out unwholesome trash, and fighting with dogs to secure something more

nutritious. They are often poisoned with belladonna or other cosmetics found therein. A glimpse of misery one step higher in the scale is a half-clad woman, wrinkled and feeble with years, exhibiting to a tourist, whom she takes for the tax-gatherer, an old hen, her only possession; or a blind man with a donkey's load upon his back, led through the streets of the city by a child as blind as himself, with a long stick feeling and sounding the way. The picture is not more pleasant, of mothers, whose husbands had been conscripted into the army, seated on the ground from morning till night, on every street, in every city and village, under the blazing sun and in the flying dust, waiting patiently, each one, for some passer-by to purchase her little pile of Kahk (tortilla-like cakes or "slap jacks"), her naked and puling babes the while climbing over her, or rolling in the dirt at her feet. A sufferer from ophthalmia, she carefully tests with her teeth every para that reaches her hand. Long after the shades of night have fallen, she gathers her babes in her arms and upon her shoulder, helps another child by the hand, and trudges toward her mud-built hut, if she has one. Here she prepares anew her little stock for sale, and sets out again in the morning. Many beggars had disappeared from the streets within Ismail's reign; but two or more years before his fall, at the beginning of his financial straits, they began to come from their hiding-places, and are now seen alone or in groups upon all the thoroughfares—mothers with suckling babes, their bones barely covered with flesh, and their eyes literally running from their sockets—hugging the shade and asking alms in most piteous and pleading tones. When Ismail was making his improvements in and around Cairo, men and their families from the villages and lands were attracted to the city. When the financial crisis came on building almost entirely ceased, all business was depressed, and such crowds of people were without work that I have counted eighteen hale and hearty men engaged in splitting and carrying into the house-yard one donkey-load of wood, thus building up a title to backshish or something to eat. One of the first evidences of the evil time was the

appearance, as a medium of exchange, of little silver coins, with holes in them, worth but a trifle more than an American cent—the women were breaking up their little jewelry.

It was not long after this that women from the harems—blacks and beautiful Circassians—dressed in white, or the most flashing-colored silks, thinly veiled and with glancing eyes, anklets with dangling bells, appeared in the public gardens as *fillès de joie*.

The native population of the city are commonly laborers, or are connected with the markets and bazaars. Their children, swarms of flies crowding around their diseased eye-lids, are to be daily seen in packs, like the dogs, in the streets stirring up the dust. Their dress is what nature has bestowed upon them. When they have reached say ten years, the promising males become donkey-boys or bootblacks, and the more enterprising girls, with baskets, and with fingers as forks, follow like cow-birds the animals in the streets, and gather up the droppings, which are patted into cakes, dried, and sold for fuel.

The nakedness of the gown is not half covered. The first dress worn is simply the loose robe common when the Israelites were commanded not to go up by steps unto the altar, lest their nakedness be discovered thereon. This a mature girl will strip off in the street, first depositing her water-jug, gather herself together with the slightest show of modesty, and wait while a companion is sewing up a rent in the garment. Young girls may be seen at almost any time, careless as to exposure of person, bathing in the canals round the city. Crowds of young fellows from ten to twenty-five years of age may be seen (as at the cutting of the Khalig*), while waiting for the water to enter the canal, playing on the bank, stark naked (unconscious of immodesty, as their demeanor shows), in full view of the surrounding multitude of foreigners and natives of all classes and sexes, gathered to see the ceremony, as well as watch the boys dive into the

*The "cutting of the Khalig" is a ceremony performed yearly at the rising of the Nile. It is a relic of and commemorates an ancient usage, once annually performed to propitiate Isis, the goddess of agriculture.

water after piastres thrown down by the city governor. The climate has much to do with this apparent lack of modesty. But the Ghawazzi, so common from the earliest date in Egypt, may have been more than an effect, may have been a cause contributing to this result.

The people live on the simplest vegetable diet—unleavened bread, cucumbers, beans, onions, lentils, and helba are staple articles of food. Mutton is had at feasts, when the rich provide it—rarely at other times. Melons, although very common, are a luxury to the poorest. One must have arrived at the prosperity of a bootblack to be able to smoke an occasional cigarette; and in a higher social circle before he gets an occasional taste of opium or hashish. The common amusement of the poorest, when not asleep, is to collect in the evening and listen to tales recited or read by story-mongers. Men who have a few paras to spend often go to a café, and indulge in a game of checkers or backgammon; or they may go to the public garden (the Esbekiah), where women also congregate, to enjoy the Arab nasal-music, drink sweetened and flavored waters, and talk with acquaintances. They go to the mosque, and have weekly meetings at the tomb of some sheik, and sing and pray in their style, and perform as dervishes—commonly all night long. If one is a sojourner, disturbed in one's rest and dreams by a sound similar to that made by a wild boar when surprised, by one resembling the abrupt and tremor-producing grunt of the ambushade heard discordantly in the war-dance of the red-man, or by one which reminds the hearer of the noise of a locomotive when putting forth its utmost power, then one may be sure, when once he has fixed his identity and locality, that it is only the dervishes, in the supreme moment of their delight or pain, uttering in combined voice and full energies, in rude harmony the single syllable, "Ugh!" If one changes his residence to secure Friday night's rest, he is sure to be disturbed the next Monday or Tuesday. Wherever we go, in whatever locality of the city, one night or more of the week is appropriated to do honor to some departed sheik or saint.

Some of the interesting occasions in Cairo are pleasant to recall. The great fast of Ramadan, when day is turned into night and night into day ; their feasts of Bairam, and of Hassan and Hussein, when jugglers yet occasionally appear to eat glass, pierce their flesh with swords, and tear snakes in pieces with their teeth ; the departure in the autumn of the pilgrims with the Mahmal and Kiswat to Mecca ; and their return, when there is drum-beating and great rejoicing as each family enters the city. Then occurs the most interesting of all the ceremonies, albeit as disgusting a one as a Spanish bull-fight. This is the Doseh—the winding up of the fête called the birthday of the prophet, instituted some three centuries ago in his honor, and now annually repeated on the anniversary of his birth. At the opening of the festivities the venders of Arab confectionery, with their establishments, throng to the city from far and near. They gather in the suburbs and line the avenues to the grand encampment of sheiks. Here, the latter, from their many mosques, pitch on the four sides of a square their superb pavilions ornamented in many colors with lines from the koran. Here is where the several orders of dervishes enjoy themselves in singing, dancing, praying and feasting. In the centre of the square is a skeleton pyramid of ropes, inclosing the space for the dancing dervishes. Thronging the avenues are also venders of the koran, the Arabian Nights, and other tales ; beggars, jugglers and romancers, fortune-tellers and merry-andrews—legitimate descendants of “wise men,” “magicians” or “prophets”—with here an innovation of swings and flying-horses, and Punch and Judy in every relation of life, and there the lost remains of Osiris. Each and all of these exhibitions, with their tambours, pipes or horns, vie with each other night and day to present the most attractions to an obscenity-loving crowd, which is thus prepared to enter the more sacred precinct where the dervishes of the various orders sway to and fro, or from side to side, or spin, and chant in intonations high and low the monotonous “al-lah, al-laah, al-lah ai,” to the tap of primitive drums.

The first I witnessed of these was in 1877. There were hanging lamps on a thousand ropes, taut or in festoons, extending from tent to tent, and from one pole to another, along the avenues, and upon the buildings. These were lighted early and shed a fair illumination upon the scene. Then came men, women and children, the halt and the blind, afoot and on donkeys, foreigners and natives, in carriages and out, eunuchs and harems, princes and equerries, crowding along. Soon there was a sudden discharge of fireworks; cobras and circles, rockets and bursting bombs, throwing their tinted lights and stars upon a scene with its many colors and nationalities, its varied dances and dins, at once picturesque, fantastic, monotonous and weird-like. And so a week passed by. Then we saw the most extraordinary of Egyptian ceremonies, the miracle of the day. This was performed by a sheik whose prerogative and power have descended from father to son with more regularity than the sceptre of king or emperor. Early on the morning of the Doseh-day, more than the usual gathering of footmen and carriages was inside the square and along the entrance to it. On either side were policemen and soldiers, blue and gray coated, protecting the passage to the Grand Sheik's tent, at the end. Soon the vicinity for acres and acres around was covered with vehicles and human beings encroaching on the Sheik's way. The people took possession of tents, and broke down carriages, covered houses and climbed upright poles; even the trees, as an Arab expressed it, grew men. Carriage whips and policemen's cudgels were used unmercifully against men and boys, only to surge the crowd, carrying along foreigners as well as natives, the curious with the fanatics, all excepting the privileged and sexless beings who guard the many women of the wealthy. Now came the harem carriages hurrying down the avenue, pressing back the throng, and forming in a line on the side opposite the tents of the princes; consuls, judges and other officials arrived with their families, some of whom entered the tent of the courteous Towfik, then the heir apparent. These were followed by other

coupés, with their thinly-veiled occupants—wives and concubines of His Highness the Khedive. Everything and everybody gave way for these favorites, and room was made for them in the carriage line. Then the Khedive was looked for by the anxious throng, but he did not come. It was now near one o'clock in the afternoon, and the motley assemblage in eager expectancy gazed cityward down the avenue. Anon, was heard the cry of "They come, they come!"

Rushing along, with banners flying, were three hundred or more dervishes, heated, frenzied with excitement, who threw themselves at full length upon the ground, side by side and close, with heads together. By-standers and Arab boys, in their faith or ambition, vied with each other for a place. Their faces down and upon their hands, there could be heard from the fanatics along the line only the mutterings of prayer—prayer without intermission, "La illa il Allah" (There is no god but God); but not a motion of body or limb, save when an individual charged with the arrangement of the line, pulled a body this or the contrary way, in order that its middle should, with that of other bodies, form an unbroken line. All was ready. The miracle-performing Sheik, who had passed the night and the morning in fasting and prayer, was now seen approaching, ushered along also by banners and many dervishes. To the end of the line these dervishes darted and flung themselves upon the ground. Then followed the most degrading scene which has saddened human eyes since its prototype, the car of Juggernaut, crushed believers beneath its wheels. Only the Sun Dance of the savage Indian can excite similar revolting horror. This bulky man, past the middle age, in the grand robes of his calling, and under a turban as sadly out of proportion as a drum-major's bearskin, mounted on a fine, large, unshod* gray horse, now neared the farther end of the line. The sight was repugnant to the noble beast. Not satisfied with what his eyes told him, he lowered his head, and with nostrils sought to verify his impressions. He hesitated, but a sheik

*In 1878 the horse's hoofs were rhod.

coaxingly led him forward. Then he carefully mounted the line of prostrate, praying forms, and began to tread the human way, steadied on either side by men who also held the rider in his seat. At a right good pace, as if to hurry through his disagreeable task, the horse followed the syce, who had dropped the rein, and now only guided. The other three assistants kept hold, and all, with horse and rider, trod full upon the bodies—heads and shoulders, legs and ribs alike. Nothing was heard but the continual invocations to Allah, and the multitude looked on in silence and with palpitating breasts. The Sheik, with head fallen to the right and eyes closed, affected a supernatural physiognomy, which suggested the irreverent exclamation, "Husband of a Madonna!" He had no sooner passed than many of the men jumped up and ran away; but scores and scores with painful features, closed eyes, and almost silent prayer, were lifted up, foaming at the mouth, and were spirited away, evidently seriously injured. The equable pace of the horse had carried both fore and hind foot upon the bodies on which he trod.

Egyptians of all degrees say that there is no hashish used by the principal performers in this horrifying ceremony; although, *apropos* of this, it may be stated that the drug is commonly used by many of the lower class. While waiting for the Sheik, an Egyptian lieutenant said to me that any other horse than the traditional gray one could be used; that on a former occasion, by suggestion, a European horse was mounted, but the beast would not put foot on the bodies until the Sheik had dismounted and gone through certain incantations around the fractious animal. Then, unguided, he strode down the line as if it were his daily work. Further, after this ceremony (in 1877) it was not long until one could hear repeated, through the crowd of natives, a story to the effect that the horse in treading the prostrate forms stopped suddenly and still, just as he came to a curious Copt, who was down in the line, and not until the unbeliever was dragged out would the animal proceed. During the ceremony I was in the tent of the Sheik, and looked down the entire length of

the line, but having partaken neither of hashish nor opium, I was unable to see what had been so generally observed by the natives.

The peculiar dancing and singing of the dervishes after this was kept up until their grand feast in the evening. This was followed by fireworks—the most brilliant of the week—and continued until dawn, when tents fell and the multitudes disappeared as chaff before the wind.

CHAPTER VI.

THE EGYPTIAN HAREM AND ITS BAD INFLUENCES—A HEAVY INCUBUS—CONTRALTO KNIGHTS—THE MOTHERS OF PRINCES—DIVORCE MADE EASY—THE CODE KORAN—MARRIAGE A LA MODE—RICH DRESSES—EMBLEM OF IMMORTALITY—FOND OF THE BATH—EQUESTRIAN EXERCISE—THE VEIL OF ISIS—HOW A YOUNG MAN WAS IMPOSED ON—A MARRIAGE CEREMONY.

In the wealthier part of Cairene society, is an institution in full operation which has been entwined with their religion. This is the harem. Nowhere is it supported with more magnificence than in the valley of the Nile. It looms up front and foremost as a dynamic and inertial power—as the Turkish Empire's great evil-generator, at which all progressionists, all who wish Egypt well, should hurl their shafts. Making some allowance for weak human nature's short-comings everywhere, it is to this institution and its maintenance, with all its ignorance, superstition, envy, jealousy and intrigue, that may be traced lying, backshish, blackmail, bribery, forgery, theft and corruption generally, high and low, and exorbitant taxes, cruelty and murder, emasculation and slavery, and all their concomitants. That intensity of fanaticism, also, now so peculiarly Mohammedan, and which the sheiks, with their dervishes, are ever prepared to fan, is the offspring of the ignorance so sedulously maintained in the harem. Although the first wife may be superior to the others, the hundreds of women who afterward enter the harem generally do so as slaves, coming from the very depths of barbarism, ignorance and superstition; and these are the mothers, the educators of youth upon whom hang Egypt's future hopes. The word harem, itself, if not originally the

plural of hhaar (hot), certainly ~~suggests~~ a hell on earth, as the institution is known, with its sooty guards. Pandora should be its patron saint.

The radical measure suggesting itself to relieve the country of this incubus, the fellah from this unjust and cruel tax upon his labor and life, is to inaugurate an exodus of the contralto knights and regulators of the harem. This, certainly, would destroy the magnificence and great power for evil—physical, moral, social and political—of the institution, which could then exist only in miniature, and controllable, as it is now among the poorer class of city society; for it is here partly as an imitation, and by the sufferance of pachas and rulers, who themselves are lords of great establishments. Were Egypt's engagements with other powers for the suppression of the slave-trade fully carried out, the harem would no doubt lose its influence and power within a generation or two. But the traffic continues, only being less noisy and more alert than a few years back, harems being kept to their full. Not only is there a constant supply of blacks coming down the Nile, but of the more valuable and lecherous Abyssinians, and even of the beautiful Circassians and Georgians, who enter the establishments only of the more wealthy.

The harem, with its hoary traditions engrafted as an institution on the koran, has formidable *vis inertiae*. Household slaves, limited by the purse only, as to number, color or age, recognized in almost every page of the koran, become in the harem concubines, provision being made by the koran for their welfare as wives when they become mothers. The mothers of nearly all the Khedivial princes—including Towfik, Hussein, Hassan, Mahmoud, and Faoud—became wives to Ismail Pacha only after they had become mothers in one of his harems. In any similar case, should there exist already the koran allowance of four wives, it is only necessary to divorce one of them—which is easily done without a lawyer—to make room for the new one, whose royal offspring is thus legitimized, she herself freed and exalted to the *ne plus ultra* of all her ambition and hopes as princess and mistress over a harem.

Not only is the institution intimately connected, as they see it, with their religion, but the koran furnishes the mussulman all his ideas and rules of life, moral, social and political. The head of the State being also head of the Church, they are to the faithful inseparable. It is only within recent years that foreign influence imposed upon Egypt tribunals with European ideas of justice (*code Napoléon*); but these exist only that the foreign population may receive justice, as it is known in Christendom. Between native and native the code koran yet decides. With all the professions heard in high quarters for the extinction of slavery, the municipal law having this aim, by limiting or checking the trade, that is to say, the demand, is only for the eye of the foreigner. It is cake for Cerberus. Ismail Pacha disregarded the law himself in entering the market to keep his harems filled to their capacity. The government, its agents, sheiks, police, in fact every man, woman and child of the Mohammedan faith, and old enough to distinguish a Christian, and other natives too, seem to conspire to protect each other in this illegitimate commerce. They all violate the law, and stand or fall together.

To have a civil polity distinct from that of the church cannot of itself be a remedy, for violators of law are not apt to be its sincere executors, and a remedy cannot spontaneously evolve from the church. The influences to bring around this result must be extraneous. However, Ismail Pacha, the chief (at the time I write of) of this institution having recently disappeared from political and social life in Egypt, the harem should not thrive as formerly. In his numerous harems the ex-Khedive, when in power, had about nine hundred women.* To maintain all these in the most magnificent and lavish style, in rich dresses and costly jewels, with hundreds of carriages and numerous palaces (over forty, one of which with the surroundings, cost about fifteen million dollars) and those of the inferior Pachas, the very heart of the fellah has been gnawed into. Occasionally, some of these women are

* The Khedivial family had, it is said, about three thousand women.

married off and pensioned. While the Empress Eugénie was in Cairo, for her express entertainment, the Khedive married off one of his women to a young Egyptian named Ibrahim Bey. When the master dies, or his money fails, many of these women go to the dregs.

The only observable difference between the Khedive's establishments and others, is that between royalty and subject, between unlimited and limited wealth. The most costly dress and sparkling jewels ornament the stout persons of the former, and two syces run in front of their carriages to clear the way; whereas there is but one for coupés (or horsemen) not of the Khedivial family. The women of all the harems are more than extravagant. They have no idea of the value of money, or that it represents so much of the sweat and blood of man. Goods are brought to them through or by the spindle-shanked nondescripts who stand as guards to their honor at the main entrance to the court of the harem. These black fellows always share the profits and become wealthy; and when they die, the state is usually their heir. To one harem—not a Khedivial one either—a lady from Constantinople supplied three hundred and fifty thousand francs' worth of personal linen, at one time, and on one order. A lady of Cairo, wishing to attend a masquerade ball in the costume of a princess, procured such costume from a harem. Subsequently she attempted (or feigned an attempt) to return it; but although its value, jewels and all, was fully two hundred thousand francs, the harem lady would not receive it back. This, on the part of the foreign lady, was simply a case of indelicate aping or aristocratic begging.

An ill-considered admiration of a personal ornament worn by one of these ladies is the expression of a desire to possess it; and as princesses do not like to refuse, they often deprive themselves of mementos, to make their visitors happier and richer.

We are told that the scarabæus (beetle) is the Egyptian emblem of immortality. The crude manner of representing this fact—if it be one—upon some of the monuments (the child in this representation may be considered either

as the parent or offspring of man) leaves one in doubt whether it was intended to illustrate more than the life or fructifying principle. It is certainly apt to suggest to the common Egyptian, whose chain of ideas is very short, that there is fertility in the beetle. The harem woman, whose social standing and happiness depend so much on the fact of her becoming a mother, eats the insect in this belief and hope. I have also been told by natives that some of the women eat them to become fat, as this is a necessary adjunct to Egyptian beauty. It is believed, however, that the desire to grow fleshy is often expressed only to veil the real motive in eating the beetle.

The women are fond of the bath. They go to it often, both as a luxury and a necessity. The body is kept clean of absolutely everything but the naked flesh. This with a Circassian, under a system of rubbing and scraping by assistants, becomes as red as that of a new-born babe. The joints, stiffened from lack of exercise, are made supple by pulling until they fairly crack—thus enabling the bather when she is dressed, to step out with some pretensions to walk. But this she soon finds insufferable with her high-heeled shoes and unwieldy proportions; and lifts herself into her carriage, or upon the back of a donkey, where one can see only her protruding eyes without lustre, newly doctored with belladonna or kohl, or her nails newly adorned with henna. Following the carriage, are generally two postilion nondescripts, who sink near to their shoulders, astride their horses. The ladies on donkeys, covered with a robe (usually) of black silk resting upon their head, are to be seen mornings and evenings perched upon the saddle with a foot on either side, but on the same level with the knee. It is not known how they preserve their equilibrium, unless they have an adjustable centre of gravity. The veil of Isis worn by these ladies is now indissolubly connected with the harem, rather than with Mohammedanism. All the women of the former wear it, but of the very poor, none. Young girls about marrying, put it on for the first time. The Copts also commonly wear it, but the moment they descend from their convey-

ance and ring the door-bell of a friend they are about visiting, they do not hesitate to take the veil off, while waiting an answer, and expose their faces to the gaze of the stranger. Year by year the veil is becoming thinner, or more transparent, and is gradually slipping down, exposing more of the upper part of the face. My observation is, that the proportion of the face thus exposed is measured by the beauty or vanity of the fair one.

The custom becomes very inconvenient sometimes. A private soldier once made complaint, in my presence, to his commanding officer, against a woman who had imposed herself on him. He was a young man whose friends had arranged a marriage for him with a fair young lady of known family. He had often seen her in her youth, and was told by his female friends, as is customary, that she was all his fancy painted her, or that heart could desire. When the marriage had taken place and the veil was removed, behold! his wife was a woman old enough to be his mother. This was a rare case, but no one would wish it to happen more than once. Being on the subject of marriage, a word more about it may be said. When the groom is able to arrange for the *fantasia*, as the marriage fête is called, a procession may be seen going to the house where it is to take place. At the head is a band of music. Then comes the bride completely veiled, with a canopy overhead, surrounded and followed by rejoicing friends. Her dowry, usually personal if she has any, precedes her in the procession. There are two other processions daily seen in the streets, which at a distance are not unlike this one. But when one is critically close to them it is found that in one the principal character, preceded by a band and followed by friends, is an eight or nine year old boy dressed as a miniature pacha or bey, upon a horse. This is a circumcision; the other is a funeral, the men in front of the coffin singing, and the women in rear mourning. These latter are afoot, on donkeys or in carriages, depending upon the wealth of the surviving friends.

At the house where the *fantasia* occurs, are lines crossing the street and hung with many-colored little flags.

At one marriage ceremony I attended, the bridegroom was only an ill-paid lieutenant, the father of the bride, a lieutenant-colonel, providing the *fantasia* at his own house, where the couple expected to live temporarily. As each carriage drove up to the door it was received by welcoming music from brass and reed instruments. The occupant was politely assisted to alight, and was then conducted into the salon of guests, where, if a stranger, he was carefully introduced to each one present, and then seated on a divan. Soon a black boy came round with the inevitable coffee *à la Turque*; afterward, came another boy with cigarettes in a salver; behind him was a smaller negro with a coal of fire. When the invited guests had all arrived, a sumptuous repast was spread. First came boys with vessels of water to pour on the hands, and with a towel to dry them. Ten or a dozen guests sat at each circular table. There were fifteen courses, beginning with soup held in a tureen, from which each one ate with a wooden spoon; turkey and meats followed, all carved and served with the right hand (the left being unclean), without knife or fork. About the eighth course came the dessert, and then we began to return to the place of beginning. The cooking was Turkish, and approached Parisian. Water and towel were again brought in at the close of the dinner; after that coffee and cigarettes; and then music and gossip began. The lieutenant, dressed as a lieutenant-colonel (officers on such occasions always dress in the best they can borrow), and a few groomsmen then departed for the mosque to recite their prayers. On their return they marched two and two, hand in hand, the music in the salon as the bridegroom entered striking up a tune so appropriate, that it should be entitled "Behold! the bridegroom cometh." He was welcomed back, music and general rejoicing continuing. In another part of the building, the bride and her lady guests were making themselves quite as happy. This continued nearly through the night. When the guests were ready to depart, a curtain which separated the groom from his now unveiled betrothed, arose, and the two became man and wife. This marriage was, with the single

exception of myself, exclusively an Egyptian affair. At another wedding, where there was more wealth, and many of the guests were foreigners, there were wines of all descriptions, and the cooking and manner of eating were adapted to the tastes and customs of all present. Here the groups, also of ten or a dozen, sat around silver salvers, and music was continuous. Outside the harem (this one was inside a harem), were bands and Arabic theatres, and story-tellers and fireworks, for the entertainment of the populace. The festivities were kept up three days and nights, new guests arriving each day.

CHAPTER VII.

THE POPULATION OF EGYPT—ABSORPTION OF THE COPTS—
OVERFLOW OF THE NILE—THE FELLAHIN—NO SOUL
FOR MUSIC—AN EXOTIC RELIGION—EGYPTIAN CRUEL-
TY—CONTRAST BETWEEN EGYPTIAN AND ABYSSINIAN—
THE FORMER NATURALLY AVERSE TO WAR—A STRIDE
IN THE REGENERATION OF EGYPT.

The population of Egypt has grown from a mixture of distinct races and nationalities, of all shades of color between black and white, coming, from the remotest periods, from the south and east, and meeting on the Lower Nile. There, in a system of cruel slavery, these priest-ridden people have toiled under the rod and the sword of a Hyksos, Israelite, Ethiopian, Greek, Persian, Roman, Arab, Turk and Mameluke; or, as now, under the kourbach or rod of a native bey, or more heartless and oppressive pæcha of Circassian or Turkish blood. The Copts (Christians), the remains of the ancient inhabitants, also believed by many to be the outgrowth of early ethnic processes on the banks of the Nile, are slowly disappearing by absorption into the general Egyptian stock, which is growing up with this wondrous valley. That beneficent process of nature, beginning in the unknown ages of the past, by which an alluvium is borne from near the equator down the Nile when at her flood, and deposited near the sea, has continued year by year, until rich agricultural lands have grown from out the scattered waters. Early in the centuries man began to confine the waters, and by canals, systematized from year to year, regulated the overflow, until now the fellahin of the Lower Nile have, if not a country, certainly lands of great fertility. During the course of these many ages the fellah has by the fiat of Nature, contending against sand and water, become the

slave of the Nile—his occupation as an agriculturalist being pre-eminently one of necessity. He has a compactly-built and powerful physique, but, with sluggish blood, is disposed to be of a negative character, needing the spur where the Abyssinian, for instance, needs the curb.

The fellah has neither native science nor art at his command. There is in his country but little of exotic growth. His modern literature consists principally of extracts from the koran or the Arabian Nights, or old Arabic stories, which, although quite lustful, remind one very much of the songs of Solomon. Music was thought to be too effeminate, and was forbidden by the ancient Egyptian priest. When Herodotus and Plato wrote, the Egyptian had but one "poem," and to-day the monotonic repetition of a few notes through three octaves places the modern native but little higher in the scale of musicians. The plaintive monotone of the fellahin and the vulgar hums of the carnal, with the lascivious contortions of the *ghawazzi* inspire no lofty sentiment in the bosom of the spectator. Neither painting nor sculpture are known to the modern Egyptian. The condition of mankind was such during the flourishing period of ancient Egypt's history that races or nations were generally at war. It was quietude, then, that a nation needed for development, and this, the position of Egypt assured her above all others. Her decline began with the later influx of the foreigner.

The fellah's mind is preoccupied with religious forms. He is without spontaneity, and there is no yearning of the heart for the unknown. His religion—an exotic, as it is—does not fit him, although he patiently wears it. It is not adapted to his negative character, it being intolerant and fanatical, something that he is not. Though practical Moslemism is somewhat modified by preponderating civilization and Christian sentiment, yet the Turk's so-called religious tolerance arises mostly from contempt, while that of the fellah arises from indifference, dislike of change and of mental effort. His prayers are said without spontaneity. Though under inexorable oppression they sometimes seem

continual. He goes to them and his ablutions five times daily, simply because so taught as a religious duty, or as one goes to his physical labor.

Egyptian cruelty is absolute, general and continuous, and arises in the normal mind from nothing more than lack of sympathy. Lane in his "Modern Egyptians"—an excellent work—was under the impression that they were not cruel. He mistook veneration for kindness. There are at this time, strong traces of the reverence for dogs, cats and other animals held sacred by the ancient inhabitants. As the slave becomes the most exacting and cruel of masters so has become the fellah in his treatment of his donkey or other animal. Submerged as he has been by the resistless wave of Mohammedanism, precisely as is his home by the waters of the Nile, all instinctive feelings seem crushed out by slavery and pachalic oppression.* Unlike the Turk, who is called grave and imperturbable, the fellah is subdued. He is not, nor is the Turk, philosophic or even contemplative. His *sang froid* and apparent tranquility arise from a lack of tone in his life. His so-called contentment is a misnomer for resignation. The vehement language (of exotic growth) by which he attempts to express the movements of his soul belie him; and when clutching an opponent by the throat—at the same time using such epithets as elsewhere accompany blows—his conduct is altogether ridiculous. He would much rather argue than fight. His obstinacy is passive, and does not arise from any determination or fixed resolution; whereas the Abyssinian (of whom more hereafter) comes at once to the point in dispute, and the negro loses no time in forcing the Egyptian to an issue of courage rather than an issue of strength and skill. But the fellah suffers more patiently than either, this superiority being due more to obtuseness of feeling than to stoicism. When involuntary resignation takes possession of the fellah, the Abyssinian is inspired to new efforts; the former submits, and the

* "If thou seest the oppression of the poor and violent preventing of judgment and justice in a province, marvel not at the matter." for does not Bāishā signify he who seeks or lays waste?

latter resists ; one endures, the other aspires. The Egyptian is reserved, and seemingly mysterious ; the Abyssinian is frank and demonstrative. The latter is intemperate in both eating and drinking, and the former abstemious, under the restraining influences of civilization and the effeminate customs of his religion. The Turk, in recent years, has been less destructive. Yet destruction in his practical life always accompanies decay ; whereas decay is the ruling element in the Egyptian's objective life, as repose was in his ancient art. Ebullition and disorder shape the political life of the Abyssinian. In brief, the peculiarities of, and the contrasts between, the natures of the Abyssinian and Egyptian are such as an ethnologist would expect to find between a mountain people and a valley people—between nimrods and agriculturists—such as are suggested by the sharp, stimulating atmosphere of ranges which reach the limits of eternal snow, and the hot, drowsy air of the lower Nile—by a mountain torrent and its sluggish waters when it reaches the morass and the sea.

It is the Egyptian's religion alone that is destructive. Its influence on his character has not overcome the effect of antagonizing physical circumstances which surround him. For the mountain Turk, this religion was first simply an additional stimulus to his warlike energies. Even his character has been modified and toned down, if not by circumstances during recent centuries certainly by the exhausting practices of a religion based on polygamy, the harem and slavery—with ignorance, superstition and self-sufficiency in their train. It may be stated that the Egyptian is naturally averse to war, even though it be to extend his religion. In the campaign to be described further on he will be found simply the instrument of (so-called) Turks or Circassians, by whom he was commanded, and who vainly attempted what for twelve centuries the Arab and Turk have never been able to accomplish. So deep, however, has been the impression made by them upon the Abyssinian, that he looks on them as his natural enemies, and every foreigner who to-day enters the

country is called a Turk, and believed to be a veritable one unless there is indisputable evidence to the contrary.

It was around the fount of learning that Egypt's ancient greatness grew into such magnificent proportions. There are epochs, however, in her early history, when, in her relations with Ethiopia and the East, she seems to have had aspirations as a military power. But in process of time, as the Delta gradually grew fitted for agriculture, and the country more isolated, the population became essentially bonded tillers of the soil. Military duty was performed by a caste, and all the lands were divided among priests, soldiers and royalty. When the fellahin were combating sand and sea, and nature began to unfold her Egyptian and Ethiopian treasures, the rapacity of distant rulers projected into the country overwhelming hordes. This continued periodically, time out of mind, and to the days of Mohammed Ali not only shaped the destinies of the people of the Lower Nile, but crushed their spirits with the lash and rod, and unfitted them for the contending and progressive work of freemen. Whether it was to sustain himself in place, or whether it was to free his people from a leprous parasite, the crushing of the ill-used and dangerous power of the mameluke* by Mohammed Ali was a stride in the regeneration of Egypt. It then became feasible, notwithstanding the stroke in itself could not change the character of the people. It certainly did not fit these "hewers of wood and drawers of water" to contend on the field of Mars.

* Their massacre in 1811.

CHAPTER VIII.

SHAPING A MAN INTO A GOOD SOLDIER—THE FELLAH WITHOUT LOVE FOR HIS OFFICER—WITHOUT HOPE OF REWARD—COURAGE AND FORTITUDE—THE FELLAH DEVOID OF SUCH INFLUENCES AS MAKE GOOD SOLDIERS—THE ALTAR OF DESPAIR.

It has been strenuously urged on the one hand, that the Egyptian is the beau ideal of a soldier; and with equal violence it has been contended upon the other hand, that he is an arrant coward. We credit Ismail Pacha and his advisors, with having had the forethought to settle this question satisfactorily in their own minds, before undertaking that costly and hazardous war against Abyssinia in 1875-6. But in order that the reader may be enabled to decide this question for himself, and to fully understand the campaign against that country, that is, the part played therein by both the Egyptian and the foreigner, it will not be out of place, it is thought, to devote a few pages to the consideration of the subject of the fellah's fitness for a soldier. The first question presenting itself is: What prerequisites in a man, render it possible to shape him into a good soldier? Without discussing the various distinctions between the disciplined Prussian and all the intermediate grades of so-called soldiers, down to the bashi-bazouk, the general answer may be given, that the man should be disciplinable—physically and mentally adapted to military life. He should be so constituted as to be capable of acquiring, under available stimulus, obedience and endurance, the former being stimulated by enthusiasm (religious or military), and guided by instructed intelligence; especially thus guided, since masses have dissolved into lines, and commands are becoming smaller, more numerous and more independent. The Egyptian,

particularly the fellah, possesses the power of physical endurance to a wonderful degree. If nothing more were required, he could be readily converted into a valuable soldier. He is a good campaigner, but he is not easily instructed. His intelligence is not such, nor is he capable of such enthusiasm, as to render his obedience of that higher kind possessed only by the best soldiers. His intelligence is imitative, with little thought of the why or wherefore. Enthusiasm is possible with him only where his religion is involved, and he is utterly incapable of rising to the dignity of an American and English soldier. To be disciplined into that full obedience necessary upon a battle-field, he should acquire what he does not already possess of courage and subordination. This latter may arise from hope of reward, fear of punishment, or from respect inspired by authority, which authority may be law itself, or its personal embodiment. Military authority, especially during war, when the soldier is in his normal condition, is peculiarly personal. To meet any contingency, the will of the commander, rather than fixed law, is then the reigning power; this is especially the case in Egypt. To be effective, the officer must at all times be present to declare his will and see that its decrees are accomplished. When so much depends on the character of the officer, he should be of the highest type, to command the respect of the troops and lead them intelligently. But the Egyptian has no love for his officer, not even for the native one, who, if he attempts to do his duty at all, does so in an oppressive manner, and strives to obtain the soldier's subordination through fear. The idea that the fellah is ever inspired with any hope of reward may be abandoned at once. Promotion or recognition is made by favor or caprice only; a fact so well known, that those aspiring for advancement, instead of redoubling their efforts to merit it, apply their wits to court intrigue, thus lowering themselves still further in the soldier's scale. So far we find the Egyptian soldier with endurance, capable it may be of religious enthusiasm, and of being rendered subordinate through fear of the officer

placed over him; but this, little as it is in the requirements of an ideal soldier presupposes courage; full obedience amidst war dangers includes it. It is to the purpose to say only, that there are not only degrees of courage, but also various kinds, arising from the peculiar circumstance attending one's life. A courageous soldier would not necessarily be an adventurous mariner, nor *vice versa*—Ney a Magellan, nor Farragut a Sheridan—much less the fellah, *à l'improviste*, a fit man in the field.

The "Greaser" who twenty years ago, among slashing knives would drop no note, nor lose his step in the Varsouvienne, would leave the fandango through a window head-foremost at the sight of an American revolver, and I can speak authoritatively for one "Gringo," who, on the other hand, has the most profound respect for a "bowie," or blood-thirsty looking sword-bayonet. When there are no aspirations, no high sustaining motives to that confidence which leads men to the cannon's blaze, the individual trusts alone to his personal experience. This teaches him that death is not certain even then, that there are chances in his favor; and thus supported, hope bears him on. The fellah has no such aspirations, no such trusty experience from which almost solely is derived that knowledge of danger and its extent, upon which the soldier builds his hope and sustains his courage.* It is not, however, necessary to notice the ordinary distinction between moral and physical courage, as for our purpose the attribute may be better distinguished by its influences—physical, emotional and intellectual. Beyond the instinctive courage which impels even the brute creation to risk life in defense of life, the physical has reference more especially to pain and is called fortitude. The mother that stands at bay in her lair protecting her young, exhibits an instinctive courage bordering on the emotional. But this, and all so-called physical courage, need not be considered here, as it is something beyond these that the soldier of to-day is mostly in need of. This patient courage, or fortitude, the fellahin possess to an uncommon degree. But, as a passive quality, it is de-

* Ignorance is sometimes mistaken for courage.

sirable only as a secondary consideration in a soldier, the first being to fight. The higher order of courage, which has been denominated intellectual, is influenced by knowledge in its more comprehensive sense—in the soldier, particularly, by military science and art. His courage is sustained by belief in success, arising from confidence acquired by knowledge and experience—confidence in himself and comrades, in his officers, in the system of organization, and in his arms; in brief, in a sense of duty, which is more intellectual than emotional. These influences not only sustain, but they may determine, a soldier's courage when there is no preponderating contrary motive. They alone against worse military systems might stand in lieu of a high order of courage. The fellah is devoid of all these influences. He has no confidence in himself, as he is, so to speak, without eyes, art, and experience. His comrades he knows to be, like himself, without reputation from other wars, and without noted exhibitions of positive courage. The officers are without reputations; nor is there anything about their daily life, or in their manner of executing their duties, calculated to inspire confidence. The soldier, ignorant of other organizations, cannot compare his own with foreign systems, nor his weapons with those used in other armies. If he could do so, his inability to properly use them would negative any confidence he might otherwise have in them. And he has no such sense of duty as is possessed by the intelligent, or is instilled by long and wise discipline, nor that emotional phase of it which grows from an instinctive sense of honor, or from pride in national or military history and traditions.

There may next be enumerated among a soldier's emotional stimulating motives, religion, patriotism, love of glory and display, love of the cause, of his organization, its history and tradition; love of home, property, personal liberty or fear of slavery, not to mention plunder and the accompanying excesses of an unrestrained soldiery. As a soldier the fellah is without patriotism or love of military glory, and for good reasons. He is torn from his home and dragged, often in chains,—destroying his self-respect, if the

lash has not already done so,—into the army where he is destined to serve for life, with little prospect of bettering his condition. He has no *esprit de corps*, and yet these are the basis of military enthusiasm. For what cause then could the Khedive undertake a campaign with which the Egyptian soldier would identify himself? He has not that individuality or intelligence which lead men to embrace and fight for a cause for opinion's sake. Love of the excesses of an unrestrained soldiery need not of course be considered, for these are not the legitimate fruits of a disciplined army. Love of personal liberty and fear of slavery, love of home, property and traditions operate on his courage only when these are in danger. He is, in fact, a man devoid of all intellectual sustaining motives, all emotional impulses save religion.

Unlike what obtains with the mountaineer and the pioneer of civilization, there is in Egypt no wrestling with such active and varied forces of nature as arouse latent energies, widen mental resources, and tear away the veil of the future. Indeed, the ever-recurring annual return and overflow of the Nile brings along a never varying agricultural drudgery, having the simple purpose of appeasing hunger. The overflow drives the laborer to his mud-built village, where, without occupation, he basks in the sun, and whiles away long weary months. Then, with the receding of the waters, he goes to the enriched field, to plod naked in a burning sun, whose enervating beams consume every energy not driven out by hunger, to sustain a hand-to-mouth existence. Between the contending flood and the khamsin sand, driven now by one and now by the other, he is imprisoned by the overwhelming forces of nature. Without attractive scene of any sort whatever, almost without seasons, his existence at best can be but monotonous, unsuggestive, and non-progressive, encircled as he is by these vast wastes of water and sand, with here and there only monuments so stupendously imposing as to swallow up in his untutored mind the idea of man's agency in their construction, and so imposing as to drive back his thoughts into the distant past, there he to tremble alone

among gods and demi-gods who contended for supremacy and the future. His superstitious awe is thus kept alive. His overwhelming impressions, almost his only ones, are in and from the past, there being nothing in his surroundings to suggest or open to him a future, much less to incite within him aspirations which would elevate him in the search and attainment. This is in contrast with the pioneer who, breaking away from ancestral monuments and traditions which bind him to the past, disenthral his imaginative soul, which in her joyous freedom wings her way like a fairy scout into the future and returns laden with the rich and bewitching products of the new civilization. *Presto!* savage beasts bow to his will; forests are swept; the sod is turned; the bowels of the earth and the depths of the sea are scrutinized; rivers, oceans and continents are spanned—even time itself is annihilated, and Utopia heralded. As for the poor fellah, without education or fixed home—within his breast the consuming conflict of distinct races, extending from the equatorial beams to the frozen sea; often less attired than were Adam and Eve; without furniture, vehicles, or roads; only the most primitive agricultural implements; a kennel in common for himself, donkey and dog, the companions of his toil, privation and misery—in this contracted sphere, with the ever-recurring daily drudge, goes round and round his fettered spirit hopeless, weak and weary. Upon his body, trampled in degradation as in the *doseh*, stand as rulers, lusty, screaming cormorants in human shape—pachas and beys—in turn fighting and gloating in rends and gulps, at the life of the prostrate form of this poor, decrepit nation of veritable (mental) Casper Hausers. It is of these people that the Khedive would have soldiers at a nod. They are clad in white and given a Remington rifle, forgetting their own ancient adage, “a beard and cloak do not make a philosopher.”

Nor does the victim in his agony reach out in supplicating search for relief. A squirm of pain or discontent does not grow beyond puling days—every spark of aspiration is quenched at the faintest glow—the victim,

while in muffled prayer to Allah being spirited away, to be seen no more of men. Calumny, suspicion and wrong have usurped the places of truth and justice, but there is no relief. The master's cotton, rice or corn may greedily appropriate every spot of earth, or the poor fellah, if he works a patch, may, by *corvée*, be driven into starvation from the immature fruits of his toil. Pity and sympathy are cut down or torn from their roots, like weeds from the soil. Long misty ages since, when classes were created, and the lands appropriated by the rulers, priests, and soldiers, oppression began and continued until every hope was sacrificed upon the altar of despair. The gluttonous flame has lapped up the very fountains of grief—just as the mother, when death has stolen into her home again and again, and torn her loved one from her embrace, sinks overwhelmed at the brink of the grave, staring at vacancy when the little form of her last earthly hope disappears beneath the sod.

Contentment among the fellahin? No! there is none. It was resignation that Lane mistook for contentment. His (the fellah's) feeling is that of the *pariah* which knows no better life. The poor dog that is most beaten grieves the most conspicuous laugh, and kisses over and again—Egyptian like—the hand that smites it. Yet the fellah would have aspirations, but there is no outlet in the direction of civilization. So, fond of company and sympathy, as misery ever is, he has become as proud of his suffering from the bastinado or lash as an adventurer is of his deeds of daring.

CHAPTER IX.

FATALISM IN THE FELLAH'S RELIGION—ARAB FANATICISM—
THE SLAVE OF THE NILE—EVIL EFFECTS OF HIS LIFE
HITHERTO—A LACK OF IMPORTANT ELEMENTS—ANCIENT
EGYPTIAN SOLDIER'S SUCCESS IN 6,000 YEARS—COUR-
AGE, ENTHUSIASM AND DISCIPLINE—THE ART OF WAR—
UNDER A FOREIGN YOKE—CAMPAIGNS OF IBRAHIM
PACHA AGAINST WAHABEES—SUCCESS OVER THE
GREEKS—GOLD MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN ARMS.

The next question suggesting itself is this: Is it possible by exciting the fellah's religious prejudices to arouse enthusiasm and identify his faith with the objects of an aggressive military campaign? The question is one not easily answered. That principle of fatalism in his religion is not calculated to make a coward of him, but when he is positively inspired it has a contrary effect. It has a tendency to make him inactive, although in danger or under suffering there is no trembling as is seen in the nervous, the fearful, and the impatient. There is a seeming loss of power, or a dogged *inertia* befitting one of his associates—the mule for instance. That aggressive enthusiasm that once propagated his faith, if such enthusiasm ever existed among the fellahin, is now quite extinct. There remains little else of the objective of his creed than forms and ceremonies, and these are the joint products of the pagan and other religions. Yet it is to this creed alone, that one must look with any reasonable prospect for a foundation on which to build the faintest hope for an immediate offensive war—for military success measured by a civilized ideal. Where this religious zeal did exist in the East, it lived generally by a pampering which swelled into a burning fanaticism, inflamed by the prospects of plunder and the gratification of the fiendish passions which follow the

train of barbarous war. Were there of this unholy fire now amidst this people, a spark that might be fanned into a flame, it is not necessary to consider what might be its offensive power in the fellah, as civilization stands ready to quench it. Were this tiller of the soil inclined to or fitted for such religious strife—something impossible to presuppose—the rules of civilized warfare having deprived him of the food on which Arab fanaticism once thrived, there remains no volition, no such incentives to dare and do as once bore the crescent in triumph to the very portals of civilized Europe. Not only is the fellah's mind pinioned, but what little religious enthusiasm he may possess is interrupted by the insurmountable barriers of civilization. It is driven back upon itself, reacting upon him as a cliff-repelled billow upon the sea, accounting in some measure for the continuation at this distance from the dawn of civilization, of such surges of paganism as the dervishes, doseh, etc., as well as for his pride and fortitude under the rod.

Veritably, the slave of the Nile and of the pacha is driven by relentless man, as well as by nature, to thus develop his aspirations. He often yields himself half unconsciously to a muttering prayer, not so much with a hope of averting calamities, as because it is a retreat and consolation to the discouraged soul. Shorn of all religious stimulant, bereft of all that has been found in our cursory examination which is buoyant and aggressive, to bear him along, the fellah soldier—the antipodes of the free savage—is but an untutored slave, the rudest overtasked machine, that can be put into the slightest effective operation and controlled only by distinct intelligence, by a long process of education. But this material can be brought into immediate use only by a distribution throughout the army of the only remaining practicable cohesive force. In this emergency, fear alone makes the fellah more or less effective. He is rendered subordinate through fear, begotten by the wise use of power, in the hands of intelligent officers; that is to say, by driving him as a conscript or an unwilling soldier, Mohammed Ali like, into the alternative of fighting

in the front or being shot in the rear. It is not asserted that the Egyptian cannot be improved; that he cannot be raised above himself; that tolerable soldiers cannot possibly be made, in the course of time, out of the fellah; but it is intended to convey the idea that his life hitherto has rendered him unfit material to be moulded with reasonable time and care into a soldier of even common parts for offensive operations and battle. To accomplish this, his life and surroundings would have to be changed, and he made to undergo careful training and discipline. Even with great patience and care, it is doubtful if the fellah who has passed his twenty years, and seen this life only, could be converted into a reliable soldier before he would lose his usefulness by reason of age. It certainly could not be accomplished unless this discipline was the result of experience gained in the field, and in battle. Secondary to this personal experience is that of association with veteran soldiers, who have seen much of actual warfare. In a word, as to the recent past, the Egyptian soldier certainly has not been kept apace with his profession, while the American volunteer, for instance, by dissolving masses, etc., even raised the science of war up to his intellectual standard.

Old as Egypt is, there is little in her history to show that she has ever been a military power; that is, in the modern acceptance of the phrase. On the contrary; there has generally been a lack of some of the most important elements to constitute such a power.

In the long period of her historic age, her successes were very exceptional, and not always such as to be recorded by the historians of other nations, though made much of by her own rulers, as is attested by her imperishable monuments. She was renowned abroad for her learning, riches, pomp and treachery, rather than for her military greatness. In benighted ages, when society was in a state of ebullition, her isolation secured her a repose which enabled her to rise amidst barbarous nations as a beacon light from out the clouds. Admitting, however, that there may have been such greatness in the past, it

certainly was not due to the fellah's military qualities. The oldest monuments are records of slavery. As from the earliest times she was rich beyond her neighbors, it is not improbable that the battles she may have had at the beginning were fought by one of her classes, if not by mercenaries, even when not under foreign rulers, as in the time of the Hyksos.

Coming down to the time of the great Rameses, it is learned that he had a soldier class. From that time to the conquering of Egypt by Cambyses, every native ruler—Shisback, Nectabanus, Psammetichus, and others—employed to fight their battles, mercenaries and allies,—such as Lybians, Ethiopians, Greeks and Arabians,—besides the soldier class, who owned a part of the land but did not work it; that is to say who were not fellahin, in the modern acceptation of the word. As "the race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong," it is not so surprising that in 6,000 years a nation should have some successes besides those of the cloister, so peculiarly her own, especially as she was rich enough, not only to maintain a soldier class, and to employ mercenaries, but to place in their hands the latest and most improved weapons of defense and offense; the long shield, the iron-pointed spear, the curved lance (which like the scimitar was to reach over the shield), and above all the mailed horse, and the chariot.

Nor is the battle always to the courageous. There are other factors of science and art, new principles of war, new and superior weapons—as battering rams and catapults—which are important, if not always determining elements in the problem of war. Beyond courage, are enthusiasm and discipline, as well as the introduction of artillery, of fire-arms, rifles, Minié-balls, needle-guns and breech-loaders as factors in the problem, each of which has often decided battles, and sometimes campaigns and the fate of nations. Among barbarous hordes, brave though they be, a first repulse in battle, by surprise or otherwise, or the chance loss of a chief is apt to produce a panic, and of course defeat. It became one of the first problems of the

earliest military commanders to remedy this defect. From that day to this, organization, discipline and arms, to say nothing of strategy and tactics, have contributed towards an accomplishment of this purpose. The general and continual tendency was to break up this irregular-shaped mass of undisciplined force into small units—into fractional masses, columns, lines, groups and individuals. One of the earliest steps in the remedial direction was to cause the mass to present a solid, invulnerable, and movable front, giving us the phalanx, legion and line of elephants. Before these was the line of war chariots, with mailed horses, which preceded the army. Egypt's early successes were due more to this state of affairs than to the qualities of her native soldiery, who, after the defeat of the enemy—by some such superior principle as her wealth enabled her to employ—became spoilers and butchers on the field of battle.

Five and a quarter centuries before the beginning of the Christian Era, Egypt came again under a foreign yoke, from which she has never since escaped; serving successively the Persian, Greek, Roman, Arab, Mameluke, and Turk. It was not until the days of Mohammed Ali that the fellah figures as a soldier; and one may search in vain for an instance to disprove the assertion that the fellah, as he is, cannot be converted into a tolerable soldier within a reasonable time. There was little change in the people under this ruler. His was hardly a system; it was rather the will at work of one dominant spirit.

Let us examine cursorily the Wahabee and other campaigns of Ibrahim Pacha, to which allusion is sometimes made to disprove the assertion. It may first be surmised that his case is very exceptional, he being a born soldier, who inherited much of the military talent of his father. Those who know war are cognizant of the extraordinary influence one indomitable spirit may have in battle. After several years of warfare, conducted by Mohammed Ali, Toussoun Pacha and others against the Wahabees, who were much weakened thereby, Ibrahim Pacha succeeded to the command in Arabia, and at the close of three

or four more years of constant campaigning captured the chief, thus ending the war. Over his enemy he had the advantage of new tactics, introduced by French deserters and other renegades from Europe. Ibrahim was a cruel leader, who made mercenary murderers rather than soldiers of his men. He offered rewards for the heads of men in the opposing armies, while his more humane enemy offered even larger rewards for all who were taken alive in battle. It was in this manner that Ibrahim succeeded in accomplishing the objects of his campaign. His men were also stimulated with the prospects of plunder and the gratification of their passions, and were religiously incensed against these heretics to their faith. Moreover the troops were principally Turks (Albanians, countrymen of Mohammed Ali) and Circassians. There were no fellahin among them, excepting as servants, of whom each soldier had one.

The campaign of Ismail Pacha, half brother of Ibrahim Pacha—in the Soudan—undertaken for the purpose of subjugating the tribes between the Nile and Abyssinia, was very similar in all respects to that of the Wahabees. New tactics and firearms, quite unknown to the blacks, succeeded. Nor were the troops in this campaign taken from the fellahin. They were the so-called Turks, Circassians, and Bedouins, or Bashi-Bazouks. Ibrahim Pacha, in his Morea campaign, had many of these Turks—Albanians or Arnauts, and Mougrebins—and Mamelukes, all of whom were experienced campaigners, who, especially the officers, had been instructed by Colonel Sève and other foreigners. They relied mostly upon the artillery, which, with the cavalry, was made up of Turks, as was also the greater part of the infantry, including a regiment commanded by Sève in person. What fellahin there may have been in the infantry were mixed with Soudan negroes, and were under these officers right from the drill-master. Fighting in masses enabled Ibrahim to place his worst troops between two fires. Nevertheless there is but little in this campaign to commend itself to soldiers. The campaign being against Christians, Turkish fanaticism was

aroused, and its conduct was barbarous in the extreme. The work was that of pillagers and murderers, instead of that of soldiers, as the enemy was without organization or any military trait. In brief, it was, as has been stated by Planat (Mohammed Ali's Chief of Staff), a campaign against an enemy without soldiers. Ibrahim Pacha's recorded victory near Tripolitza over seven or eight thousand Greeks, with the loss of only four men, indicates the condition of the enemy with whom he had to deal. Children are frequently brave, one against the other; and even lambs fight among themselves, although their success over each other does not make a host of them equal to one wolf.

Nothing whatever is found in these campaigns calculated to change our opinion of the fellah. He was not relied on then, just as under the Ptolemies the Egyptian soldier was not counted at all. Native officers have indeed said this much; but not one of them would dare record such a general censure unless he knew it to be in harmony with the wishes of the sovereign. There is, however, no difficulty in believing the fact when one learns how carefully were concealed their opinions as to the value of the Egyptian troops in the Abyssinian campaign. With reports and letters round him, even Planat records his opinions during these successes over the Greeks, that it is in revenge, or in religious strife, that the Egyptian may become a good soldier. When writing the word revenge Planat must have had in mind the blood feud law that moves one to lie in wait and assassinate his enemy. It is only in such a case that the Egyptian's hatred could have been specially aroused. The practice of this law was more common then than now in and around Egypt. The law was individual and local, and not available for war, as is the Turk's traditionary hatred of the Russian, against whom he develops the characteristics of the robber and murderer, rather than those of the soldier. It may be said, therefore, that Planat saw in him simply the possibilities of a soldier under religious enthusiasm, just as the fellah may be viewed to-day. If, whatever there may be

of this stimulating quality in the fellah is not to exercise any influence upon him in the field,—as in Abyssinia, for instance,—why should he fight simply to rivet his chains tighter, or to change his master ?

The remarks already made about Ibrahim's warfare in the Morea will apply to his campaigns in Syria and on the Euphrates, against the Sultan's troops. His army was composed in great part of the same veteran campaigners, led by foreign, not Egyptian, officers. The dense formation used then enabled Ibrahim to make a favorable disposition of his worst troops, who were borne along by the momentum of more disciplined bodies. In other words, he made the most out of his bad material. His successes at Koniah and elsewhere were due more to his system and generalship than to the destructive valor of his troops, certainly not to any peculiar qualities that the fellah may have possessed as a soldier. His troops did not have the contrariety of religion to inspire them. This fact weakened the causes of both armies, and enabled the gold of Mohammed Ali to succeed where his arms and the name of Ibrahim Pacha—then a power in the army—might not have been successful. At the battle of Nezib entire regiments came into his lines, and the Turkish fleet surrendered without firing a shot. Indeed Ibrahim's campaigns simply afford the only argument—such as it is—as to the possibility of making a tolerable soldier out of the fellah. In the Crimean, Crete and Mexican campaigns we find similar stories of the fighting qualities of the Egyptian native.

CHAPTER X.

STRENGTH OF ISMAIL PACHA'S ARMY—THE FRENCH SYSTEM FORMERLY OBSERVED, BUT NOW THE GERMAN—ONCE A SOLDIER, ALWAYS A SOLDIER—HOW DESERTION WAS GUARDED AGAINST—MONEY-MAKING PACHAS, BEYS, MUDIRS AND SHEIKS—SCHOOLS OF INSTRUCTION—NO PLACE FOR VOLUNTEERS—GOOD ARTILLERY—INSTRUCTION OF CADETS—BAD EYESIGHT—A SHARP-SEEING MAN—THE MULISH LOOK OF UNCONCERN—THE INFLUENCE OF EXPERIENCE AND DISCIPLINE—NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND OTHERS—THE COMMANDING OFFICERS FULL OF LYING, DUPLICITY AND INTRIGUE—MILITARY SCHOOLS—THE BOYS EDUCATED—BARRACKS—INSTRUCTORS—A LACK OF DISCIPLINE—THE PACHA SYSTEM.

At this writing little more than the *cadre* remains of Ismail Pacha's regular army, which, at the height of his prosperity, numbered about 45,000 men. The organization, tactics and manual of this army followed closely that of the French. Within the past two or three years, however, the German army has become the model, and slow efforts are making to introduce some of its improvements into Egypt. The artillery guns were of the latest and most improved pattern, many being from the Krupp establishment in Germany. The mitrailleuse and Gatling gun were also represented.

The organizations were kept up to the maximum by calling on the mudir (governor) of any particular province, who in turn called on the sheiks of the villages for so many men. The recruits were brought in great numbers, often in chains, to be examined, after which they were taken to the military rendezvous, to enter upon a service—torn as they were from home—quite distasteful to them. It was a

common thing to see men in the ranks who had had a thumb or finger cut off in the belief that they would escape their hopeless fate. When once received, they are forever soldiers on the active list, or as pensioners. An Egyptian king of 2,500 years ago, by name Psammettichus, had at that early date become convinced that an intelligent man could learn in three years all that could be acquired in peace of a private soldier's duties. The American officers, had they been permitted, would have fixed this limit to the term of service, believing, as they did, that it would add *élan*, that is to say, mental buoyancy to the army. The Egyptian soldier, like those in other countries, loses spirit and ambition when he remains indefinitely in service, not voluntarily but by compulsion. However, the statement that a recruit when once received is ever after a soldier, should be modified by the expression—unless money procures his discharge. Desertion is guarded against by holding the man's family responsible for his disappearance.

The lack of system leaves openings for many irregularities, upon which pachas and beys, mudirs and sheiks constantly thrive. For instance, a sheik receives an order for twenty-five men, either for the army or any other service, say to work on levees. He issues his call for thirty men, and, if possible, in such words as to include some of the well-to-do natives. These latter escape only by paying whatever sum the sheik may demand. If it is paid, both are compromised and stand together. Should, by any chance, complaint be made against the sheik, he is always ready with an excuse, such as, that he called for the additional five men so as to be certain to secure the required number in case of sickness or the absence of any of them. From the sheik they pass through the hands of the mudir and medical officer, and often are handled by other pachas and beys before they appear before the Minister of War, who gives them their last examination. The discharge of any one may be procured by similar means.

Under the enlightened rule of Ismail* not only were there

* Visionary, wanton and unscrupulous as he was, the ex-Khedive's rule may be called enlightened—as it was certainly one of great activity—when measured by that of any of his modern predecessors, Mohammed Ali always excepted.

established schools for embryo officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers' children, and for volunteers (of which more anon), but some pains were taken to instruct the private soldier. The pay is very similar to that received in most European armies. While the soldier receives less than one dollar a month, this is quite as much as he could possibly save as a laborer, after paying for his food and clothing. The private in the artillery and cavalry arms is exclusively Egyptian—white soldiers, Prince Hassan calls them. Indeed, all the organizations serving in Lower Egypt are made up of Egyptians, except the regular divisions of infantry, where there are several regiments containing blacks exclusively. Under Mohammed Ali, the blacks, then first (in recent years) introduced in the military as an experiment, were generally without distinctive organization, and were distributed in companies, battalions and regiments among the Egyptian troops—that is to say, not among the Albanians and other foreigners of which his army was mainly composed, but among the fellahin. It was then that, for the first time in recent centuries, if not in all time, there began a system to familiarize the fellah—bone and sinew of the soil—with the duties of a soldier. But this was for foreign conquest, and not to render them, as the yeomanry of a free state, capable of defending their liberties or loved institutions, for they had none.

To still further elucidate what has been said elsewhere about the fellah's soldierly qualities, it may be said here, and generally: First, an intelligent volunteer army, loyal and reliable, would be incompatible with the conditions of a despotic government, freedom and slavery being at variance with each other. Secondly, were the fellah's capacity such that he could, in the course of time, be moulded into such a soldier—his machine character destroyed; and were Ismail's ideas of schools which were in progress of development during his reign, broad enough to make the most of the material, yet all that could be said is that it (the fellahin) was in a transition state. In other words, the ex-Khedive's method differed from that of Mohammed Ali in this, that the latter began schools for the purpose of rais-

ing his army and country up to a higher plane of civilization. In doing this he recognized that while the army was in a transition state the best immediate service could be got out of it by the same means as that which obliged the fellah to disgorge his last para in taxes. This—I say it with due deference—the ex-Khedive or his advisers failed to discover; hence, instead of having a number of officers, like Colonel Sève, attached to the line to discipline the army for immediate service, he relied wholly on the staff, and it so contracted in its sphere of usefulness as to be unable to reach the army. In brief, the Egyptian soldier has not been kept apace with his profession. When masses dissolved into little self-moving intelligences, he remained a machine still. And yet he has been thrown before enemies whom only the best-trained troops could defeat.

The Egyptian artillery at the time written of was comparatively good. The cannoniers were as a class better than the infantrymen or cavalrymen, as were the officers better than their brethren of corresponding rank in other branches of the service. This was primarily, because at the artillery school (commanded by an intelligent Frenchman) more attention was paid to the instruction of the cadets, and more care taken in selecting battery commanders. But even this Frenchman's usefulness was somewhat paralyzed by having over him, as superintendent of all the Abassieh military schools, an Egyptian bey or colonel, while his own rank was that of pacha, or brigadier-general.

Here, as elsewhere, a battery or company of artillery was more isolated than one of infantry, and a good commander could make much out of his material. The discipline of a battalion of infantry is measured by that of its worst company, just as the strength of a chain is by its weakest link; consequently it is much easier to destroy than to mould discipline. Again, in consequence of the many artillery salutes (for princes, fêtes, etc.), the cannonier necessarily obtained more of the essential part of the drill of his arm than he otherwise would have done, and more than the infantryman ever secures. The nature of the

surrounding country near where the infantry are stationed, would, if nothing else would do so, prevent their receiving as much practical instruction as is needed. Furthermore, the eyes of an Egyptian are uncommonly bad, not good enough, generally, to see through rifle-sights for a greater distance than a few rods. The eyes of the black soldier are better, and he makes, under the same conditions, from 30 to 40 per cent. more hits on the target than can an Egyptian. This increased percentage is, however, not wholly due to the eye, but to his nerve, confidence and eagerness to excel. There are often found in a battery, gunners whose eyesight is good enough to lay a cannon for any reasonable distance ; and in the artillery only a few men need good eyes, whereas all in the infantry should have them.

Right here it may be said, that I know of but one Egyptian who even claims to have good eyes. He is a photographer, and takes great pride in exhibiting a photograph of the koran which is so minute that ordinary eyesight cannot read it. However this man looks at it and recites passage after passage. One day, as it seemed to be in his line of business, I showed him an agate on which had been distinctly photographed a full-grown tree, leaves and branches, done, as he was told, by the Great Pacha. He was not so enraptured as he might have been, and this it was thought at the time was because he was unable, on account of the light, to distinguish its beauties. But covering one eye with his hand so as not to have a confused focus, too often engendered in Egypt by reason of ophthalmia, he at last exclaimed, "No, no ; I see it perfectly. I see even the little squirrels jumping among the limbs."

The artilleryman is more accustomed to the noise of his guns. This drowns the battle's din, which not infrequently unnerves, at first, the inexperienced soldier ; and again, in battle he begins to fire at long range, and has time, before the enemy nears him, to steady himself. Subject as he is from the first to less fire, generally, than the infantry soldier, his courage and discipline are not so prematurely questioned, nor so steadily assailed, and usually

not so severely tried as that of the infantryman, who more speedily meets the foe face to face. Then the individuality of the soldier comes into requisition; and when eye meets eye, the slave cowers. For instance, it has often been noticed that when two fellahin are fighting, although they may clutch each other's throats, they never eye one another; in fact, they always have such a mulish look of unconcern, that one often asks himself, can they be in earnest? But when a black fellow gets into an altercation with an Egyptian, he looks him straight in the eye, soon comes to blows, and, though of inferior physique, downs, and soon defeats his squalling antagonist.

The exceptional advantages possessed by the Egyptian artilleryman, teach, in a minor degree, the influence of experience on discipline. But they create no radical change in his character, no inheritable military traits. As already stated, the artillery and cavalry, and in great part the infantry, are from the fellah class. The black regiments have Egyptian officers and non-commissioned officers, and are generally uniformed and instructed the same as the Egyptians. As organizations, therefore, they cannot be greatly superior to the others, although individually, the blacks, inured as they are from childhood to the chase and war, to dangers unknown to the fellah, have far more of the combative and adventurous qualities desirable in the soldier. It is a *sine qua non* that non-commissioned officers, all of whom are of the fellahin, must be able to read and write in Arabic. The comparative progress made by the fellah at the non-commissioned officers' school, is in drill, signal service, and the art of war; in all of which, as well as physically, he is superior to the cadet who is to command him.

Officers of the higher ranks are all of them descendants of Turks, or Circassian slaves; the lower ones being their sons, the sons of pachas and beys who are found in every department of the government, graduates of the schools, and men who have been promoted from the ranks, taken from those who can read and write. This latter is a step in the right direction, but it does not make an army; it is

simply a condition precedent to the establishing of proper relations of discipline between the rank and file. The higher officers are generally sufficiently brave, but cruel, avaricious, and as pompous as the natural imperturbability of the Turk will permit. "They are not in trouble as other men; neither are they plagued like other men; therefore pride compasseth them about as a chain, violence covereth them as a garment. Their eyes stand out with fatness; they have more than heart could wish. They are corrupt and speak wickedly concerning oppression;" they speak loftily; in fact, they are ignorant, having neither the theory of, nor any experience in, their profession, and are so self-sufficient that one mentally arraigns them under the proverb, "Seest thou a man wise in his own conceit, there is more hope of a fool than of him." They have an inordinate amount of mental as well as physical inertia, with morals diametrically opposite those needed in an honorable profession—lying, duplicity and intrigue being as necessary to their distinctive manner of existence as marvel in an Egyptian story. Were the soldiers of the best possible quality, to be effective as a body they must be properly led; to fight is not the only thing necessary, the when, the where and the how being often of more importance. It is not necessary to specially consider here the character of the young officer who rises from the ranks, as promotion alone cannot radically change him, and the surroundings are but little if at all modified. The young civilian who may receive a commission, has no better standing than the graduate, and being inferior in the requirements of the profession, his character as an officer need not be further examined apart from that of the graduate. Elsewhere allusion is made to the fact that after the French expedition into Egypt, several French officers (among them was Colonel Sève, who afterward became the Mussulman Soliman Pacha) obtained service in the Egyptian army, and coming thus in contact with the men of the line, gave them the practical benefit of their knowledge and experience. Further than this, Mohammed Ali sent numbers of young men to Europe, most of them to France, to be educated;

who, on finishing their courses, returned home and entered the army, or other government service. Besides Colonel Sève and others especially attached to the line, a body of French officers, called the "French Mission," (General Boyer, Planat Pacha, chief of staff, and others) were also received into the service; and schools for the education of staff and line officers were established as far back as 1825, and European professors and instructors were introduced into the country. The army of Ibrahim Pacha while in Greece, and afterward when in Western Asia, had the benefit of their instructions. These schools were maintained in full glow and vigor, and with signal advantage to the army, so long as Mohammed Ali saw any prospects of gaining his independence of the Sultan, or of extending his eastern boundary. Later they were suffered to decline, and were finally closed during the reign of Abbas Pacha. However, they regained a little of their former vigor under his successor, Said Pacha; but it was not until the accession of Ismail Pacha that they, with certain modifications and improvements, were again found in full operation.

It is not pertinent to present purposes to examine the manner of conducting the schools under Mohammed Ali, nor the character and extent of their influence on the army; suffice it to say that the instruction, however limited it may have been, was for good. But more is known of the present condition, and as it is supposed to be an improvement on the former, and the essential features have been the same for several years, it is proper to say something about them. The boys educated here are generally the sons of pachas and beys in the military and civil service of the government. In their childhood these boys have no physical or social associations to develop self-reliance, nothing to inspire them, such as may be found in most other countries, and so necessary to create a military character. On the contrary, they are surrounded at an impressionable age by such very effeminate and demoralizing influences (the harem, for instance) as are not forbidden by the koran. They are without proper facilities for physical recreation and growth. Besides their love extravaganzas, the tales

they daily hear chanted in the streets are so marvelous that, instead of their ambition being inspired, hope is distanced and aspiration extinguished, the mind being simply consumed in the flame. Lying, on the part of the young, if not always extolled, is seldom corrected, and is generally encouraged or cultivated by the affected surprise of a grown person (to the child's delight) at the fables invented and related by the young.

The boys in the city first go to a ward school, where only passages from the koran are chanted. Thence they are ushered into the preparatory schools, where they remain for several years; but the instruction and treatment they receive here are not calculated to develop in them physical or moral qualities in any way superior to those brought out at the military schools, to which place they are next sent. Here they remain four or five years, the length of time depending on the service to which they are subsequently to be attached, and on their proficiency,—or, shall it be said, the converse? For the best scholars are selected from the graduating class, and then put into the staff school, where they remain a year longer, while the more idle enter the army as lieutenants and draw pay as such.

The schools and barracks are built of plastered stone or brick, erected without taste or much order, on a plain, with no tree in view—nothing whatever to relieve the eye or break the sun's burning beams, which are reflected from the white walls and the scorching sand. Recitation rooms and cadets' quarters are alike hot and uncomfortable. But little physical exercise in the way of drill and gymnastics is required of them. In fact, circumstances preclude the possibility of their obtaining anything like what is necessary to grow young boys to properly develop the physique. It is rare that one sees an army officer, who has passed through the schools, that is above the medium height. They are generally greatly inferior to the fellaah, both in breadth and height, as well as in muscle, and are not well set-up, as the saying is. There is nothing surprising in this fact, when it is remembered that one is the product of the field and the other of the impure atmosphere of the harem; nor in the further

fact that they are inferior morally to the fellah, for they are brought more in contact with civilization ; and, at that early stage, when, like the North American Indians, they imitate the most conspicuous traits—the vices rather than the virtues of others. Their intellectual activity is superior to that of the fellah, but it receives improper impulse and direction from surroundings with which the latter does not come in contact.

There were under Ismail two or three foreign professors of languages (French, German and English), and one other foreigner, the Frenchman who has charge of the artillery school. All the other professors and instructors were and are natives, without a single notion of discipline, and who, of course, impart no such ideas to the cadets. General education, a knowledge of military science and art, when these are possessed in perfection, are not the only desiderata. Military discipline is essential, especially among young officers who are to become instructors of the rank and file, to whom discipline is almost everything.

The superintendent of these schools is a native named Soliman Bey. He received a scientific education in France many years ago, and is a kind-hearted, pleasant gentleman ; but he learned no discipline while in that country. It is not uncommon to see the native professors, cadets and soldiers together in the most familiar intercourse. In any of the little, boyish peccadilloes, of which cadets will be guilty, the native professor and instructor shield them from punishment and reproof, and second them in deceiving the examiner or inspector, thus destroying instead of cultivating a sense of honor and self-respect. And what is found when they reach the army ? During the earlier years of Mohammed Ali's reign, what may be called the Pacha system, to its full extent, was in vogue. There was some companionship between pachas and beys, but inferiors in the army were treated as servants, and compelled to light the cigarettes and serve the coffee of their superiors. This system, when the officers are intelligent and of force of character, may have sufficient cohesive power to enable a commander to accomplish something,

even with bad material, against an inferior enemy; as, for instance, Ibrahim Pacha, whose officers were foreigners. But it cannot endure, as the nerves are always at full tension, and the slightest accident breaks the connection between the men and moving spirits. This system, to some extent, has reached down to our day—the pachas and beys treating subordinate officers as well as soldiers as described. In fact, one must reach the grade of colonel (bey of the first class) before he is permitted to ride in a first-class railway coach. But among the subordinate officers of the line, who are now mostly native (true Egyptians), there is, besides the described lack of discipline, a community of feeling and interest.

The brighter boys, who are mostly the sons of Turkish or Circassian pachas and beys, generally get on the Staff; therefore among so many officers as are found in an army of say 45,000 men there is a comparatively small number of these somewhat favored sons—the rest of the subordinate officers (graduates) being sons of the Egyptian who cannot boast of recent foreign blood, a few civilian appointments, and the rest from the ranks. Some of these are boys of family, who failed in their studies or conduct at school. It may be observed here that when they once go under the sheltering wing of the government for schooling, there is no escape. If there is failure in the higher branches, they are classed lower; if there is failure in any of the requirements, indeed it may be said that if one fails to please the instructor, he may be relegated into the army, even as a private soldier, and this, too, after he is an officer. Among the mass of the army there are comparatively strong sympathies, as all are in for life. The officers cook and eat with the men, and of course lax discipline prevails. In brief, the entire body of subordinate officers may be classed with the rank and file for all practical purposes upon the field. The men obey superior officers of higher grades, in all ordinary cases, just as the slave obeys. They are “eye servants,” having more contempt than respect for their immediate commanders, who are, therefore, generally obeyed with alacrity only when the soldier be-

believes that the officer is under the eye of a still higher officer, as pacha or bey. In this case the inferior is apt to enforce the order with the rod, to save himself.

What is called the Pacha system is not limited to the army, but it radiates through all branches of the government service. The following occurrence will show the influences at work around the young officer to demoralize him, destroy his *amour propre*, and his fitness to teach, discipline and command soldiers. A young lieutenant, whose pay for his full maintainance was only about nineteen dollars per month, was occupying a room for which he owed some little rent. The proprietor came around and demanded his money, as he needed it to pay his taxes. The officer stated that the government had fallen in arrears with him during the past two years some twelve or fourteen months pay; that he had not been paid for some time; that he had nothing else to depend upon; and that as soon as the government paid him any money he would hand it over to the landlord. Immediately after this conversation had taken place the house-owner reported the officer to the government, making the latter's non-payment a pretext for not meeting his taxes. The officer was at once deprived of one grade in rank. Soon after this, another officer unfortunately got into a similar difficulty over the payment of his rent. He made all proper explanation, and promised the proprietor everything, but all to no purpose. He then said to the fellow, having the occurrence just described fresh in mind, "Remain here for a few minutes and I will return with the money." A donkey-boy was standing near the door, and was called by the officer. He jumped upon the donkey and rode away, saying to the boy it was unnecessary to accompany him, as he would be back in a few minutes. He rode into a side street, sold the donkey, and returning with the proceeds gave the landlord the money due him. Presently the boy asked for his donkey, whereupon the lieutenant told him exactly what had happened, gave him what was left of the money and promised him more, to make up the value of the animal as soon as he could get any pay from the government.

The boy naturally objected to any such arrangement, and reported the officer to his military superior. The offender was called up and an explanation demanded. After telling the whole story, the officer added that he supposed from the punishment the other officer received that the government must have money, and that consequently it would be better for him to obtain the money due his landlord in the way he had done, and which was the only way he could conceive of getting it or to see himself out of the difficulty, than to be deprived of a grade. The matter was then dropped so far as the government was concerned. This was no uncommon occurrence.

Another incident will illustrate the condition of discipline. A lieutenant, for abandoning his guard, was sentenced as a punishment, to be confined for a few days. This is an Egyptian punishment, even for officers who have not yet been educated up to—have not “invented,” says Planat—that high sense of honor which would warrant the substitution of the arrest while waiting trial. Trivial as was the punishment, there was not a day, hardly an hour, during the time this punishment lasted that the officer ordering it did not receive deputations of officers and soldiers, who came to intercede for the culprit. Lieutenants, beys, pachas, nearly every native officer at the citadel below the rank of prince, each had something to say. It is possible that the fact that the officer ordering the punishment was a Christian had something to do with the exhibition, which was a feeling of opposition to the foreigner rather than sympathy for the fellow; but in either case it illustrates the idea of discipline.

CHAPTER XI.

A COMMANDER'S STAFF—HARMONIOUS ACTION NECESSARY—
IN PEACE PREPARE, ETC.—AMERICANS ORGANIZING A
GENERAL STAFF—DIVISION OF LABOR—THE PERVERSE-
NESS OF PACHAS—STAFF CADETS—PACHALIC JEALOUSY
—THE KHEDIVE'S IGNORANCE—GENERAL STONE AND
HIS HIGHNESS—THE MINISTER OF WAR—ORDERS TO
THE ARMY—THE SUEZ CANAL TROUBLE.

To aid a commander in the discharge of his duties, there is in every well organized and efficient army a body of officers called a staff, who accompany him into the field. Some of the more important duties of these staff officers, in general terms, are: To supply the army, move it, distribute the commander's orders in such a way among the several units as to preserve the harmonious relations of the parts and their unity in and on the field. They are to keep the commander well informed of the enemy's condition and movements; to learn the military nature of the country to be passed over, and its vicinity—that is to say, its facilities for supplying, moving, or resisting an army.

In this military age, the main purpose of a good army is not jeopardized by disturbing the harmonious action of its parts or the fractions of any of its minor organizations, by depriving it of any of its officers to perform these staff duties. Armies are found to be more efficient when this staff is composed of officers other than those in command of troops—officers without the care and responsibility of command, and who have been educated and trained especially for staff duties. Some of these duties during war have been mentioned above; and as the *ultima thule* of all military instruction is the campaign and battle, manifestly the A, B, C of the staff system should not only tend to this end, but should commence during the leisure of peace.

Then is the time for a staff officer to be more than a name; then it is that he should be afforded the opportunity of familiarizing himself with his war duties, in order that he may not be snatched away unprepared, as it were, from his bed, undressed, and in darkness, and deposited upon the field, there to forget his "cram" in the din of battle. Not only his duties in the abstract should be known, but his practical relations with the line should be rendered as intimate as they are to become in the campaign. The relations between the staff and line are reciprocal, each having duties toward the other. The staff officer's duties should be assimilated to what they are to be during war—his position being the same—in order that the line and staff may know each other intimately, may learn what these relations are, learn to confide in each other, and in order to develop that mutual respect which is so necessary to the well-being of both, and to the success of the common undertaking.

Although the Americans were engaged for the General Staff in most part, on their arrival in Egypt there was nothing worthy the name. A few officers were on "staff duty," but they were without employment. The very dregs of the Intendance system was all that the army could boast in the way of a staff. A few incompetent natives were serving as engineers and as surgeons; but there had been nothing deserving the appellation of staff since the days of Planat, under Mohammed Ali. Even the name itself had fallen into entire disrepute.

After the arrival of these officers the old French staff system was revived, the Abassieh military schools were reformed, especially as regards the staff, and new life infused into the military administration. Prince Hussein, a young man at that time about nineteen or twenty years of age, became Minister of War, and General Stone, his Chief of Staff. Some slight innovations were now made in this system, but it remained substantially the same. A few words about it will be sufficient. The organization of the staff, in theory, was into sections or departments, numbered from one to seven, each with a chief and assist-

ants, and with a chief at the head of all. The theory was that the headquarters of the army, and of each army corps, division and brigade, should have a sub-staff department, similarly organized to that of the War Department, the General Staff contributing officers to perform the duties; this was the theory. But the traditional military system of the country (that of the Mamelukes and Turks) was what has been called the Pacha system. The pacha or the bey was everything within himself, from commander, through all the departments of the staff, down to judge and executioner—this officer often simply changing the title of servant or slave for that he now bore. It was natural for one ignorant of the organization of modern armies, and the rules of civilized warfare, one who inherited from so many generations, the prerogatives and distinction of so many officers combined within himself, to guard them jealously, to resist every attempt to introduce a staff into the army, believing naturally that such officers would necessarily encroach upon his legitimate rights and authority. Being, as he is in time of peace, customs-collector, tax-gatherer, and such like, the pacha saw in them spies upon his military or civil administration. This spirit led to the destruction of the Mamelukes, but the system itself remained in the persons of Turks and Circassians—the subsequent French mission, which attempted radical changes under General Boyer, being soon destroyed, although supported by the dominant will of Mohammed Ali. It is not surprising then, that very soon after the arrival of the first batch of Americans, weak-kneed efforts to introduce some of them as a Staff into the army utterly failed. Not only did the pachas by their perverseness, succeed in rendering their positions an intolerable *simulacre*, but their influence and intrigues attacked every effort of reform—and there was no Mohammed Ali to say nay to them. The staff school was formed, as already related, of the choice graduates from other military schools, who were required to remain another year at school, or twelve months more than the less studious, and with no immediate or prospective compensation. It was thought expedient and just to

give them, during this additional year, the same pay as their former class-mates were drawing as sub-lieutenants in the army. But this was soon dextrously taken away from them by those who were inimical to the staff, and they are now graduated with the poor satisfaction of knowing that studious habits and exemplary conduct procured them a place in the army one year later than their less worthy class-mates. The effect of this was to lower the standard of the staff officer naturally, as it lowered that of the staff cadet, and, consequently, of all other cadets, and the officers of the army generally gradually deteriorated under its influence.

These staff cadets were pursued by this system even into the army. The intrigues of pachas, if not the influence of princes, were arrayed against them, often preventing their just promotion. They were frequently stigmatized by pachas and beys as Christians, as interlopers, and deprived of that respect, kindness and assistance which they needed so much and should have received from superiors of such rank. The prime cause of this condition of affairs is, as remarked, the Pacha system—a contention for what its representative officer conceives to be his inherited prerogatives. Another cause is the native's jealousy of the foreigner, or Giaour (an epithet which applies throughout Turkey). The higher offices of the Staff are almost exclusively held by foreigners, and necessarily so when launching a new system. But it also unfortunately compromised the young native staff officer, whose duties not only associated him with the foreigner, but who learned to go to the latter for advice when in trouble. Although this jealousy of the foreigner—not being confined to pachas and beys—was more general than the Pacha's jealousy of the Staff, it was less potent in influencing the action of a ruler, who, it was supposed, had already considered the subject when he received the Americans into his military service.

Two or three reasons may be given why the ex-Khediye suffered this abnormal condition of affairs to exist. There may have been such ignorance of an army's requirements

as to have made it imperative for him to rely almost wholly on the opinions of adventurers and unscrupulous advisers, claiming to be experts, who may by chance have been around him. Or, this sufferance on his part may simply reveal the insecurity of his position; merely discover the dangers threatening his little bark—now among the counter-currents of opinion, of Turks, Circassians and natives; tossed one moment by the fanaticism of the Ulemas; the next, apparently engulfed by the rapacity of the foreign bondholders; then rescued by popular clamor, only to drift rudderless toward the breakers of bankruptcy.

Some people believe that foreigners were in the first instance received into his service simply in furtherance of his desire for ostentation—pomp and show being as much Egyptian to-day as in the days of the prophet Ezekiel. To these people it may be answered, however, that puffed up with vanity or anxious for magnificent display, as he ever was, utility was not for a moment lost sight of; and to the pachas around his palace should be ascribed the merit of keeping him ignorant of the condition of his army, just as Napoleon III. was misled as to the condition of his army before 1871, by flatterers at his court. They were all interested in keeping up the Pacha system; it was their body and soul. Being despotic, tyrannical and oppressive there was no love for the ex-Khedive among his people. He therefore held his position by too slight a tenure to ignore the advice of the wealthy and influential pacha. It is not intended to include General Stone among these people. But in his capacity of military expert he had the same access to the Khedive that his ministers daily enjoyed. How far he ventured to advise His Highness can only be surmised. Soon after my arrival in Egypt, in casual conversation with General Stone, who had then occupied the position of Chief of Staff for some time, I alluded to the fact that the line and staff seemed to be kept apart as if they were two ferocious beasts eyeing each other, and only waiting to be let loose to begin mutual destruction, although both were under the orders and direction of the Minister of War. A little mental dex-

terity and sophistry dodged the point, the General simply answering that there was more unity in Egypt than if different heads had been issuing contradictory orders to the army, as was the case in the United States. A stranger might have supposed from the General's remark and manner that he was satisfied with things as they were; but I thought it merely a reluctant assent given to what was considered the inevitable; that he shrank from the danger of weakening his influence with the Khedive by coming counter to what he feared might be native predilection. If I understood him correctly,—and there can be no doubt of it,—it may be added that the better way to have attained the unequivocal and united support of his comrades to the idea of more intimate relations between the Staff and the Line, was not by leading them into the belief that he was satisfied with the existing order of things, for it was their duty to themselves, as well as to their chief, to support him. In general, he seemed to give a listener the impression that the Egyptian was nearly everything Mohammed could wish, needing only such instruction as General Stone alone could impart.

Prince Hussein had been named Minister of War, and the General perhaps believed that he could by well-timed advice influence the young man's military acts; but if such was his belief, he soon found out that he had counted without his host. His hopes and the interests of the general service were based upon a delusion and a snare, and the Staff has remained separate and distinct from the Line from that time to this. Prince Hussein issued all orders direct to the army, and General Stone concerned himself only with the Staff, who were generally employed in duties distinct from any immediate needs of the army, such as distant explorations, etc. At that time General Stone had so much of the confidence of the Khedive, that when M. de Lesseps, President of the Suez Canal Company, threatened to resist by armed force the reduction of the canal tariff, the Khedive, who was directed by the Sultan to seize the canal if resistance should be offered, after a certain date, to the international decree, sent Stone to the

scene of trouble, and placed the large body of troops sent thither under his orders. Indeed, the whole matter was left in the General's hands by the Khedive. This confidence was so great, that once when a mistake was made in a telegraphic message, by which a vessel in which His Highness was to embark arrived an hour late, he declared that if a similar delay occurred again he would place the telegraph lines under the control of the War Department.

Yet, as has been seen, not only were the Americans (as well as other foreigners) kept from the command of troops in the Line, but they were excluded from these also (as Staff officers), and the army lost the benefit of their knowledge and experience.

CHAPTER XII.

BARRACK AND OFFICE EXCHANGED FOR THE DESERT—
EXPLORATIONS AND SURVEYS IN CHARGE OF AMERI-
CANS—COMMAND OF TROOPS—NO SYSTEM OF COURTS—
WAR DEPARTMENT BUREAUS—MINING OPERATIONS—
SURVEY OF AN EGYPTIAN ISLAND IN THE GRECIAN
ARCHIPELAGO—CAPE, GUARDAFUI AND VICINITY—
LONG'S EXPEDITION—THE JUBA RIVER EXPEDITION.

But the labors of the Staff were even more severe for this cause—the barrack and office being exchanged for the desert. Of the whole number of Americans in the service between 1869 and 1879, but little more than one-half were on the rolls at any one time. These officers had as much as they could well do to perform the bureau duties at the War Department, and supply the Staff sections there with material for digestion, by means of the frequent explorations and surveys which an undeveloped frontier necessitates. Indeed, they were transferred from section to section, and from the War Department to the field, and *vice versa*, whenever and wherever their services were most needed. These officers were the basis of the Staff, only a very few of other nationalities being among them; and there were added to the sections from year to year graduates from the school. These, as assistants to the more experienced foreigners, made great improvement, professionally and socially. It is certainly to be hoped that the foundation has been laid for a future Staff in the army, when the circumstances become more favorable, and that the labor of these American officers, performed under the most trying and difficult circumstances and dangers, have not been for naught.

The expeditions were almost without exception in charge of American officers. To particularize all the services of

these officers would be impossible within the limits of a volume. Some will simply be named ; others of exceptional importance will receive a more extended notice. Although the officers mostly contracted for the General Staff, some were engaged more especially as engineers. But it was quite understood that an officer could, without objection, be detailed on such military duty, as the varied character of the services described hereafter will indicate.

Generals Stone and Sibley, and Colonel Jenifer, each, early in their services, had nominal command of troops for a short period—the first named officer, only for a few days. General Loring also had such command for a more considerable time, but like the other officers had only the semblance of authority. With these apparent exceptions no officer had any command of troops (as stated in the last chapter), save that which he, as an explorer, held incidentally over his small escort. Two or three of the junior officers performed, for a short time, duties as personal aides ; while two Americans, some time in the United States Navy, and subsequently in the Confederate Navy,* commanded for a while Khedivial steamers running between Alexandria and Constantinople.

As to the peculiar duties of the Staff. There was no judge-advocate's department, nor any system of courts, although there was in the line an occasional court, so-called, which in their total ignorance of military law and custom, and their lack of sympathy for justice, were quite as likely to find an accuser guilty, or the witness even, as the individual supposed to be under trial. Indeed courts are in Egypt known to be convened for conviction, and one composed of natives would show unusual temerity to disappoint the expectations of their sovereign, or other superior. A suggestion made for moot courts (for instruction) not coming from one certain quarter was so tainted in the minds of those who could have influenced a development of the idea, that it was neglected.

Nor was there any inspector's department ; and although

* Mason and Campbell.

General Loring at one time made a few inspections, there was little attention paid to his recommendations. There were no supply departments, such as quartermaster or commissary, in actual operation. The ordnance department was independent of the Staff, although one or two of the Staff were attached to it. It was presided over by Effletoun Pacha, who was one of the very best of the native officials. Several of the officers were connected with the coast and Suez canal defense, torpedo experiments, military schools, signal service, and public works. Dr. Edward Warren, chief surgeon of the Staff, by performing a surgical operation on the Minister of War for a complaint that had baffled the skill and courage of the other Cairo surgeons, and by his energy in the creation of hospitals, and his faithful discharge of other duties established a reputation which soon lifted him into place as provisional Surgeon-in-Chief of the army; although he was prevented from coming into contact with the Line.

But it was the first, second and third sections of the Staff which were in practical operation, although disconnected from the line. It was in the third section that the greater part, and the more interesting, of the Staff's labors were performed. Some of its officers did more or less duty at Cairo, working up the material sent from the field; but the larger body was engaged in geodetic and astronomical surveys, and explorations for tax, map and commercial purposes, and to open up, develop and civilize the new countries with which they came into contact. Some of the surveys in Lower Egypt were undertaken with a view to more correctly mapping the country; others were connected with wagon-roads, railroads, works of irrigation, schemes for reclaiming lands, or had the object of regulating if not increasing the taxes. The subject of artesian wells, oil, salt and agriculture was also looked after. The ancient Egyptian mines which were last worked by the Romans, and recently examined by Brugsch Bey, the Egyptologist, were again thoroughly explored by able mining engineers* in the belief that the mines were not exhausted, and in the hope

* Colonel Colston and Professor Mitchell.

that the improved modern processes of metal extraction would enable the Khedive to work them with profit. But this hope vanished by the consideration of the fact that they had been mostly worked in ancient times by prisoners and slaves, whose labor cost nothing but mere subsistence.

There were several expeditions between the Red Sea and the Nile, and into Syria, each covering many months, all of much interest and deserving description. Not having, however, the space for this, only the most important expeditions to more distant parts will be further noticed. One of these was Colonel Ward's survey of an Egyptian possession in the Grecian Archipelago, with a view to deriving some revenue from the Island of Thasos. Colonel Ward was directed in the summer of 1875 to make a survey of the island and ascertain the resources and conditions. After making a careful and thorough survey the Colonel submitted an exhaustive report, full of valuable suggestions, about the ancient silver mines and the manner of working them under the economical processes of the day; also concerning the marble quarries celebrated in ancient times; the copper mines, timber, and the products of the island—principally olives—and the condition of the harbors and manner of improving them, as well as the general condition of the people. His report, accompanied by drawings and a corrected map of the whole island, was supplemented by very interesting information as regards the antiquities of the island, the city of Thasos, and the ancient harbors where Grecian war-ships rode in safety.

A careful survey was also made, by Lieutenant-Colonel Graves, of Cape Guardafui* and its vicinity, for a lighthouse which the British consul urged upon the Khedive in the interests of commerce. The report (and maps) of this survey, made under a tropical sun in the summer, was so satisfactory as to elicit the commendation of the Khedive, who awarded Graves a decoration.

Lieutenant-Colonel Long's expeditions, which his book†

*The Port Aromata of the ancients. The Frankincense country is just inland.

†"Naked Truths About Naked People."

so excellently describes, need only a word. He and Major Campbell were received into Colonel Gordon's service at the very outset of that English officer's work in the equatorial provinces. Campbell died of fever at the very threshold of his experience, before an opportunity occurred for him to squarely measure his brave heart and substantial character with the less insidious but more glorious dangers, trials and difficulties of the African tropics. Several other Europeans and natives serving with Gordon also soon succumbed to disease. Long was one of the few who remained. Restless and ambitious, he set out from Gondokoro for the Victoria Nyanza, during the rainy season, and with little or no provision to alleviate the inevitable sufferings of such an expedition. He encountered all kinds of hardships, bravely withstood them all, and reached the lake. Here he was handsomely received and entertained in a somewhat barbaric and impressive style by King M'Tésa, who was anxious for friendly relations with the people of the Lower Nile, and desired to be put into communication with the Khedive. Long attempted to return by the Nile flowing from the lake. While descending this river he discovered a body of water which he caused to be named Lake Ibrahim, but which name Colonel Gordon, his superior, ignored and called Lake Coja. This discovery gained for Long quite a reputation among geographers and explorers. His boat, containing himself, two soldiers and two servants, was attacked by several boat-loads of spear-armed negroes belonging to one of the tribes bordering the water.* Being armed with breech-loaders, he kept the enemy off, upset their boats, and destroyed many of their number while he was floating down the stream. In this encounter Long was slightly wounded by one of his own men. For this service Long was promoted to the rank of Colonel, and decorated as soon as the wires could bear the glad tidings to him.

The Khedive afterward said : " There is a young officer who, with two soldiers, has done in a few days more for Egypt, than Sir Samuel Baker, with an army, accom-

* Kabba Regas' tribe, the same which gave General Baker so much trouble.

plished in four years, with an expenditure of two and a half million dollars."*

Colonel Long's book describes another interesting and successful expedition to the country of the Niam Niams and pigmies. But having a considerable force of armed men with him, he was now able to fight his way there, and back with his ivory, suffering but few of the personal hardships that he had experienced in his other expedition.

The Juba River expedition, in the autumn of 1875, deserves more than a passing notice. Sir Samuel Baker while in the service of the Khedive,—between 1869 and 1873,—although he discovered Lake Albert, did not succeed in reaching the Victoria Nyanza, or adding it to the territory he governed. Another expedition under command of an American was therefore fitted out, for the purpose of reaching these central lakes by way of Zanzibar. But the expedition and its objects were not kept so secret as the Khedive desired; and English diplomacy has the credit of putting an end to it before it was fairly set on foot. His Highness was, however, not to be so easily balked, although the lusty measures of Sir Samuel had temporarily destroyed a great part of the ivory trade, or diverted it from the Nile to Zanzibar. Colonel Gordon succeeded Baker as Egyptian Governor-General of the equatorial provinces. He soon informed the Khedive that he was satisfied that the Nile, with its miasma, was not the natural channel of trade with the equatorial lakes region; that the natural one was the short route from Lake Victoria to the Indian Ocean. His Highness recognized this fact when he found much of the trade suspended or diverted, and he determined to catch elsewhere some of the escaping products, and open a new route. Hence, while Colonel Gordon, with the crescent and star flying, was slowly extending his rule toward the lakes, he was directed to co-operate with an expedition to proceed inland, towards Victoria Nyanza, from the nearest point on the Indian Ocean where proper moorings could be found for the accompanying vessels.

* His Highness was not pleased that Sir Samuel had made the destruction of slavery his first object, for this involved the loss of the ivory trade.

With this expedition were McKillop Pacha (an English naval officer, who died in June, 1879), and Federigo Pacha, another foreigner, both of them of the Egyptian marine service; also Colonels Ward and Long. The first-named officer was the chief of the expedition, and Federigo commanded one of the four vessels. Colonel Ward's duty—which was accomplished—was to make a survey of the harbors along a part of the coast in order to determine the point of departure of the inland expedition. Colonel Long, who had already quite a reputation as an explorer gained from his accounts of his exploits in Central Africa, was selected as the immediate commander of the troops and of the inland expedition. This consisted of about 700 soldiers and their wives, with food, seed, agricultural implements, ammunition—indeed, every preparation was made for the establishment of permanent settlements about every thirty miles along the prospective route from the coast to the lake. The mouth of Juba river was selected as the point of departure; but the anchorage being poor, the expedition was obliged to run several miles farther south, to Port Durnford and the harbor of Kismayo, thus encroaching on the territorial rights or claims of the Sultan of Zanzibar. In fact, his flag, which was found flying, was pulled down and the Khedivial banner was run up in its place. This alone would perhaps have been sufficient to destroy the expedition, as the Sultan was known to be intimately associated with the British ministry through slavery treaties. This was not all. The Banyans (British subjects) at Zanzibar became alarmed for their equatorial trade. Were this expedition to open a route less than 300 miles long, from the ocean to the lake, the destruction of their trade through Zanzibar would unquestionably follow. The people of Aden—which country depends on the Somalis for nearly all its supplies—were as little pleased, as they had treaties for the continuance of this trade with the Somalis, who were practically independent until Egypt assumed sway over them and began to levy heavy duties at some of the Somali ports. Such representations were, therefore, made to the British Government, through

the Anti-Slavery Society, as caused the ministry to send friendly remonstrances to the Khedive against the expedition. These he listened to ; and it was recalled after marching inland and securing a hold on the country.

This may have been fortunate in one sense, for Gordon Pacha, who was to march down from the lakes toward the coast until he should meet the other expedition—establishing like it, posts en route—was not prepared, in men or means, to undertake this co-operation. The result of England's interference with the Khedive's plans was that all the Somali ports, excepting Zeilah, were declared free by the Khedive, whose territorial rights were in turn acknowledged by the British Cabinet to about the 10th degree of north latitude, but no farther south. This should have extinguished any hopes which Ismail may have had of uniting the lakes, under the star and crescent, with the Indian Ocean ; for a route by way of Harrar to these great African reservoirs, which he once contemplated,* could not be maintained alongside a short one, such as that by Juba River.

* The Italian expedition, under the Marquis Antinori, is now attempting this route.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE PROVINCE OF KORDOFAN EXPLORED BY COLSTON AND PROUT—THE EXCELLENT WORK OF AN ABLE OFFICER—TOPOGRAPHY OF THE COUNTRY—LAND OF THE ACACIAS—EFFECTS OF WAR AND DRY SEASONS—A NOMADIC PEOPLE—VEGETATION BURIED BENEATH DRIFTING SANDS—BORN ONLY TO DIE—VILLAGES—A MIXTURE OF RACES—VARIETIES OF FACE, FORM AND COLOR—BEDOUIN TRIBES—WARRIORS BY OCCUPATION—DRESS IN KORDOFAN—FASHION AND FOOD—BURIALS—NO GAIETY—NIGHT ENTERTAINMENTS—AMOROUS SONGS AND DANCING GIRLS—MARRIAGE CUSTOMS—VERY SUPERSTITIOUS—THE WATER SUPPLY—MOUNTAIN HOMES.

In the year 1874, the Emperor of Darfour was defeated in battle and slain by Egyptian allies, his son captured and imprisoned, and his country became an Egyptian province by conquest. Dr. Nachtigall, the African explorer, having about the same time returned to Cairo with much information of the inhabitants of that distant region, and glowing accounts of its mineral and other resources, the Khedive determined also upon a "scientific conquest," as General Stone expressed it, of this vast territory, as well as of the adjoining province of Kordofan. The expedition destined to explore the latter country was commanded by Colonel Colston, assisted by Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Reed, and Dr. Pfund, the celebrated naturalist, since deceased. Leaving Cairo on December 5th, traveling first on the Nile to the cataracts, and then by camel, they reached Kordofan early in June of the next year. Colonel Reed, having been so seriously attacked en route with the malarial fever as to be unable to accompany the expedition further, was returned to Cairo, and Major H. G. Prout

started at once to fill his place. He overtook the expedition in Kordofan. In the meantime Colonel Colston himself was taken sick; but he bravely bore up until Prout arrived, when he turned over the command to the Major, and returned on a litter to Cairo. He was afterward decorated for his self-sacrificing fidelity to duty, he having for some time led his command while seriously paralyzed, and borne at the head of the column on a litter.

The information derived from their report of their labors was both important and interesting. The province of Kordofan lies between the parallels 10° and 15° north latitude, and the twenty-eighth and thirty-third meridians of longitude, east from Greenwich. In physical appearance it is somewhat monotonous. It is a rolling, steppe country, marked by no abrupt or grand features, and in the unending succession of undulating plains, a hill of fifty feet high is a landmark for a day's journey. In the west, isolated peaks rise from fifty to two hundred and fifty meters above the plains, while south of the thirteenth parallel the face of the country changes from rolling steppes to flat, fertile, and thickly-wooded plains, from which rise abruptly, with no preface of outlying foot-hills, the rugged mountains of Tagalla and Dar Nouba. These steppes are from four hundred and ten to five hundred and seventy meters above the level of the sea, the greatest altitude being attained at El. Obeïd, and near the mountains in the north and south. Here one landscape is much like another. One sees around him a broad sweep of rolling plain, of a dull brown hue. Here and there are scattered thickets of small acacias, and a huge *adansonia* (*baobab*) is occasionally projected in rude lines against the sky. Villages, of weather-stained, conical straw huts gleam in the sunlight; broad, red stains mark the fields of grain (*dok'n*), which are green during the *khérif*, or rainy season; foot-paths wind in red lines from village to village, groups of men with lances on their shoulders, of women carrying water-jars, and small flocks of goats and sheep, and often herds of beeves, give a languid movement to the scene. For the last two or three weeks of the rainy season, when every-

thing is in foliage, and the plains are green, this landscape is pretty ; but its beauty is very transitory. By the middle of October it will have taken a dull, burned-up color, which remains until late in the following June, at which time the *khérif* again begins. Then the grass of the plains becomes green, the magnificent groves of acacias put on their graceful and varied foliage, the *baobabs* and *higlik* (*Balanitis Egypticus*, or Egyptian acorn) are clothed in their dark green ; the rare tamarinds are masses of tender green and pale rose-color, the corn begins to shoot, vast numbers of guinea-fowl and gazelles leave their hiding-places in the groves and forests of leafless mimosas ; and from early in July until the end of September all would be agreeable and attractive, but for the fevers which commence with the rainy season.

At the end of the dry season, in the month of May, the trees are stripped of their foliage, the weary traveler seeks in vain some shade or shelter from the scorching rays during the noon-day halt—the leafless boughs of the trees under which he may stop affording him no relief. The scanty herbage of the desert, all crisped with heat, crumbles to powder under the camel's feet. All is dreary as in a winter's blast. Here and there, where there are no fertilizing elements in the soil, are great wearisome stretches of reddish sand (*atmoors*) without leaf or blade of grass, without well or drop of dew. Where there are wells, it is only at long intervals ; they are deep, and water in them is so scarce that there can be little attempt at agriculture. The wandering population transport themselves, according to the season, with their flocks and herds, wherever water and pasture can be found—leaving the sun and shifting sand to complete their work of destruction and desolation. Ages past, a civilization bordering the upper Nile began to disappear, as if by some mysterious power, beneath the drifting sand. Now its glory is attested only by tottering temples and crumbling walls—the ruins of an Abou Simbel and Salina, Napata and Soleb.* Around them still gather, year after year, little

* Indeed the ruins which do remain are mostly those of monuments of Egyptian conquerors, dating—the first monument, nearly fifty centuries back.

grains of sand and pebbles which at no distant day will bury forever all that remains of Meroë's power and splendor. Here in Kordofan the naturalist (Dr. Pfund) learned that some of the great sand-reaches now bury a vegetation once flourishing and magnificent—the baobab (which rivals in girth the giant tree of California) and the sayal being the only remains. Around the sayal gather, from year to year, the little grains, which cling as a thing of life, thus building up a sepulchre cone, the prototype of the mound and pyramid, and which entombs alive all but the naked and withered branches that, peering through the top, tell the story of a struggle for life. The smallest plant, the senna, thus attracts the ever-moving sand. Its burial begins so soon as it is born into the light of day. Life and death with it become synonymous. Thus, too, is it with man in this region. Each returning year, between October and June, when the cloud-veil is lifted and the burning orb casts down his full beams; when mirage fails for lack of moisture, and all is parched and dry, and the sand moves in clouds; when the very hair (for wool there is not) upon the living sheep is crisped with heat, and man with his little flock is driven to a remaining nook, if one there be, the sands of death are surely gathering around the nomad's existence. His life is becoming more circumscribed from year to year—like the entombed plant, he yields no fruit, and soon will bear neither leaf nor branch, and then the light of Heaven will disappear.

The country is more or less peopled by village dwellers, while on the outskirts roam the various tribes of nomads. In the central region the villages are numerous. These villages are groups of *tokels* and *rakoubas*, seldom surrounded by a general inclosure, but each dwelling is usually inclosed by a hedge of thorns. The *tokel* is a cylindrical structure from fifteen to twenty feet in diameter, three to five feet high, and surmounted by a high conical roof, the whole composed of stalks of dok'n and herbage lashed to a frame-work. The apex of this cone is often finished by a stick run through a bottle, and happy is the family which can cap the climax of architectural decoration

by placing an ostrich egg above and below the bottle. The *rakouba* is a simple parallelogram inclosed and covered with dok'n stalks.

A very heterogeneous people live within the boundaries of Kordofan. Before its conquest by the Egyptian armies, the population was undoubtedly a mixture of races, and since that time new elements of confusion of races have been added. The conquest and occupation brought in the Turkish blood and that of the fellah of Lower Egypt, while the Bashi-Bazouks, who constantly patrol the length and breadth of the Province, have left in its villages the blood of all the races of Asia Minor. Greeks and Levantines have left their mark on the population of a country where the women are far from chaste, and the men have few scruples about continence. In the train of these people have come Abyssinian slaves, whose offspring is another element in the population. To these add the constant influx from the heathen negro tribes of the south, and it is not easy to say, with such a medley of races, who are the inhabitants of Kordofan. Here are to be seen all the variety of face and form and color which is to be found from Italy to the land of Niam Niam. There is, however, a prevailing type which is quite well marked, and this, Major Prout in his report says, is the resultant rather than the indigenous, and which is seen in the mass of the free citizens of El Obeïd. They are dark brown, with a slight reddish tinge in color, but rather slender when compared with the European types or the fellahin. The face is oval, with rather broad cheek-bones; the brow is not bad, but narrower and lower than in the European. The eyes are large and full, the nose straight, the lips fuller than is consistent with a classical type, and the mouth decidedly large and coarse. The chin is quite small. The hair is woolly, but worn long and elaborately braided by the women; while the men, having adopted the turban, shave the head. These people are often good-looking, and sometimes handsome.

The various Bedouin tribes that range on all sides of Kordofan, that constantly frequent the market of El Obeïd,

and that have in a few instances settled down to agricultural pursuits and to village life in various parts of the country, are a striking and interesting part of the population.* These Bedouins wander with their herds, changing their localities according to the varying conditions of water and pasturage and the requirements of their scanty agriculture; seldom, almost never, building permanent villages, but dwelling in camps, temporarily placed to suit their convenience. The cattle they breed are of the hump-backed variety. They are very docile, and the bulls are usually trained to the saddle, and to carry burdens. The cows yield but little milk; both sexes have developed a capacity to live with little water, and require drink only every second or third day. Besides cattle-breeding and hunting, they have another occupation, that is to say, war. They wage war without rest upon each other and upon the mountain tribes. Their first object in fighting is probably to steal cattle and slaves; yet they love fighting for its own sake. They are hunters of some skill and daring, unlike, in this respect, to the people of Tagalla, who look on the Bagarra who come into their country to hunt giraffe and elephants as too active to be respectable. From their camps the Bedouins pass, at the coming of the khérif, into the valleys south and west, and are gradually driven north again as the season advances, water becomes scarce and the flies troublesome. A Bedouin camp is composed of a group of huts, each group disposed in a form approximating the circle, with a thorn hedge around the whole. Within this circle, the nearly naked population perform their domestic affairs by day, and here the cattle and goats are herded by night. The inquisitive traveler who forgets stench in the search of knowledge, and penetrates into one of these camps, will find a picture of primitive simplicity and of perfect idleness. Groups of dark, red-brown men and women loll in the shade, with seemingly no other occupation than to do nothing, and the naked children seem neither more nor less busy than their seniors. Many of

* I am still quoting in substance from Major Prout's full and comprehensive report, made by him to the Egyptian War Department, and a synopsis of which appeared in the *New York Times* of June 9, 1878.

these Bedouins were questioned by Prout as to their origin. All asserted that their (the Bagarra) race came from Arabia. In personal appearance these people are peculiar. The face is round, the nose is straight and well-shaped, but rather thick than fine, and nearly approaching the aquiline; the lips are thicker than those of the Arabs of the eastern desert, the hair is crisp, the beard is very thin. In color they are a dark-red bronze; the North American Indians have no better claim to be called red-men. "I doubt," the Major writes, "if any civilized people except, perhaps, the best class of English would compare with them in stature or proportions. I have never seen a peasantry at all comparable with them. Their erect, athletic bodies, their sinewy limbs, and their small, shapely hands and feet would be admired, would be remarkable even, in any part of the world."

Concerning the dress of the inhabitants of Kordofan, Major Prout has furnished us with much interesting information. The better class of the men in town, and occasionally a sheik or *faki* in the village, have adopted the costume of people of a similar class in Lower Egypt, modified somewhat; that is, silk and woolen stuffs are mostly replaced by white cotton, and the turbans by white skull-caps. The great mass of the men wear only a voluminous piece of white cotton, coarse and dirty, wound around the body and over the shoulders. They often wear sandals, but rarely cover their heads. Most of the Bedouins, and a large proportion of the men of the villages, let the hair grow long, and plait it in thick braids, running back from the brow, over the crown, to the nape of the neck. Naturally, more variety is seen in the dress of the women. Children of both sexes go naked up to, perhaps, ten years of age, or are clothed only in a string of beads or cowry shells around the loins, with anklets and bracelets of the same, and a leathern talisman tied around one arm. If the little girls wear more than this, it is the *rahat*, a girdle tied around the loins, from which hang a multitude of thin leathern thongs, descending to cover the upper third of the thigh. The *rahat* seems to be the foundation of all female

dress in the Soudan. It is the essential first element, and, more or less decorated with cowry shells, is often the only garment of girls till they marry. As the girl advances to maturity she assumes the one other garment worn by female slaves, village women and the middle class of the town—that is, a piece of cotton, blue or Isabel-color, one end of which is wrapped tightly around the lower part of the person, descending below the knees, the other end being wrapped around the body, and finally thrown over the left shoulder, or at times over the head. The right shoulder, breast and arm are left exposed. How the garment was kept in its place was a mystery which Prout was unable to solve.

The little naked girls, the budding young women in *rahats*, the peasant women, the *bourgeoisie* of El Obeïd, and the vestals and matrons of high rank, all unite in scrupulously observing and perpetuating the mode of arranging the hair. In Kordofan, as in some of the more civilized parts of the world, the *demi monde* have much to do with setting the fashions, therefore a description of the dress of one of these will give an idea of the style in vogue among the fashionables of the country. To begin with the hair: This is worn quite long, and is plaited in tight little braids which hang perpendicularly around the head, and descend to the shoulders. These braids are usually cut of different lengths, thus giving the head the appearance of having been thatched in successive layers. The whole mass is saturated with grease, and, in the case of those who can afford it, powdered aromatic bark is freely sprinkled over the whole. Bits of colored cloth, cowry shells, colored beads and gilt ornaments are arranged among the braids. The dress is most remarkable. One ample piece of semi-transparent white muslin, striped with red, is wound in many folds around the body, half-hiding and half revealing the legs, body, and left arm and shoulder. The right arm, shoulder and breast are uncovered. On the feet are worn sandals, often about one inch thick. The ankles and wrists are decorated with ornaments of ivory, rhinoceros horn, or colored beads; beads and other

suc-suc are also entwined in the elaborately-greased, braided and powdered hair. Across the brow is a coronet of circular gilt ornaments, and similar ornaments hang from the ears and nostrils. It is not uncommon to see one of these women with a huge gilt ring in one nostril, and from this ring a gilt chain passing back and attached to the head-dress. This is considered "the thing," or "swell," of the most pronounced pattern. With the more respectable women of El Obeïd the white cotton garment is generally opaque and voluminous, and conceals effectually not only the whole person, but the head and face as well. The dress of the nomads and the mountain tribes is far more primitive than that just described.

The village people are by no means warlike, yet they never go abroad without arms with which to protect themselves from the Bedouins. The occupation of these people is chiefly agriculture. During the rainy season they plant, cultivate and gather a crop of *dok'n*; and in the rest of the year they eat and drink it. This operation of simple production and consumption is enough for them. The women prepare the bread by crushing the grain between two stones, after which it is mixed with water and is baked in thin wafers (*kissera*), or is boiled in a thick *purée*, with morsels of meat or various leaves. On a journey and in the fields the grain is eaten raw or simply boiled. The woman also prepares a jar of beer (*merissa*), and attends to her maternal duties. This is the daily life of a housekeeper. With the man, when he has grown and consumed a few crops of *dok'n*; when he has made a few thousand journeys to the more or less distant wells; when he has bartered in the market of El Obeïd a little *dok'n* and *merissa* against some yards of coarse cotton cloth, he has filled the measure of the average life of a Kordofanian, and is ready to die. When he is dead, his body is washed and clothed and carried out to the cemetery, escorted by a train of men chanting verses, and of women wailing, screaming, waving their hands and rending imaginary garments. The body is placed in a grave of proper depth, a little mound is raised over it, and the surface is frequently strewn with bits of

quartz. This is the disposal of the better class. The great mass of the dead are hardly buried at all. A trench of about twenty-five centimeters deep is dug, in which the body is laid, and barely covered with earth. As a consequence, it is not long before it is unearthed by hyenas, perhaps by dogs from the town.

Throughout the province what we call gaiety is not to be found in any of the villages. Even the children seem to be weighed down with the gravity of life in this strange land. *Merissa* is drunk in considerable quantities; but the people make a serious matter of it. The drinking is begun with solemnity, and finished with decorum. In short, Prout pronounces them a care-ridden people, thankful to have the nights pass in dull repose, and during the daylight hours striving languidly and sadly to keep from dying literally of want. In El Obeïd is this not especially true. There a large population of dissolute women and lazy men contrive to lead a lighter life, and there the animal spirits rise often to gaiety. This gaiety takes one stereotyped form. By day, the population of the town is mostly gathered in the market-place, where lively bartering goes on with loud wrangling and hubbub all day, and where a drunken person always induces wide-spread and boisterous mirth. This, however, is supposed to be the business of life. The amusement is in the evening. Every moon-light night the town resounds on all sides with the beating of tom-toms, the lulli-looing of the women, the shrill monotonous of female singers, and the deep gutturals of the male assistants. These are the orchestras at evening parties, the music of *soirées dansantes* in far-off Africa. A guest at one of these parties will find himself in a thorn-inclosed space, between two or three *tokels*, where the light of a little fire flickers on the foliage of the *hig-likes* above, and on the swarthy group below. He will see, squatting on mats and on bedsteads (*angarebs*), a dozen men and women of various colors, and in various degrees of nudity. Somewhere he will see some jars of *merissa*, on which the guests make frequent and prolonged attacks. In the group will be also several drums of clay, covered

with skin, and which give out no variety of tone. A few women, seated, will be chanting an amorous song, with little regard for the drum accompaniment. Before these three or four dancing-girls will be contorting themselves. These dancers are not a distinct class; any maid or matron may indulge the terpsichorean pleasure. The dance itself is without grace or variety. The dancers stand in line, and after some preliminary and remarkable wriggling, advance on the spectators, their heads thrown back as far as possible, and turning violently from side to side; their chests and abdomens protruded to the utmost that nature will permit. In this way, they advance with some regard for the time of the music, clapping their hands, swaying their heads, writhing and stepping high, letting their garments slip from their bosoms, and finally, falling on their knees before the honored and charmed spectators, where they continue to sway their heads and writhe their abdomens until they are released by a conventional phrase, which may be translated, "Hope and despair not." After this they fall back, rally, and then repeat the same performance. At times several men advance to meet this line, jumping up and down, brandishing sticks over their heads, and uttering deep guttural cries like the growling of wild beasts, in answer to the shrill lulli-looing of the women.

Some peculiar marriage customs prevail among the lower classes. The aspirant to the hand of a young woman goes to the father with a *dot* according to his wealth. If the father is satisfied, he and the young man go before a *faki*, where the contract is concluded. The friends of the bride and bridegroom then assemble, men and women together, and pass seven days and seven nights in singing, dancing and drinking; at the end of these festivities only is the marriage considered as consummated. The custom of allowing to the wife each fourth night is widely observed. It is agreed, according to this practice, that for three nights the wife shall faithfully share the bed of her husband, but each fourth night she shall be free to entertain her friends. Among the *Gowanieh* (one of the old races) is found a

still more singular practice. With them, no girl has a right to marry until she shall have presented to her brother a child as a bondsman. The father of this child she may choose when and where she will. If the girl has bad luck, and convinces her brother that she has sought faithfully in field and forest, in the village and by the wells, it is optional with the brother to permit her to marry. Such a people can hardly be said to have any morals. They are not, as a people, developed beyond the stage of brutal superstition. They have not yet come to a scale of sufficient intelligence or intellectual activity to have a faith, and, although Kordofan is a Mussulman province, there is little religious feeling any where noticeable. On the other hand, superstition is every where apparent. Almost every person, whatever the sex, age, or condition, wears talismans written by the *faki*. It is not uncommon to find a paper, with cabalistic words written by a *faki*, tied under the wings of fowls, and similar papers are worn by riding animals, and are freely distributed in the interior of the huts. A Roman Catholic mission has been established in El Obeïd some years, but Prout could not see that it had produced the slightest good. There is a school in which they gather blacks, whom they buy. These are at once given their freedom; but they remain at the mission, where they receive instruction and support. The Bagarra are evidently better Mussulmans than the village people. Generally the mountain negroes are heathens.

The water supply of Kordofan Prout found to be quite limited. The entire supply is, first the permanent, which is found in the wells and the lakes, known as El Birket, El Rahad and Sheirkeleh; and, secondly, the temporary supply of rain-water during the *khérif*. Aside from these two sources, no drop of water is to be found in all the province. There is not a lake nor a pond in all this country (always excepting the three small lakes just mentioned) which is not dry within a few weeks after the yearly rains cease, nor a running stream, nor a spring to be found even during the rains. Each well is fed entirely by the water which falls on its own area. These wells are

narrow shafts, going down twenty-five to fifty meters to or somewhat into the mica schist, which forms an impenetrable stratum. In El Obeïd, which place is ten times larger than any other town in the province, water becomes a regular article of commerce soon after the close of the rains. The consumer pays not merely for the labor of bringing the water; he pays to the owner of the well a price constantly increasing as the supply diminishes. The *baobabs* are put to good use. These trees are prepared by the people, who carefully remove the decayed and spongy fibre from the interior of the trunk, and who laboriously transfer the water to the cisterns thus made, bucketful by bucketful, from neighboring pools collected during the rain. The importance of these *adansonias* as reservoirs can be conceived when it is stated that trunks which contain fifteen thousand gallons of water are common; trunks which might store one hundred and forty cubic meters (thirty-three thousand gallons) were actually measured by Major Prout.

The Major's report also gives us some account of the regions known as Nouba, Daïer and Tagalla. Of the first he says: "Limited and ill-defined as is the area of Dar Nouba, it is still a definite name in the Soudan, particularly in Kordofan, where *Noubowi* is nearly equivalent to black slave, so many slaves has Nouba given to that province. The dwellings of the people are in the niches and on the terraces of the mountains. There they build *tokels* of *dhurra* (sorghum) stalks and herbage, quite like the *tokels* already described as common to Kordofan, but of decidedly more graceful forms. In these villages, perched on the mountain sides, reached by winding, slippery footpaths, the people of Nouba live in comparative security from the attacks of the predatory horsemen of the plains." Like the Noubans, the people of Daïer build their villages on the mountain sides at some height above the plains. To these strongholds in the rugged granite crags they can retreat after their forays in the valleys, and here they are comparatively safe from the brigand Bedouins. Gebel Wadelka, the home of the Tagalla, like the mountains

occupied by the Noubans and Daïer, are granite peaks of bare, precipitous, rugged slopes and bold sky-lines, with two striking features observed nowhere else. The first is the terracing of its slopes. From the base to the summit of the mountains are irregular horizontal terraces, having a height of from one-half meter to one meter, and an extreme width of about five meters. These terraces are supported by rude walls, and the surface is of broken stone and soil. The object of these terraces is to provide comparatively safe places for the threshing and winnowing of grain, processes which can be performed in the fields only at the constant risk of attacks from the Bagarra, and from other robbers, who constantly range the country. The other remarkable feature of this mountain is the springs of water which gush from its sides. The inhabitants of Nouba, Daïer and Tagalla are unmistakably negroes, though of a race superior, in Prout's judgment, to the Shillook and the Dinka. They are, he says, as black* as the human skin can be, with a small facial angle, large lower jaw, long, narrow brow, and long occiput. They are of low stature and slender figure, with thin legs and long heels. They are extremely ugly; the women are especially insignificant in form and hideous in face. Yet they seem uncommonly lithe and active, and are said to have powers of great endurance. These same mountains are to some extent places of refuge for outlaws and adventurers of many races.

*When a negro is so very black, he is often called *azrek*, which means blue or jet-black.

CHAPTER XIV.

PURDY AND MASON'S EXPEDITION—JOINED BY PROUT—CULTIVATION IN DARFOUR—MASSACRE'S AND REVOLTS—FEW FORESTS AND LITTLE WATER—DROUGHT AND WAR FOLLOWED BY FAMINE—THE SLAVE TRADE—OSTRICH FEATHERS, GUM AND IVORY—THE EXPENSES OF CONQUEST—ETHNICAL QUESTIONS—AN UNHEALTHFUL COUNTRY—GREAT DIVERSITY OF DIALECTS.

The expedition in charge of Colonel Purdy and Lieutenant-Colonel Mason set out from Cairo at the same time that Colston left, the two expeditions journeying together to the second cataract. The former then went west, entering Darfour on the north. The expedition remained about two years in the country, covering pretty much the whole province, with a net-work of exploring lines.

After finishing his work in Kordofan, Major Prout, with Dr. Pfund, also joined the Purdy expedition, and assisted in completing the work laid out for it. He found the physical features of Darfour quite similar to those of the province he had just quitted. There are rising steppes and isolated hills in the west of Kordofan, where it joins Darfour. In the latter province these steppes attain an altitude of three thousand feet above the level of the sea. The entire province is a high, rolling steppe country. The only region so exceptional as to require notice here is that of the Marrah mountains, which cover an area of two hundred and fifty to three hundred square miles. They rise to nearly two thousand feet above the surrounding steppes, are watered by numerous running brooks, and in their valleys are groves and villages and cultivated fields. The slopes of the mountains are often cultivated to their very summit. Wheat is grown to some extent; even the date palm is seen occasionally. Considerable stock could be pastured here,

water being found at short intervals. This is the home of the true For people,* the conquerors and rulers of the land until their recent conquest by Egypt. They also ruled Kordofan until driven out by Mohammed Ali at the conquest of that province. Many of the people in the plains have gone into these mountains since the Egyptian tax-gatherer made his appearance. This region (the Major so wrote in 1877) will sooner or later be the hot-bed of revolts. Old chiefs now occasionally get here into the fastnesses and defy the *kourbach*; although in general the people are in such subjection, for the time being, that one can travel through the mountains with a very small escort. Since the Major left the province there have been massacres and revolts.†

The rest of the province has few forests, and these are mainly thorny trees, such as acacias and the like. Excepting in a few scattered reservoirs in which rain-water is stored, and in a very few of which water is found for half the year, its only water for nine months is in deep and infrequent wells. During the three months‡ of rain, vegetation and herbage grow luxuriantly. But the season being short, the crops cultivated to any extent are such only as grow quickly—*i.e.*, during the rainy season—or such as will mature shortly after. The staple product is *dok'n* (*peniseteum typhoidum*.) This is the great breadstuff of this part of the Soudan. Considerable *dhurra* is also grown, and some cotton, tobacco, onions and a few other vegetables.

We have now seen the lights of the picture—the people

* Darfour, the country of the Fours or Fors.

† The Egyptian correspondent of the London *Times* wrote to that paper in August, 1879, as follows: "Despatches from Colonel Gordon have arrived from Darfur of so late a date as the 7th of June. Colonel Gordon himself is now on his way to Cairo, where he expects to arrive in the course of the present month. His last expedition has been to Darfur, and the state of that country seems to offer another proof that a rage for territorial aggrandizement has pushed Egypt further than her power of orderly rule could possibly extend. Brigands harassed the path of the Governor-General as he marched through the country, which had relapsed from a state of cultivation into barren desert. Colonel Gordon made certain salutary changes in the government and sent back many useless Egyptians to Khartoum; but we are not sanguine enough to expect much permanent improvement. Darfur is a constant annual drain on the Soudan exchequer, and the repetition of the policy to be applied in the Bahr Gazelle district seems the wisest course."

‡ At the equator it rains eight or nine months in the year, but as we descend the Nile to Cairo the quantity of rainfall gradually decreases.

producing barely enough for their own sustenance during the dry season. But it has also its shades and dark clouds. The land is subject to very serious droughts; and these, with wars, cause famines of greater or less extent and severity. Two seasons of drought and war preceding 1876 caused a famine of wide extent during this year. *Dok'n* was sold in the markets at a price implying starvation for great numbers of the people. They subsisted most wretchedly on roots and the leaves of the *higlik*; and when grasshoppers came some relief was found in them. As these officers journeyed through the land, frequent dreadful sights gave evidence of the widespread sufferings. "Mothers," writes Major Prout, "sold their own children for a mere trifle."

There is but little other source of wealth. The slave trade built up the few fortunes found here before the Egyptian conquest. The ostrich-feather trade has some little value; but ivory rarely goes through the Darfour markets. Indeed the government has a monopoly of this trade, and there is a gradual falling off every where. The gum trade is also quite insignificant compared with that of Kordofan. A country so limited in its products can buy little. In Prout's opinion, it is wholly unable to repay Egypt the original cost of conquest, much less the expense of military occupation, which is necessary for its complete subjugation to the Egyptian political level. Besides, says Colonel Colston, of the more promising Kordofan, so long as there are thousands of square miles of fertile soil on the upper Nile (in Egypt proper, and Upper Nubia about Dongola), which might be easily irrigated and made productive, and which remain uncultivated, it would certainly be more profitable to turn the efforts and resources of the government in that direction than to this barren region and arid climate. If this conclusion, he adds, is not very promising for the future development of that province, let it be remembered that the avoidance of unproductive expenditures is one of the best economies.*

* The same Egyptian correspondent of the *London Times* from whom I have already quoted, writes: "Much of the country, once fertile, cultivated, and prosperous, is now

It may be added, were an army's object the complete destruction or the possession of a country (irrespective of right, expediency or cost—indeed only to gratify ambitious vanity and add glory to the Khedive's reign) this could be accomplished, according to Machiavelli, either by destroying the people of the country or by mixing ethnically with them. The first of these will be the effect, if the attempt is continued, to have the people pay by taxes the expenses of conquest and occupation. However, were the ultimate object of the present military occupation of Darfour the destruction of the people there, and to introduce in their place Chinese as agriculturists, as suggested by Dr. Schweinfurth, the African traveler, the Egyptian would long since have shown that he needs no Machiavelli to suggest that this could be more readily and economically accomplished by poisoning their wells. No! The ex-Khedive had other hopes and visions. Did he have hope to regenerate them under an eternal military rule, it were all in vain. If it was that there will be an ultimate mixing of the races, by the soldiers marrying among the natives, and that the people will eventually become as reconciled to the Pacha rule as the fellah is, it is replied that mere success is not all that should be hoped for. International morality (if there is such a thing) recognizes that a conqueror may have either one or both of two objects in going with fire and sword among a foreign independent people. One is for the ostensible ultimate good of the conquered, to ameliorate their condition; the other for the well-being of the conquering party—in a word, ostensibly (Mohammed-like) to advance civilization. But to keep them under military restraint is to crush their

a desert; homesteads have been burnt, and the inhabitants either taken as slaves or they have fled in fear to the interior. The Egyptians are almost as much feared as the slave-dealers themselves. Evidently the abandonment of the country is the right step for Egypt to take. * * * * The whole financial position of the Soudan is somewhat analogous to that of Egypt. The Budget for 1878 fixed the receipts at £550,000; £190,000 only has really been collected. There is still a hope that £188,000 more will be encashed. Even supposing this hope will be realized, there is a deficit of £170,000 on the estimate of receipts formed at the beginning of the year. While the receipts have thus fallen off, the expenditure has reached the amount of £660,000. The taxes are very light compared with those of Egypt proper; but, light as they are, they cannot be got in, and Colonel Gordon has wisely resolved on a reduction of expenses all round, by which he hopes to clear off his debts, now amounting to £300,000, in three years' time."

spirit and lower them still further in the scale of human beings. Under the most favorable circumstances, the Mohammedan is not a civilizer; the fellah is not, nor is the negro sent into that country with arms in his hands; and when there is added to these the dregs of Egyptian society—the worst criminals unexecuted in the land—who are deported there,* the native of necessity still further sinks in degradation instead of rising in the scale of humanity. The time is distant when the mixing of the people with the military force maintained there for their subjection, will have such an effect upon their subordination, love of law and order, as to warrant the disbanding and withdrawal of the troops. To maintain many thousand of these† there until such period arrives with any hope that the expense of conquest and occupation can be beaten from the soles of the For's feet (and preserve, elevate him at the same time) is worse than vain—it is imbecility and criminality exemplified. If one says that slavery is less, the reply is that it is not necessary, and is quite insane, to kill the patient to cure the disease. The Khedive should, like Tiberius, instruct his proconsuls to shear, and not flay his sheep.‡

Notwithstanding the altitude of Darfour, and its vast, dry, open steppes, the rainy season is extremely unhealthy. The one serious disease is malarial fever in its various forms. Guinea worm (*filaria medinensis*) though very common, and reducing the average health, is perhaps never directly fatal. The Arab soldiers sent by the Khedive into the country have seldom survived a third rainy season. In one battalion of about 400 men, the deaths were ten per diem in the month of September, 1876. One negro battalion lost from June to September, inclusive, no fewer than 400 men by death.

The inhabitants of the Marrah mountains, as I have already stated, are the Fors, the rulers of the soil until their subjugation in 1874. These are negroes, black, tall,

* Instead of sending missionaries and tradesmen who respect law and order.

† 30,000 in the Soudan when in comparative peace.

‡ At this writing, (December, 1879,) Darfour, by the valor of its people, has passed from under the Egyptian yoke.

with small muscular development, small heads, big jaws, but higher in the human scale than the heathen negroes farther south, or the West Coast negroes, so many of whom populated our Southern States. They are lazy, apparently cowardly, and about the only noticeable special industry, besides that of agriculture, is blacksmithing, and this the very rudest. Besides these people, there are many negroes from the southern Nile lands; red people from the Bedouin tribes in the north, and black Fellata from the west—people from the countries of the Niger. There is great diversity of dialects; but more or less Arabic is spoken everywhere. These several people do not differ in habits and industries from the true Fors, except that the nomadic Bedouins breed camels in the north and cattle in the south.

Speaking of the people of Darfour in general, Major Prout describes them as having more religious fervor than their neighbors of Kordofan,* and more intelligence. Their dress is somewhat better, and so are their village huts. But he saw no marked sign of improvement in agriculture, stock-breeding or in handicraft. After remaining nearly a year in Darfour, Major Prout was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and transferred to the provinces of the Equator, as *Wakeel*, or Deputy Governor-General, under Gordon Pacha. Here he spent some months, in the absence of Gordon, inspecting the military posts. He was then taken so alarmingly ill, that Gordon sent him out of the miasmatic country. He was soon afterward promoted to the rank of Colonel.

Lieutenant-Colonel Mason was also transferred from Darfour, promoted to the rank of Colonel, and assigned to duty in the provinces. He made the first regular survey of Lake Albert, passing around it in a steamer. His actual survey reduced the Lake's dimensions to much smaller proportions than it was supposed to possess.

* Both peoples are Mohammedans.

CHAPTER XV.

THE ABYSSINIAN—ETHNIC MOVEMENTS—DISAPPEARANCE OF ETHIOPIA'S POWER—HANDSOME-FEATURED PEOPLE—EARLY JEWISH SETTLERS—NON-NEGRO BLOOD—TITLES OF RULERS—CHRONICLES KEPT BY PRIESTS—ANCIENT PORTS OF ABYSSINIA—EGYPT'S INFLUENCE—CHRISTIANITY IN ABYSSINIA—THE ROYAL SUCCESSION—TURKISH POSSESSION OF RED SEA—PORTUGUESE COLONISTS—INFUSION OF GALLA BLOOD—FURIOUS CONTESTS A CENTURY BACK—RISE OF THEODORE—THE COUNTRY CONSOLIDATED—GREAT DIVERSITY OF CLIMATE AND SOIL—A RICH LAND—THE NEED OF PORTS—WITHOUT LITERATURE—NO FOREIGN COMMERCE—MARKET DAYS FOR TRADE—WARRIORS AND NIMRODS—GENERAL CHARACTER OF ABYSSINIA.

To clearly understand the campaign which I have more particularly undertaken to describe, it will be well first—having already examined the fellah or Egyptian—to take a cursory view of the character of the other of the two peoples involved in the contest, and of the prior relations subsisting between them.

History, monumental and written, tells of two geographical points, if not of as many distinct periods, of ancient civilization in the valley of the Nile. One Ethiopic, or Meroic, on the Upper Nile; and the other Egyptian, along the Lower Nile. If the suggestions of physical laws which have been operating for ages in the formation of this valley are to be followed, and if the teaching of tradition and of such historians as Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus are to be credited, and the teachings of even the later monumental researches, the earliest Nile civilization beyond, if not the earliest within the historic period, may be supposed to have dawned upon the Upper Nile, whose principal con-

necting link with the East was the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb. But, in process of time, there grew on the lower Nile a brilliant graft rivaling, and finally, after the lapse of centuries, wholly eclipsing, Ethiopia's power and glory—the Hyksos and other light-colored peoples, who may have crossed the Isthmus or have come by the sea at earlier and later periods, meeting on the banks of the Nile the blacks who were coming down agreeably to some impulse unknown; whereas, they who crossed the straits met them in force first, perhaps, in the mountains of Abyssinia. It is not to the purpose to speculate as to what blood pulsated in the hearts of this migrating people, whether it was Aryan, Semitic, or, more definitely, Cushite—or as to the time the first ethnic invasion may have occurred.* Whatever the truth may be as to this, it may well be that the ethnic processes, which now are and have been during historic day at work in and around Abyssinia, among peoples of all shades and color—from white to glossy black—were, during the dominancy of Ethiopia, taking place upon the Arabic side of the straits; and that it was not until Ethiopia's powers began to disappear in the brilliancy of Memphian and Thebian glory, and her limits became contracted, that the processes sought refuge (if one may so say) again upon the more hospitable shores of Africa, where they must, it is thought, in the first instance, have been precipitated by Eastern civilization. The Gallas have, perhaps, sprung from such early invasion. They are more typical than the Abyssinian, as they are not now, nor have they been for centuries, subjected, as formerly, to such abrupt ethnic processes as are yet at work along the borders of and within proper Abyssinia.

But to account for the present Abyssinian, it is sufficient to know that at an early day a light-colored people crossed

* It is an interesting fact (for those who believe with Mr. Baldwin that the Abyssinians are descendants of Cushites, who, in remote times, crossed the straits) that the Abyssinian is often called Coashtan—not Cashtam as the Orientalist, M. Joel Desvergres, had it in 1847—by the Egyptian, and sometimes by himself. The border people sometimes use Coashtan-y—just as one does, and quite as pertinently, Hiadostan-y. Kush (as in Hindu "Kush") means mountain; and Kush-tan, "mountainous country." It is difficult to trace Coashtan as a corruption of Christian, through the Arabic, Turkish, Geez, Amharic or Tigré language. The Ancient Egyptians called the people of Ethiopia "Kush."

the straits from the east and stretched themselves along the coast; and to fancy that the inhabitants found there retired to the mountain ranges which separated the people from the blacks of the Upper Nile. Instead of supposing that the occupiers of the soil were the handsome-featured people now inhabiting Abyssinia, it is more consonant with the facts to believe this people are the result of more recent ethnic processes. It is conceivable that the dominant race of men from the coast would, in the course of time, engraft their features by elective affinity upon the parent stock of the mountains, while the black color would still be maintained in the composite stock by the continued accession to their breeding force of choice maidens captured by the former in their depredating incursions among the blacks descending the Nile. It may be added that the Abyssinian mountain retreat favored such border incursions, and that they have continued through a succession of centuries down to the present day.

Would not selections of wives and concubines thus naturally made by a more refined people eliminate ultimately the more angular of the negro features? The changed climatic conditions, the new life to them of comparative ease and luxury—would not they also tend to reduce their prominence? And the torrid beams, with the preponderance of negro blood, would contribute toward a maintenance of the color. The discriminating instincts by which the prognathous jaw, and even the flat nose, are maintained in all their ugliness among some of the Central African tribes, would so guide men of superior refinement in selecting wives and concubines, that in the course of time—when more isolated, and the ethnic processes between the two races have fairly taken place—there would appear such as the existing, a more homogeneous race—the Habesh* of the Arabs—with complexion black, without gloss; hair curly, but not crisp; forehead low and somewhat retreating; and who possess the smooth, har-

* Mixed people. But the word Abyssin(-y) may be derived naturally through the grammatical processes of the Arabic language, applied to the word Seba or Saba, the earliest name we have for much of that region on both sides the straits. The mountains now called Abyssinian, Diodorus (S.) named Psabean.

monious features of ease and self-satisfaction, if not the more æsthetic of civilization and refinement. This is especially the case with the maiden, though she may be as black as night. The darker color and other lubricated negro features seen generally among the people of West and South Africa, in contrast with a less glossy black (and even lighter color), and European features of the people of further East and North Africa, indicates, unmistakably, not only the ethnic movements, but the direction of the opposing streams.

Not unlike, but even more handsome, more expressive are the features of the Abyssinian than those of the better known and more tranquil Nubian. The latter, being without mountains' shelter, have suffered more abundantly, if not so frequently, impregnation of negro blood flowing down the Nile. There is the testimony of such explorers as Livingstone that similar results have followed like ethnic processes elsewhere in Africa. Dr. Barth, writing of certain Central Africans, says: "I was struck by the symmetry and beauty of their forms and the regularity of their features; but I was still more astonished at their complexion, which was different in different individuals, it being in some a glossy black and others a light copper."

Within historic time the ethnic processes in Abyssinia have been various; but the general and more recent ones are readily traced. While the Persian, Indian, Egyptian, Greek, Roman, Arab, Portuguese, Turk, Mameluke, and a sprinkling of other foreigners have each contributed to the production of the Habesh, it is, perhaps, to the Jew—who seem to be the first within historic time to have settled in Abyssinia (during the reign of Nebuchadnezzar)—that the Habesh is indebted for the nucleus of his regeneration; that he owes most, if not the earliest, of his non-negro blood. Notwithstanding the color, form and features of the great mass of the people of Abyssinia proper, and of the border people, may point only to a mixture of distinct races, yet the relations which are said to exist between the Ethiopic (Geez) and the Semitic languages, as well as the remains of Jewish customs and religious ceremonies found

here, suggest the preponderating influence Semitic people had, in early times, in molding the modern Abyssinian.

There are still in the mountains of Samien the living remains of a large body of Jews (in blood) who have hitherto resisted Christian conversion. Their ancestors ruled Central Abyssinia from near the middle of the tenth century to about the middle of the thirteenth. Moreover, among the ruling class of kings, Rases, Dedjatches, and lesser chiefs,* are still often seen throughout Abyssinia, plainly distinguishable Jewish features, besides the lighter complexion which they have, and less frizzly and longer hair, which enables them to make more elaborate tresses than their less fortunate commoners. Indeed, if we are to credit the Abyssinian chronicles, kept by the priests in several of the churches, the people ruled by the "Queen of the South" were the ancestors of the present Habesh, Sheba being identical with southern Abyssinia. The result of this queen's visit to Solomon, whose fame for wisdom and magnificence had reached her, was a son, Menilek, from whose loins sprang a dynasty which was early converted to a disputative Christianity, was long seated at Axum, and which lasted down to King Theodore II., with no interruption to their reign, albeit, a part of Abyssinia was wrested from their rule, and governed, as already observed, for three centuries by Jews, whose living remains yet inhabit the mountainous region between Tigré and Amhara.

Abyssinia lies in the direct route of the caravans, which are believed to have traveled between India and Meroë during the early centuries, when the Delta was a morass and Osiris was making a conquering tour through Ethiopia, Arabia, and more eastern countries of Asia; and later—during the reigns of Rameses, Solomon, Sabaco, Ahasuerus, Ptolemy-Euergetes and Candace—to have traveled to

* The ruler of united Abyssinia is called King, King of Kings, Negous, or Emperor of Ethiopia. The ruler of Shoa is also commonly called King. The ruler of each of the three states—Amhara, Tigré and Godjam—is now called Ras, which is Arabic for head or chief; and some claimants have the title by courtesy. Dedjatch is the title of the ruler of the larger provinces into which each state is divided. Smaller districts and villages have inferior officers. An officer's functions, though rude, are both civil and military.

Thebes, Jupiter-Ammon, Memphis and Carthage. Until Berenice became, under Ptolemy-Philadelphus the Red Sea port for the Egypto-Indian trade, this peaceful commerce is believed to have been carried on principally, if not uninterruptedly, along the Mareb,* through Axum, the ancient capital of Abyssinia, to Arabia-Felix, passing en route through Zulla (the ancient Adulis), and perhaps Azab and other small ports (intermediate between it and the present Massowah), from which Arabia-Felix and Axum could be reached. During the flourishing period of Meroë's history this route must have been under its control; and it was not until Egypt, through her connection with the East by the Isthmus and the Mediterranean Sea, grew into a rival power, that the latter country succeeded in rendering herself quite independent of Ethiopia and in crippling the power of her rival. Then began her influence for bad on Abyssinia, and the broken reed of the Jews became a thorn in the side of the Abyssinian. This route fell, perhaps, into the hands of Rameses II.—the Sesostris of the Greeks—when he conquered Ethiopia, the Red Sea Isles and Arabia. If this commercial artery was not absolutely cut at that time in order to render Ethiopia more dependent on Egypt, its control by the latter must certainly have crippled Meroë and Abyssinia. Yet it was in the evening of her decline that the bond which for ages had united the upper and lower Nile was absolutely and permanently severed; and this by the establishment of the port of Berenice, which was connected for the purposes of commerce by a caravan route with Coptos, and perhaps other points on the Nile within the Egyptian territory.

With the evident intention of still further crippling the waning power of his Ethiopian rival of the Upper Nile, by utterly destroying his direct trade with Arabia, Persia, and India, Ptolemy-Philadelphus' successor—Ptolemy-Euergetes—seized the port of Adulis. But the cameliers and merchants connected with the trade had gathered

*It is interesting that the name of the country through which this river courses for a great part of its length—*i. e.* Serli—means in the East Indies, a place for the accommodation of travelers; also a caravansary, etc.

themselves not only along the caravan routes but about the centres of trade upon the banks of the Nile, and grew into such a formidable power that about the beginning of the Christian era, under the Ethiopian queen Candace, they were enabled, when the Romans were establishing themselves in Egypt, to possess themselves for a time of part of upper Egypt itself, and then, if not before, regained at least the port of Adulis. The ruler at Axum seems to have asserted authority over that part of the coast country lying between the route through Adulis and the Egyptian route through Berenice, which was inhabited by the Troglodytes, or, as the Abyssinians may have called them, the Bougaites. Gradually, however, the Blummeyes,—ancestors of the Ababdi and Bisharin Arabs,—the Egyptian branch of nomads engaged in the trade, who occupied country along the Berenice route, extended their power as far as Adulis, and it was felt even at Axum itself. The trade which had flourished for unknown centuries gradually dwindled away. The Sabeans (Psabeans) who were engaged in it, then gathering themselves into a body in a fertile spot upon the route, became the progenitors, perhaps, of the Shangallas. The great body of coast people between Berenice and Adulis disappeared with the trade of these two routes. But the Hexamite rulers' authority continued to be exercised along the coast toward Berenice.

Abyssinia was brought within the sphere of Christian influence as early as the latter part of the second century, when Pantœmus, the stoic philosopher, preached there. It is not known, however, that Christianity had obtained a fixed hold until the beginning of the fourth century, when Frumentius acquired a Christian influence over the sovereign and began to spread Christianity according to Athanasius. The struggle of the Arabians against Gallus, the Roman general who was trying to subdue them to the Egyptian-Roman power, weakened them so much as to enable the Hexamites (or Axumites) to obtain possession, by force of arms, of that part of the Red Sea coast occupied by the Homerites. These allies against Persia, the Emperor Constantius desired to convert, and sent the Monk Theophilus

there for this purpose. As George* at this time replaced Athanasius as Bishop of Alexandria, Frumentius was recalled to receive new (that is, Arian) instructions. Theophilus, also being an Arian, then crossed over and began work in keeping with his religious creed. Abyssinia from thenceforth was dedicated as a battle-field for Christian dogmas, Athanasian, Arian and Eutychian; and there are found to-day the remains of this early spiritual wrestling between the Greek and Latin churches, though the Abouna is a bishop sent by the Coptic patriarch of Cairo.† These dissensions under the lead of Portuguese priests culminated in many a battle-field, yet these people have ever been bound together by the influence and tenets of their church against external foes. Notwithstanding the efforts of the Samien mountain Jews, who, when reinforced by co-religionists that had fled from Arab persecution in Egypt, after the advent of Mohammedanism, ruled Abyssinia for three centuries; notwithstanding the encroachings of Pagan Gallas from the south, and in spite of the Moslems who have brought one-fourth of the human race under the banner of the prophet, and who for years surrounded Abyssinia with fire and sword, these people still retain the simple doctrines of early Christianity instilled by the disciples of St. Mark.

When Abyssinia possessed herself of the country of the Homerites, her territory on the west of the Red Sea extended far up the coast. Near the close of the sixth century, however, the Persians drove the Abyssinians out of Arabia and obtained possession of the ports on the west coast, as well as the ports on the eastern side of the sea. But they were not held long by this power, as the Arabs, inflamed by the new religion, marched against them under the banner of the Prophet, drove them out of Arabia, and flocked to the Abyssinian coast, along which they extended themselves south, establishing the empire of Adel, with Zeilah as the residence of the Emir. These people were tributary to Abyssinia for a long time, but in their rising

* Now greatly revered as a Saint in Abyssinia, as well as in England.

† As successor of St. Mark, his nominal residence is Alexandria.

power aspired to independence. Their opportunity arrived when Abyssinia was divided against itself. This was at the time when the Jews obtained possession of Axum and the province of Tigré, after destroying all the Menilek royal house, except one male infant that was carried away to Tegulet, the capital of Shoa. In this province he and his descendants ruled during the occupation by the Jews of Tigré (the capital province). The empire of Adel now became quite independent, but in the year 1255 Abyssinia was reunited under the Menilek dynasty, and war operations soon began again to reduce the Emir to vassalage. These wars were continued with varying success, but generally to the advantage of the "King of Kings," whose soldiers, at length, learned from Mamelukes the manner of manufacturing the saber, cuirass, Greek-fire, etc. In the meantime the seat of empire was removed to a more central position on the lake in Amhara, to be removed again in the seventeenth century to a still more favorable location at Gondar. But, previous to this, the Turks, who had conquered Egypt in the beginning of the sixteenth century, and possessed themselves of the Red Sea and its ports, also seized Zeilah, and introduced new arms, muskets and artillery among their co-religionists. They began to stir anew the embers of strife, and it was not long before the flames swept over Amhara and Tigré, the Moslem destroying the reigning family of the King of Ethiopia in their Amba, only the ruling member escaping. They overturned the Axum monuments and laid in ruins the churches and public edifices.

At this time the Portuguese were successful colonists in the East against the Turks. On the invitation of the Abyssinian monarch, four hundred of them, also with fire-arms and cannon, arrived amidst this scene of blood and desolation. Battles succeeded, in which the Abyssinians, with the assistance of their redoubtable allies, came off victorious, utterly destroying any aspirations of the Turk beyond that of holding the port. This he continued to do until 1875. The Portuguese remained in the country for nearly a century, but their priests kept it in

such a state of turmoil and civil war that they were finally all driven out or destroyed. Other sporadic efforts were then made by the Pope, Louis XIV., and others, to Romanize Abyssinia ; but without avail. Soon there arose a new cause for dissension. Yassouf II., about the middle of the eighteenth century, took to wife the daughter of a Galla chief, with whom came certain of the Gallas, her kinsfolk, who rose to positions of power and influence to the detriment and degradation of the native chiefs. Wars followed, and these were kept up almost uninterruptedly, as arbiters in their frequent disputes, until the time of Ras Ali, the father-in-law, and predecessor as Governor of Amhara, of Theodore II.

After this infusion of Galla blood with blood royal, the "King of Kings" at Gondar was gradually deprived of quite all the accompaniments of royalty—even of riches, dignity and influence—save the crown and name, the Ras appropriating the powers and privileges of the Emperor, such as maintaining armies,* collecting taxes and administering justice. To maintain the King in very simple state, only a small tribute was given him by a few neighboring villages near enough by to feel the influence of his name. Yet the people were proud of the blood royal and desired to retain and propagate it. But to prevent intrigues or protect the royal family from the machinations of the Jews or other religions inimical to the house of Solomon, or, in fine, in conformity, it may be, to some traditionary custom which has been found to exist in various forms from Persia to the Nile, the royal family, other than a reigning member, have from time immemorial been imprisoned upon some inaccessible natural fortress (Amba) from where were supplied thoroughbred—if a little imbecile, yet thoroughbred—monarchs. The native people, proud of the blood, were incensed when it became defiled by that of the hated Galla. They armed themselves and rushed to the standards of their chiefs, thus enabling Ras Mikael (Governor of Tigré a century back, who ruled Abyssinia during three reigns of minority and

* King John now sets a limit to the number of fire-arms which each Ras may have.

imbecility of the nominal sovereign) to maintain the furious contest until, as we are told, the streets of Gondar ran with blood, and the city became so drunk with carnage that for days hyenas feasted upon the carcasses with fearful impunity. The Ras had, as already remarked, absorbed quite all the power of the *Negous*. But the latter, simply as a recognized, though only a nominal ruler, prevented the encroaching of one Ras upon another with any hope of ultimate dominancy. Though this was a mere semblance of royalty and authority, it enabled each Ras at the same time to govern his province quite independently. Mikael was finally worsted in battle. Victory frowned for years, first upon one side and then upon the other, until the Gallas succeeded in installing one of their number as Ras of Amhara—in fact, *Negous*. Finally, Ras Ali, his descendant, rose to the governorship of Amhara; but being of Galla descent, his son-in-law, Kassa, contrived to quarrel with him, and succeeded in crowning himself as Theodore II., thus depriving the legitimate heir of the house of Solomon—whom he confined at Magdala—of his kingdom and his crown. All that remains of this house, on the male side, is personified in this released prisoner of Theodore, now an old man of seventy-seven years, by name Atza-Gourghis, who, reduced to penury, is dependent for his daily meal, at Adua, on the charity of King John. During the earlier days of Theodore's reign the country was consolidated by the fear which his rigid justice inspired. But seeming opposition to his will so aroused the devil within him that his arbitrary and merciless acts drove the people, terror stricken, into such disorganization that he was unable to inspire in them any sympathy. Indeed, he was enabled on the field of battle to oppose only six thousand men against the English expedition,—in a country where three hundred thousand can spring to arms, where almost every hill is a natural fortress and every house a miniature arsenal,—the other important chiefs, thanks to British diplomacy and the judicious expenditure of nine millions sterling, having joined his enemy.

Lying near the equator as Abyssinia does, having mountains of disintegrating rock, intervening valleys, plateaus and annual rains, one is not surprised to find great diversity of climate, soil and productions. Although the trade winds, especially the northern, seem in Abyssinia, at the sea's level, to be quite neutralized by the preponderating continental winds between Asia and Africa, producing a northern and southern monsoon, yet it is when the latter blows, between April and October, that central Abyssinia has its rainy season. The monsoon, in its course across the Indian Ocean, gathers up the daily evaporation of an equatorial sun, and forms it into great masses of heavily-laden clouds, which, when suddenly arrested in their onward flight by the Abyssinian range, burst with great flashes and terrific noises, and pour out such volumes of liquid cargo as in their descent tear down rocks, and drive before the swift-rolling torrent all loose detritus of the Abyssinian slopes into the valley below, to enrich the soil of the native agriculturist. Much of it is carried to the bosom of the Nile itself, whence it is borne far toward the sea, to form, as it has, the richest of valleys, fructifying it from year to year. In this Abyssinian country there grows luxuriantly such a great variety of cereals, fruits and vegetables, dyes and perfumes, besides cotton and flax, that the country may almost be called a paradise for the farmer, as it is known to be for the shepherd and hunter. Here, too, are found precious metals, and other minerals, including iron and coal, in such abundance that the country needs only access to civilization to raise it above the temptation of lynx-eyed despoilers. The natural ports of this country are not large, at best, but would be sufficient for her present needs were they in her possession. To be practically deprived of all of them, as she has been for so many centuries, is simply to set every man's hand against his neighbor, and divide the country against itself. A people so active, sympathetic and aspiring as the Abyssinians are known to be, need new channels for the proper development of their impressionable natures.

Great possibilities are within the reach of the Abyssinians. Did they not, when they had access to the sea, bear favorable comparison to other peoples in ancient times? Where else in this vicinity may we search for a stalwart and comparatively long-lived people—the Macrobian—but in the pure air unknown in the malarious valley of the Nile? Where else but among mountain recesses which sheltered them from forays of border tribes? In this part of Africa, only in the stimulating atmosphere of the Abyssinian Alps, would one expect to find such physical proportions as enabled the possessor to bend a four-cubit bow, and create in a people that self-confidence which nerved them to defy the conqueror of a great part of the then known world. They are still, after four and twenty centuries of turmoil within, and ruthless attack from without, the same confident and courageous people. Adjoining seas and high mountain ranges, plateaus and valleys, with diversity of soil and resources, torrents and sluggish streams, lakes and morasses, forests and barren stretches, alpine blasts and desert fumes,—these are some of the physical accidents and diversities of nature which are calculated to develop intense, if not stable, life. Combatting these various forces in agriculture and in the care of herds, in war and in the chase, there has been developed a people as courageous as the lion they often encounter, as muscular and lithe as the leopard, as sure-footed as the flocks they tend, and with wonderful powers of endurance.

The Abyssinian's objective life is almost wholly religious, and is expressed in feasts, fasts and ceremonies. Surrounded from time immemorial by, and subjected to the influence of Paganism and the religions of India and Judea, of early Christianity, Mohammedanism, Romanism, and Protestantism, it may be said that, while they, instigated by priests, fought almost continuously among themselves about the three natures of Christ, they have no settled convictions nor Calvinistic intolerances, though they may be roused to enthusiasm and led by their spiritual teachers. Any seeming intolerance belongs, therefore, to the jealous priest rather than to the individual.

They are without science and without professions. The art of surgery with them consists principally of two operations: First, to extract a rifle or pistol ball the practitioner lays a certain leaf* over the wound, which in about half an hour is removed and a tube large enough to cover the wound is fitted over it, and the missile extracted by suction. The other operation is, when a limb is so broken that there is no hope of recovering its use, or the sufferer's life is in danger, that frequently, so it is said, the extremity of the limb below the injury is beaten away between two stones. Amputation with a vengeance! Charms and incantations, and superstitions generally, take the place of medical science. But few herbs are used, the principal one being a native plant called *koosa*. This herb is taken as a cure for tape-worm, the general disease of the country, and must not be confounded with the *koosa* (squash) of Syria, used for the same purpose. Another medicine made much of is a certain root used for dysentery.

The country is without literature. They have long had the Ethiopic translation of the Bible, which, however, is used exclusively by the priesthood; also a translation of the New Testament in the Amharic language, which, by the way, is the court language of the country. Chronicles in the Geez language are kept by the priests in four or five of the principal churches, but are never seen by the people. Their music is only a few degrees above the rudest. Occasionally a strolling band of musicians is seen, roaming through the country, like troubadours, to enliven the marriage ceremony or assist in driving away an affliction with which, sometimes, a native is supposed to be possessed. The principal musical instrument, the one heard above all others, is the *aimbetta*—a huge kind of clarionet, having the range and flexibility of the trumpet. These with *nagariths*—a kind of timbrel or tabor—compose the military bands, whose slashing tones

* I am told by a priest named Duffot, who for nine years was a resident of Abyssinia, that notwithstanding great diligence on his part, he was unable to find out the character of this leaf or what virtue, if any, there is in it.

drown all an Abyssinian's thoughts other than of *mêlée* or battle, stirring his wild nature up to the very highest pitch of frenzy and daring. These bands are mounted and lead the column on the march, a *dedjatch* having twenty-four *nagariths*, and lesser chiefs twelve and six, with no fixed numbers of *aimbellas*. The command of one of these officers is often, if not generally, described by giving the number of *nagariths* instead of the number of men. After hearing one of these bands, and knowing that in the Egyptian hieroglyphics the battle was known by its din, and therein represented by an anvil, I wondered whether these instruments had been selected to imitate this din.

There is neither painting, sculpture nor architecture. There are no trades. Paez, the Catholic priest, built churches for them, and one Italian who enjoys much of King John's favor now does the same for him. He makes the doors and windows, while the people build up the walls with rubble stone. Instinctively more is known of military science than of any other, as well as of the art of war. Each soldier makes his own ammunition and spears; in fact, all his weapons, except firearms. The rifle or musket balls are cut from chloritic schist, found everywhere throughout the country, as is also iron ore. This is smelted in small kilns, and as the Abyssinians are ignorant of the proper use of flux and of the process of tempering, their scimitars are quite soft. A few of the people work in gold and silver.

There is no foreign commerce. There is some little trade with the Egyptian ports out of which the King derives a small revenue, increased somewhat by the duty on salt.* The duties on all goods are specific, not ad valorem, the gaudy silk shirt of a *Ras* paying no more custom than a cotton one. The duty on a mule-load of goods is five thalers; on a donkey-load, two; on a porter's load one thaler. But there are several places in the interior where duties are paid, five being located between Massowah and Godjam. Hence, a mule-load of goods from Massowah pays twenty-five thalers in customs by the time it reaches

* In 1877 these sums amounted to twenty-six thousand thalers.

this distant state. The King gives most of this money to the church ; but some Abyssinians believe that he has jars of thalers buried at the Amba, where his son, aged eleven years, is kept with a chief and priest. Trade in the interior is conducted on regular market-days at some of the villages, salt and cotton being the principal commodities. In some parts of Abyssinia the former is the medium of exchange.

The Abyssinians are essentially warriors and Nimrods, and in some sense, also agriculturists and shepherds, as their women and children work the fields and attend the herds and flocks. Land is held by the peasant for cultivation alone, but he can hold as much as he can pay taxes on. One-fifth of the produce goes to the king, one-tenth to the governor, and perhaps one other tenth to lesser chiefs. Besides this tax on his labor, the peasant must supply the king, the governor and the soldiers with food, such as honey, butter and meat, build houses, and do many other things for his chief. He is impulsive and fond of change ; is vain rather than proud ; and, like the North American Indian, has great yearning for display and military distinction. In contrast with the latter, who strips for battle, he adorns himself and horse with all his wealth and finery. He loves his friend, rather than hates his enemy, and is capable of gratitude and magnanimity. He is revengeful rather than cruel, and has none of that love of torture so characteristic of the American Indian. He is demonstrative rather than positive ; vivacious, and more excitable than irritable—yet irritable, turbulent, phrenziable even—but choleric rather than pugnacious, though impatient, impetuous and daring, and has the stoicism of pride and vanity. His hospitality is instinctive, though not religious and uniform like the charity of the Egyptian, who gives without ostentation—that which is given to-day being equally obtained from another to-morrow. In brief, he has a brilliant eye, indicative of fire and intelligence, an erect and proud carriage, and a passionate love of freedom, war and the chase.

CHAPTER XVI.

BORDER RELATIONS—PUSHING EGYPT'S FRONTIERS—SEIZURE OF PORTS—ABYSSINIA ENVELOPED BY MOHAMMEDANISM—MASSOWAH—THE ENGLISH EXPEDITION TO ABYSSINIA—THE KHEMIVE'S SCHEMES—THE BOGOS PROVINCE—LAZARIST SOCIETY OF FRENCH CATHOLICS—MUNZINGER'S MOVEMENT—TREACHERY OF A GOVERNOR—KING JOHN'S APPEARANCE—GENERAL KIRKHAM SENT TO QUEEN VICTORIA—THE KHEMIVE'S PURCHASE OF THE PORT OF ZEILAH—THE ENGLISH ENSIGN HAULED DOWN.

During the vice-royalty of Mohammed Ali, the Egyptian frontier was pushed by Ismail Pacha (his son) well under the Abyssinian slopes, and the former's schemes of conquest are said to have included Abyssinia itself. He gave up the idea only after formal assurance from the British Minister that his country would not suffer a wanton attack to be made on this Christian state. But in their gradual encroachments the Egyptians came into collision with Abyssinian authority from Cassala to Gallabat—formerly a great rendezvous for slave-traders, and the place where repressive measures were for a long time taken by King Theodore to regain territory of which his kingdom had been despoiled. Among the measures conceived during the reign of Said Pacha, but never put into execution, was the turning of the Blue Nile, of which more anon. Beyond the detrimental influence which Mohammed Ali and his successors have always exerted over the internal affairs of Abyssinia—(interfering with her spiritual, to say nothing of her political matters)—nothing definite occurred from this time until the reign of Ismail Pacha as Egypt's ruler. It should not be forgotten, however, that besides the Abyssinian Port of Zeilah, which the Turks seized and thereafter held till 1875, they also seized another Abyssinian port called Suakim, and not long after-

ward that of Massowah. These captures cut off Abyssinia entirely from the sea, and deprived her of the benefits of the world's commerce and civilization.

At the time Ismail (Mohammed Ali's son) was on her borders, Abyssinia was between the Turk, the Galla and the Egyptians, thus enveloping that country with that hissing monster, Mohammedanism, which has for so many centuries been spasmodically tightening its folds against this struggling country. When the Turks possessed themselves of these ports, the coast country up to Suakim (dominated over by the Bougaites) was Abyssinian territory, and governed—as is learned from the Portuguese, and from Bruce—by a Barnagash,* who was seated in the mountains at a place now called Debaroua.† The Turks, with Massowah as a base, made many efforts to reduce this part of Abyssinia to subjection. They failed, however, in all their attempts in this direction. They were more successful in procuring, with the assistance of the Mohammedan Arabs, the destruction of the Holy Land pilgrimage, annually made from the Hamaseen, past Massowah, and along the coast to Suakim. They also succeeded in diminishing greatly the trade of the port, besides weakening the power of the Bahr-negous, who from a powerful Abyssinian vassal, in the days of the Portuguese, had, in Bruce's time, become poverty-stricken. Failing to get possession of the country back of Massowah, the Turkish forces were withdrawn, and a native, as governor, appointed to rule the island, to collect customs and pay tribute. Left to his own resources to maintain himself in possession, the new governor entered into a treaty with the Abyssinian ruler, wherein it was stipulated that the Turks should remain undisturbed, provided they should pay over to that individual one-half the customs. Latterly, however, but little revenue was paid to either party, although claimed by both.

In 1866, Turkey transferred her interest in the island and

* A corruption from Bahr-negous, King of the Sea.

† Perhaps a corruption for queen, or capital city of the sea, as Adua is (perhaps) a corruption for queen, or capital city.

port of Massowah to her dependency, Egypt. When the port was received from the Turks, the Viceroy, always diplomatic, was ambitious to be recognized as a progressive ruler, and anxious that Egypt should be received into the family of civilized powers. England and France, each an eye on Egypt, could thwart or aid him in any schemes he might have in view. It is therefore not at all singular that he should under the circumstances attach himself to the fortunes of Napoleon III., and send his soldiers as allies to the French troops into Mexico, nor that his wealth and position should contribute so much to the success of the Emperor's canal project. He had already in conception great internal improvements, and was industriously paving the way for conquest.

In 1867 the British Government—first disclaiming to the Khedive and the Sultan any intention of conquest—requested that their expeditionary force might be permitted to pass through Egyptian territory into Abyssinia. The Khedive, nothing loth, did more than asked to do. The little Turkish fort at Arkiko—a few miles south of Massowah—was garrisoned by Egyptian troops, and the governor of the place claimed authority as far south as Zulla and over its surrounding country. He had stationed troops at the southern extremity of the Annesley bay. The Viceroy not only suffered Zulla to be used as the base of the English expedition, but so anxious was he to identify himself with it (like the fly on *Æsop's* wheel), and acquire what is apt in the Eastern mind to pass for prestige, that he proffered the use of his Red Sea fleet and forwarded to Massowah and elsewhere near the seat of war some three thousand soldiers just returned from Candia. The commanding officer was instructed to render every assistance possible on the request of the British General.* These acts of war were declined by the British ministry, and one Egyptian battalion was returned from Massowah. These acts were, however, not calculated to produce loving kindness on the border. Indeed, Cassala and Gallabat were

* This same number of English troops once landed on the eastern coast of Arabia to assist Egypt in the campaign against the Wahabees.

spoken of as bases of supplementary British expeditions, and it is understood would have been so employed had not the English commander determined on another plan of campaign.

The Khedive's schemes included the conquest of the provinces of the Equator and Darfour. Though his insatiable ambition made these conquests chronologically the first in order, they should have been contemplated merely as secondary and natural consequences of the full development—as he conceived it—of the whole basin of the Nile from its mouth to its source, including its Abyssinian tributaries, whose products' natural outlet he believed to be the same as that of the equatorial lakes. This notion will appear only the more singular when it is stated that these lakes are only a few hundred miles distant from the Indian sea, whereas by the route indicated they are as many thousand from the Mediterranean. Whether the Viceroy had at this time any ulterior design on Abyssinia as a whole, it is not doubted that he intended to make any of her available territory contribute to his grand project. Supplementary to the conquest and preliminary to a further extension of the canal system, a railroad was projected in the belief that it, as one of the great schemes, would not only redound to the glory of his reign, but as a feeder and a feeder would at once contribute to the nourishment of Egypt, and more rapidly develop the remote provinces. One of these railroads was in process of construction for several years, along the banks of the Nile.* An important contemplated branch to Massowah for the Indian trade, say from near Khar-toum, would pass through the Bogos district of country. This main line and branch would have effected a gain of three days over the canal route. The project originated in the hope that he would thereby regain some of the trade of which he contributed so largely to deprive his country.

The Khedive has always claimed that this Bogos prov-

* At this time of writing, after an expenditure of millions of dollars, the entire railroad project has been abandoned.

ince was wrested from Abyssinia by Mohammed Ali. Only the Egyptian border of it, however, was forcibly held, and the Abyssinians deny that they ever relinquished their rights, or acquiesced in the seizure. Border warfare was maintained until Said Pacha withdrew his troops. This he did because the Lazarist society of French Catholics had established themselves at Bogos (or Boghos) and were rapidly acquiring an influence over the people prejudicial, he claimed, to the interests of both countries. The territory remained neutral, as it were, for many years, although Egypt insisted that the Abyssinians made use of it during this time as a base for predatory warfare against her people. The next step in Egypt's designs was in no wise opposed by the harmonious relations subsisting between the French and her own rulers. The time was opportune for the Khedive to reassert Egypt's claim to this territory. The concord which existed between Napoleon and Queen Victoria enabled Munzinger* to represent at once the government of both in a consular capacity at Massowah. He, with the prestige of his consular service to these two sovereigns, was incomparably the most eligible candidate for a pachalic and the governorship of Massowah, an honor subsequently conferred on him by the Khedive.

In the summer of 1872, while the king was engaged south in war against a tribe of Wollo Gallas, Munzinger Pacha seized the occasion to occupy and fortify, with some twelve or fifteen hundred troops, Keren, the capital of Bogos, thus adding a new province to his gubernatorial possessions. About this time, Egypt got hold of another district of territory which the Turks had never succeeded in holding, called Ailet, and lying between the province of Hamaseen proper and the district of Massowah. Nieb Mohammed, one of the Arkiko Niebs, who had transferred his residence from there to Ailet, was then governor of this tributary Abyssinia district. He treacherously transferred his allegiance to Egypt in consideration of an annual money-allowance from the Khedive. Look-

* A Swiss, who had been about twenty years in the country.

ing on these acts as no more nor less than encroachments upon his territorial sovereignty, and feeling the need of aid, the king concluded to lay his case before some of the Christian powers of Europe. To one of these he naturally believed that he would not have to apply in vain, as this particular nation seemed to take much interest in him during the expedition against King Theodore.

To understand this feeling it is necessary to make a brief explanation. Kassa (meaning ransom, the real name of King John*) was placed by his father, then governor of a district in Tigré, in a monastery as *élève* monk. Soon afterward he ran away and became the chief of a band of robbers, and by his prowess rose to the grade of Dedjatch and Governor of Tigré. In this position he had just consolidated himself by the defeat of Ras Bario when the English arrived in his country. He became their fast friend, protected their rear, and helped them through his territory. The English commander, in his gratitude, left him twelve cannon, two thousand stands of arms, and much ammunition, with which to install and maintain himself in the position made vacant by the death of Theodore.

A member of the expedition, who had been through the Crimea, and with Burgovine, Ward and Gordon in China, remained with Kassa. This was John Charles Kirkham, who was given the rank of Colonel. This officer early displayed much zeal in the cause of his new sovereign; with his efforts the King was enabled to defeat Goubassie, his rival to the throne. Colonel Kirkham was sent to Europe in 1873, with letters to Her Majesty, Queen Victoria, and to other Christian sovereigns, imploring their assistance against what his master termed the Mohammedan invasion. But the interest which the British Ministry manifested in the welfare and progress of Egypt, prevented their favoring Kirkham's embassy. It resulted, therefore, in no practical good to King John. The

* He is known by all the following names: Kassa; John; Johannes; King; King of Kings; Emperor, or King, of Ethiopia; Negous and Bizbiz. To distinguish the followers of two Abyssinian chiefs in battle, the name of their chief's horse is repeated. Abba Bizbiz, chief of pillagers, is the name of King John's horse, and His Majesty is often known by it, or simply Bizbiz.

King, exasperated by the lack of diplomatic success, as well as by what he conceived to be aggression against the integrity of his territory, resolved on immediate measures. These to Egypt may, perhaps, have seemed retaliatory, but to himself and his advisers, who were made to see in a near future an attempt at his subjugation, and who looked upon these encroachments as mere preliminaries, they seemed to be the wisest and most effective of available measures for the protection of his people, and the maintenance of his rule.

Soon after Kirkham's return from his mission, His Christian Majesty, holding the long and faithful services of the Colonel a pretext for his promotion, raised him to the rank of General, and installed him as Governor of a district of country, which, though like all these provinces, without well-defined boundaries, included the seaboard from the head of Annesley Bay to Amphilla Bay, and the Shoho, Zulla and Annesley Bay and Arho country, running into the interior and joining with the district of Guinda, lying just south of Ailet. While interior Abyssinia was in a disorganized state, the Egyptian authorities had, as already observed, stationed a few men in Annesley Bay and held it; but the Abyssinians did not countenance the seizure, surrendered none of their rights, and simply awaited a fit opportunity to assert them, if necessary, by force.

One great object in joining these Sheikdoms into one province ruled over by Kirkham was to open up the port of Zulla to trade and commerce, Abyssinia being without a port of her own, and the king's subjects who went to the Egyptian port of Massowah to trade were constantly complaining that they had to endure many forms of maltreatment, such as unjust taxation and imprisonment. The Turks had already broken up the Abyssinian religious pilgrimage, but their Mohammedan successors, the Egyptians, compelled the Abyssinian priests then being educated at Jerusalem to disguise themselves, when passing through Massowah, in order to escape insult and other indignities. With a view to enlisting the enterprise and

capital of the British in opening up this port, King John gave Kirkham instructions to invite the co-operation of British and British-Indian subjects. Advised as he was that he might enlist the sympathy and aid of England, and that it would enable the Governor-General to exercise the functions of his office without molestation, and that neutral territory would thus be placed between Abyssinia and Egypt, the king gave to Kirkham—who was a British subject—the freehold possession for life of the Guinda district which adjoins his province. This was with the understanding that his headquarters as Governor should be and remain at Guinda village. About the middle of December, 1874, he ran up the British flag.

This district, as well as the others named, notwithstanding the few Egyptian soldiers on Annesley Bay, was tributary to the King, as they exercised no authority beyond their mere presence. Furthermore, in order to consolidate his power, His Majesty, during the following May, concluded a treaty of peace with Menilek, King of Shoa, who acknowledged himself tributary to the King of Kings. Peace now reigned throughout King John's dominions as well as on the border, and the main body of his troops were returned to their fields. In July, 1875, the Khedive acquired, by purchase from the Sultan, the port of Zeilah,* the base from which the Arabs and Turks had for so many centuries operated against Abyssinia—indeed, his nominal rights to all the coast country once ruled by the Emir of Adel—from about Tajourah to a point on the Indian Ocean, including the ports of Berbera and Bulbar. It was not until the Autumn of 1875 that the transfer was practically effected, although as early as August and September the king became uneasy from the constant shipment of Egyptian troops from Suez to Suakim and Massowah, and finally to Zeilah. This last-named place he could not without anxiety see pass into the hands of the same extending power that was already threatening the other flank, if not the rear, of his dominions. Kirkham also became uncomfortable in his position, and obtained the promise of French

* He pays £15,000 a year for this port.

protection for both his person and interests, England having already lost her last representative in the person of Munzinger. These fears were realized when about the middle of October, 1875, there arrived at Guinda from Massowah an Egyptian force under Colonel Arrendrup, which hauled down the English Ensign, ran up the flag of the Khedive instead, and took possession of the headquarters of Governor-General Kirkham, who had some days previously been conveniently called to Adua, the capital of Abyssinia.

CHAPTER XVII.

EXPEDITIONS FITTING OUT—RUMORS IN CAIRO—THE AUTHOR SELECTED FOR IMPORTANT SERVICE—DOUBTS AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS—A MYSTERIOUS EXPEDITION—DEPARTURE OF ARRENDRUP AND DURHOLZ—MAJOR DENNISON'S ADIEU TO FRIENDS—ARRENDRUP AND HIS PERSONAL STAFF—LETTER TO KING JOHN—PORT OF MASSOWAH—PROVINCES IN CONSTANT TURMOIL—RAS AREA AND THE KING—MARCHING ON THE ABYSSINIAN CAPITAL.

Before giving the particulars of the expedition just referred to, a few words, descriptive of the excitement under which the General Staff had for some time been laboring at Cairo, are necessary. Expeditions were fitting out in the fall of 1875, and their destination was rumored to be Abyssinia. Indeed, the palace people could be heard saying, "Things are working;" "The time is approaching;" "Zeilah has been purchased—it flanks Abyssinia completely;" and such like expressions. Premising such to be their object, the best informed among the Americans ventured to advise that no serious demonstration should be made against that country. This was advised because, first, it was believed to be impracticable for Egypt then to conquer the Abyssinians; and secondly, Abyssinia being a putative Christian power, England, if not other European countries, would in the event of such attempt be afforded a pretext to interfere in her own interest, if not in behalf of Abyssinia. But these suggestions encountered simply such blattering of the over-sanguine and unscrupulous in the service of His Highness as, that "in these enlightened days the world is acquiescing in the extension of progressive powers." It would only have opened a bungle to more sophistry, to have asked if the science of

good government had come to mean, to keep man alive while converting him into a simple tax-paying machine, and squandering upon palaces the filchings from his sweat and blood?

Prior to this time, I had been selected for an important service; I had then received a definite idea of what this duty was to be; but now the subject was involved in the most impenetrable mystery, as though the gods had retired to prophesy. One day we would get an inkling that boats were constructing; anon, the name Darfour would be dropped by some personage supposed to have access to a kitchen or harem, solving the riddle satisfactorily, until Harrar, Sobat, Blue Nile and Equator carelessly strewn like logotypes along the streets, were picked up by the anxiously interested officers, who would meet and compare notes, with but a series of conundrums—only the most inextricable confusion in their calculations for their pains. Fortunately, they were not to remain in this condition of hopeless anxiety, for a glimmering light was soon thrown upon the scene. Colonel Arrendrup and Major Durholz were discovered making purchases of high-topped boots (not an Egyptian necessity by any means), zemzemiyas, (leathern water-bottles for the desert) and other campaign necessities.

“They have orders for the equator,” said one.

“No,” replied another. “Their boxes now making are too large for porters, and will not resist the attacks of the white ant.”

“For Kordofan, then.”

“Not a bit of it; for they tell me they are to go to Suez, and that don't mean Suakim (and the Nile), as the camels there are too small to bear up for a fortnight under the weight of a pair of those huge boxes.”

“Why, don't you remember the Sultan of Zanzibar was here during the summer?”

“That is so; but Long has already gone out with sealed orders, and Ward along with McKillop—where else could they be going, out of the usual route of steamers, than on some special service beyond the Straits?”

"No, no ; you are all wrong. I'll clear up this matter for you," said an officer just returned from a visit to General Stone. "I have learned from the General of the recent purchase by the Khedive of Turkey's interest in the port of Zeilah and the adjoining coast country. Has not this mysterious expedition some connection with that purchase?"

"Yes, it looks like it. And Durholz, who claims he does not know positively where he is going, says that after looking over the barrack drawings made by the Staff, he had dreamed of Berbera, and his chief tauntingly held him in this delusion."

A day or so later the news went round that Arrendrup and Durholz were gone. Major Ruchdy followed them. Then Major Dennison received orders, unexpectedly at night, to prepare to leave early the next morning. He ran, and his friends hurried from store to store ; carpenters, merchants and clerks were aroused for this and that ; he crammed his midnight purchases into hastily-constructed boxes, and bade adieu to family and friends, and was away.

Colonel Arrendrup was formerly a lieutenant in the Danish artillery, who had sought health in the mild climate of Egypt. At Cairo he came under the observation of General Stone, who, finding him an educated and highly gifted officer, induced the Khedive to take him into service with the rank of lieutenant-colonel. Notwithstanding this military position, his duties were mostly those of a civilian until he was ordered on this expedition, not, however, until he was promoted to the rank of colonel. Accompanying him as his personal staff were Major's Dennison, Ruchdy and Durholz. Count Zichy, a brother of the Austrian minister at Constantinople, was also present. He had come, he said, as a sportsman to the mountains of Abyssinia, but was somehow received in the expedition, where he asserted the authority of some unknown rank. It was subsequently rumored that he was to be appointed ruler over one of the conquered provinces. Arakel Bey, a nephew of Nubar Pacha, and sometime governor of Massowah, also graced the expedition with his affable

presence, and discharged at short range the diplomacy of the occasion. Dreams of conquest, power, and glory entered into the mind of this young, ardent and ambitious adviser, who, being stoutly seconded by the Count, found little difficulty in imposing his views on Colonel Arrendrup, and shaping, if not absolutely controlling, the expedition. Major Dennison, a graduate of West Point, was chief engineer, and made most of the reconnaissances. Major Ruchdy was born on Egyptian soil. His father was a Turk, and formerly governed the Province of Assouan. Major Durholz was a Swiss, and served for a time in the Pope's army. He was for several years private secretary to General Stone, and was commissioned to accompany the expedition.

Colonel Arrendrup sent a letter to King John on the 19th of October, 1875, in which he informed this ruler that the expedition was undertaken to restore upon the frontier that tranquility which it was said recent acts of Kassa had disturbed, and to so define and fix the boundary line as to avoid all future disputes. In order to more clearly understand the condition of affairs on the frontier, it is necessary to state that the Egyptian port of Massowah was the only port accessible to northern Abyssinia. Here the products of this country could be exchanged for the necessities of life and the simple articles of luxury of the *Banyans*. The invitation that Kirkham was directed to give for the co-operation of these merchants in the Zulla port scheme had well-nigh destroyed the open trade with the Abyssinians, particularly with the inhabitants of the Hamasseen and Okuleh-Gousai.* Both of these provinces had for years been in a state of almost constant turmoil, engendered and maintained, in the latter province, in great part by the Roman Catholics, who were watched over by the missionary, Duflet, of the Lazarist Society. In the Hamasseen this turmoil was created by rivalries for place and power among the native princes of the ruling families. Believing that their trade with Massowah was to be de-

* According to Priest Duflet, Akéle-Gousai, or children of Akéle.

stroyed, the factious spirit in these two provinces became paramount and tribute was refused.

In the Okuleh-Gousai, Ras Area, the uncle and fast friend of the reigning king, governed with but little aid from the latter. But his majesty found it necessary to occupy the Hamasseen with a considerable force to preserve the peace, and sustain in place a governor favorable to his reign. This force occupied the province at the inception of this expedition; but the body of it in the early part of October, 1875, on the arrival of the Egyptian soldiers at Massowah, retired to the interior, leaving a single detachment for observation.

Colonel Arrendrup, receiving no reply to his letter, moved his little army on to Asmara, Godofolassie and Addi-Huala,* the small detachment already referred to retiring before him, and offering little opposition. The route he took, lead direct to Adua, the capital of Abyssinia.

* *Addi* means village.

CHAPTER XVIII.

DICTATORIAL SPIRIT OF FRANCE TOWARD EGYPT—
ARMS FOR ABYSSINIANS—MORAL AND MATERIAL
SUPPORT FOR THE KING—DISAPPEARANCE OF TWO
JOURNALISTS—TO ARMS, TO ARMS!—OPPOSITION
TO INVADING ARMY—ARRENDRUP'S FORCE—A NIGHT
SKIRMISH—A CHANGE OF LINE OF OPERATIONS
—WARFARE OF BORDER PEOPLE—RELIGIOUS RE-
TALIATORY MEASURES—BOTH ARMIES IN THE FIELD—
AN EGYPTIAN GUIDE IMPRISONED—ENDEAVORING TO
ANTICIPATE THE KING—BARBAROUS CRUELTY—A WEAK
POSITION—AN ACTIVE NIGHT—ATTEMPT TO SURPRISE
THE KING IN CAMP—MUTUAL ASTONISHMENT AND A
PRECIPITATE ENGAGEMENT—NON-EFFECTIVE ARTIL-
LERY—A TERRIBLE MASSACRE—ATTACK ON ANOTHER
FORCE OF EGYPTIANS—THEIR ALMOST TOTAL DESTRU-
CTION—GREAT BRAVERY—THE ENEMY'S SUCCESS.

After the fall of Napoleon, new men came into power in France, and its fraternal policy toward the Khedive gave way to a dictatorial spirit over the affairs of Egypt, which lost none of its acrimony by the transfer of the Suez canal shares to England. In the very midst of these bickerings there arrived at Massowah, in the autumn of 1875, a quantity of arms, destined for the King of Abyssinia, as a present from the French government. The French Vice-Consul, Sarzac, with some difficulty succeeded in passing these munitions of war through Colonel Arrendrup's lines to Adua, where he arrived in no friendly spirit to the Egyptians. Besides this material support questionably given to King John, the Vice-Consul gave the King his moral support and official presence until the close of the campaign. Shortly after Sarzac had passed the lines, two Englishmen, calling themselves journalists, who had suc-

ceeded in securing Colonel Arrendrup's confidence to the extent of one hundred thalers, borrowed money, suddenly disappeared, and were traced to the enemy's lines.

About the 21st of October the King learned that the Egyptian troops had advanced to Asmara. Thereupon a call to arms was sounded in the markets through all the kingdom. On the 30th he moved out with a force of lancers, swordsmen and fusileers—infantry and cavalry,—counted by tens of thousands, to oppose the further progress of the invading army.* Meanwhile Colonel Arrendrup, with his main body, had advanced to Tzazega, near which place he was joined by a battalion of Soudan troops from Sanheet.† He now had about two thousand five hundred men, consisting of twenty-four companies of infantry, armed with Remington rifles, two six-gun batteries of mountain artillery, and six rocket-stands. The only cavalry accompanying the expedition was a dozen or so mounted soldiers, to be used as messengers. Colonel Arrendrup advanced with his main force from Tzazega to Debaroua, Addi-Magunta and Godofolassie. During this march an outpost of the enemy, located in a village near Addi-Magunta, was attacked at night by the Egyptians, but escaped being captured. Two or three Egyptian porters were wounded; the loss of the enemy is unknown.

The Asmara Mountains, steep, rugged, and more than eight thousand feet above the sea, having been found impracticable for camels, the Colonel was readily induced by Priest Dufлот and Governor Arakel Bey to shift his line of supplies from the Asmara, to what is known as the Kaya-Khor and Godofolassie route. Major Raif Effendi, with four companies of infantry and two pieces of mountain artillery, was stationed, therefore, at Kaya-Khor, where Major Durholz, with an additional force of two com-

* Right here it is well to note the fact that when the Headquarters of the English expedition arrived at Annesley Bay, "the Emperor Theodore was no longer an emperor, except in name. The only spots where he possessed authority were in his own camp and in Magdala." The priests were against him, and he could raise only a force variously estimated from three thousand to eight thousand men. These facts were obtained directly from British official reports.

† A frontier station seized and fortified by Munzinger in 1873. The place is called Keren by the Abyssinians.

panies of infantry and two rocket-stands, joined him. Having assisted Raif Effendi in fortifying the place, Durholz, in accordance with his orders, marched to the Tzana-tegli district of the Okuleh-Gousai province and established himself at Saganeit, two days' march south of Kaya-Khor. This was ostensibly to prevent the Abyssinian Governor, Ras Area, from raising troops on the Egyptian flank, although Arakel Bey was anxious to manifest some interest in the welfare of these border people who were in rebellion against the arbitrary measures of King John. Many of these people have been converted to Catholicism by the abbé DufLOT, under direction of Bishop Touvier, chief of the Lazarist Society, also at work in the province of Bogos. Impressed with the belief that there was more toleration in religious matters and more order under the rule of the Khedive than under that of King John, DufLOT was anxious that his religious protégés should come under Egyptian control. The native priests being now, as ever, intolerant, jealous, and justly fearful of Catholic influence in the country, steadily moved the King against them on the borders. This naturally brought about an endless succession of retaliatory measures, instigated on the one hand by the native priests and on the other by Catholic missionaries—measures summarized in rapine, murder and conflagration.

Colonel Arrendrup intrenched the remainder of his command at Godofolassie. Count Zichy, with six companies of blacks, two pieces of artillery and two rocket-stands, was next advanced ten hours to the village of Addi-Huala, situate on a commanding eminence overlooking the valley of the Mareb, and within ten hours' march of the King's capital. There he ascertained, for the first time, that the King's forces had already taken the field. This intelligence was at once communicated to Colonel Arrendrup, who decided to move up immediately the rest of his force to Addi-Huala. Arrived here, on the 5th of November, he found Count Zichy, with his command, three or four miles in advance of that place, down in the valley at Gundet, with two companies of blacks, under Adjutant-Major

Agler, on duty as an outpost near the Mareb. This position, commanded as it was by the neighboring heights, and favorable to ambuscades and surprises, was not liked by Major Dennison. But the Colonel seemed to think that the Count could hold his own there if anywhere, and the position was retained.

Among Colonel Arrendrup's guides was Nieb Mohammed, the man who had sold Ailet to the Khedive. This individual was, on the 6th of November, sent by the Colonel to the King either to negotiate or to gain time. Strangely enough he appeared before King John with several of the Ailet people dressed and armed as Egyptian soldiers, and asked permission to enter the service of the King, claiming that he had abandoned Egypt. The King saw through this *ruse*, and ordered him to be seized and imprisoned. Several days were passed by Arrendrup in making reconnaissances, bringing up the rear of his army from Godofolassie, and in other preparations for the impending struggle. In the meantime, King John was also advancing warily, masking his activity and enticing his enemy on.

The courteous, warm-hearted and gentlemanly commander of the Egyptian force, being inexperienced in war, was too readily persuaded to adopt audacious measures to which he may have been personally averse. Hence, it is not astonishing that he resolved to abandon the heights of Addi-Huala, descend the difficult and precipitous passage to Gundet at its foot, advance into the Seraï, and endeavor to anticipate the King, whose forces were feeling their way along the valley of the Mareb. As the King approached, the inhabitants of Gundet grew alarmed, and implored the protection of the Egyptian commander. Upon the receipt of this request, and, it is said, at the instance of Count Zichy, the Adjutant-Major on or about the 14th pushed forward a part of his force to resist or observe the advance of the enemy. Abyssinian troops were soon encountered and put to flight, several of the number being killed and wounded. One of the slain fell into the hands of the Soudanese, who mutilated the body accord-

ing to the custom in vogue between the Abyssinians and the border blacks. Upon hearing of this fact, repressive measures were immediately adopted by Arrendrup against this barbarous cruelty.

The news of the skirmish soon reached the rest of the army. Colonel Arrendrup was informed, and resolved to anticipate the impending attack. When the danger was near at hand he apparently realized the weakness of his position, fearing that Count Zichy's entire force would be cut off. Accordingly, on the 14th, one half company under Major Ruchdy was sent some four miles to the south-east of Addi-Huala, on the Mareb flank of Gundet, to protect a path leading up the mountain-side to the plateau, and Major Dennison with a similar force was sent to do a like service on the opposite flank at another pass, equally distant from Addi-Huala. Colonel Arrendrup placed himself at the head of four of the ten companies now at headquarters, and two mountain pieces, and descended the mountain to join the Count in the valley.

Meanwhile, King John's army arrived in the darkness and assembled on the left, or opposite, bank of the Mareb, where their camp-fires could be seen for miles up and down the river. All was activity during the night, as both commanders were resolved to attack on the morning of the morrow. Orders were quickly sent to Rushtan Bey, then in command at Addi-Huala, to advance at daybreak with five companies, two mountain pieces of artillery, two rocket-stands, headquarters' baggage, and all the transportation to Gundet, there to take position. Dennison and Ruchdy were also ordered to return by daybreak to Addi-Huala, where the former, as senior in rank, was to join these half companies to the company and four pieces of artillery to be left by Rushtan Bey, and there await further orders from the Colonel commanding.

Leaving one company to hold Gundet until the arrival of Rushtan Bey's command, and another, en route, to hold a mountain pass and to keep the enemy from his rear, Colonel Arrendrup, with the remaining eight companies of infantry, four pieces of artillery and two rocket-stands,

pushed on toward the ford of the Mareb, with the intention of surprising the King in his camp.

But Johannus, not less wary than his adversary, had already put a part of his army in motion, and after a march of only one or two hours, the hostile forces were mutually surprised on the banks of the Mareb, where the engagement precipitately began. Under protection of the infantry fire, Arrendrup's artillery and rocket-stands were rapidly thrown into position ; but the nature of the ground contracted the range and rendered this fire non-effective. The infantry delivered their fire, such as it was, in the open field. Failing, although partly deployed, to take advantage of the river-bank and other irregularities of the ground, they were driven into a mass by the surrounding enemy, who, outnumbering them as thousands do tens, rode upon them with shield and sword in hand, and cut them down almost to a man. No cry of quarter, no supplication to the Son or the Prophet, could stay the bloody hand. In vain, appeals were made to the conquering foe by upright or prostrate forms transfixed by lance or spear, by men with armless bodies or nearly headless trunks, their life blood pouring from every gashing wound. Nothing could stay the dreadful carnage. Doomed,—doomed, as they are taught,—mercilessly fated, was this little band. They escaped the bullet only to feel the scimiter, or resisted the club only to be lanced ; and as though this was not enough, the massacre over, mutilation held frightful sway, and the frenzied barbarians reveled in blood.

While this slaughter was going on, another column of the King's forces rushed to attack Rushtan Bey's command, which, alarmed by the sound of battle, was hastening to Arrendrup's aid. Pell-mell down the mountain-side came the excited troops and half-laden camels and mules in one promiscuous mass. The artillery, infantry and beasts of burden were scattered from Addi-Huala to Gundet. Upon this column fell a strong force of the enemy. Although partially surprised by the attack, the engagement began under more favorable circumstances for the Egyptians. The precipitous mountain in his rear enabled Rush-

tan Bey to concentrate his forces, and the rise in the ground gave him a more commanding view, as well as a better field for his artillery. Necessarily, however, he made his disposition of troops hurriedly and under the fire of the enemy, who had already gone up the right bank of the main Mareb, passed to the left around the ridge which in its length crossed diagonally the main road in front of the Bey's position, and began the attack. The Bey's artillery was put in place and into battery, also the rocket-stands, and his infantry thrown along the crest of the ridge. This position was maintained and the engagement continued uninterruptedly for some time without perceptible advantage to either side. Meanwhile, the body of the King's scattered hosts, which had hurried to the first sound of battle, ended the slaughter in front, and now came like ravenous beasts to this second sound. They swarmed up the ridge and quickly over it, coming down upon Rushtan's men in front, in flank and in rear. They closed in upon the Egyptians, surrounded them, piled them in one bloody heap—a great mass of human flesh, unrecognised and unrecognizable!

Early in the struggle the Bey had fallen, fighting bravely. Wounded first in the head, around which he bound a handkerchief, he continued to give orders and cheer his men until stricken down by a second ball. Almost with his last breath he gave the order to charge and to fight till death should check the enemy. Here also fell Arakel Bey. The spirited governor, although mortally wounded by a rifle-ball, which passed through the body, stimulated officers and men by his personal presence and brave example, until all hope had fled. Then, so the Abyssinians say, he stood upon a rock, swallowed a draught from a bottle, and ended his life with a revolver.

The accomplished Arrendrup, when surrounded, is said to have first emptied his revolver into the faces of his enemy, and then with sabre in hand defended himself to the last. There fell with him on the banks of the little Mareb about eight hundred men, and with Rushtan Bey a thousand more.* All the arms, including four rocket-stands and

* Some of Arrendrup's men, who had escaped the first battle, were killed here.

six pieces of artillery, with ammunition, baggage, seventy thousand thalers in specie, and what few persons survived the two engagements, fell into the hands of the enemy. Among the few prisoners were about thirty negroes who, it is claimed, laid down their arms on the first appearance of the enemy, and cried out, "Marekouni" (Take me prisoner), and thus saved their lives, and their bodies from mutilation. The first engagement lasted less than half an hour and the second nearly twice as long. In both battles King John lost about three hundred and fifty killed and wounded. Of the slain, nearly one-half were killed outright.

CHAPTER XIX.

DENNISON AND RUCHDY AT THE TOP OF A MOUNTAIN—
PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENSE—NEWS FROM THE BATTLE—REJOICING ENEMY—DENNISON'S SURRENDER DEMANDED—AN AMERICAN'S REPLY TO AN ABYSSINIAN KING—RETREAT OF DENNISON'S FORCE—SUFFERINGS ON THE MARCH—A FRIGHTFUL NIGHT—HOW A PANIC WAS PREVENTED—RELIEF AT LAST—DURHOLZ'S ESCAPE TO MASSOWAH—TROOPS WHO LOST THEIR WAY—THE REMAINS OF THE ARMY OUT OF DANGER—THE KING'S COUNCIL—MUNZINGER DEFEATED—ABYSSINIAN ARMY DISBANDED—HORRIBLE CONDITION OF COUNT ZICHY—THE BATTLE-FIELD—A HUMANE FRENCHMAN.

Majors Dennison and Ruchdy, with their little force on the mountain-top, at Addi-Huala, were so high up that they remained in complete ignorance of the terrible struggles going on below them. During the morning, however, a friendly Abyssinian came into camp, and informed Ruchdy that a battle was in progress, whereupon men were sent out to learn, if possible, the true state of affairs. Soon after, an Egyptian soldier, from one of the commands, came in from the front and reported their defeat. This intensified the desire for reliable information, and created such anxiety as to their situation as to stimulate the men under the orders of Majors Dennison and Ruchdy to enter at once upon preparations for their defense. The two companies were joined, and the construction of a wall, of such stone as they could pick from under their feet, was begun around their position. The enemy unconsciously stimulated the soldiers in their life-saving efforts, by appearing in force two or three times during the day in uncomfortable proximity. Soon there arrived from the front a mutilated soldier, who was speedily followed

by others. These gave the news with sufficient circumstantiality to leave no room for doubt as to the extent of the disaster, and to indicate pretty conclusively the fate that was in store for themselves. Alarmed by the terrible recital and appearance of their bleeding comrades, the troops began to show signs of utter demoralization, and it was only by the most opportune and violent measures of their commanders that they were prevented from abandoning their arms and taking to ignominious flight. They paused, listened, and finally set themselves to work (as only Egyptians can) piling rock upon rock around their position, until they saw death retire farther and farther away. During the night they were joined by the company which Colonel Arrendrup had stationed on the Gundet mountain. From their position the soldiers of this company had seen enough of the fighting to realize that the main body had been defeated, and they hastened to join Major Dennison's command.

The enemy's rejoicing next morning sounded very much like a battle. A company on the way from Kayah-Khor with supplies heard the great noise, which so frightened the cattle-drivers that they fled in utter confusion. Only one-half this company entered Addi-Huala, the other half remaining a short way back on the road, with the stores.

The news which Major Dennison personally received from the battle-fields, far from being satisfactory, caused him the greatest anxiety. He had already resolved to move out in force with a part of his little command to the brow of the precipice, and to learn positively just how matters stood, and act accordingly. So soon, then, as the last half company arrived (this increased his force to four companies) he gave orders that two of the companies and two pieces of artillery should at once prepare for this service. The Egyptian officer, through whom the order was communicated to the soldiers, soon returned and informed the Major that they refused absolutely to go. Before decisive steps could be taken with his rebellious force, Major Dennison received from King John a demand for the

surrender of himself and command. At the same time some two or three thousand of the enemy showed themselves threateningly near. The demand came in writing. The King, attributing his success to the interposition of his Heavenly Majesty, desired, he wrote, to avoid the further effusion of blood, and promised the Egyptians safe conduct to their border if they would lay down their arms. Indeed, he added, if they would surrender they might, if they chose, remain in Abyssinia. Immediately the answer was returned that the proposition could not be entertained, but that the contents of the letter would be communicated to the Egyptian commander, not then present. This reply was given to save time, and the clerk who copied the letter to the King says that he stated in it that the commander was at Assa—a day and night away.

To Dedjatch Häilo, the Governor of Hamasseen, and his troops, the King had assigned the duty of capturing or destroying this Addi-Huala force; but with the annihilation of the main body of Egyptians, and the capture of all Colonel Arrendrup's papers, King John had obtained what he believed to be evidence implicating the Governor in treason. He was seized, and—as it is for their chief, mainly, that Abyssinians fight—the Hamasseen soldiers lost their head and rested on their arms for more than four and twenty hours. About two o'clock on the afternoon of the 17th of November they were again led against the enemy, but their expected prey was nowhere to be found. The Egyptians, now that the fate of their comrades was accidentally known, themselves without hope of succor, or of benefit accruing to their cause by their destruction—certain if they remained—spiked the four cannon, which were without transport animals, buckled on their belts, seized their arms, and with two or three *boxmat* (hard bread) each, without bag or baggage, stole silently away. They passed through Godofolassie; and, then, without a road, in the mountains' darkness, stumbling—many with naked feet—amongst the cutting rock, along or off a narrow bridlepath, struggling, torn and tattered by sharp, piercing thorns, across valleys, up mountain steeps, along crags

and past precipices—they were forced by their pursuers who were close upon them.

It was a frightful night of anxiety, and the suffering and nerve tension were prolonged till far into the next day. At the commencement of this retreat it was with the greatest difficulty that the men were prevented from running frantically away like panic-stricken troops. But Majors Dennison and Ruchdy placed themselves at the head of the column, and, with revolver in hand, threatened to kill whoever should venture to pass them toward the front. Notwithstanding the exertions of these brave officers some of the men, to lighten their steps, threw away their guns and even divested themselves of trowsers and other clothing. The pursuing Abyssinians succeeded in picking up between three score and seventy stragglers before the retreating body arrived at Gura and Kaya-Khor, at which last-named place, about noon on the 18th inst., they joined Major Raif, who, with four companies, was fortified in the valley.

Major Dennison when turning over the command to Raif, his senior, advised that Major Durholz, who was still at Saganiet with two companies, be directed to join him, but he refused to do anything of the sort. Nor would Raif wait for Durholz; and only upon the urgent solicitation of Major Dennison did he send him a note, informing him of the disaster to Arrendrup's immediate command, and advising him to march to Massowah. But Major Durholz had already heard of Arrendrup's fate, and fell back on Massowah by way of Addi-Rasso, where, perhaps fearing to meet the enemy from the direction of Guinda, he turned to the right toward Arkiko, and followed the Ali-Guddy torrent-bed* in which route they could have no fear of a flank attack. Meanwhile, Raif had decided to continue the retreat. The troops set out at night, and when going through Haala plain lost their way. They were wandering among the hills when the cry of an awakened shepherd stampeded them, especially the

* Guddy means valley; *Ali-Guddy*, great valley. The Arabic for guddy is waddy, or oady, as the French term it.

new men who had been in the rear with Major Raif. These cast away their arms and clothing, and ran for dear life. Nor rocks nor thorns, acacian or cactian—nothing could have stopped them had they known where to go. But in the darkness, and consequent confusion, the officers succeeded in restoring comparative order, and finding once more their lost way. With a discordant mingling of privations, sufferings and stampedes, the retreat continued through the mountains to Addi-Rasso, and across Bamba mountain, a distance of one hundred and fifteen miles, or about thirty-two hours. Here the troops, feeling safer, slept for the first time. Thence they proceeded more leisurely to Yangoos, where they slept again, and the next morning started for Massowah, distant one hundred and sixty miles from the field of carnage. Satisfied that all danger was passed, and order in the ranks being well established, Majors Dennison and Ruchdy anticipated by some hours the arrival of the command at Arkiko and Massowah, in order to relieve anxious minds, as early as possible, by communicating to Cairo by telegraph the true state of affairs.

Having followed these men to Massowah, let us now return to the terrible battle-ground, where so many soldiers fell. On the 17th of November, King John visited the ruins of the village of Addi-Huala, which in some unaccountable manner (each nationality accused the other) had, on the preceding day, been destroyed by fire. Here His Majesty held a council with his Rases and Dedjatches, some of whom urged an advance upon Massowah. But this move was decided against by the prudent ruler, who feared to involve himself in difficulties with the several other nationalities at that place. King John learned at this time that Munzinger's invading column of Egyptian troops, which had landed at Amphilla Bay, and was marching to the interior toward the salt-plains of Arrho, had been utterly defeated by the Taltals. The news from Metemna, where, in consequence of massing Egyptian troops he feared a move, was also favorable, as Ras Addal, of Godjam, had gone with men to watch the Egyptian

movements. Favorable news was also received from Menilek, of Shoa, who, he heard, had been unsuccessfully approached with Egyptian bribes. His Majesty, therefore, proceeded at once to disband his army, leaving only enough men with the Governor of Hamasseen to observe the Asmara-Massowah road.

In the meantime, the King had caused M. Sarzac, then at Adua, to be informed of the destruction of the Arrendrup expedition, and invited him to come and take his leave. While endeavoring to comply with this request, Sarzac heard, two days from Adua, on nearing the battle-field, that Count Zichy was alive and desired to see him. M. Sarzac says he found the Count in a condition altogether too horrible and pitiable to be described. A scimiter-stroke had cleaved the face from mouth to ear, freeing the lower jaw. Four other such cuts were on the head, a rifle-ball had passed through one arm, and the body was pierced by a lance. The poor, brave fellow had not only lived to feel the pains of suppuration from these ghastly wounds, but to recognize himself in rotten and filthy tatters. After bathing his parched lips he exhibited fine spirits, and inquired anxiously, although in feeble voice, after his friends Arrendrup and Arakel Bey. The disastrous result of the fighting was still unknown to him. M. Sarzac improvised a litter, and had the Count carried to a village, where he was placed in the keeping of a Greek family. The Vice-Consul promised to return and take Zichy back to Massowah with him after he had taken his leave of the King, who had gone to Adua. M. Sarzac next went out to the battle-field in search of the body of his friend Arakel Bey, in order that he might perform upon it the last of Christian rites. Along the banks of the little Mareb he sorrowfully picked his repulsive way, among the hundreds of outstretched limbs and trunks and disfigured corpses scattered here and there, just where they had been cut down by the great swoop of death.

"Among them," says Sarzac, "there was one of manly form and Circassian blood, lying on his back with extended limbs, his face still wreathed with smiles as if he

had laughed at death. A ball had passed into his right ear." This was our friend Arrendrup, whose fall brought grief into the families of many relatives and friends, made a sorrowing widow and orphans, and extinguished fresh hopes and fond expectations. High carnival had been held on this field, human beasts vieing with jackals, wolves and hyenas in their work of mutilation. Oppressed by the shocking sight, Sarzac quit the offensive atmosphere to clear his head in the mountain air, after which he renewed the search. Near the village of Godda-Guddi he found a mass of bones, putrifying flesh and blood of the one thousand or more who had been driven and crowded by the encircling battle-storm, into one great pile of food for beasts and worms. No friendly hand was near. Hopes, fears, sufferings—all had been drowned in blood, and the work of savagery and woe was well nigh complete. He hurried away to Adua. Here he took his leave of the King and then returned to where he had left the Count. To his sorrow, he learned that his friend had been taken from the Greek's house by soldiers who claimed to act under orders from the King. The poor man died en route for Adua, of exhaustion, after forty days of suffering. His body was not cast by premeditated accident, as Sarzac supposes, over a "Tarpian" rock. Subsequently, the body was buried outside the walls of the little church near where the Count died. Of all the Egyptian army who fell upon the field of Gundet, his was the only body which received Christian burial—indeed the only one whose bones are not now bleaching along the Mareb.

CHAPTER XX.

EXCITEMENT IN CAIRO—A MUCH BEWILDERED STAFF—READING UP ON AFRICA—PICKING UP HINTS, ETC.—WILD RUMORS OF EGYPT'S SUCCESS—INFORMATION ABOUT ARRENDRUP'S DESTRUCTION—A GREAT SECRET OF STATE—FIRST NEWS OF THE DISASTER—BEATING OFFICIAL DISPATCHES—ANOTHER EXPEDITION—THE AUTHOR'S LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN PACHAS AND BEYS—A FRANK CONVERSATION WITH THE CHIEF OF STAFF—A PROFFERED HONOR DECLINED—PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGN—FOREIGN INFLUENCE AND PROGRESS—NUBAR PACHA AND OTHER LEADERS—THE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF—AN OFFICER ASSIGNED SECOND IN COMMAND—SATISFYING NATIVE CLAMOR—CREDIT FOR ORGANIZATION OF FORCE—ITS NUMBERS—AN ANXIOUS OFFICER—LORING'S BOOMERANG—TACIT CONSENT TO THE GENERAL ARRANGEMENTS—THE TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT.

No sooner had Colonel Arrendrup and his command departed than all sorts of conjectures and surmises were again rife in Cairo. The excitement grew intense when it became known that I had been in conversation with the Chief of Staff.

"Where are you going?" I was asked.

"Mohammed only knows," was the reply.

"Well, I hear White is going to do the Blue Nile. Derrick's base is to be Cassala; and Graves, Loshe, Johnson, Lamson and Porter are to go with you. Graves is now getting boats ready. Loshe is taking hurried lessons in photography. Johnson is compounding medicines; and Lamson and Porter are making their outlay."

The officers frequented each other and the hotel. Loring came up from Alexandria, so did Reynolds, his chief of staff. They had a look of anxiety and disgust. One

of them hinted loftily of trouble in Abyssinia, and expatiated fulsomely over the extraordinary selection of a lieutenant of artillery, without military experience, to command an important expedition.

Days passed away. We continued our preparations, reading up on Africa, paying particular attention to explorations under Egyptian auspices, with an eye on Gordon in the equatorial provinces, and a glance toward Purdy, Colston, Mason and Prout in Darfour and Kordofan, not forgetting Mitchell between the Red Sea and the Nile. And now we were to go—where?

Weeks passed. An alphabetical letter was dropped here, and now a word, sentences and telegrams were soon constructed, and readily followed the "news" of the advance of Arrendrup into Abyssinia and the hasty flight of the King before him. Telegram after telegram was reported, news was retailed, or was manufactured wholesale, in the cafés or at the palace; all went swimmingly and Cairo danced with joy! Envy and jealousy were aroused in real Egyptian style by the rumors of the rapid advance and brilliant success of the expedition; when lo! a Frenchman—who, during our fraternal strife in the United States, conveniently shifted his conscience between the North and South—called me to one side and in an agitated whisper asked if I knew whether there was any truth in the rumor about the destruction of Arrendrup's expeditionary force. He stated circumstantially what had happened—what had in part been once and again foretold by the wiseacres. Knowing the activity of rumors in Egypt; knowing that they outdo electric dispatches, as thought does the wind, in falsity as well as in speed, I determined to wait a couple of days without inquiry. Then, receiving a note calling me to the citadel, I confidentially heard again, and officially, in all its horror, the disastrous fate of the expedition. But it must remain a secret, said General Stone; a great secret of state until the lost ground could be recovered, and there could be published to the world at one and the same time the defeat and an overwhelming victory, lest the Khedive be ruined financially, if not politically.

"Admirable, General! But," said I, "only two days ago I was buttonholed on the street and heard in detail sufficient of this matter to indicate that it has already reached every nook and corner of the Egyptian imagination."

"Impossible! I just came from the palace," said the General, "where but a few minutes before had been received the dispatch—the first news of the disaster."

"Nevertheless, General," said I, "Madam Rumor and all her numerous family are rollicking in the streets and tearing the expedition into shreds."

"Then the matter *must*, indeed, be wrapt in mystery," he replied, "lest we may not recover from the blow."

Thus the families of officers and others engaged in the expedition, who could but hear these flying rumors, were cruelly tortured for days, in ignorance of a son's, a brother's, a father's or a husband's fate. And the rumors which caused all this pain came ahead of the official dispatches in the shape of a confidential telegram between two telegraph operators.

It was not alone to hear of the fate of Arrendrup and his force that I was called to the citadel by General Stone. It was to learn that the government had resolved to avert, if possible, calamitous political consequences in the loss of prestige, etc., upon the borders, by sending there a larger expeditionary force under an Egyptian commander, and that I had been named as his chief of staff. It is not necessary to repeat all that was said at the time of our conference; suffice it to know that I expressed my gratitude to Stone for the favor thus shown me, but did not hesitate to say frankly that, independently of that unexceptional jealousy against foreigners, and of the jealousy of the Pachas and Beys, and of the Line generally toward the Staff, which had thus far prevented the latter from attaining its proper position, I had not confidence enough in any native Pacha's ability, natural or acquired, to conduct such an expedition, to permit me to conceal my misgivings. On the contrary, so meagre was my confidence in the officer (Ratib Pacha) who, being the General-in-

Chief of the army, it was supposed would be honored with the command, that I expressed my belief it was more than hazarding a very important expedition. I felt justified in expressing myself so frankly, because of Ratib's well-known distrust and jealousy of foreigners, because of his self-sufficiency and obstinacy. These would cause him—under the influence of intriguing Arab friends and advisers—to heed any advice his chief of staff might be able to give him, only when he found himself in inextricable difficulty and in danger of immediate ruin; indeed, that I would be used simply as a scape-goat. Especially when so far away from the government, and Ratib comparatively independent, would this be the case. Such being my belief, I did not think the expedition, with such appointments, could meet the expectations of the government. It was for this reason, and this one only (need I say?) that I reluctantly declined to occupy the high position offered me. “This done, General,” I immediately added, “I feel that my duty in the premises is discharged, and I am now ready for orders.”

I suggested that there were in the service two officers of age, rank and experience; these were Stone himself, and General Loring, and added that I would serve under either of them, in any capacity which the government might designate, should either be selected to command. “General Loring,” I said, “is very anxious to go, and if he is sent out, harmony may be secured in the staff.”

Two or three days later I was sent for again, to be informed that Loring had been selected to go as the commander of the expedition, and that I was to accompany him as chief of staff. Other foreign and native staff officers were designated, and directed to prepare for the campaign. The staff supplies were procured by Major Loshe and myself during the next few days. We were kindly given *carte blanche* by the Prince Minister and Chief of Staff, and at the latter's suggestion, our larder-boxes were filled by grocers with four months' supplies, the best that money could buy or campaign appetites might fancy.

In the meantime, I was again sent for by the General and informed that the arrangements for a commander had been changed. Among Ismail Pacha's advisers and courtiers at the palace were two parties, who were always at war with each other in their endeavors, the one to supplant the other in His Highness' favor. One of these was favorable, the other inimical, to foreign influence and progress in the country. At the head of the former party was Nubar Pacha, who was at that time Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is an Armenian Christian, and is a near relation of Beghos, who was the able minister of Mohammed Ali, and is a brother of Arakel Pacha, who for many years also filled prominent places under the government and was the father of the promising young Bey killed with Colonel Arrendrup. Nubar Pacha is an able Eastern diplomat and administrator—characterized by Lord Beaconsfield as a "statesman." He has carried the ship of state over numerous shoals, always commending economy and retrenchment and condemning extravagance and folly, although he has ever been the inspiration of the ex-Khedive's progress. Simple in his tastes and habits, democratic amidst Oriental luxury and sensuality, he stands forth in noble contrast to the intriguing, dishonest pachas who have too long obstructed civilization in Eastern lands. A man of decisive character—he is often called imperious; but his measures of reform, notably the mixed tribunals, were carried by great moral power against the opposition of nearly the whole native element.

The head of the other party oscillated, at this time, between Sadik Pacha, of fellah blood—the Mefettish or Finance Minister—and Cherif Pacha, another one of the ministers. They were respectively at the head of the two branches of this party, known as the Egyptian and the Turkish; the latter also having two branches—the Turkish proper and the Circassian.* Cherif Pacha is a Circassian by descent. He has for wife a daughter of Colonel Sève (Soliman Pacha), the renegade Frenchman. By asso-

* All Egyptians, excepting the fellahin, presume to preserve a knowledge of their lineage, and commonly claim Turkish, Circassian or Arabic descent.

ciation he has acquired the seeming politeness of the Frenchman as well as the characteristic suavity and duplicity of the East. While representing, as he did at the time I write of, one of the conflicting elements in the Khedive's Cabinet, he sometimes seemed to foreigners as though inclined toward reforms; but this appearance was assumed with reluctance and used as an expedient. He was darkness itself in the light of Nubar Pacha's excellence.*

Ratib, the Generalissimo of the Egyptian Army, was a relation by marriage of and very intimate with Cherif. Besides, he represented the Circassian element in the army. When General Stone informed me that a change had taken place, it was hardly necessary for him to add that Ratib had been selected as the officer to command the expedition. I was less prepared, however, for one of those compromises, usually so fatal, of assigning an officer to the nominal position of second in command and chief of staff. When informed of this arrangement, and that General Loring had been named for this dual position, I remarked, although distrustful of the result, "The General's age, rank, and long service with this people, may possibly cause them to pay heed to his advice. At all events, General, the responsibility is not with me. If General Loring chooses to go in this capacity he will be my immediate superior, and you may rest assured that I shall support him to the end. I will try to give effect to his wishes, to his superior judgment, and to make a success of the expedition."

Although Loring was very anxious to join, and desirous as Stone was to have him join, their acquiescence, if not satisfaction, in this new arrangement must have been in the absence of appreciation of the problem; or, based upon extravagant notions of the former's persuasive temper of mind. It was generally acknowledged, among those acquainted

* During the life of Sadik Pacha the Khedive could manage the conflicting elements in his cabinet by playing the rôle of a peace-maker, while actually keeping them by the ears. But two years after, when Sadik fell, there was not a flutter of his bloody mantle; it dropped as naturally upon the shoulders of Cherif as if it had come down from above, and he now had, for a time, undisputed sway.

with the facts, that Ratib Pacha had been named to satisfy a loud native clamor. The satisfaction glowing on the face of one party was in the hope and belief that in the prospective campaign Ratib would rely on General Loring's superior judgment. But the native party, by their ill-concealed delight, indicated that their souls were bathing in unctions quite as flattering.

As a member of the General Staff, I came next in rank to Loring, and individually, with some assistance of subordinates, made all further preparations for the expedition. For the organization of the force General Stone and Prince Hussein, the Minister of War, are entitled to the whole credit. When it seemed to them complete, Ratib, Loring, Colonel Field and myself were summoned to the War Minister's citadel chamber to hear Stone's description of the force, and to make such suggestions by way of modification as might occur to us. The force was to consist of—

	MEN.	HORSES.	MULES.
INFANTRY :			
Four regiments of infantry of three battalions each, aggregating.....	9,600	68	720
CAVALRY :			
One regiment of cavalry of the guard (sabres).....	800	900
ARTILLERY :			
Two field batteries, one brass and one steel, of six pieces each, calibre about seven centimeters; two mountain batteries, and one rocket battery.....	474	54	334
ENGINEERS :			
One company of sappers and miners*.....	150	6	100
GENERAL STAFF :			
The General-in-Chief, Chief of Staff, two generals of brigade, two colonels, three lieutenant-colonels, six majors, two captains, three lieutenants, two sous-lieutenants and fourteen soldiers.....	36	30	50
Total	11,120	1,058	1,204

One of the infantry regiments was composed entirely of blacks. Besides this strength, the General thought that the remains of the Arrendrup expedition at Massowah would raise the force to nearly if not quite twelve thousand men. Only casual reference was made to a force of about one thousand two hundred men at Sanheet, which would probably be within the theatre of operations. There was little change made in this force, but an embarrassing *contretemps* occurred, which may be mentioned as an illustration of the real difficulties encountered by General Stone

*This was increased in the field to five companies.

in his position as Chief of Staff. An officer of the *État-Major* not designated to go, was very solicitous to be one of the expeditionary force. General Stone had good reasons for believing that it would not be pleasant to this officer and his family for him to be assigned to this duty; and not until after the detail had been made did the Chief of Staff know that he had any such desire. Notwithstanding numerous entreaties from various quarters Stone declined, therefore, and repeatedly, to relieve an officer already detailed—one who wished to go—and substitute this officer in his place. Moreover, he needed this particular officer for other important work. The rules of discipline warranting him in believing the matter settled, imagine General Stone's astonishment when at the close of this meeting—the Prince desiring to know if there were any further recommendations—General Loring asked His Highness if he would not detail this officer to accompany the expedition. The scene which followed need not be described. Suffice it to say, the suggestion was both a bomb and a bomb-erang. The officer was not detailed.

To fully understand this incident, it is only necessary to remember that a young prince usually is without rule or ideas of military discipline. Notwithstanding he is capricious, he does not like to refuse when the condition of his mind or stomach will suffer him to say yes. This renders it the more necessary, tempting as the contrary is, for his entourage to be circumspect—their harmonious relations among themselves depending upon their own general conduct, and not upon rule.

At this meeting, younger officers present gave tacit consent to the Chief of Staff's general arrangements, so far as they were then developed,—as to sufficiency of force, etc.,—in order to strengthen him in the eyes of the Minister of War, and the General-in-Chief; for his position was continually being assailed. Only thus could there be any hope to introduce reforms—certainly not by destroying their chief's moral power. Not desiring, therefore, even to appear as differing from General Stone, it was only after the meeting, first in his own office, and afterward at

his house, that, in reply to the query, "What do you think of the arrangements?" I said: "General, our great difficulty will be transportation."

He replied that the transportation department was not in the hands of the war ministry.

"But it properly should be," said I; "and in as absolute a government as this one is, there is no good reason why it is not."

CHAPTER XXI.

OFFICERS BEFORE THE KHEDIVE—A PLAN OF CAMPAIGN—
THE PRINCIPAL OBJECT THEREOF—NUBAR PACHA'S
CONCERN—A THEATRICAL SCENE—ORDERS TO DEPART
—HURRIED PREPARATIONS—OFF AT LAST—DINNER
IN SUEZ—FAREWELL TO FRIENDS—THE VOYAGE DOWN
THE RED SEA—MASSOWAH—ITS TRADE—SALT WATER
DRINKERS—OFFICERS OF THE GENERAL STAFF—RATIB'S
ATTEMPTED SUICIDE—HIS ELEVATION TO THE COMMAND
OF THE ARMY—THE SPHINX.

A day or two later, the Khedive was surrounded at his Abdin palace by the superior officers of the expedition, whom he had called together to receive his instructions. There were present, Prince Hussien, Nubar, Cherif, Ratib, Stone and Loring Pachas, Colonel Field and myself. Official propriety does not forbid the repeating all that is necessary to properly understand the true state of affairs. There were three of these meetings. The Khedive was absent from the second one, in consequence of the death of his brother Mustapha, who died the day before (December 3, 1875) at Constantinople. At the the third meeting the General-in-Chief was furnished with a supposititious plan of campaign, prepared, of course, by General Stone. This explained, so far as was then known, the military features of the country to be passed over, and touched all other elements entering into the calculations of an able commander. He was also supplied with instructions sufficiently definite as to the political and military objects of the expedition. These emphasized the assertions made by the Khedive and by Nubar Pacha, that the principal object was to regain, in the Soudan as well as in Europe, prestige lost in the late campaign. To accomplish this, it would be necessary to engage the King in battle. If it became necessary

to go to his capital to bring on an engagement, it would also be necessary to retire from it, the language of the instructions disclaiming any idea of subjugation. All this must be accomplished before the rainy season should set in, which is generally in the month of May.

At these meetings I was impressed by the fact that Nubar Pacha was greatly concerned lest some uncivilized act of war should be perpetrated in the campaign. It was to ascertain Loring's opinions on the subject that Nubar asked if the laws of war permitted the burning of villages. Notwithstanding the causes of these expeditions against Abyssinia were recited in the instructions, not a few—mostly the enemies of the Khedive—talked of conquest, of forestalling Turkey in her demand for Egyptian troops for Herzegovinia, and of this expedition as an effort to re-establish Egyptian credit, which had been waning since the sale of the Suez canal shares.*

The officers were dismissed from the last meeting at 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon. The Khedive called General Loring back, and in the presence of Nubar Pacha very impressively joined the hands of Ratib and Loring, saying, warmly, that he wished them to work together, like brothers, particularly impressing upon Ratib the necessity of listening to and profiting by Loring's counsel.

Soon after we had reached our quarters, the order came to leave Cairo at 6 o'clock, P. M. In that country one receives an order to prepare for an expedition, and often hears nothing more about it for weeks and months. Then, by the time he has quite forgotten that he has such order,—one falls into this bad habit, when so few orders are executed,—he receives another, directing him to leave in a train that is to depart in an hour, or even less time. Boxes, just arrived from the shop, were to be packed with campaign articles strewn around the room. Thanks, however, to the assistance of a few friends, these were thrown into the boxes, stationery and shoes, utensils and medicines—delightful confusion when one is hurried—and we

*The Russian General, Fadeleff, passed, rather mysteriously, much of the winter in Cairo when this force was organized.

were thus enabled to reach the train in time. There we found Prince Hussein, Nubar Pacha, and quite a number of the *élite* of the city assembled to witness the departure.

The train moved slowly away, arriving at Suez the next morning. Here the Etat-Major gathered at a public table for dinner, which Ratib Pacha insisted on paying for, against the polite protest of General Stone, who called for wine to toast the success of the expedition. I also made some pleasant objections when the Pacha inquired my age, and when answered, shrewdly turned the matter by saying that he (the Pacha) possessed the advantage of maturer years. We were in an English hotel, and the waiters were Indians. But the Egyptian officers on either side of me, Rachid Pacha and Ali Bey, not knowing this, vainly talked in Arabic to them, to the discontent of their own stomachs, until the end of the meal.

In the afternoon, we, with a battalion, boarded the Khe-devial steamer Dahaliah. General Stone said farewell and bade us God-speed, got ashore, and, at the last moment, threw a "cypher" to be used on the expedition. At four o'clock P. M. we got away amidst many wavings of handkerchiefs. A guard was placed over the fixed ammunition, which filled one end of the cabin, and other arrangements of security made for the voyage. Drafts of the usual orders necessary in opening a campaign were prepared, and the engineers employed themselves in making detailed maps. Other officers spent the time of the voyage in the captain's cabin, most of the time with cigarette and coffee, discussing Egypt's prospects in the coming campaign. The Commanding General and several other superior officers of the line betrayed the usual Egyptian reticence, and thus early gave signs of misgivings and obstruction in deploring the fact that there were to be so few Soudanese instead of Egyptian troops. This was ominous. The entire voyage was spent by the officers in this cabin, just as time is spent in an Egyptian café; and such a vehemence and babel of tongues—English, German, French, Italian, Norwegian, Turkish and Arabic

—was there as can be heard only in the East, entitling the place to a superlative adjective in describing it as a pandemonium. We should have called it a first-rate one had there not been occasionally heard from a cage hanging near, meek, suggestive little strains from a nightingale which put the noisy ones to shame. We arrived at Massowah* on the 14th of December. The town receives its name from, and is situated on, an island capable of containing but few more than the two or three thousand mixed population now at the place. Between it and the mainland is another small island, with the Governor's so-called palace at one end, and connected at the other with both Massowah and the mainland by several hundred yards of narrow causeway recently constructed. Between these two islands, their connecting causeway, and a point of land just north of the town, projecting several hundred yards into the sea, is a good harbor, although the coral anchorage is not of the best during one of those storms which sweep these latitudes. These storms, however, are only occasional, notwithstanding the islands inclosing the harbor are low and flat—coral reefs which have gathered shifting desert sand—for the harbor lies in a peculiarly neutral position between the sea and the land breezes, being partly hemmed in by mountains on the west, south and east. It has, therefore, being without shade-trees and almost without ornamental shrubbery, the reputation of being the hottest place along the African coast—hotter far than Yuma itself is reported to be. However, during the winter months, beginning the last of December, the nights are sufferable. The heavens in the vicinity are then filled with clouds, which sprinkle their waters in the evening, and at night diffuse a cooling vapory mist throughout the surrounding atmosphere. The Abyssinian rains proper occur during the summer months. But these winter rains have their local causes.

* According to Bruce this means "Harbor of the Shepherds." It is suggestive, however, that Diodorus Siculus, in describing the Red Sea coast, does not mention Massowah, but locates some distance north of it a harbor which he calls the Savior's. The Hebrew of this—Messiah—and the Arabic, would readily be corrupted into Massuah, just as this latter has in our own day become Massowah.

They are within the radius of the Red Sea's influence—daily sea breezes and consequent clouds—that reaches no farther than the northern slopes, which are high enough to deprive the low, winter, yielding clouds of their burden of moisture. Vessels are discharged and loaded by lighters, as there is no pier from the Massowah side of the harbor, and the flimsy one from the point affords no moorings for even the lighter vessels. There is a government store-house upon this point of land which was selected as the *garrar* or depot. Here were deposited as they arrived the personnel and matériel of the army—excepting the ammunition, which, very strangely, was distributed, for greater security (“As some women do a secret,” one officer ungallantly said) among the inhabitants of the town. The population is characteristic of this frontier. It consists mostly of a bushy and greasy-headed shepherd people, of mixed Abyssinian, Egyptian and Arabic blood, who attend in the mountains the herds of the more wealthy—as the Egyptian proper, the ubiquitous Greek, the Banyan merchant, and a few other foreigners of various nationalities. We found also a battalion of Egyptian criminals stationed at Massowah. When one sinner can destroy the labor of many missionaries, is it not a strange way to attempt the civilization of the Soudan by sending the worst of the Egyptian population there? Trade at Massowah, as elsewhere where the Turk has crossed his legs, has dwindled away under the upas touch of Mohammedanism. There were but few signs of life, even. Here and there in the bay and out at sea were seen shell, coral and sponge gatherers, sitting, each upon his little bark—two logs lashed together—propelled by a double-paddled oar. This was all on the water. Over the causeway occasionally came and went an Abyssinian, with tressed hair and an upraised umbrella, seated upon a donkey or mule, followed by big-horned, big-weathered and many-colored little bullocks or cows, packed; and Abyssinian porters on the trot, laden with their little stock in trade of pelts, teff, etc., brought from the Hamasseen or Okouleh-Gousai; and porters from the town, their bushy heads

adorned with scratching-sticks and anointed with rancid grease, trickling down their shoulders, with fuel for cooking purposes, gathered from the neighboring hills, or with skins of brackish water obtained from the reservoir.*

The transport camp—*i. e.*, the rendezvous of camels, mules, horses and donkeys—was established at Arkiko. This little town is a few miles south of Massowah, near the beach, and just under the first range of hills. Near by are the ruins of the small Turkish fort, occupied since 1866 by four guns and twenty men, under an Egyptian lieutenant, and built to protect this passage from Abyssinia. This was the only sign of protection to Massowah, if we except two guns on the island, pointing seaward, and a breastwork—to guard the causeway—thrown up by Major Dennison after the Arrendrup disaster. Five or six miles west of Massowah, beyond the inland reservoir, are the villages of M'Kooloo and Hotoomloo. Here Rachid Pacha and Osman Pacha, the brigade commanders, established their headquarters, and encamped their troops as they gradually arrived during the next few days. The Commanding General accepted for himself and staff the invitation of the Governor of Massowah to share his palace and the use of the grounds in its vicinity. One of the first things to attract our attention, after the army arrived, was that all the higher officers (excepting one colonel), and many of the lower, prided themselves on their Circassian blood. The rest were Egyptian, whose blood cannot be traced. The real Turk was not to be seen. Indeed, throughout the army he was gradually disappearing under

* The people of Massowah may be called salt-water drinkers, as are the inhabitants of some of the Oceanic Isles. Excepting a little water caught in cisterns by one or two of the wealthier residents, during some of the winter and spring months, when there is a slight fall of rain, the inhabitants of Massowah have nothing for drinking purposes but this sea-water obtained thus: Three or four miles inland from the beach are several wells dug a few feet into the sand. The sea-water percolates into these after depositing, en route from the beach, the major part of its salts. But the salts remaining in it make it so brackish that the English, after learning this fact (in 1868), no longer thought of using Massowah as a base in their expedition against Theodore. The water some of the foreign officers in the Egyptian expedition occasionally procured from the condensers of vessels, came, in contrast with this brackish stuff, as nectar from the gods. From these wells the water is lifted into a reservoir near by. It then runs in underground pipes to the causeway, and along it to another reservoir on the smaller island, where it is dealt out and sold to civilians and soldiers, and for beasts of burden.

Ismail Pacha's rule, and Circassian slaves and their descendants, and true Egyptians, pushed to the front. This eliminated one element of strife among themselves; for they are divided by jealousies. But as they are a unit against the foreigner, this elimination only centralized their power and consolidated them against the staff.

The brigade commanders have been named. The colonels present were Kurchid Bey (who commanded a negro regiment) and Osman Bey Negib, Osman Bey Galib, and Mohammed Bey Gabir (Egyptian), who commanded Egyptian regiments. Major Sabry Effendi, an Egyptian, was chief of the artillery. The officers of the general staff were General W. W. Loring, whose name is somewhat familiar in at least some parts of the United States. He is sixty-two years of age, of medium height, compactly built, and has a vigorous physique and much self-assertion. He claims that he fought under Sam Houston in Texas forty-four years ago; and later served as a soldier against the Indians in Florida. Since then his career is perhaps better known. He received an original appointment as captain of the mounted rifles when that regiment was organized in 1846 for the Mexican War. He served during that war, losing an arm in one of the battles, and became, by regular promotion, the colonel of his regiment six or seven years after the close of hostilities. He was serving on the Indian frontier at the beginning of the four years fratricidal strife in America. A native of Florida, he threw his weight into the Confederate scale. To make this more effective he carried a major-general's commission. He was again wounded at Kenesaw Mountain in Georgia. I have been told by a gentleman who served under him in the Confederate Army that a certain peculiar energy of the General's gained for him the not very euphonious appellation of "Old Bluster." He has a kindly heart when he is in good health; although he is often fretful—being a bachelor, he has many of the foibles of that class of humanity—and passionate, causing him to do things spasmodically and hastily, and to say things he does not always mean. Indeed, his violent prejudices sometimes

warp his judgment. He went to Egypt as brigadier-general (pacha) in the spring of 1870. He was assigned to duty as inspector, and afterward given a "palace"—as he persisted in calling his residence—to flourish in near Alexandria, with General Reynolds as chief of staff, and the nominal command of troops on the coast. Soon afterward he procured his promotion to Ferik Pacha, and secured a decoration.

Colonel Wm. McE. Dye was graduated from the Military Academy at West Point, in the class of 1853. He served in the army from that time on the frontier, and in the field during the Civil War (as colonel and brevet brigadier-general), and resigned in 1870. He entered the Egyptian service in 1873, through the kindness of General W. T. Sherman, and labored there as chief of the first section of the Staff Bureau.

Colonel Charles W. Field was another West Point graduate, of the class of 1849. He attained the command and corresponding rank of a division commander in the Confederate service. He was seriously wounded in front of Richmond, but served the "cause" to the end. He arrived in Egypt only about three months before he was selected as one of the general staff for this expedition.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ali Bey was an Italian who had been long enough in the Egyptian service to quite forget his family in Italy, and to have arrived at the Moslem belief that the chief end of man is to multiply and replenish the earth.

Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick was a civil engineer who served the Confederacy as captain of engineers. He entered the Egyptian service only a few months before the Abyssinian campaign.

Lieutenant-Colonel (Baron von) Möckeln, who had recently left the Austrian army, entered the Egyptian service only a few days before we left Cairo.

Major Löshe was an officer of long and valuable service during the Civil War and subsequently in the United States regular army. He had resigned from that army, and only recently arrived in Egypt when the expedition started.

Major Lamson was a promising young man, who had just finished his education as a mining engineer when he entered the service, only a few weeks prior to the departure of the expedition from Cairo.

Surgeon-Major Wilson was an assistant surgeon in the United States army, where he had seen several years' service in the field, including those of the Civil War. He arrived in Cairo just in time to accompany the expedition.

Captain Porter was a son of Admiral Porter of the United States Navy. He, also, entered the Egyptian service only a few weeks before our departure from Cairo.

Captain Irgens was an officer who had served in the United States Army for many years, including the Civil War. He, too, had just entered the Egyptian service.

There were also fifteen young Egyptians of the *État-Major*. Four of these—lieutenants—joined the expedition as engineers; one captain and five lieutenants as Amharic translators; four lieutenants as signal officers; and one as English and Arabic translator. Besides these were General Loring's two aids—Major Ibrahim-Lutfy-Effendi, who speaks tolerable English; Lieutenant Raif, who spoke French; and Ahmed Effendi, an English and Arabic translator.

The most prominent character was Ratib Pacha, the General-in-Chief, who, ever small of stature, was now as shriveled with lechery as a mummy is with age. Of Circassian blood by one parent, his color and features plainly show darker blood by the other. It is always difficult to tell the age of one of these people. But Ratib is perhaps fifty-five years old. He was formerly a slave of Said Pacha, by whom he was sent to France, where he remained in school some five months. He was next made a captain, and soon rose to the rank of colonel in attendance on the Viceroy, his former master. Except for being so slight in figure, and his enjoyment of the society of *bons-vivants*, he might be called a fine specimen of the imperturbable Turk. He can be as grave and look as stolid as a North American Indian chief in council. Indeed he prefers to talk the language of the Turk, and scarcely reads Arabic—certainly not well.

His nature is as sensitive as his figure is delicate. After obtaining the rank of colonel, his master and sovereign—Said Pacha—used, for some unexplained reason, some very uncomplimentary epithets toward him—even struck him, it is said. The Colonel, feeling that he had received an insult that he could not properly resent, straightway disappeared from the presence of his master, obtained a pistol, and shot himself. He placed the muzzle in his mouth; but, strange to say, the ball made its exit at the base of his nose, near the left side. His excellency passes for a good fellow and likes his brandy and sport of all kinds. On the accession of Ismail as Viceroy, Ratib Bey was recalled from Constantinople, whither he had fled from the wrath of the preceding Viceroy, and was elevated to the rank of Ferik Pacha, and made General-in-Chief of the Egyptian army. Said Pacha being dead, this recall and elevation aroused suspicion, and much talk, anything but complimentary to either Ratib or the Khedive, was indulged in.

The personal staff of the Commanding General consisted of two lieutenant-colonels who spoke Turkish and Arabic; three majors,—including one of the Etat-Major,—one of whom could neither read nor write; an adjutant-major of artillery—an energetic officer who spoke a little French, and promising well with experience; a diminutive captain of infantry, and last, although by no means least, a native clerk—Riffat Effendi—who wrote Turkish as well as Arabic. As Riffat did not know a word of any other language, matters were set down as ominous. With the exception of the Etat-Major officer this personal staff were almost without available knowledge of any kind. Not one of them had ever been out of Egypt; they were without experience, and had but little, if anything, of the soldier within or upon them other than the name and the uniform they wore. The Etat-Major officer—Major Turnheysen—had just entered the service, and was temporarily attached to Ratib's personal staff. He was a subordinate officer in the Austrian cavalry, and a courtier with Maximilian in Mexico. As he prided himself on his contempt

for everything not usually found round an Egyptian Court, he was selected by Ratib, chiefly as an interpreter—speaking with fluency, as he did, half a dozen languages,—and with reference to his other qualifications. It was not long before one of the lieutenant-colonels was sent to Sanheet, where he remained during the campaign, and the other contracted ophthalmia and became unable to do anything; one of the majors was assigned to the command of Major Raif's battalion of Arrendrup troops, and the Etat-Major officer returned to duty under the immediate orders of the Chief of Staff. The personal staff remaining to the Commanding General, were one Major, who could neither read nor write, the Adjutant-Major, (Nassim Effendi), the Captain, and Riffat Effendi.

Knowing something of the traditions of Egypt from the period when the priests were the receptacles of knowledge and the embodiment of power, down to the later time of the proverb, "although writing with a plow [both plow and pen being sticks] the Egyptian keeps his accounts in his head," one could but look upon the clerk as the sphinx in the background—effeminate in front, you have only to dig away the gritty rubbish around, to find the lion in rear. My own personal experience confirms the general opinion that among indolent Egyptian officials, princes and all, these clerks (who are generally Coptic) gain an immoderate and dangerous ascendancy and power, leading straight to evils and disasters when they are entrusted with matters they know nothing of. What has been said applies to the Coptic (Christian) clerk. When the clerk is a Moslem—as was Riffat Effendi—he becomes still more formidable.

CHAPTER XXII.

BOUKRA, INSHALLA—RELATIONS OF STAFF AND LINE—A UNIQUE PICTURE—ASSIGNMENT OF OFFICERS—OBSTACLES IN THEIR WAY—A HERCULES—LACK OF CLERICAL FORCE—LORING CHAFING UNDER DIFFICULTIES.

To understand better the condition of matters in the field, it should be known that there were, at the time of this expedition, and are now in Egypt, two phases of what elsewhere has been named the Pacha system. One is where the clerk has an unbounded influence over ignorant, indolent or weak Pachas, Beys, Mudirs and other officers. Here he controls matters in his own mercenary interest. It is the special sphere of the avaricious Copt. This phase extends throughout the civil, and has reached even the military, administration. The other phase is where the nominal is the real head, and the clerk becomes a mere calculating machine, as the fellah is a tax-paying one, the former disgorging his figures as the latter does his piastres. This is the other extreme. But it is as natural to the Pachas' search for system and civilization, as it is for the young Egyptian, who yesterday was in bags and bare feet, to-day to wipe with his cambric kerchief his patent-leather shoes instead of his nose. This phase is more generally found in those governmental departments veneered with civilization. But it is peculiarly a military one, where the head is still more absolute, where the officer looking up sees only Death with his sickle, and down only grist for his own mill. The Pacha in the army, no more than the Pacha in the civil service, will see the need or object of a systematic division of labor and responsibility—*i. e.* a general staff—in his administration. To him nearly every question is a Gordian knot, and the sword solves it. Records he will not generally have, as he considers them

as mere revelations—unpleasant checks on his administration. He has a personal staff, but they rank in importance in his mind below his clerk. If one of his personal staff can communicate a verbal order in such way as to rid himself and his General of responsibility, he is doing quite enough. In its essence, this is the ideal system. This distrust of subordinates is carried so far in this absolute government, that Prince Hussein, the Minister of War, at the beginning of the campaign, when he attended to business at all, wasted his time on the most trivial details—such as inspecting recruits—often compelling him later, when important matters demanded his attention, to answer day after day, as is yet heard all over the land (mostly in consequence of habits of indolence), "*Boukra, inshalla*" (Tomorrow, God willing), just as was done in the olden days, when was written the proverb: "Say not unto thy neighbor, go and come again to-morrow, I will give thee, when thou hast it by thee." Alluding to one of the phases of this distrust, a distinguished American General, who visited Egypt a few years back, observed that "no one can command an army and be corporal of the guard at the same time." The individuality of the Pacha has, of course, some influence on his administration, civil or military. The condition of his harem and stomach may also have some such influence. But what has been described as the extreme phases of the Pacha system, are general. When there is a mixture of the two phases the mixture is mechanical, and you have either one or the other extreme (quite pure) wherever you may go in the country. His Excellency, Ratib Pacha, was no exception to the rule. But, in consequence of his indolence, his authority naturally gravitated into the hands of his clerk.

The Line and Staff never having before been associated in the relation they were now to occupy toward each other in the campaign, a distinct understanding should properly have been had—in the presence of the Prince Minister of War and General Stone—before our departure from Cairo, as to what were to be the duties of the Chief-of-Staff in the field, and of the officers under him. This, however, was

neglected, and the importance of having an immediate understanding with the General-in-Chief, was repeatedly suggested to General Loring aboard the vessel ; but nothing definite was arrived at. However, a day or so after our arrival at Massowah, Ratib conducted Loring to the camps of Rachid and Osman Pachas, whose commands were paraded, and the General introduced, with great ceremony, as second in command, and Chief of Staff.* The ceremony being over, there seemed to be an impression among the pachas and beys that the iron was laid, and the Etat-Major had nothing further to do than to jump in and ride. They would suffer General Loring, the second in command, and Chief of Staff, as an ornamental associate with Ratib, as he could heed or not the former's advice. But, as to any further extension of what they considered an innovation in their customs, privileges and almost sacred traditions, entailed upon Egypt principally by the Turk, they determined on a resistance worthy of a better cause. In receiving Loring, they considered the Etat-Major simply as his personal staff, and would confine the General himself to duties merely advisory. This would have deprived the army of the knowledge and valuable experience of the staff. Held responsible, as they were at the palace, for the success of the campaign, yet, to have no word, nor pen, nor finger, in it? No! The General's view was different from theirs. We had had orders prepared aboard the vessel that brought us to Massowah, organizing the Etat-Major—in such manner, of course, as not to interfere too abruptly with the established ways of the Egyptian officers, but so as to give effective employment to the Staff, and affect to good purpose the immediate campaign. But nothing further was accomplished there in this matter. After our landing, work was waiting for the Etat-Major, and the Chief of Staff ventured to suggest to the Commanding General that there were certain duties expected of a properly organized staff of an army, and that

* By the way, it was a unique picture (the day before this ceremony)—an Egyptian camp preparing for such a parade—these black and yellow fellows of many shades, stripped to the last rag, and in groups throughout the length and breadth of the camp, each with a basin of water, washing and drying his clothes.

among the Etat-Major were officers qualified for the special departments of labor which might be proposed for the staff.

“We are not here, your Excellency,” said the General, “to interfere with the legitimate duties of your clerk and personal staff; but, among us are professional soldiers of rank and experience, who were sent along by His Highness, the Khedive, to assist you in the organization of your army, and in the conduct of the campaign.”

The indolence and fear of responsibility of Egyptian officers might in some cases lead them to suffer a division of labor, did they not distrust others—especially foreigners—and fear a loss of prestige, a loss of authority and power, their only hold upon their subordinates—their own official and personal security. But a general-in-chief had less than a subordinate pacha to fear from this. Ratib, therefore, fond as he was personally of harmony, and possessing his share of suavity and Eastern craft, ultimately yielded, very dexterously, too, but only partially, to the entreaties—importunities, he would say—of General Loring, who concluded this negotiation, if it may be called such. A staff system based on that of the French of the last generation, we have already learned, was, at this time, in vogue in Egypt. But it cannot be said that it was known outside the staff itself. It was in embryo—a paper—not a practical organization. It was this system, in deference to the desires of General Stone, that the Chief of Staff (aided by me) ventured now to inaugurate. He tried to make a corresponding division of duties in the assignment of the Etat-Major officers; but, after great difficulties, succeeded against objections so far only as to assign officers as described below:

Colonel Dye as Chief of 1st Section, with duties similar to those of officers in the Adjutant-General's Department in the United States Army, or at the Horse-Guards in the English Army. Major Lamson was temporarily an assistant.*

* On the 23d day of January we had to deplore the loss of this promising officer. Poor fellow, he was quite disconsolate. After aiding enthusiastically for weeks in the

Colonel Field as Inspector-General, with Lieutenant-Colonel Möckeln as an assistant. A few days after this Captain (Count) Sormani joined us and was also assigned as an assistant. Lieutenant-Colonel Möckeln then took temporary charge of the Intelligence Department. Shortly after our arrival at Massowah, Lieutenant-Colonel Graves, an active and capable officer—formerly of the United States Navy, also of the Confederate Navy—took charge of the water transportation in the harbor, the lightering of vessels, etc. Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick was assigned as Chief Engineer, with Majors Dennison and Durholz, Captain Irgens and two Egyptian lieutenants as assistants: and Major Loshe as Quarter-Master and Commissary of the Staff, with Captain Porter as assistant, and Lieutenant Magdy Effendi as Turkish, Arabic and English translator: and Major Wilson as Surgeon of the Staff. The duties in the latter two departments not to extend outside the Staff. Nothing could shake Ratib's crude notions of the Intendance Department. The troops—battalions, companies and detachments—were destined to carry, when it was possible, their full campaign supplies around with them, each company being a little magazine and Quarter-Master and Commissary depot. A position was also found for Ali Bey, the renegade of two or three religions and as many families, who was fortunate enough to be on intimate terms with the Commanding General. He was assigned to duty as Chief of Ordnance. He was permitted only to inspect ordnance material, rather to inquire about it, and thus he tried to keep the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General well advised in this Department. He was wholly without authority to correct an evil. If he reported one, an investigation outside the staff was instituted in the matter by the Commanding General, thus bringing the line and staff into conflict. "Such distrust," I wrote at the time, "does not savor of harmony, and

preparations to go to the front, all his fond hopes were blasted, on the eve of our departure, by a telegram directing his return to Cairo for service in Darfour. En route to his new field of duty, and near the close of his journey, he died of that pestilential Central-African fever, which has carried off so many other daring spirits and co-laborers in opening up that mysterious country.

such circumlocution, if continued, must consume important moments and destroy patience and unity. Indeed, without authority as he and others of the staff are, their duties assimilate those of a detective. If the army is taught not to respect them now, what will be done upon the field of battle?" In order for Ali Bey to obtain the weight of a box of cartridges at the storehouse of the Intendance, it became necessary to fortify him with a written order to that effect, to the officer there in charge, and this latter one of the best, who was merely following in the beaten track. Ali Bey could not last long in this position, under such circumstances, and he soon gave way to Major Sabry Effendi, who, as Chief of Artillery, was now entrusted with everything pertaining to it. Ali Bey was then placed in charge of the construction of the telegraph.

Major Loshe also launched out in search of information and certain supplies in his department, only to encounter unexpectedly, right at the very threshold of his duty, an order direct from Ratib, assigning one of his personal staff to this duty. This was finally arranged to prevent conflict of authority and confusion. "Query! Attached as these officers—the *Etat-Major*—are to this army by the Khedive," as I wrote at the time, "are they permitted to wear the mere name—the decoration—of chief of their respective departments in order to disarm suspicion of foul play, and have them near at the same time in case of danger, to be used as scapegoats?" This arrangement of officers, at any rate, was as far as we could now proceed toward organization—toward relief from our embarrassment—and we had to await developments, and resolve to do meanwhile the best that we could under the circumstances. The other members also set themselves to work in their respective departments, establishing pickets and guards, gathering news of the enemy, making maps of the several routes to the interior of the country to be invaded, examining approaches to Massowah, submitting plans for its defense, etc. Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick found similar obstruction in his department. For instance, when he

submitted a list of engineering tools necessary in the campaign, the Chief of Staff had much difficulty, and spent days to procure the Commanding General's consent to the sending for them by telegram. Egyptian suspicion created the spectre of a cypher and secret communication between Generals Loring and Stone. Ratib sent the dispatch in his own confused language, which was corrected only by repeated telegrams and delay. Another case which arose, perhaps, from misapprehension instead of obstruction was this: The Lieutenant-Colonel, in packing his engineering material in Cairo, directed an Egyptian lieutenant of the Staff to procure, and carefully pack, an odometer, which he expected to make use of in measuring roads in Abyssinia. As Derrick was new in the service, his astonishment and annoyance may be imagined when, on breaking open the box and unwrapping the delicate package, he found, stowed away as for a voyage, not his odometer, but a small gimlet. There was such a mingling of the ludicrous with annoyance here, that "Aminadab Sleek" would have smiled. Even Derrick, who is never demonstrative in his humor, thought he would have been less annoyed had it been a harem, but no more surprised had it been a catapult—something in keeping with the progress of the country.

A word about the first section. Written orders may go to generals, and commanders of regiments, separate battalions and batteries; but, as orders to other Line officers are, in the custom of this service, generally verbal, the reader will not be surprised to learn that no clerks were supplied; that every department of the *Etat-Major*, even that of the first section, was without clerks who could write English or French. Brother officers knowing the labors of this section will smile incredulously to hear of the duties being performed wholly without clerical labor—an army run without machinery, but so it was to be. It was a waste of intelligence to use officers for such duty. But, as days passed, the pressure became oft-times so great, that when one dropped in for a moment he was invited to the recreation of a fifteen minutes' scribble; but no sooner

was he down, with pen, than hands were laid upon his shoulders, and he was sent thitherward to do the duty, perhaps, of an orderly. Another entered, wanted this or that, and was entreated to employ his waiting time with a shoulder to the wheel. He, too, must go; and soon were seen three of the Staff—a colonel, a major and a captain—with another officer, and a detachment of twenty engineers, going to the camps to sink an Abyssinian pump.

“Great God!” exclaimed General Stone, when he heard of this afterward.

Notwithstanding preliminary and scientific surveys had been made of the ground where pumps were to be driven (with as much ado as if it were a channel tunnel), the scheme at this time was a failure, as might have been expected, it having been neglected to send along a “Hercules,” or trip-hammer. Besides the English and the French, there was to be an Arabic, Turkish and Amharic department, the last being the court language of Abyssinia, as Turkish is of the Turkish Empire. And writing this syllabic language—the Amharic—is almost as tedious as making the type. Orders communicated to the Line, if in English or French, had to be rendered first into Arabic; proclamations into several languages; Turkish into understandable English or French and Arabic—a reciprocal rendering of languages here which was, in a manner, accomplished mostly with the assistance of one or two young Egyptians, and, wonderful to relate, without any serious mistake being made during the campaign. A boy named Ahmed Effendi deserves the credit of doing the most of this work—translating Amharic, Arabic and English—during the expedition now under description, as well as similar work for Colonel Arrendrup in his campaign. Being always up before the early day—at half-past three to four o’clock, A. M., or earlier—as was the chief of this section, and nearly overwhelmed with work, continued without a moment’s relaxation in the most indescribable confusion of languages, duties and persons, to one or two o’clock, and even later, at night, only to re-

peat day after day, was calculated to produce some such a request as this to General Stone :

“Send a clerk who writes English and French ; English at least. If you can, one who is lame and halt, if not blind ; one who knows nothing beyond clerical duties ; one, if you please, who stinks, or has some other repulsive quality which may protect him in my employ. Without one here you need expect no record, although we may stumble through the multifarious duties.”*

From the notes of the chief of the section the following description of a model day is taken at random : “Couriers arrive during the night ; messengers are to start at three, A. M. ; we are aroused ; camels from Sanheet arrive, and vessels with the field-telegraph, with men, animals, and what-not. Where shall they go ? The reservoir has given out, and the pumps have struck rock, says one ; there is no water for the animals, nor for the men, says another ; nor any tents, nor trees for shelter—only drifting sand. Pachas, beys and effendis, of all grades, flock in and around, and guides and messengers—like children—all to know, to know !

“‘Ahem ! ahem.’ I hear, and quickly, straight at Ahmed, are ejaculated the words, ‘Why in the devil don’t you attend to them ? Where is Lutfy Effendi ?’

“‘Saying his prayers, sir,’ answers Ahmed—at this time the only translator and clerk.

“‘Tell him to cut them d—d short ;’ and up goes the stump of that arm in fitful flaps, and Loring, with burning face and excited tread—steps full a yard in length—and selected expletives, eyes aglance, sparkling with passion, rushes up and down the room amidst the gathering crowds, drops out for a breath of air, and then returns to wry-face and tread anew.”

I thought then, that were my mule-train stuck in the mud, or were it at the bottom of a long and steep hill, such as the Lancaster in Texas, which it was necessary to ascend, I should ignore General Harney and go far to borrow Loring’s choice collection of expletives, which lost

* He never came.

nothing of their pungency in an Egyptian climate. Many readers may think them excusable, too, when commanders, day after day, were failing to respond to his, or rather the Commanding General's, orders, for instance for orderlies, guards and fatigue men. Indeed, when any such soldiers did arrive they generally soon disappeared, before reporting, on the slightest semblance of excuse. Orderlies who remained were appropriated by Ratib's personal staff, and the guards were repeatedly taken stealthily away by their commanders at night. It was no less worrying to him, after leading the Commanding General up to the importance of making some immediate arrangement to procure from Abyssinia meat on the hoof for the army; and, after making by authority of His Excellency an extremely favorable contract with a man named Hassan—an Austrian who for many years had resided in the country, and who had been a contractor for the English in their Abyssinian campaign—for this purpose, that the contract should be suddenly and deftly broken by the Commanding General, right amidst the contractor's engagement,—compromising him with his sub-contractors,—and without any discernible cause other than distrust and jealousy of foreigners, and in order to put the business in native hands, where accounts are not questioned, if kept at all. An old man of the Intendance Department was entrusted with this business, as he was with the whole Supply Department, and thus had the army and the campaign, as well as the treasury, in his hands. The Chief of Staff's mind was constantly at full tension. He spent many days before he succeeded in convincing native officers—who are mere imitators—that there was no good reason (in the Abyssinia campaign) for having three pass-words, as is their custom, unless, forsooth, they had ascertained by experience that Egyptian guards are then more vigilant—are kept awake in their efforts to remember them. He made no less efforts to satisfy the pachas that no officer, not even an Egyptian, the courtesy of the country would say, could properly perform the duties of officer of the day, day and night for a week together; and to convince

them that this officer should not be entrusted with all the duties and responsibilities of the commanders, as was the custom, particularly as he was, in general, a junior.

CHAPTER XXIII.

GENERAL KIRKHAM—PRISONERS FROM THE ARRENDRUP EXPEDITION—THEIR MUTILATION—KIRKHAM'S SEIZURE—STRIPPED OF HIS EMBASSADORIAL LETTERS—HIS IMPRISONMENT—HIS STORY—DAUGHTER OF DR. SCHIMPFNER—KIRKHAM'S GRAPHIC VIEWS OF EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONS—THE HARRAR EXPEDITION—BEHEADING THE KING AND CHIEFS—KIRKHAM'S WARNINGS—ABYSSINIAN ARMS—PUERILE ARGUMENTS FOR THE RETENTION OF KIRKHAM IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT—HIS NEW QUARTERS AND MORE LIBERTY—DINNER IN HIS HONOR.

A note dated at Asmara, Hamaseen, December 18, 1875, and signed by General Kirkham of the Abyssinian army, was received at the headquarters of the Egyptian forces on the 22d of that month. This informed the Egyptian Commanding General that Kirkham had been directed by His Majesty, King John of Ethiopia, to deliver to the Governor of Massowah about one hundred and five prisoners, including one officer, who were taken in battle at Gundet. General Kirkham expressed his sorrow at not being able to go to Massowah himself "to do His Majesty's friendly wishes"; but he sent a servant, as he styled him, along with the prisoners. These arrived with the letter. Among them were a number of barbarously mutilated soldiers. Including a few who had previously straggled in, there were thirty-seven of these unfortunates who survived the barbarity. The scalp that the North American Indian tears off indicates only that a life has been taken—it may be that of a woman or child—but the Abyssinian, or Semitic, trophy, proclaims indisputably a warrior slain or captured. This trophy is sometimes seen hung in conspicuous places about the houses. It is commonly taken in the troubles between Abyssinians and the border tribes. It was more generally done when there was a greater demand than now for eunuchs. When there is, as in such cases, a desire to

save the victim's life, the treatment often is to bury him in earth up to his arm-pits, until inflammation has been absorbed. Notwithstanding this care, only about one in from six to ten recovers from the inhuman operation.

A few days after the arrival of these released prisoners, Kirkham himself arrived. In front of our lines he was seized by the guard and immediately put into a filthy cell. This was ordered to be cleaned. But the officer commanding the guard at the cell door had not seen the Commanding General or his seal,* and would not recognize the seal of the Chief of Staff. On my entering, therefore, to listen to Kirkham's story, as I had been directed, he was found in an extremely dirty hole, in a low-roofed, one-story, stone-building, closely guarded by sentinels. The only indications on his person of military rank were a forage cap and a cavalry jacket, both gold-laced and supposed to belong to the uniform of an Abyssinian general—but relics, perhaps, like himself, of a more distinguished service. On hearing the door open, he looked up toward me, and in stammering, hiccoughing sentences began vilifying, in good old Scottish accent, all who had been instrumental in getting him into his present position. He, the ambassador of the King of Kings, said Kirkham, en route to Her Majesty, the Queen of Great Britain, to be thus degraded, and he also a British subject, was too much for poor human nature, and again he began reviling in a manner showing himself uncertain of the ground, literal and diplomatic, on which he stood. As a "soft answer turneth away wrath, but grievous words stir up anger," care was taken to throw no fuel upon the fire of his fury. He calmed down after a time into a very conversational mood, and made a statement which was afterward corroborated.

"I was given," he said, "the character of ambassador, so far as a sovereign (half civilized) could clothe me with such, and entrusted with diplomatic letters to the Queen. While en route to England, in this capacity, I had arrived near the Egyptian line in company with two English journalists named Houghton, who, the Egyptians allege,

* Subordinates generally expect personal orders on the Kourbach.

suddenly disappeared from Arrendrup's lines.* I permitted them to precede me and announce my coming. They were, I understand, arrested and deprived of the letters upon their persons. Soon after this I, too, arrived at the Egyptian lines and was seized, searched and stripped of all letters, dispatches and ambassadorial credentials, and incarcerated in this prison, unfit, as you see, for a felon."

Kirkham had with him a small sack which answered some of the less choice purposes of a trunk, one or two leopard skins on which he was reclining, and in one corner an old chair on which was seated a modest-appearing lady with her little daughter at her side. This was Mrs. Bender, the daughter of Dr. Schimpfer (by his Abyssinian wife)—the celebrated botanist who for forty odd years has resided in Abyssinia. She was the wife of an Austrian missionary, recently deceased. They were en route to Jerusalem and were soon liberated. There was a further desultory discharge of words by Kirkham, during which he said that "when Arrendrup was making his expedition there were several other moves against Abyssinia made by Egyptian troops. Even the Abyssinian boa-constrictor, observing that he cannot, in his crushing capacity, gird the elephant, knows enough to abstain from the attempt. Cutting a command up into several parts without connection destroys the life of the whole."

"Are you not mistaken, Kirkham," I asked, "in thinking Egypt intended the conquest of Abyssinia?"

"Well, maybe I am. Perhaps that column from Metemnah† was only to be one of your staff expeditions in search of the remains of the lost Egyptians—Psammitichus' soldiers who went up there somewhere. And Munzinger's column‡ may not have intended to go to Senafé—may, in

* These gentlemen claim they were captured, stripped and detained by the Abyssinians.

† He said there was a move, unsuccessful, from here toward Abyssinia, made nearly simultaneously with Arrendrup's, by six companies of Egyptian troops.

‡ This was a column of about two thousand men and several pieces of artillery under Munzinger Pacha, which entered Abyssinia at Amphilla Bay, near the time of the described expeditions, and was supposed to be destined for the salt plains or for the Senafé Pass. The expedition was destroyed by the Taltals—the Pacha, his family (who were with him) and many of the men being killed. The King received the news of the fate of this expedition at Gundet, as noticed in the description of the Arrendrup expedition.

their humanity, in taking possession of the salt plains, have intended to prevent Abyssinia from dying with the scurvy. But then, how do you account for Arrendrup's expedition? Did they too come as scientists, or did that column come as an army of the Prophet simply to feed the starving Hamaseens? And the Turks (Egyptians) from Zeilah to Harrar and beyond;* what else could have been intended there but intrigue with the Gallas and Shoa? At any rate the effect of all this was that King John, in the campaign against Arrendrup, was not joined by any of the Southern Gallas; he was not materially assisted by Shoa; Ras Addal of Godjam remained at home to watch the movements from Metemnah, and the Taltals were mostly engaged against Munzinger. So that the King could bring against Arrendrup only the people collected in the small provinces immediately surrounding Adua—including one or two small bodies from Begemeder (in Amhara); and one of them arrived only after the battle of Gundet. That is, he had been able to assemble against that officer only about one quarter the force that can in an emergency be raised by united Abyssinia. Very good all that, but so much the worse for you now, Colonel. So look out. Artillery was once a great moral power against Abyssinians; but at the Gundet fight, where it was easily captured, it lost its prestige. The Abyssinians are better armed with fire-arms than is commonly supposed. They have matchlocks [to ignite the powder the soldier wears a cotton belt with one end burning], shot-guns, Brown-Besses—part of the English present to King John—Snyders, now Remingtons, and a variety of other fire-arms throughout the country, brought in from time to time, and especially during the consulship of Munzinger, whose wife was an Abyssinian.†

* This was an expedition of about four thousand men, with artillery, under Raouf Pacha. It reached Harrar with little opposition, but was unable to penetrate the country any distance beyond. News, which I have not heard disputed, came to us at Massowah, that the Pacha seized and beheaded the King of Harrar; and that afterward twenty-five chiefs of surrounding tribes, who on invitation went into the city of Harrar to break bread with the Pacha, also lost their heads for their temerity.

† Vice-Consul Sarzac said that thousands entered then; and old residents of the country say that there is now scarcely a family in the land lacking a fire-arm of some description.

General Kirkham remained in solitary confinement for several weeks, notwithstanding the expressed views of one or two superior officers who believed there was no justification nor necessity for such cruel treatment.

In reply to these officers, it was said by an officer high in authority: "Did he not voluntarily place himself in our hands? Is he not the enemy's general and ambassador, or his spy—it is all the same? I have known flags of truce to be fired on; indeed, I have fired on them myself."

What else then could Kirkham expect than a solitary prison, near enough to hear the aggravating clatter of royal dishes and scent in the air the savory fumes of luscious viands? Naught! There he had to remain and hear the bustle and noise of preparation against his adopted country, be denied access to the consulate and thank his stars that he was not with his fathers. But it is the Almighty who disposes. After Kirkham had suffered weeks of this incarceration a change came over the spirit of our dreams. Diplomatically inspired, we were to heal the General's wounds. The nurses had only to follow the Cairo prescription and all, it was said, would be well. Among our other frivolities, therefore, invitations were sent round to English-speaking officers to dine with Ratib Pacha, who proposed the dinner in honor of Kirkham before his departure in comparative liberty to his new quarters in Massowah, where it was decided he should be transferred. There were present also one or two besides Ratib who did not speak English. For the nonce the prisoner was to become the honored guest and to play a new rôle at which he was quite an adept. On entering the salon of the Governor's palace, to my utter and grievous surprise I soon found myself seated at the head of the table, and from the way the wines passed round, with winks and blinks, I was not long in discovering—notwithstanding a little obtuseness—that a woeful mistake had been made somewhere. If the object were to get Kirkham incontinently drunk, the wrong man certainly had been placed at the head to conduct the Bacchanalian festivities; for, notwithstanding all may be fair in war, as in love, all of us

are no more fond of playing the spy or executioner under the garb of gentlemen than we are of playing procurer or seducer under that of protector. After one glass of wine, the subject was dropped, on my part, against repeated protestations. Nevertheless Kirkham fell into the hands of the Philistines. But torture is not always remunerative. The gods seemed to guard him; and by no word or question did he betray himself or his cause. He gave the Commanding General some wholesome warning, and aside said, "I do not wish to see any of the Americans eaten up—(the equivalent of an Abyssinian expression),—for I formed an order of companionship with them when with Ward, Burgovine and Gordon in China." What became of Kirkham will be learned in a future chapter.

CHAPTER XXIV.

PRINCE HASSAN'S ARRIVAL AS COLONEL OF THE ETAT-MAJOR—RATIB HIS SPONSOR—HIS IRKSOMENESS UNDER RESTRAINT—RÔLE OF A PRINCE NOT THAT OF A SOLDIER—ATTENTION OF THE ARMY TOWARD HIS HIGHNESS—DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN FOREIGNERS AND EGYPTIANS—THE CHIEF OF STAFF DEPRIVED OF SOME OF HIS PREROGATIVES—LORING'S CONFIDENCE IN THE PRINCE.

A few days after our arrival at Massowah, Ratib Pacha was informed by a telegram from the palace that the Khedive's son, Hassan Pacha, a lieutenant (nominally) in the Prussian Huzzars, had been granted leave of absence by the Emperor William to enable him to join the Etat-Major of the Egyptian force sent against Abyssinia. Prince Hassan is Ismâil Pacha's third son. His mother was one of the Khedive's slaves, whom he married after she gave birth to this child. The Prince was at the time of this expedition twenty-two years of age and married. He is low in stature, but fleshy—almost of Japanese wrestling proportions. He is a good horseman; speaks Turkish, Arabic, of course, French, English and German. Nominally of the Etat-Major in this campaign, he wore its uniform, but without insignia of his rank as colonel. His Highness arrived in the Khedive's floating palace—the *Mañfousa*—about the last of December. He was received with the honors due a Prince—soldiers under arms, and officers dressed in their best, bordering the little bay, and vessels with manned rigging, pennants flying and many-colored flags from every cord, made the harbor seem in bloom. After landing, the Prince was escorted by Ratib Pacha, Loring and the young Governor to the palace of the last-mentioned official, where His Highness

held an impromptu reception for the members of the staff. The Chief of Staff, having received an autograph letter, in French, from the Khedive, announcing that Hassan would be attached to the *Etat-Major*, desired to assign the Prince to a special department of the staff. But the Commanding General also received an autograph letter, in Turkish, from the same source, which, when translated into French and English by Ratib's aides, required His Excellency to keep the Prince near his person. The Commanding General felt that he was personally responsible for his safety, he having construed the letter quite literally. This responsibility he more fully realized and exhibited the day after the Prince's arrival, by a show of uneasiness and indications of displeasure when informed that His Highness had been on a hunt in front of the picket-line, where, with some of his suite and about half the *Etat-Major*, he was ostensibly making an inspecting tour through the camps. Thus early did it seem, and it was not unexpected, that His Highness was to play the rôle of Prince of the blood, and not, as Loring flattered himself, that of the soldier. "The army and its success"—an officer wrote at the time, "are they then to be only of secondary consideration?" The Prince was very restless under restraint, and Ratib was obliged to handle the reins very gently. His Highness, although in Massowah, was not present at the dinner given to Kirkham; but was extremely anxious to be there in proper person, with his secretary and physician, who did represent him. He was prevailed on, however, not to go (it was afterwards learned) lest the deed to be perpetrated should attach stigma to his name. When he saw an African hornbill and the horns of an addax coming from the front, and saw other evidences of abundant game in the mountains, his youthful love of sport could no longer be restrained. He had a magazine of arms that would do honor to an arsenal. With these he boarded Möckeln's fleet—three or four harbor sail in the Intelligence Department—passed down the coast some miles and landed in Abyssinian territory. His prolonged absence caused His excellency Ratib the great-

est anxiety. The entire headquarters, and the camps also, showed uneasiness, which rose to fever heat when darkness came and scanning field-glasses failed to discover a sail. Orderlies and aides were running in every direction. But after much anxiety at headquarters, he finally turned up with his game, having had a successful day among guinea-fowl, hare, gazelle and antelope.

The same watchful care over the army, similar zeal in its interest, would have done wonders in advancing the campaign. But the riding animals of the Commanding General and of all his personal and general staff, some fifty officers in all, who had on their hands a ponderous Abyssinian elephant—the conduct of an important military campaign—were, when the Prince first arrived from Suez, ousted from their shade and convenience, and sent away off into the scorching sun to make room for the baggage animals of His Highness and the riding animals of his numerous non-combatant suite.* Veterinary surgeons and farriers were caused to come daily and attend these animals; but almost every imaginable obstacle was thrown in the way to prevent the staff animals from receiving similar necessary care. The culpable officers, doubtless, believed they would be sustained, if not rewarded, by the Prince, if only they pleaded as excuse loyalty to His Highness† in thus trying to anticipate what they believed to be his wishes. Surely, such people were not prepared for war.

Another case, where an Egyptian officer was conscious of traveling the beaten track and of doing His Highness a service: The sentinels around headquarters, never too polite to foreigners in the service, on the Prince's arrival, concentrated their attention upon him and his suite. The *Etat-Major*, in leaving their offices at headquarters, and returning thereto, were obliged to pass and repass two or three of these sentinels, who would, however, not deign

* His suite numbered nearly fifty men, including his aide-de-camp (Yussuf Bey, colonel of cavalry), physician (Badr Effendi), and secretary (Mr. Zoreb, called Bey by courtesy).

† Rascalions have sometimes stolen themselves rich in the name of loyalty or liberty.

even to turn up the whites of their eyes to them. General Loring himself was one day leaving the building and going down the palace steps when these sentries deliberately permitted him to twice pass without saluting him. He returned to his office in a furious white heat, his tongue stumbling among the roughness of his vocabulary for epithets fitting the occasion. Nothing could appease his passion until a member of the staff jokingly remarked :

“Why, General, don't you know when the sun rises the little stars disappear?”

There was no intentional sting in the observation ; but the General at once seemed to realize his awkward position, smiled as only he can, and said nothing more about the discourtesy. However, during the day he learned that it was without the Commanding General's knowledge that one of his personal staff, a junior to the Chief of Staff by three or four grades, had countermanded certain orders relative to the sentinels—orders of the Commanding General, countersigned by his Chief of Staff—and thus caused this continued discourtesy. The General then, after much reflection, chose the unpleasant task of communicating to the Commanding General his apprehension of trouble arising from the exercise of the functions of the Chief of Staff by two distinct persons. The letter was couched in the most respectful terms, and embraced an earnest request, which had been repeatedly made verbally, that His Excellency would habitually issue his orders through his Chief of Staff, in order that such conflicts of authority might not arise, and harmony might prevail. But little good resulted from this arrangement.

It was just after the Prince's arrival that a change was made in our administrative arrangements, foreboding no good to any one, showing evil-working distrust and suspicion of the staff, and destined to impair their influence and deprive them of one of the principal means by which they could hope to advance the campaign. One of the first field orders of the Commanding General, inspired from Cairo, directed that all letters of both Staff and Line, intended for elsewhere than his immediate command

should be sent *open* to the army headquarters, to be forwarded to the ministry of war for distribution. This, by the way, notwithstanding the fact that at the port and town of Massowah, which were in charge of the young Governor, letters were being continually sent and received without this restriction. What a commentary on the attempt to move an army toward a given point with two or three distinct heads! One wonders if this is a copy, so near akin is it, of the brilliant example furnished the world gratuitously by the United States, where, trying to run the Indian Department by both a military and civil head, they have succeeded in running it into the ground. A few days after His Highness' arrival, there came a Cairo telegram, in Turkish, about letters. All the surrounding circumstances indicated that it was inspired from army headquarters in the field. As translated for the Chief-of-Staff it distinguished between native and European officers—all foreigners being classed in the dispatch under the latter appellation; and directed the Egyptians to send their letters in sealed envelopes to the Commanding General's personal office, thence, for distribution, to the Minister of War, at Cairo; and that the foreign officers should continue to send theirs open to the Chief-of-Staff, at Cairo. Egyptians generally do what they conceive to be their master's wish. It is therefore impossible to say what was in the original telegram. Nor does it matter much where what was certainly intended as an offense to, and restriction upon, the foreign staff was originated. It is part of a system—the Pacha—and it is this that we condemn. They who venture to excuse the war ministry at Cairo, only make more heinous the wrong and insult, perpetrated by the Commanding General's personal staff, with his, if not Prince Hassan's connivance, to say nothing of the act being sustained at Cairo. A more aggressive word than sustain might be used, for it was a query whether the two lines on which it seemed the army was to exhibit its acrobatic dexterity, extended to the Abdin Palace itself.*

* This refers to the native resistance to the rule of Nubar Pacha, who represented the progressive foreign element.

Could such opposing orders be wholly inspired by the same head at army headquarters in the field? "Are these orders," one asked himself, "simply the natural out-cropping of the native opposition to everything foreign which is looked upon with disfavor, as hated innovation, if not as conspiracy, against the Egyptian's rights, privileges and customs?" Instead of considering the Etat-Major as the right arm, if not head, of the Commanding General, they looked upon it as a rival establishment. These never-ceasing, insidious efforts of natives against the foreigner, to reduce the Staff to non-entities, to circumvent these officers in doing what they conceived to be their duty, and firmly believed to be necessary to the success of the campaign, evinces the folly of hoping that a foreign staff officer can lead a crafty native, superior in rank,* and specially ignorant even in the essentials of a campaign, particularly when the native is supported in his ignorance and prejudices as powerfully as the staff-officer is resisted, by the army, by the people, by an all-powerful party at court, if not unwittingly by the sovereign himself. The telegram procured from Cairo was pointed to in justification of the steps already taken by Ratiib regarding the mail; but it did not warrant the demand of the native party, already insisted on for three weeks, that all the mail of both Line and Staff should pass through the hands of a certain ignorant, intriguing and unscrupulous officer of the General's personal Staff, who held his position by virtue of such talents as are mostly employed around a profligate court, and having as correspondents at Cairo the low and corrupt. As letters, both private and public, are often abstracted from the Egyptian mail, and opened, there would have been no certainty, under the proposed arrangement, of our letters reaching their destinations, and this fellow would have had the whole campaign in his hands. Deprived already, as was Loring, of the use of the telegraph—only by great circumlocution and delay had he, up to this time, succeeded in

* A foreigner placed above the native, has comparatively little difficulty in commanding.

getting one dispatch through the censorship of Ratib—there could be no hope under this arrangement of exposing virulent evils which it was out of his power or influence to have corrected on the spot.

Although the Commanding General favored the arrangement, he would issue no positive order to put it in execution, so long as his Chief of Staff opposed it. But all his orders on the subject, to his personal Staff, had its ultimate accomplishment in view and enabled them to strive persistently for that end in intermeddling, and by annoyance. When, therefore, the telegram about letters arrived from Cairo, there was such an exuberance of delight among the whole native element in the army that Loring felt it useless to further argue about the matter. He demanded, however, that the official letters of the Staff should go direct to the Chief of Staff at Cairo, as they, certainly, should not run the gauntlet formed of ignorance, suspicion, jealousy and rascality. This, for the time being, Ratib reluctantly assented to. And Loring was thankful for even this small privilege of being authorized to send an official letter to General Stone, through the Egyptian Governor at Suez.

“If the Chief of Staff at the war ministry and the Chief of Staff to the army in the field cannot be trusted to have official correspondence, without its passing through irresponsible hands, then was it a mistake,” I wrote at the time, “to send the Staff along into the field, as all their efforts for success will certainly be thwarted?” At one time it seemed that we were destined to fare even worse than this—that is, have no mail throughout the campaign, as indeed we did not have for months, at its close. For the mail department, after laboring three full weeks in the throes of paternity—when our expectations were so sharpened by labors, anxieties, annoyances and disappointments that a woman would have wept for joy at the mere sight of an envelope—brought forth, not bags of loving epistles from wives and daughters, mothers and sweethearts, but an estray to Loring, from some rude aspirant to honors as an Egyptologist, inquiring whether mummies had tails and

straight or curly hair. The General was very philosophic about letters. But the wailing and howling of some of the members of the Staff caused him then to take steps to lift our letters, which seemed to be deposited at Suez as security for our good behavior.

Notwithstanding Prince Hassan's name was naturally connected with all this mail matter, General Loring believed he was being assisted by the influence of His Highness, exerted over Ratib, and that the Prince was using his good offices, not only to harmonize the frequently-conflicting views of the Commanding General and his second in command, regarding the conduct of the campaign, but to further those peculiar to, or advanced by, the latter officer. Contributing to this belief was the Prince's presentation of a fine saddle-mule to the General, a daily invitation to dine with him, a considerate suggestion by the Prince that his presence should be ignored whenever he might be found playing chess or backgammon with Ratib Pacha and Loring desired an interview with His Excellency on important business; and, in general, very flattering and unexpected attention. But an Eastern Prince's manner of selling himself is not by giving away a mule. His politeness and suavity should not be mistaken for artlessness and candor. Neither Prince Hassan's disposition (boy that he was) nor his ability and experience were such as would cause him to appreciate Loring's better views in contrast with those of Ratib Pacha, with whom His Highness naturally sympathized as an Egyptian and Mohammedan, as an associate and personal friend. Introducing him, therefore, as Loring did at this time, as an intermedium between himself as Chief of Staff and Ratib as Commanding General, was cutting his own throat while attempting to swim—it was simply installing and supporting another power antagonistic, in the long run, to the General's better views.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE GOVERNOR OF MASSOWAH—HIS DEFAMATION OF GAL-
LANT OFFICERS—NEGLECT OF THE GOVERNMENT TO
REWARD SKILLFUL AND LOYAL SERVICE—THE ME-
FETTISH—THE GOVERNOR EXERCISING THE FUNC-
TIONS OF AN OFFICIAL OF THE STATE, FINANCE AND
WAR DEPARTMENTS—IMPORTANT MATTERS IN THE
HANDS OF A BOY—PREROGATIVES OF THE COMMAND-
ING GENERAL ASSUMED—NUBAR PACHA DISPLACED—
NATIVE PARTY MORE INDEPENDENT—THE KHE-DIVE
SAW BREAKERS AHEAD—FAILED TO AVOID THEM.

There was one other person whose position enabled him to exercise great influence on the expedition. This was Ahmed Bey, the Governor of Massowah. A sufficiently dignified designation of the office held by him would ordinarily be, "Alcalde of an African village;" but during this campaign it assumed more importance. Ahmed Bey was a bright young Egyptian of the world, courteous, bland and familiar, of some twenty-two years of age. In consequence of such youth, his inexperience, and independence of the War Department, the influence he exercised was naturally detrimental to the success of the campaign. One of the first things we learned on landing at Massowah was that he, with youthful zeal and lack of discretion, had, after the Arrendrup disaster, telegraphed the State Department, independent of the war ministry, all kinds of undigested rumors and stories of escaped soldiers, reflecting upon the officers, without giving proper credence to, or making thorough investigation of, the reports of the officers themselves. Finding, as we did, these officers already in disgrace, the matter claimed the attention of the Chief of Staff, and one or two of his trusted subordinates. It was with much difficulty and delay that the General

and his assistants could mollify the unmerited obloquy under which these officers were suffering, and prevent their trial and condemnation, it may be believed; for the seal of a boy in Egypt is quite as large, and as much embellished, as that of Egypt's wisest Governor. Assuming the government wanted scapegoats, and knowing the Egyptian custom in such cases is to anticipate the superior's pleasure, the young Governor undertook to manufacture them; and that, too, out of some of our finest officers, foreign and native, from whom the Staff were expecting great assistance during the approaching campaign. All the higher Egyptian officials, including the Commanding General, were strongly prejudiced in this matter, and it is believed would have given those skillful and gallant officers but a few hours to make their peace, had not the unmitigated numbskulls been stoutly resisted by General Loring, myself, and others taking an interest in the welfare of the officers so unjustly accused—for the Turk acts, and thinks afterward, if at all. General Loring's interposition in this matter was creditable to both his head and heart.

The best defense that can be made for these Egyptian superior officials in this affair, is to say that they were simply giving expression to traits inherited from their fathers; and hence would arise the question whether they were responsible and should be condemned. However, be their instincts what they may, the pachas' and beys' knowledge of war extends little beyond the shedding of blood. With them fighting—if their instincts lead them there—is not only the end of war, but it comprises also nearly all the means. In their view, butchery is the essence and science of war. Saving the remains of the Arrendrup expedition, as Majors Dennison and Ruchdy so skillfully did (aided by Raif and Durholz), from destruction, useless and inevitable, had they remained at Addi Huala, Kaya-Khor and Saganeit, was, therefore, in their eyes cowardice and flight. The feeling against these officers was so strong that the matter could be touched at first only very gently, as is indicated in the following extracts from notes written at the time by a member of the staff,

whose opinion in the premises was desired when the officers were about to be brought before a court-martial:* "Advised that the official inquiry be made later—perhaps after the campaign, as the officers are now invaluable to us here. So far as I have yet learned, the demoralization which the barbarous mutilation of prisoners caused among the men was as well handled and controlled as circumstances warranted. A greater effort should, probably, have been made to destroy ammunition (by water) and to render the artillery-carriages unserviceable.† When Dennison and Ruchdy left Raif's command, after the Arrendrup expedition had met its fate, they would have appeared in better light had they each gone to this officer and said: 'Major, we are now out of danger, and the men have become more composed. It is necessary for some one to go ahead and prevent false dispatches being sent over the wires, and to report the facts of the disaster to the government. As you have no further use for me—I being a staff officer—would it not be best for me to go?'"

But all, including those who thought it would have been more prudent to have thus obtained the formal consent of Major Raif, found, with the full facts before them, not the slightest reason to think there was any offense committed by these officers, unless it was one against their own reputations, which, in doing their full duty to the government, they had moral courage enough to risk by giving their enemies in the line a lever to operate with against them. On the contrary, abundant and overwhelming reasons were discovered for believing that the government should have seized the first opportunity to demonstrate, not its malignant ingratitude, but its high appreciation of the coolness, courage and skill displayed by these officers in extricating that little command from Addi Huala, surrounded as it was by tens of thousands of the enemy, thirsting for their blood.

Governor Ahmed Bey was fortunate in being the nephew

* Court of condemnation would be a better term.

† We afterward learned from them that they were without other means of doing this than would have prevented their escape by attracting the immediate attention of the enemy.

of Sadik Pacha, who, being foster-brother to the Khedive, had risen from the degradation of a fellah, to place, power and immense wealth. His Highness, indeed, had given one of his daughters in marriage, and entrusted his privy seal to a son of this beloved friend, who was now all-powerful as the Mefettish, or Finance Minister, of Egypt, and the trusted counselor and associate of the Khedive. He was especially powerful at this time, as Nubar Pacha's influence—partly in consequence of his opposition to this Abyssinian war—was on the wane. He, the head of the fellahin party, was, therefore, now represented by Ahmed Bey, the successor as Governor of Nubar Pacha's unfortunate nephew, Arakel Bey. This enabled the Mefettish to exert an influence in the government and on the campaign outside his own legitimate sphere. The powers, as exercised by the Governor, became quite complicated, partaking at all times of the nature of a subordinate in the Finance (fifty thousand dollars for the use of the Prince during the campaign were sent to the Governor), as well as State Department, and often infringed upon the prerogatives and duties of the Commanding General himself. The Governor's official communication was, of course, direct with the Abdin Palace and not through the War Ministry. One may imagine, therefore, the confusion and delay created in suffering this young fellow—without knowledge or experience, whose certificate was a pass for any Abyssinian through our lines—to remain in charge of the mails, telegraph lines, and water transportation—our whole communication with the home government—as well as of the procuring of beasts of burden for our land transportation. This was the most important duty connected with the advance of the army; for the Bashi-Bazouks were left behind, and we were to forget the traditionary plundering of the border, and transport our own supplies. It was difficult to believe that the government was really in earnest—one in high authority, indeed, said it was to be a "promenade,"—in inaugurating such a serious undertaking as an expedition against Abyssinia, when powers and responsibilities so weighty in the issue were entrusted to this inexperienced,

though suave and polite, young man. Nevertheless, he remained in his position to the end of the campaign, was the confidant and counselor of the Commanding General, knew his plans and purposes, and was so presumptuous in his zeal or jealousy, as to endeavor to anticipate him in the issue of a proclamation to the people of Abyssinia, written in view of a possible invasion of their territory. It was by sheer accident that the policy of the campaign, as described in the Khedive's instructions, was not controverted by the promulgation of this ambitious document. The proclamation, which had been prepared for the Commanding General, was read in the hearing of the Governor, who straightway drew up a paper which, by fault of memory, by misconception of the objects of the campaign, or, by the intriguing designs of one who assisted the Governor in putting his notions into shape, did not disclaim the coveting of the Abyssinian's territory, nor disclaim the desire for his subjugation; which ideas the Khedive—especially his Minister, Nubar Pacha—was so anxious to inculcate. On the contrary, it left this people to infer that their territory was to be occupied indefinitely. Whereas the Commanding General's proclamation expressly set forth that there was no intention of conquest. War was to be made only against King John and his followers, and rights, ecclesiastic as well as of person and property of all Abyssinians, were to be strictly respected. Nubar Pacha was bitterly opposed to all appearance of conquest. He seemed to feel the necessity—now that the Arrendrup disaster, and others, had occurred—of pursuing the war so far as to regain lost prestige, but no further. He was extremely anxious that it should not assume the shape of subjugation, and should be conducted in the light of civilization. But, surrounding the Khedive's palace was a conquest party—I shall not call them a fighting party—which seemed to have unbounded faith in the valor and discipline of the Egyptian troops, fancying, perhaps, they were their own handiwork, and had visionary notions as to the brilliant destiny of the Khedivial régime. These conflicting influences around the Khedive could not remain

long together. As Nubar Pacha stood almost alone at the palace, he soon became a victim to his political integrity.*

It was when rid of this enlightened and vigorous minister that the party inimical to foreign influence began to shape the Khedivial policy—ignoring the interests of foreign states, and further bent themselves to carry along the campaign itself, in individual interests, by means which could not bear the light of day; by cross-purposes, which, like unseen little under-currents, lead all within their reach to the turbid waters of the eddy and the whirlpool, there to be engulfed in confusion. All the higher officers—not of the Etat-Major—with Ratib Pacha in the lead, were of this party. They had already shown how jealous they were of authority (though fearful of responsibility), and now the removal of Nubar gave them a new impetus in their course. Letters written from Mas-sowah, at this time, indicated the misgivings of members of the Etat-Major, in their anomalous position, regarding the success of the campaign. Nevertheless they determined to bend all their energies to help the Commanding General so far as he would permit them to attain this object. The Khedive himself, sagacious enough to see at the outset the danger ahead, did not have the ability or nerve to avoid it. On solid land his vision pictured the two opposing parties as hyenas in human shape struggling for the spoils of power, and he successfully played the jackal. But when he set himself afloat these parties loomed out of the water like two great rocks in the way of his little bark of state, and it was madness, when they were so near together as to strike hands across the abyss,† to expect to avoid the whirlpool they would generate, by steering between. One knowing Egypt would never ask

* Subsequent to the time I write of Nubar Pacha was restored to power; but he was afterward again deposed from office, and is now numbered among the "outs" when considering Egyptian affairs.

† This refers to the joining of the hands of Ratib and Loring Pachas—the former the representative of the native party, and the latter considered by this party as the representative, in the field, of the opposing one. His Highness essayed in this child-like *coup de théâtre*, and the accompanying language, to impress upon these two officers the necessity of uniting their labors like brothers.

whether the young Governor had immediate inspiration from this native party. He belonged to it, held his position as their representative, and his instincts alone would have led him along in the party's tracks, as is indicated by the proclamation he sought to foist upon Ratib and Abyssinia. And it was not long after this effort that the Governor, still intent on carrying out his own campaign policy, presented for the Chief of Staff's signature another paper, which he had got up in the way of a letter to a prominent Abyssinian, promising the people money, protection and liberty*—by inference depriving them of their legitimate Abyssinian head and substituting the government of Egypt—in downright antagonism to the proclamation of the Commanding General and the supposed policy of the government. That the Governor did not succeed in introducing this document into Abyssinia, as he wanted to do, as an emanation from the Department of State countersigned by the Commanding General, was due to no prudence of his nor lack of officiousness on his part. He exercised baneful power to the close of the campaign, tampering with the army mails, which passed through his hands when the troops went to the front, abstracting letters, etc. And whatever neglect there was in not providing, in time, transport animals for the army, is laid at his door, though this does not relieve the government from the grave responsibility of placing an inexperienced youth in that important position.

*This curious document began : " You swear by your religion and by Jesus Christ and Moses ; and I swear by my religion and the Mosques of God and Mohammed," etc.

CHAPTER XXVI.

NO TRANSPORTATION FOR A MOVEMENT—JUBA RIVER—
RATIB DOES NOT REALIZE THE PROBLEM BEFORE HIM—
PACK ANIMALS TO GO FORTY MILES WITHOUT REMOVAL
OF LOAD—BAIRAM—COUNCIL OF WAR—ROUTE SE-
LECTED—KING JOHN AMONG HIS PEOPLE—EXCOMMU-
NICATIONS—PLAN OF ADVANCE.

On the arrival at Massowah of the Commanding General, and the body of his army, the only transportation found for his command consisted of three hundred indifferent camels—hardly enough for the ammunition and other supplies of a battalion of infantry for ten days. After three weeks had passed away, so few additional animals had arrived that it was yet impossible to advance, notwithstanding Ratib was constantly reminded from Cairo of the political importance of making an early move. We, in the field, felt the military necessity of a move in concert with the Zeilah column—far as it was from us—if we and this column would escape the fate of some of the other expeditions, from whose shades the veil of mystery now began to rise.* Yet it was impossible to advance with the whole army, and unwise to push any fraction of it forward until we had sufficient transportation to follow up the movement immediately, in order to give the King as little time as possible to assemble an army, which he would no doubt begin to do so soon as he should hear of an advance.

The Commanding General had no power over the Governor, whose time was mostly enjoyed in self-contemplation and singing. Considering the Khedive's desires for

* Besides news brought by Kirkham and the Houghtons, Federigo Pacha and Colonel Ward had just arrived at Massowah from the Juba river expedition, bringing us news from the Abyssinian coast.

an early move, and our fears that the King might anticipate us, and mobilize his army during our delay, it was unfortunate, everything else now being ready, that the army could not push forward. Some of the Egyptians, however, derived consolation from this condition of matters in this wise: "So much the worse for the King that we are not in his strongholds, where he would be sure to 'eat us up.' If we are to remain here," said they, "so much the better for us." While awaiting transportation this was the subject which engaged the Commanding General's particular attention. On December 31st he submitted, for the consideration of the Chief of Staff, transportation figures in which about two thousand camels and one hundred and fifty mules were to be appropriated in moving each regiment of infantry, with five hundred rounds, per man, of ammunition, and twenty-five days' rations. This was from three to four fold more transportation than was necessary; and an attempt to move, even by detail, predicated upon this estimate, would be rendered absolutely nugatory, as but a small proportion of the estimated number of transport animals had yet arrived. This paper is some indication of the limits of the practical—of the relations between living and dead forces—in the Egyptian mind; and of the Commanding General's failure, as yet, to realize what a problem he had before him—to move an army, almost without transportation, into the territory of a powerful enemy confronting him. On receipt of this extraordinary paper, which was so much in keeping with, so rich in the mental products of, a people who are not in the habit of thinking, but generally submit their problems to old Father Time, General Loring directed me to call on Ratib Pacha and explain to him the result of an investigation of this subject, which I had undertaken, after carefully weighing specimens of the articles to be carried, and testing the carrying-power of the various classes of animals—many of the Suakim, Sanheet and Cassala camels not equaling in power, certainly not in endurance, one of the very ordinary mongrel ponies furnished the expedition. In accordance with this inves-

tigation, the allowance of tents was cut down in the proportion of one hundred and seventy-nine to fifteen, baggage, etc., limited correspondingly, in drafts of other orders now submitted for the approval of the Commanding General. These he approved of, and one was able to write, "Thus far, well." But His Excellency was inclined to let the animals go through to a depot of ours (in contemplation)—forty miles away—without having their loads removed, not even during the night, in camp. He still argued that one man to five camels—the usual number—could not load and unload them.

"True, General," said I, "but this difficulty is surmounted by detailing more men, is it not? and you can thus expedite matters materially."

He listened as if approvingly, but ordered only the removal of the loads; and this without detailing additional men. He needed more time to consider the matter. He did not realize the necessity for the removal of the saddles, and would at this time, issue no orders to this effect; but left the impression, which among the cameliers was certainly unfortunate, that the Commanding General thought the traditional way the better one. After this much had been accomplished, orders were issued designating the allowance of transportation for each individual and for each organization of the army, disposing of surplus baggage and stores, refitting and organizing batteries, etc.

It was not until January 8th, 1876, that anything more decisive was accomplished; Courban Bairam fell on this day. The visits of etiquette, usual among Christians at Christmas and New Year, had been participated in by our Mohammedan friends, seemingly with a desire to cement our now apparent harmony. Now these compliments were returned by the Staff. The Prince received us in Turkish style—apathetically or with affected dignity. Coffee, *à la Turque*, was sipped, and a word was interspersed here and there. His attention was invited to the happy coincidence, which might form an omen now that we were together in the field—of this Bairam falling on a day so generally honored by Americans.

There was no responsive impression intelligible in his demure countenance. We soon bowed ourselves away, going thence to the sanctum, near by, of the Commanding General, who received us with similar cordiality. A few minutes here in passing the customary compliments, then, those of the visiting party who had important duties to perform withdrew, the Mohammedans keeping up the customary festivities during the day.

It was just after these civilities, and as if still further to signalize the day, and obtain amidst the festivities a harmony of views regarding the approaching move, that a council was sprung on us. I was unexpectedly called in to complete the organization, consisting already of Ratib, Loring, Rachid and Osman Pachas. The government was anxious that a move should be made. It was believed at the palace that favorable news from the seat of war would bolster-up the waning credit and suffering prestige. An immediate move was thought to be an absolute necessity, and the Commanding General was resolved upon it. To determine when and how this should be done with so little transportation was the reason why this council had been called. There is temptation here to observe that projects in the Egyptian mind are, like Egyptian poultry eggs, hatched mostly by artificial heat. To determine the "where" was to determine the line of operations (or route) where nature and the enemy could obstruct our army least. The problem, "how" to move the army, involved the transportation itself,—limited as it was and consisting of a variety of animals,—and another important element was the condition and situation of the enemy. Our attention had been directed in Cairo to five routes :

- (1.) The English route by Hadoda and Şenafé.
- (2.) Route by the Taranta defile.
- (3.) By Sanheet.
- (4.) By Asmara.
- (5.) By Kaya-Khor.

Considering the length of the routes, their practicability, and the facility of preserving his communications (as well as other less important points), the Commanding

General had already decided that the choice lay between the Asmara route, first followed by Arrendrup, and the one by Kaya-Khor. The impracticability of using camels for transport on much of the former route near Asmara had already been demonstrated—mules, ponies and bullocks (which it was more difficult to provide with forage and water), as well as porters, taking their place under Arrendrup. Before our departure from Cairo, General Stone had favored this Kaya-Khor route. And Loring, after some diligence on his arrival at Massowah, also favored it in general terms. But it had not yet been adopted by the Commanding General, although our engineers were already working the roads. This was because there were influences diverting his attention to the Asmara route, and, ridiculous as it may seem, to the Sanheet route. Another influence which deterred him from coming to a decisive judgment in the matter, was the inability of his Chief of Staff to meet all his objections to the favored route. This inability arose from the lack of some definite information about it, our maps being defective in detail. Indeed, our two principal sources of information regarding the interior of the country were so nearly contradictory in some important particulars—one source being military and the other not—that Loring flopped about between wind and water, although he was trying to cling to the route through Kaya-Khor. This was the condition of matters as to the route when the council was called.

Now as to the "how" to move. Besides forty-four elephants and more than six hundred carts, the English expedition into Abyssinia—consisting of about the same fighting force as Ratib's expedition—had on hand April 1st, after four months' campaigning, about twenty-five thousand transport animals, to say nothing of the number already lost by disease and other contingencies of the service. With this experience in view, five thousand camels, or the equivalent of this number, which we were informed we were to have in the campaign, seemed a small allowance, when losses from the natives' habitual cruelty and inefficiency and other extraordinary causes were considered.

True, the objective of the English army was Magdala, whereas our possible objective was only Adua; and there is always a large train of non-combatants with an Indian army. Nevertheless, in order that this small number of camels might answer for such an expedition, the camels, men and their movements should be such only as enter as elements into a mathematical problem—they must be mere figures, which are easily manipulated in an office. In the field, the figures become rapidly decreasing variables, the practical problem involving many contingencies besides, as in this case, the lack of experience in nearly all those who were engaged in the resolution of the problem. Again, there is as much difference in the burden-bearing power of what is known as the Egyptian camel, and frontier camel, as there is between that of the mule and the donkey. The more powerful of the former, when well cared for, may bear up under five hundred pounds, and the average Egyptian camel's load is about three hundred and fifty pounds. Whereas, the frontier camel furnished our expedition varied in burden-bearing power between one hundred and two hundred and fifty pounds, one hundred and fifty being a liberal allowance for an average camel. Now the camels to be furnished the expedition were, according to the Cairo estimate, to have an average burden-bearing power of three hundred and sixty-six pounds. It was readily conceded that, were the expedition now, at the beginning, provided with this amount of transportation—five thousand camels, bearing three hundred and sixty-six lbs. each—its purpose might be accomplished, if at all, before the transport force could become depleted by disease and bad usage. Consequently, anomalous as it may seem, it could have been accomplished with much less transportation than if the animals should arrive (as they were now doing) in such small numbers and at such irregular times as rendered it possible for the army to move only by detail. But we did not have it—we had, at the meeting of the Council, an equivalent of only about one-fifth this amount, and were wholly dependent on the young Governor for more. Notwithstanding the army had now been at Massowah a month,

within a day or so, there had accumulated only about two thousand animals, less than half of which were camels, and these mostly of the inferior frontier type. Nevertheless, besides the favorable news desired by the palace, from the expedition, the Khedive had expressed, in connection with it, much anxiety about the Abyssinian rains, and had such decided notions upon the subject that he would not have his army caught among the mountains, where torrents sweep down the passes and over the plains. Each succeeding day was bringing us nearer this season, and also rendering more probable the possibility of the King's seizing the defensible passes and seriously obstructing our march, if not destroying the campaign at its very inception. Indeed, the King was at this time traveling among his people for the purpose of reassuring them against flight, of enrolling them preparatory to the arrival of the Egyptian troops in his territory, and attaching the Amharic chiefs to him by promises and threats. He was encouraging the soldiers, who were disbanded after the Gundet fight, to make up powder and ball; indeed, he was making every preparation for an early, stout and combined resistance of the whole country, and if this meant mobilizing it behooved Ratib Pacha to move at once. Moreover, the Commanding General was daily receiving promises and assurances—based on reports quite encouraging, if they were to be believed, and seemingly satisfactory to His Excellency—regarding the future arrival of more transport animals. Prior to the council, therefore, I was directed by the Chief of Staff to prepare an estimate of our transport force—composed, as it was, of such a variety of material—and of its power when applied to the army. This estimate was to include the animals which the Governor assured the Commanding General would arrive at certain designated times during the next few weeks. It was made with the assistance of Major Dennison. The animals' transporting power within a fixed time was illustrated in it by moves of troops, supposititious as to number, time and place—the quantity of transport power for each specific purpose in the move being given. Luckily this paper was about completed when the

council was called, and it served as a basis for the suggestions of the junior member when called upon for an opinion. When reading the suggestions, about to be repeated, it should be borne in mind, if the route to be adopted should be that of Kaya-Khor pass that it was important to seize as early as practicable the plateau just beyond, first reached on Gura plain. But the lack of transportation forbade the immediate seizing of the plateau, for there was not enough, as yet, to supply a force sufficient to control the pass while the army would be moving up. It was, therefore, necessary to hypothesize and take risks which would have been unnecessary with abundant means of moving. Thanks to our Intelligence Department and other sources of information, we had learned that the King had yet to mobilize his army, and this it was believed he would probably put off so long as possible—that is, mobilizing the body of it—on account of the difficulty of feeding an army. The King, it is true, was now enrolling his people, and had announced the imminence of invasion. The priests, led by the *Tchèghi*, or Abyssinian head of the church, true to their calling, had begun to hurl their anathemas. But it would require, after the command should be given in the market places—where the sound of trumpets and tambours on such occasions gathers the people—at least two or three weeks' time for the King to assemble his soldiers. As said before, the amount of transportation did not warrant the seizing of the plateau; but it did warrant an advance toward it. However, it warranted only such an advance as is about to be described, and which, when suggested in council, was prudently based upon the supposition that we should be prepared to seize the plateau within two or three weeks after the advance; indeed, based on the supposition that we would seize it within this time,—that is, before the King could get possession of it,—and with such an Egyptian force, of course, as would be able to protect the pass while the rest of the army was moving up. The essence of the plan, therefore, was to throw our supplies as far forward as could safely be done during these two or three weeks, while the King was mobilizing his army; for the force

necessary to protect these supplies while the King was yet out of the field, would be far less than that necessary to protect them (and the Kaya-Khor Pass) when they should arrive at Gura plain, and while the King was advancing. Consequently, there would be a great saving of supplies and an economical use of our scanty transportation.

The Kaya-Khor route seemed to me as it did to Generals Stone and Loring, the preferable route, and any plan of advance should necessarily provide for the proper protection of our prospective line of communication and the Egyptian frontier generally.*

A part of the garrison at Sanheet made junction, during the Arrendrup expedition, with this officer's force near Asmara. He intrenched a few of the men near this place. Ratib Pacha had now constantly before him the written suggestions of the Khedive's military adviser that this garrison should again be utilized by advancing them over to the Asmara road, from where they could partly cover from the enemy's depredations two or three small provinces claimed by Egypt, and protect the right of our prospective line of operations. But, about the Commanding General's intentions regarding this force, not a word could be learned from him nor from his Chief of Staff, and the secret has been well kept to this day. The knowledge that "silence" (as well as "patience") was once commended to General Loring by the Khedive, creates a doubt in my mind whether that officer, also, was ignorant of Ratib Pacha's object regarding the Sanheet force. Supposing His Excellency had some instructions which he did not wish to reveal regarding the protection of the Bogos province,—relying, perhaps, for its protection on French† or other influence,—I was induced amidst this mystery and uncertainty, to suggest, as part of our plan of campaign, an alteration in the protection at least of our own operations, and incidentally all the territory—excepting the Bogos province—

* Plans for the defense of Massowah had already been submitted to the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General. This was, therefore, no part of our present business.

† There were French Lazarist priests and Swedish missionaries there.

otherwise left open to ravage. The principal suggestions as to the manner of accomplishing this, and making the advance, even, were: That there should be two nearly simultaneous moves from Massowah—one on the Asmara road (first used by Arrendrup); the other, on the road to Kaya-Khor. The first to be made by a small force—consisting principally of one battalion of infantry and two guns—as far as Guinda (the junction of a branch road from Bahr-Reza, on the Kaya-Khor road, with the Asmara road), where a work should be thrown up for several of the companies and the guns, the rest of the troops retiring to Bahr-Reza. The command moving on the Kaya-Khor road to consist, in general terms, of four thousand men, including five companies of engineer troops, one battery and a few cavalry. This force to establish a fortified depot at or near Bahr-Reza. As it would be necessary, when a further advance—that is, to Kaya-Khor Pass—should be made, to leave a fortified force at or near Addi-Rasso (about one day's march beyond Bahr-Reza) for the protection of our communications, it was also thought advisable and suggested that the Commanding General, in order to facilitate the transport of supplies, should avail himself of such force by pushing part of the Bahr-Reza command forward at once and throw supplies into this temporary depot until the advance should be made to the plateau. Our limited number of animals demanded, and all else favored, such economical use of this transport force. The enemy could as yet offer no serious obstacle; Addi-Rasso is on the Ali-Guddy route to Massowah; there was wood, water and tree-shelter there; no rains at that season (as at Bahr-Reza), consequently healthful, and stores would not suffer from exposure; it would enable the Commanding General to distribute his animals to advantage along the route, and our operations would be better covered with both Addi-Rasso and Guinda occupied, than with neither.

Realizing, as no one else did, the straits we were in regarding transportation—for I had been required to make it a study—I further suggested large escorts from Masso-

wah to and from Bahr-Reza, to expedite loading, etc.; to familiarize the men with the duties, fatigues and dangers of a campaign, and to supply the Bahr-Reza command with bread and ammunition. This would be accomplished by each man of every escort carrying to Bahr-Reza ten days' rations or one hundred rounds of ammunition, which would be left there on their return to Massowah, and the men be in better health and spirits at the end of their trip than they would be were they to remain motionless in camp. Accompanying this was also the recommendation that the cavalry and artillery animals should be temporarily utilized in a similar manner and made to carry light loads. "If these suggestions are to be carried out," I continued, "everything will be in condition in two or three weeks for the Commanding General to advance with about four thousand men and three or four batteries to seize the plateau and Kaya-Khor Pass." There was no dissent from these suggestions expressed in council. No one else gave an opinion in the matter, nor was any one called on to do so. I was, therefore, led to believe that the views advanced were in consonance with those of the Commanding General and his Chief of Staff. The council was dissolved after examining some maps (brought in at the close by Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick) showing the country under discussion.

During the evening following the council General Loring disclosed its proceedings to an officer who had been absent from Massowah during its sitting. This officer was in such an abnormal condition as to forget the dues to harmony, and attacked the proposed plan—for reasons best known to himself—as furiously as if he were on a forlorn hope, determined on its demolition. He descanted about depots being established behind armies—not in front of them—and expatiated on the dangers of a fraction only of an army entering an enemy's territory. Loring was taken by surprise; his confidence was, for the moment, shaken by the vigor of the attack, he faltered in defense of the plan, and then joined in and said that there would be too much risk, "and by G—d, I will not put in unne-

cessary jeopardy the soldiers of the great and good man who has given me an asylum in my old age." He added, with great fervor, as a clincher (speaking of Addi-Rasso), "and they eat up supplies there!"

To do the authors of all this eloquence justice, it should be said that one of them was not familiar with the amount and conditions of our transportation, and its relations with our contemplated move. He was not in a position, condition or situation to realize the fact that it behooved the Commanding General, before the King mobilized his army, to make the most economical use he could of our limited transportation. It would have been a sufficient reply to this gratuitous attack, that in Abyssinia, above all countries, perhaps, a commander has less need of the theoretical rules of war than he has of its intuitions. But the reply was, that we could not have war, if war we must, without risk, without the sacrifice of blood and treasure. It was an offensive, not a defensive, campaign that we were undertaking, our objective being far beyond Addi-Rasso. "Your reasoning," said I to them, "is based upon wrong premises, wholly in view of dangers instead of advantages. Your spectre is defeat, whereas the glory of victory should be your beacon-light. Your remarks bear upon the comparative merits of Bahr-Reza and Addi-Rasso, whereas they should bear upon the comparative merits of Addi-Rasso and Gura. Your eyes are turned on Massowah instead of on Adua. You are ignoring the more important question of supplying an army upon the plateau, to say nothing of an advance beyond."

But the General's position was difficult in the extreme, and he needed the full support of the staff, a united front, to help him jolt these people out of their formidably effete ways, instead of being annoyed, as he was at this time, by the inconsiderate obtrusion of vapid ideas about the mails as well as about this advance. Especially was this support, and even exceptional consideration, due him from members of his own staff, because of intrigues elsewhere continually practised, to bring him and the staff generally into disrepute, the natural effect of such in-

trigues being to put a suspicious nature, like his, always on the alert, rendering him still more suspicious, and as liable in the dark to shoot friend as foe. The never-ceasing intrigues around him, rendered him so exceptionally suspicious that I found it imprudent to hold any official intercourse with others, on important matters, away from him. All communications with pachas and beys were carefully kept up by and through the General, who made it his particular duty to do the polite and agreeable for those who were too much engaged to pass beyond the absolutely essential social formalities. This discussion was therefore unfortunate, and the effects of it on an impressionable nature, like Loring's, will be seen hereafter.

Notwithstanding the criticisms, no one offered a substitute. In separating from the gentlemen I requested that a substitute might be submitted. One was again asked for the next morning, but no such suggestions were made. I then handed in writing the result of my own and Major Dennison's labors (embracing the substance of the foregoing suggestions) to Loring, who said simply, "all right." The discussion ended here, and this officer left me to infer that there would be no change in the plans—at least, that he would recommend none to the Commanding General. To impress his sincerity upon my mind, he now gave me more of his confidence, and put me in charge of his seal.

CHAPTER XXVII.

PREPARATIONS FOR AN ADVANCE—THE MOVE—EXCITING SCENE—DESSERTION OF CAMELIERS—DEPOT AT BAHR-REZA—MUDDLE ABOUT RECONNAISSANCE—CONFUSION AT MASSOWAH—INTRIGUES OF EGYPTIANS AGAINST THE CHIEF OF STAFF—HIS RESORT TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL—THE BATON OF AUTHORITY—THE PRINCE FOR SHOOTING SOLDIERS—FUTILE EFFORTS TO SYSTEMATIZE PUNISHMENTS.

Definite preparations for a move began soon after the closing of the council. Major Durholz had already commenced to blast a road through the mountains; Captain Irgens made a reconnoissance to Bahr-Reza; and all the orders usual in opening a campaign, such as disposing of surplus stores and baggage, were issued. Besides these, it became necessary to issue, right amid the most engrossing other labors of detail, general orders whose substance, in a well-organized and disciplined army, is always embodied in well-known regulations and customs, and would, therefore, already have been taught in time of peace. In a word, the orders had in view not only the correction of the soldiers' ignorance, but the rooting out of the stumps of exploded ideas and substituting new ideas. This is a far more perplexing and difficult undertaking.* Orders intended to overcome the passiveness,—which is the prime cause of such of his delinquencies as neglect and disobedience, leading to insubordination and criminality,—were like the Pope's bulls against comets.†

All was ready on the 11th of the month. Then, agreeably to the views expressed in council, a force of about

* The custom of officers and men cooking and eating together—by which the former are brought into disrepute and contempt with the latter—could only be deplored.

† There is, however, some good growing out of their negative character. The Egyptian soldier is sober, docile,—though not very teachable,—and we never hear of such fire-arm accidents among them as often happen elsewhere among young soldiers, whose interest in their arms develops into love and bed companionship.

one-quarter of our little army—including Field, Derrick, Irgens, Sormani, and two or three Egyptian lieutenants, of the *Etat-Major*—the whole under command of Osman Pacha—opened the campaign by advancing on the Kaya-Khor road. Before we left Cairo it was apprehended that one of our great difficulties would be about transportation, and a member of the staff, therefore, suggested to the ministry of war the indispensability of some assorted rope for the pack-trains, as well as the artillery. This suggestion was thus made because there was no department in the army on which one could make requisition for such articles; but he must make specific demands for them on the ministry. Yet, for this mild suggestion, he got a stunning indication that the duties of the ministry of war should not be assumed by outsiders. Should there arise any need for rope, said the Chief of Staff, it could be taken from the steamers.

“Yes, General,” said the officer with all humility and deference, “but we would not deprive these vessels of their proper allowance of hawser; nor would we create an emergency; we would avoid one while we can.”

Well, our experience on this morning may now be anticipated. The convoy, accompanying the troops, could it have been well stretched out, would have been several miles in length. It consisted in half part of camels, obtained mostly on the frontier, here and there, and with the worst of saddles and of old, rotten packing and leading ropes, where there were any at all. In fact, as the Bedouins on the desert habitually drive their camels, the rear of these saddles had not, generally, the lead-rope—such as the Egyptian saddle has—to which the camel, which follows, is tied. There was to be seen, therefore, on this morning one continuous line of camels, generally tied head and tail,—the Bedouin imitating, as near as possible, the Egyptian camel style,—a Bedouin to every five camels and one to every three other animals.* No sooner had

*The English had already demonstrated the impracticability of this in Abyssinia, and found it necessary to have a soldier with each mule. Experienced packers, as on the frontiers of the United States, are a further necessity.

the caravan reached the hills than—as if to preserve the tradition about starting days—the ropes, or leading-strings, began to part, breaking the caravan up into many fractions, whose leading camels in turn snapped their ropes, jostled from the path and lumbered away to browse. A camelier led back one, only to find another and another of his five burden-jolting animals clambering up the hill, with load fallen or turned. It was but a few minutes until there was along the whole line a scene of the most indescribable confusion. For an instant were heard imprecations of men, amid the blubbering of irritated camels. But as these sea-rolling animals, some with cargo and some without, were here, there and everywhere upon the hill's side, browsing, or dragged to the ground by their burden in every conceivable posture, the Suakim cameliers, in utter helplessness and fear, were soon to be seen, with rations and arms, fleeing for dear life, not to be heard of again.* It was a most trying time for all—men and animals—connected with the convoy service; but damages were finally repaired as best could be done in such an emergency, and the body of the troops arrived at Bahr-Reza the evening of the next day—much of the caravan, however, not arriving for several days afterward.

A depot was established at Bahr-Reza, immediately under the protection of a small field-work, at which the officers—especially Derrick, Dennison and Irgens—and men busied themselves during the next few days, while supplies were being thrown into the place. The principal part of the plan suggested in council was, it will be seen, carried into effect; but neither Guinda nor Addi-Rasso was occupied. As to the responsibility for this change (also for others which will be noticed farther on) in what seemed to be accepted in council as the manner of opening the campaign, it should be known that the Commanding General utterly failed to grasp the situation, and needed advice at every turn. This his second in command and Chief of Staff was there to give; and Loring

* These Bedouins take better care of their own animals. These camels had been purchased by the Governor.

was, therefore, in frequent converse with His Excellency. But it is not known what advice was given, as I made it a rule to let these interviews be strictly private when they took place in the Chief of Staff's office, unless I was specially invited to be present, which was seldom the case. The facts, however, are these: In lieu of occupying Addi-Rasso at once, Osman Pacha had already been directed to make—so soon as the depot should be well under way—a reconnaissance from Bahr-Reza, one or two days farther in advance (notwithstanding it destroyed the only shadow of an objection which could be urged against the immediate occupation of Addi-Rasso), wasting a considerable amount of transportation in preparation for this wholly useless proceeding. Two or three days subsequent to Osman Pacha's leaving Massowah, General Loring had so far changed his mind about the occupation of Addi-Rasso as to desire that the reconnaissance should not extend beyond this point; and to effect this, he began, personally, so as to be sure there would be no misunderstanding, a correspondence with the front—principally with Colonel Field. Ratib Pacha and his personal staff began another series of letters, on the same subject, with Osman Pacha. The Chief of Staff was, in his letters (written after consultation with the Commanding General), directing the reconnaissance to take place, while the other series of letters was practically ordering that none should be made—this being caused by Riffat Effendi and Osman Pacha's confounding the word, or place, Bahr-Reza with Addi-Rasso. It required a week's harassing and jumbling correspondence to brush away the misunderstanding; and then, of course, time, labor and transport force lost could not be recalled.

Again: A deaf ear was ever turned to all suggestions about utilizing, temporarily, artillery and cavalry animals. Instead of arranging the escorts in such manner as to aid in supplying the command in front with boxmat, they were, on the recommendation of an officer at the front, suffered to dwindle down to mere nothing—ten men; and Osman Pacha even retained some of them, thus accumulating a larger force at Bahr-Reza than the com-

manding General first determined on—much larger than was necessary,* and larger than could well be fed in justice to further demands on our limited transportation. The consequence of all this was, that there was accumulated at Bahr-Reza inside of two weeks, only about ten days' supply of boxmat and salt for the army (besides a full allowance of ammunition, and a few days' forage for a little cavalry)—several days, less than should have been accumulated, rendering it afterward necessary when the plateau was reached, to delay there longer than would otherwise have been necessary—feeding the force there with difficulty, while bringing the stores all the way from Massowah. But these results were not wholly due to the mistakes just described, for there was much confusion at Massowah at this time. Orders from the Commanding General, whose contents were unknown to the Chief of Staff, were continually sent to escort and other commanders. Orders, through the Chief of Staff, lacking the Commanding General's own personal seal, were flatly disputed and disobeyed in every direction. Messengers and trains were stopped or diverted from their course. Staff officers were daily rushing into the office with despair broadcast upon their faces, in utter helplessness. Scores and scores of animals with contraband baggage and stores were going to the front. Orderlies and guides, all were carried away unknown to the Chief of Staff. Nearly every order issued through his office by the Commanding General, was preceded, accompanied, or followed by one, on the same subject, emanating from the fertile imagination of one of Ratib's redoubtable personal staff, or maybe from that of Riffat Effendi, who was an able exponent of the Pacha system. Orders were repeated twice and again only to be ignored. No heed was paid by the Commanding General to representations and advice of the Chief of Staff, regarding the Egyptian soldiers' maltreatment of friendly Abyssinian hucksters who were permit-

* Indeed the original force suggested in council, was suggested on the supposition that Addi-Rasso would be occupied immediately. When the Commanding General determined not to do so, this force at Bahr-Reza should have been reduced instead of increased.

ted to enter the lines and sell their marketable articles—fraught, though such treatment was, with much evil against discipline, and against the Staff's pacific efforts with the border Abyssinians. And the Arab "cypher," which it was desirable the Commanding General might employ, on the wires with the war ministry, failed; doubtless, because of Ratib's suspicion that a devil might lurk under the bush, although the Egyptians would have the Chief of Staff believe that it was in consequence of the inability of the translator. All this was unconscionable wear and tear on Loring, who felt that the burden of responsibility was upon his shoulders. In his extremity, he went to Ratib Pacha, whom he found quietly enjoying a game of chess with the Prince. The General's ruffled feathers and manner led His Highness to considerately authorize that his presence be ignored when the Chief of Staff had business of importance with the Commanding General. He now had such business, and was warm for the work. He began to detail the irregularities, and soon impressed His Excellency with the seriousness of the occasion. The Pacha was aroused, for the moment, and directed the General to punish the officers himself.

"All officers who disobey you," said he, "must be thrashed;" and he thrust into the General's hand a stick with which to do the cudgeling. The Prince caught the excitement, mumbled out something which terminated with the expression: "Some of these fellows must be shot yet."

The General returned excited, taking long and firm strides, full of confidence, as if he had found the panacea for all our military ills, and then, before he had fairly reached the door, rang out in the usual vigor of his language, above the noise and confusion of the office, "Yes—some of them must be shot!"*

"So mote it be," was echoed round quite listlessly, and by some with ready and indiscriminating gusto. Else-

* Instead of teaching and regulating the Egyptian soldier, the officer finds it easier to credit him with full knowledge—though he usually acquires as little through orders as he receives by inheritance—and then holds him responsible for the consequences of his ignorance, even to the extent of his life.

where the suggestion was made to the General to more fully impress upon Ratib the necessity of inaugurating, before it was too late, some equitable system of dispatch courts and of punishments founded on justice, and in lieu of caprice. The army was then, as it is now, in the condition of frontier society in America, where the lack of courts and law creates a tendency to spasmodic extremes and to take life for every little delinquency.

"Cannot some system of discipline be introduced?" said one officer to the General; "our own safety—if the campaign is not to be thought of—demands it."

"What shall it be?" asked the General.

"Let it be the loss of pay, rank or grade, or be whatever else efficacious and convenient to administer in the field, you may select from the many equitable punishments in vogue in other armies."

Right amid the conversation and under our very noses occurred another flagrant case of neglect and disobedience, effecting in the General a spasm of discipline. He required the offender (an officer) to carry a message some twenty miles and return, afoot, within a certain time. The effect was almost marvelous on the individual, so unexpected was the punishment. He would have preferred the usual rod.* But as scarcely another officer or soldier in the command knew of the offense and punishment, the discipline of the army was, of course, not affected by it. Such an isolated case was like attempting to empty the sea with a bucket. In some quarters it was thought a magnificent effort, answering as a scare-crow to the army for the rest of the campaign, and with a self-satisfied air, we again relapsed into a state of indifference. Only, however, for a day or so; for our measures—from Ratib down—had now been carefully taken, almost instinctively, by the inferior officers and soldiers.

* Soldiers, and men generally, who have not lost all self-respect and ambition, suffer, under the infliction of ordinary punishment, more mentally than physically. When this punishment has been and is endured by sympathizing friends, it is freed of its greatest poignancy. A new, unexpected—surprise—punishment, putting the sufferer out of the common pale, has more deterring power. Instance: The rod in and out of Egypt.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE JOURNALISTS—WERE THEY SPIES—THE CHIEF OF STAFF IN HIGH DUDGEON—PATIENCE IN EGYPT—TROPICAL MUSIC—REORGANIZATION OF THE TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT—THE CHIEF DIRECTED TO USE THE CUDGEL—RATIB'S INDIFFERENCE—LORING'S ANXIETY AND EXERTIONS—SHEIKS—KRUPPS—MOHAMMED ALI PACHA—SANITARY STORES.

General Loring's influence with the natives was not strengthened at this time by such associations with the two Houghtons (during their short stay at Massowah), as their habitual eating at his table, together with two others of the staff and myself. There was much feeling among the Egyptians against these two Englishmen. It was believed by the Prince, Ratib Pacha and others, that the Houghtons were endeavoring to establish an Abyssinian port at Zulla—territory claimed by Egypt; that they had originated the story now prevailing at Massowah—at which His Highness turned up his nose and suggested that it may have been Arrendrup—that Arakel Bey, when hope had fled at the battle of Gundet, had shot himself. It was also believed that, after borrowing one hundred thalers from Arrendrup's Egyptian funds, and otherwise getting into his confidence, they voluntarily made their way to the enemy's lines.* Indeed it was generally believed by Egyptians that they were the worst of spies, whatever may have been their real character and occupation. And short work would doubtless have been made of them had there been none to say nay. Excepting one or two members of the *Etât-Major*, and, perhaps, two or three Egyptians near the Commanding General, none knew that these

* This latter is thus publicly noticed because, if untrue, it should be denied. I think it my duty to these gentlemen to say that it was generally believed of them.

journalists, as they called themselves, had been thus imposed, (was it with malice prepense?) by the wiseacres of superior authority, on the General. Notwithstanding their presence prevented those at the table wasting some of their festal moments in business, the General could not, under the circumstances, be satisfied with the arrangement, although his mouth was closed. Insubordination, therefore, rife at all times, and arising from general neglect and the lack of proper respect for the foreigner and Christian among the staff, was daily spreading wider and wider and had now entered the General's own little household, even into his office and kitchen. This was an insufferable strain upon the harmony of his disposition. The flood-gates of his wrath opened. Officers, clerks and cooks were belabored or collared and whirled from the door into the air, like rags in a khamsin. One would have thought that this was the beginning of a new era in the history of the campaign. But it was only a flash. There were no further regular or effective steps toward inculcating a spirit of discipline. The General did make other efforts with the Commanding General, but his success was so meagre that he frankly said:

"Well, I myself cannot punish systematically. Once I knocked a servant down; no sooner had it been done than I raised the man up and gave him a dollar. And that was not the worst of it," he continued, "the d—d fellow ever after tried in every possible way to induce me to knock him down again."

Truly, of all known places, there is none like Egypt for losing or acquiring patience, when you come in contact with the people. "Losing or acquiring" is an apparent anomaly—but, one going with patience to the country, is certain to lose it; and if already without it, he will as certainly acquire it—nature's law of progress always changing the tack. The place of all others, in Egypt, where the tension on one's patience is greatest, is in the army, where time is such an essential element of success; for time here, as elsewhere throughout the country, is the cheapest article (unless it be lies?), every man, woman

and child inheriting a slice, measured, they seem to think, by the duration of the pyramids.

Nevertheless, all did not think the situation pessimistic. Although there was conflict among the orders, and resulting confusion and delay, personal relations between the line and staff and around headquarters were the pleasantest. Some officers were actually swamped in work, yet there were others who could sport the plains. Although letters did not arrive, no one could deny that the vessels which put into port almost daily came well laden. Our animals were dying, yet were we not blessed with music over their bleaching bones? Although night was made hideous, thought some, by these prowling beasts, yet others of our number who were nightly hearing the spit of the lynx, the yelp of the jackal, the plaintive howl of the hungry wolf and of the hyena, mingling at random with the snort of the Arab (steed), the mellifluous grumble of the camel, and the dulcimer strains—the distinctively Egyptian bray—of the ass, were not to be deprived of their fascinating optimism. The Egyptian optimist who enjoys his three octaves in discord, and is at ease with the softness of a bed on the desert sand, and lives in hashish dreams, Koran visions, and luscious promises of kohl-eyed houris, even he paused, be it in his evening prayer, when the lion's terrific roar joined this tropical harmony.*

When the Suakim cameliers fled, Ratib Pacha telegraphed to Cairo for troops to fill their places, which had been temporarily filled by soldiers taken from the expedition. Lieutenant-Colonel Arraby Bey, Chief of Transportation—an Egyptian who would have been a fine officer elsewhere than in Egypt, and should not have been held accountable for evils in his department, which were mostly the result of lack of system—was superseded as chief on this morning by Lieutenant-Colonel Shakir Bey, a Circassian, who then, under instructions from headquarters, organized the transport animals into five distinct convoys; more officers were assigned to duty with them, and one soldier was de-

* Many children are carried away yearly by beasts of prey from the villages near Massowah.

detailed for every two camels. Even this arrangement gave little more satisfaction, so great was the disorganization. Major Loshe was, therefore, made Chief of Transportation, in lieu of Shakir Bey. It was with much difficulty, however, that the Chief of Staff prevailed on the Commanding General to gain his consent to this assignment. He assented to it, but retained both the lieutenant-colonels practically under the orders of the Major (but against the Major's wish), thus inciting disaffection and intrigue. However, ambitious to succeed in his difficult task, rendered most difficult by the lack of means, the Major threw into it all his unflagging energy—scarcely closing his eyes during the next ten days—procuring new rope, causing one soldier to be detailed to each animal, more officers to be detailed with convoys, and the department generally so systematized that we were saved from immediate ruin. Notwithstanding this improved organization, neglect and disobedience were so widespread that a staff officer was impelled to write at the time, "the resulting delay must end in disaster, if a remedy is not soon applied."

Another effort was, therefore, made to cause some system of rewards and punishments to be established. The result was that the Chief of Transportation was directed to personally take the cudgel and enforce his authority and orders with knocks and pounds among both officers and men. But, as the Major was not quite ubiquitous, any good which might arise from this could be only partial. The Chief of Staff laid complaint after complaint before the Commanding General, until the latter himself, his habitually smooth temper ruffled at the recital of the facts in one particular case, seized a cudgel and went for the officer against whom the complaint was lodged. This, however, proved to be but a surface-disturbing zephyr. A little oil of words quieted the troubled waters of his disposition, which then relapsed into a serenity as melancholy and insufferable as the doldrums, to be disturbed again only by a monsoon. One might suppose this, judging from the placidity of his countenance while engaged with the Prince in backgammon, which he interposed between

himself and trouble. This seeming indifference was, in fact, an inability to realize the magnitude of his undertaking,—to see the labor between himself and success,—as he, for a Turk, has quite a sensitive nature, and realized to the fullest his responsibility in the care of the Prince.

Although at this time the Chief of Staff's office was the general channel through which the Commanding General's orders were communicated to the army, the latter officer's personal staff continued to ignore the *Etat-Major* almost entirely; kept the Chief of Staff ignorant of the many conflicting orders they were continually sending direct to the line, thus creating, of course, almost inextricable confusion and collision. But the General had done such continual hammering that he was now sore with his trials. And in order not to be officious or seem obtrusive, another letter, which he had caused to be written and addressed to Ratib, inviting his attention again to this impropriety, was, on reflection, withheld. But he did not forget that we were soon to have an enemy in our front and it behooved him and all the staff to redouble their exertions generally and repair as well as build.

The poles of the telegraph line, under construction toward Bahr-Reza, were broken down almost as fast as put up. The line was too near the traveled way, the poles were entirely too light,* and the cameliers were so careless as to suffer the animals to run against them or use them as scratching-posts. Several more constructing parties were, therefore, put on to forward the work, and the line transferred to the hills, and eventually put up on trees. A baker's dozen of sheiks now arrived and were distributed among the troops, ostensibly for their spiritual welfare. But if the Egyptian soldier is not to fight fanatically for his religion, the teaching of sheiks simply imposes resignation on him and makes him less a soldier. Therefore, as a kind of counterpoise to the teachings of these disciples of Mohammed, some of the staff, who

* With the recorded experience of the English in their Abyssinian expedition before the eyes of the Egyptian authorities, it seems that this should have been foreseen before undertaking such an expedition. The English were obliged finally, if my memory is not wrong, to procure iron poles in consequence of white ants, winds, etc.

pinned their faith to artillery, became instrumental in having a battery of Krupps telegraphed for.

It was now the 23d of January, and Mohammed Ali Pacha, an educated gentleman and surgeon—one of the living representatives of the Viceroy Mohammed Ali's colony of Paris students—had arrived in good time to assume the duties of Medical Inspector and prepare his department for the field. For this purpose he associated with himself Badr Effendi, the Prince's private physician, and Surgeon (Major) Wilson. With him came tobacco, sweet oranges, and other delicacies, from the Khedive, quite in the manner of the United States Sanitary Commissioner—indicating that the trumpeted fame of this institution had found an echo in the lavish mind of that ruler.

CHAPTER XXIX.

RAPINE ON THE BORDER—THE KING WITH HIS PEOPLE—
HEADQUARTER-PREPARATIONS TO ADVANCE—AN EGYPTIAN SPECTACLE THROUGH EUROPEAN GLASSES—THE ROYAL CAVALCADE—ITS DISMEMBERMENT—LORING'S RIDE—YANGOOS—FASCINATING SCENES—MURDER—MOCKELN'S HAREM—MOUNTAIN SCENERY—DANCE ON THE MARCH—WILD BOARS—VILLAGE OF THE DEAD—LUXURIANT VEGETATION.

We were as anxious at this time, as the reader now must be, to get away from the worrying details, the stifling muddle, so to speak, into the open air of the campaign. To second our anxieties, a score of chiefs and attendants from the Okouleh Gousai came to us with terrible tales of pillage, fire, starvation and massacre, woman and child stealing, and the like, which the enemy had inflicted on them, and other border-friends of Egypt. As they had recently refused tribute to the King, they feared he would again send an army among them to aid his uncle. The Commanding General was strongly urged by them to an advance. Moreover, although the King himself was yet among some of the Galla tribes, whom he was trying to enlist in his cause, Ratib could not prudently longer delay a forward movement, if he would secure a position on the plateau. For His Majesty must be credited with beginning the mobilization of his army on hearing of Osman Pacha's advance to Bahr-Reza. The reconnoissance to Addi-Rasso certainly would not make him more tardy; nor would the fact that the engineers had been improving the road as far as Bamba; nor that no corresponding move was made on the Guinda-Asmara road. Indeed, the natural effect of this neglect was to enable the King to give more definiteness to his own plans.

Nearly a fortnight had already passed since Osman moved to Bahr-Reza. Were the Commanding-General to leave Massowah at this time, it would be well on to three weeks, we knew, before he could get possession of the Kaya-Khor Pass—ample time for the King to assemble an army and advance. Several hundred more transport animals had meanwhile arrived, thus justifying an advance to Gura, if the transportation should be used with care and economy. At any rate, it could no longer be delayed without jeopardizing our further progress, and the success of the campaign. On the 23d, the following conversation occurred between General Loring and myself:

“Now that we are to start to-morrow, what transportation, General, shall be provided for His Highness, Prince Hassan, and his non-combatant suite, and what for the Commanding General, and his personal staff? They should have good camels, of course; but there are now only about one hundred Egyptian camels at transport camp for everybody, including engineers and their material, the signal corps, the medical and other departments of the general staff. Some will be needed for the battery ammunition, as that brilliant undertaking of transporting it on eight-mule carts, which carried each only three pack-mule loads, did not succeed.”

“Put down what you choose.”

“But, General, would it not be well to consult His Highness’ pleasure? At least, to see Ratib, and learn what stuff is to go along; what number of transport animals may be desired or needed? That magnificent silk and satin pavilion, large enough for a harem—is it to go?”

“No; the Prince has been advised that it would be too conspicuous.”

At my solicitation, the Commanding General directed that there should be selected from the largest a score of camels for the Prince’s use, and half as many for his own. The transport camp being at Arkiko, several miles away, these camels were assembled early at night in the palace inclosure, and put aside near their respective places, where they were to be loaded at daybreak. Be-

sides this number of camels, there were thirty-eight more elsewhere for the use of the general staff, and some hundreds of yards away were a lot more, prudently concealed by Major Loshe, to be held in readiness for contingencies. Experience had already taught us the necessity of this precaution. Members of the staff occupied themselves, during the night, making necessary preparations, while the Prince, the Governor and the natives around headquarters ate and drank as if on the morrow they were to die. At daybreak loading began. The Prince's attendants charged his pack-mules—brought from Cairo for his exclusive use—and then began to load the twenty camels.

“Are we to have no more?” they shouted. “This is not enough.” And in a moment could be seen many of his suite darting among the other camels, and with unparalleled effrontery, seizing them here and there, already partly laden with staff stores, the representations of officers that these particular animals were for the signal corps, the medical department or other branch of the staff, availing nothing.

The Chief of Staff stood upon the balcony overlooking the disagreeable scene, yelling and swearing vociferously at this one and that one, the officers interested in the animals disappearing in clouds of blue blazes, the transportation officers even, in utter helplessness, dodging behind a column under the balcony. Up flew that stump of an arm, as is its wont in his wrath, and Loring rushed gallantly below.

“Where in h—— and d—— are you taking that camel? It belongs to the Doctor.”

“His Highness sent me for it,” was the quick reply of the man, with a salaam.

“And you; and you; and you?” shouted Loring, turning from one to another.

“They are all for His Highness, General.”

“Great Gods! this is a pretty kettle of fish. Every cook, syce or what not, is a Prince, and a Major-General's order is but a puff against a squall. We are going to the devil sure enough.”

Any one else might now have succumbed with credit, and most people would have done so in despair, from an inability to find appropriate terms in which to characterize the proceedings. But the General, whose reputation was here at stake, was, as always in such cases, equal to the occasion, and the very air around, where his stentorian voice could be heard, seemed sulphurated. But the cooks kept the camels. The Prince and the Commanding General stood together, leaning over the balcony, enjoying the commotion with apparent unconcern. Every animal of the general staff had been appropriated, yet we were to accompany the Commanding General. A part of the reserve were now called up, and many of these were also captured by these privileged representatives of royalty.

It should be remembered that these animals were exclusive of forty-eight mules and horses especially designed for the Prince's service. This was war with a vengeance! And these incidents are described here, not as exceptional, as it would be in a well disciplined army, but as a type of the habitual. To fill in the time while this was developing, some of Ratib's staff, who occupied quarters in the palace, appropriated, just as the camels were appropriated, several tents belonging to the general staff, and who were not only occupying but preparing them for their own use in the campaign. It was not until after the Prince's attendants had helped themselves that the *État-Major* stood any chance for transport animals. Then Dr. Wilson and others succeeded in making a proper distribution of what was left; and next we followed with the eye the strange cavalcade which, with the Prince and Pacha and a battle flag in front, finally moved out for an advance on Abyssinia. In its *tout ensemble* it had more the appearance of a regiment returning from a "bumming" or foraging expedition than that of a commander entering upon a campaign. Near midday the tail of the caravan could be seen creeping out, its end a huge camel with a hotel cooking-stove spilling its hot ashes and live coals upon the poor animal's flinching back.

Unable, from lack of animals, to accompany this proces-

sion, so stately in everything but order, Loring and myself remained to the last. Setting out at midnight we obtained, after riding six miles, an Abyssinian guide from Rachid Pacha, who, with lantern, kindly guided us through his camp. We traveled all night long in rain and the blackest darkness, among thorned acacias, boulders and blasted rock thrown up by Major Durholz. We passed en route the scattered remains of caravans—the supplies of medicine here, our eatables further on; the signal caravan divided in twain, and that of the engineers ensconced among the rock in mid-route—while the Prince and Ratib, with their escort battalion and squadron, and the mountain batteries, were overtaken just at peep-of-day at Yangoos, where the liberal hospitality of Colonel Möckeln found vent in furnishing all, from his sandy torrent-bed wells, pure mountain water, quite in contrast with the brackish stuff around Massowah. He had entertained them during the night, also, with a rehearsal of the scenes here, where without which would reign dismal solitude—nightly scenes made wild and fascinating amidst echoing hills, fires aglow, by brays and grumbles of asses, mules and camels, and by carcass-eating animals' carousals and hunger howls, the cracking of twigs under the tread of the stealthy leopard, and by the prowling lion's guttural sounds, which, swelling to a majestic roar, and reverberating, spreads solemnity and awe over the midnight scene. And now, as the Prince, Ratib and their suites had just taken their coffee or tea, they were quite ready for the march to Bahr-Reza. General Loring had sent one of his Arab aides—Major Lutfy Effendi—forward the night before to prepare some few conveniences which might be needed after an all-night ride on a mule in the rain. But, much to his chagrin, he was to continue the march, as he arrived, wet and hungry.

Near this station occurred one of the few outrages of the campaign, committed upon an Abyssinian by a soldier, not an Egyptian (the fellah, cruel as he is, has not a murderous disposition), but a Soudanese, from the small command stationed at the place. An Abyssinian woman,

living in a small village off from the main road, and out of sight, refused to submit to this soldier's embraces. Next day he went back to the village, this time with his gun, and murdered her. The man was never punished; not even brought to trial, although Möckeln did his duty in the matter. Indeed, although the latter was without an Arabic translator, he was doing much good at this auxiliary station by reorganizing and otherwise caring for passing trains. On his arrival here everything, under the mismanagement of a native officer, was in the greatest confusion on the road and around the wells, corpses as well as many carcasses lying among the scattered stores. But now if trains did arrive in some disorder they received here, after a rest, thorough reorganization and summary discipline and new impetus onward.

"The caravan is gone; we must be off." Adieu was halloed to Möckeln, who rejoiced in being dubbed Governor of Yangoos.* We worked our way past dozens of Abyssinian women and girls—Möckeln's harem, the Prince jokingly suggested—who were gleaning from the sand the remains of our animals' morning meal of barley; and after a couple of hours' manœuvering along the caravan and column we reached their head. From Massowah beach we had waded through a sandy plain to the villages of M'Kooloo and Hotoomloo, just beyond which we first reached hills of volcanic rock. Thence they extend toward the south into a succession of rising ranges, which from Massowah and onward seem like great terraces or steps thrown up by Titans, higher and higher toward the peaks of Samen, in Central Abyssinia, as if to scale the overhanging clouds. The first of these hills in our vicinity, en route, were more or less bare of vegetation, which, however, becomes profuse upon the more southern spurs, which rise higher into more rock-disintegrating elements. Herds were now seen upon the hills, our own cattle, sheep and goats picking their way along the sides and crests. The valley up which we were going was densely covered with odoriferous and other varieties of the acacia, the

* The name Ya-Negous means, oh, king.

tamarind, etc.; the hill-sides and other shaded spots were green with luxuriant and succulent grass. Over the hills, on either side, was water, so we were told, not in abundance, but, as elsewhere, often springing, like Moses' stream, from rended rock. We passed two or three of these on our way; but a large quantity of water could be secured only by digging several feet down into the sand of the torrent bed, which winds along the valley. The temperature was delightful and the landscape charming. Choristers and birds of brilliant plumage, the rustling of leaves and snapping of twigs, the flit of the gazelle and bound of the deer, announced our advance; and the very thunder, in rejuvenating the atmosphere, seemed to dance in delight among the hills.

Inspired by the fairy scene, the simple-minded boys of the accompanying battalion assembled, without guns or accoutrements, in front of the column. There were they, with arms uplifted and moving up and down like those of jumping jacks, the hands clapping rythmically, and the extended legs ambling a can-can, all in graceful cadence and march to the monotonous though melodious repetition, with varying accent, of the word *Ef-fen-dee-na*.* All in honor of the Prince was this varnished paganism, which seemed ludicrous, even ridiculous, to us in view of battle, though it reminded us again that the Khedive was of the opinion that the expedition would be simply a promenade.

By and bye we arrived at the beautiful plain of Amba-tagan, and there came upon a village, the first one we had seen since leaving Hotoomloo. The surrounding hills abounded with game, and beasts and birds of prey,—a fair struggle here between them for existence,—and which gather with impunity where there are only spears to fear. The dhurra planted by the villagers was well out of ground, and in this green pasturage, less than eighty yards ahead of us, we saw two enormous lion-like wild boars which, surprised, stood with bristles up like great manes on end, and with glistening tusks, in size like the horns of an American antelope. In an instant the Prince was off his

* Meaning (Turkish) lordship, master, protector, etc.

horse, his suite following his example. A battery of small arms was opened on the boars. The Prince and party could no longer be called non-combatants, for the hills now resounded their valor. The wild beasts looked on and listened in simple wonder, and then with heads proudly up, necks stiff, they, in curiosity, advanced a step; but there was no cessation to the hasty discharge of arms. Of the very many shots, one ball alone just grazed the back of one of the boars. There was a flinch, a whiff of the wind, and then at us, in their confusion, they rushed.* But the firing continued; and as the beasts passed our flank, only a few yards away, they were followed on horseback, at full speed, by the Prince and his party, with relays and reserves of animals and arms, far into the hills. But they escaped—the boars!

Two hours later, and just before noon, we were at Bahr-Reza, commanded by Osman Pacha. The only evidence of former habitation here was a village of dead. But there was enough similarity in the construction of these little stone dwellings to indicate that they may have been made by the same friendly hand—that of the Turk. This, in connection with the fact that there is no cultivable valley near by, causes it to be believed, as tradition has it, that it marks the field of one of the thousand border battles between Turk and Abyssinian. Now, on our arrival, one of the hills near the junction of the roads was already capped by a little fort constructed by our engineers, and a redoubt was ordered on a commanding peak near by. The stores were at the hill's base, under the works' protecting fire and in tents sheltered from the incessant drizzling rains of this season. Streamlets rising from perennial springs coursed their way along both the Guinda and Kaya-Khor branch roads—their borders fringed with sweet grasses; and the surrounding hills were green with foliage in wanton luxuriance. Camels left their beans and straw to pick

* The Ethiopian boar's "sight is said to be defective owing to the peculiar position of their eyes, but their hearing is good and their sense of smell exquisitely delicate." Bruce says, the rhinoceros "stands for a moment at bay, then starting forward, he suddenly charges the horse, after the manner of the wild boar, which animal he greatly resembles in his mode of action."—RUSSELL.

among the thorns, just as I have seen them abandon their feed of corn for the mesquite and grease-wood in Texas. Indeed, for some distance after leaving the Massowah coast the country reminds one vividly of the chaparral and mesquite covered plains of Texas and Northern Mexico. Nor is the cactus wanting. But the acacia in Africa, unlike the Texas plant, ascends into the mountains and climbs into places where in many of our Territories only the cedar or pine is found. Hot morning suns, afternoon rains, and cold nights, with accompanying decay of profuse vegetation, rendered this an unhealthy spot at this season of the year. Its name, Bahr-Reza, signifies "sea of dew."

CHAPTER XXX.

PREPARATIONS TO ADVANCE AGAIN—LIEUTENANT MAGDY'S ADVENTURE—EN ROUTE TO GURA—THE DEFILE—ASCENT OF MOUNT BAMBA—WATER-SHED—NECROPOLIS—BLASTING A ROAD—DARWINIAN INHABITANTS OF ADDIRASSO—ROARING FIRES IN THE TROPICS—SCATTERING LUGGAGE—FORT OUTLINED—MESSENGERS FROM THE KING—LUDICROUS SCENE—HAALA PLAIN—VALLEY OF KAYA-KHOR—DILEMMA ON A GOAT PATH—TWO RARITIES MEET—MAGNIFICENT LANDSCAPE.

“Not a thought of Sanheet men yet,” I find in my diary. “All is mystery. Is there a fear to isolate the Egyptian force on the Asmara road, because His Highness (the Khedive) cautioned that detachments should be carefully watched in order that the Abyssinians should have no slight successes to encourage them against the main body? Or does the Government rely upon French influence for the protection of the Bogos province, and desire that no proprietary issue be made just now? If the Commanding General proposes to exercise no care over it, or if its protection is to be a distinct undertaking of the Keren force (to command which he sent a Lieutenant Colonel of his own personal staff), then, to guard our own line, should we not hold Guinda? No such orders are given; mum seems to be the word. We learn that considerably more troops than it was intended should be stationed here have gradually accumulated by Osman Pacha's detaining some Massowah escorts, and reducing others. This has unnecessarily consumed transportation, and is the consequence of the national tendency to do things just contrary to the way other people would do.”

However, transportation had accumulated under our orders for an advance, which should have been no longer

delayed. The road was clear, there was no enemy in front nearer than Adua, except a few hundred in the Hamaseen, under Welda Mikael. Major Loshe arrived on the afternoon of the 26th with the rear of the supply train. Major Dennison and myself, and one Arab clerk, set about reorganizing the command, arranging anew the transportation, and otherwise preparing for the march at daybreak on the morrow. This was hard work to do in the absence of daily reports, which were persistently refused us by the several battalion commanders. It was necessary for us to wade through the same laborious work, but with less detail, perhaps, as at Massowah to ascertain the strength of the force, so that we might make a fair distribution of transport animals. There was not an animal to spare, and we had to calculate almost to the pound for our soldier-children. We had to do their work as well as our own, and furnish them with animals accordingly; for a deficiency of one animal in one place would lead to the seizure of an animal from the command of an inferior officer, and thus through the whole army, create intolerable confusion and great delay. Five hundred and sixty-eight of our best camels were here ready for an advance. We averaged their burden power at three hundred and fifty pounds, and thus provided transportation for the command of nearly four thousand men, including a battalion of engineers, four batteries of mountain artillery, and a few cavalry. The camels were to carry, besides baggage, fifteen days' rations, ten days' half-forage, one hundred rounds of ammunition per man of infantry, and seventy-four rounds for each of the twenty-three guns. The men carried, besides, an overcoat and blanket, seven days' rations and one hundred rounds of ammunition. To transport all the Prince's suite and baggage was impossible, so he consented to leave a part of his traps and attendants.*

The night was passed in preparation, and in the early morning while the men were packing, I heard the story of

* It required a transport force equivalent to two hundred and twenty-five mules to carry the Prince and suite.

Lieutenant Magdy's* adventure. With a few cavalrymen, several infantrymen and servants, all mounted, he was coming in late at night with the tail of the caravan, at Yangoos. They were yet out of sight of this place (Yangoos), but had arrived in the hills near by, among the blasted rock, in a spot low and dark enough to excite apprehension of danger in the minds of these "innocents abroad." Presently they heard the awful roar of a lion hard by, and saw the beast as if it were close upon them. Instantly firearms were prematurely discharged or dropped, horses as well as men were frightened, servants and infantrymen spilled upon the ground and trampled over by the cavalry, and the two camels in the very rear abandoned to their fate. The men arrived at Yangoos out of breath, pale and bleeding, scratched and torn, as were also the horses, with the thorns of the wilderness. The men said these wounds were made by lions' claws. They could not be induced to leave the camp until next morning when they found the bones and cargo of only one camel, which had been eaten up by the prowling wild beasts. The other doubtless met a similar fate among the hills.

Osman Bey, one of the most energetic and intelligent of the native officers, was ordered to remain at Bahr-Reza, to perform a duty similar to that assigned to Möckeln at Yangoos. Osman had instructions to send every camel that arrived from Massowah with stores to the front; and *to use, if absolutely necessary, other animals*; but to cause them to go with one day's forage no farther than Addi-Rasso, and then return. An hour or so before daybreak, with the rain still falling, and everything wet and heavy but our spirits, we started out; the Prince and suite taking the lead, and the rest of us distributed along the column. We sallied from the Guinda road valley, and by the Kaya-Khor road entered a broader valley with gently sloping hills on either side; and high up among the rocks were scarcely distinguishable grazing herds, owned by Massowah merchants. There was water here and there,

* The Egyptian assistant and translator to Major Leshe.

in a little sandy bed through the valley. This valley first widened, and then narrowed toward the south, as the green mountains rose higher, and their slopes became more vertical, until just before the end of the valley, where we found a defile with precipitous sides of metamorphic rock, hundreds of feet in height, with issuing streamlets and miniature cascades, sparkling in stolen rays and playing down the rock. After a three hours' march, over a very stony road, we rested awhile and then filled canteens and *zemzemiyes* from the crystal rivulet, preparatory to the ascent of Mount Bamba, which one thought ought to be dubbed His Highness in honor of its height as well as of its present ascent by the Prince. We found a broad road, as passable as the engineers under Dennison could make one, up the steep rugged sides. With the Prince, as usual in the advance, we, with long reins, led our animals up the steep of abrupt turns; step by step we slowly ascended, fairly catching our breath at almost every instant of the way. At the end of near an hour's time we reached the summit, which is about four thousand five hundred feet in height. Here we rested while the caravan was being, almost literally, carried up.

We wiped the perspiration and dust from our eyes, but, with our hoof-scraped calves and our trembling from strain, were scarcely in condition to enjoy the extended and attractive view of mountain scenery. The rain-shed between the coast and interior of Abyssinia crests along this cloud barrier; for the rains which were then heavy—from Bamba to Massowah—cease in the spring at the beginning of the Abyssinian rains proper, which wash the mountains and fill the gorges and plains farther south, and are then gathered up by the tributaries of the Mareb, of the Tacazzé, and of other more southern streams, which bear these waters so pregnant with fertility to the Nile. The descent, although steep, was not so long as the ascent, and we arrived with comparative ease at the foot, where headquarters had been established under umbrageous wanzas. Here we lunched, water being plentiful, while the long caravan was coming down the mountain. The

whole vicinity for many miles around was but a succession of ragged mountains and deep, abrupt gorges, packed in such wild confusion as to render the country, elsewhere than the road traveled, absolutely impassable for man or beast of burden. Yet on the highest of these peaks, near its cloud-peering top, in the dewy grass and foliage, were seen animals feeding, which we took to be eland, or similarly colored domesticated cattle.

After a long rest, we were soon in the saddle, again winding our way along a valley close-hedged by hills and mountains. We passed another little necropolis, said to mark a battle-ground, and finally we ascended into the hills again, picking our way among granite rock and granitic schist (or conglomerate), at times through spaces hardly wide enough for one to pass, and several hundred yards of which had to be cut down and blasted to make a road for the artillery. We continued along ridges for three or four hours,* and finally arrived at Addi-Rasso, which, with its beautiful brook, winding the valley, on its either side palms and acacias in profusion, was a paradise in a waste of mountains, and seemed like the end of a journey. This was not so much because of our excessive fatigue, as because of the home-like surroundings. Yet there were no inhabitants other than chattering monkeys swinging in the festoons of matting convolvuli, or playing among the limbs of trees, or escaping with baboons in troops to the hills. The young upon the backs of bouncing mothers, were protected in their retreat by gray-bearded males, fierce-looking as a guard of the first empire, and who (used in deference to Darwinism) one would suppose, from appearance, spent most of their time seated.

The water at this place is as clear as crystal; but as it comes from the rock it was found to be too warm to be drunk until it had been exposed to the cooling effects of the atmosphere. Be this a result of nature's wisdom or be it one of her freaks, it certainly is a fortunate thing

* The computation of distance in hours always takes into account the difficulties of a road, and its use instead of miles is therefore at times more convenient for an army. It is used by most military nations.

for the heated and thirsty traveler that it is so warm. The moment the broiling sun disappeared, the thermometer lowered almost as suddenly as in a Texas norther, and we were compelled to build large fires throughout the camp—such as are seen on a winter's Indian campaign in the territories of North America. Indeed, overcoats and blankets, two or three of them, when obtainable, were brought into requisition. Luggage-camels arrived in detachments all night long, dropping tents in one place and the poles in another. The cooking utensils and eatables of many of the officers and men, also stationery, records and boxes of government funds, were scattered along the way, abandoned by Arab officers and men who had had these things, and these things solely, under their especial care.

A hill was selected in the evening as the site for a little fort, the line was laid out by the engineers and arrangements made to leave one of their number—an Egyptian—with a few hundred men to construct a work for three or four companies and two guns. Besides the road just traveled, another one from Massowah, through Arkiko, following the dry bed of the Ali-Guddy, enters this valley; and from the front, joining at Gura, are also two—one to the left of this Kaya-Khor road we were now traveling, *i. e.* the one through Saganeit and by which Durholz retreated to Massowah after Arrendrup's destruction.

During the night of our stay at Addi-Rasso, there arrived in camp two Abyssinians, whom King John had permitted the Nieb Mohammed captured in the Arrendrup expedition, to send to procure money for his own ransom. They informed us that the King had just returned from the south to his capital, where he had already directed the assembling of his troops. Our command, mostly without sufficient cover, were early frozen out, and dawn was locally hastened by blazing, crackling fires. Cooks and servants had been up, some of them all night; but there was one habitually lazy syce, a servant of General Loring, who was still snoring loudly when his animals should have had and eaten their morning meal. He lay among the

saddles, favorably exposed for "strap oil," where Loring found him thus coiled up. Forthwith a full-sounding blow fell upon the fellow and he jumped up as if shot up, only to receive in quick succession blow after blow and curse upon curse, while he, poor devil, struggled in the dark, over this and that box and among the tent-cords, up and down, crying at the top of his voice, "Allah! Allah!" He escaped at last, only to stumble over the General's already prepared breakfast, tumbling the dishes together in one mass, and thus gaining time and advantage over his master's temper. Then he ran to his horses and dodged around them, as he had often done before, until he thoroughly worried out his pursuer. Serious as it was to him, all of us who witnessed the incident were convulsed with ill-concealed laughter at his comical plight.

At break of day we went up the stream through a little valley, for about three miles, when we again climbed to the hills, our long train following, miles in the rear. We descended to Haala plain, and at a lunch, disorganized by our rough ride, wasted time until the train overtook us and closed up. After an examination of maps of the country in front by the Commanding General,* we all moved out again, and at the end of four hours' march reached the other end of the plain. This plain is about one-half its length in width. Covered as it was with mesquite-looking acacias, and with deep torrent-beds breaking up its otherwise smooth surface of light ferruginous soil, it, too, had much the appearance of a limited prairie of western Texas—say along the Honda—though with none of the latter's "hogwallow" unevenness of surface. Nor was the resemblance lost here; for a species of the bird of paradise which we came upon, was not unlike the commonly so-called bird of Texas. We missed the chaparral cock and the turkey, but had the guinea-fowl; for the peccary we had the wild boar; hare for hare and antelope for antelope, including the gazelle.

* The Egyptians, having little variety of scenery at home, have very indeterminate notions of topography.

The convolvuli showed the more southern latitude, which was, however, rendered partly nugatory as to climate by the height of the plain, thus assimilating the natural conditions of the two places.

Seated upon the short, dry grass, we awaited the arrival of the troops, who came up splendidly, though some of the younger ones had broken down under the weight of their heavy loads, just as they neared our stopping-place. There was very little straggling, however; not more to fear of Abyssinians was this due, perhaps, than to an uncertainty of punishment by the Egyptian commanders. The soldier realizes that only the testimony of a malicious or designing commander is required to convict him of desertion. But there were no houses en route since leaving Ambatagan, nor water since Addi-Rasso, to tempt them to leave the ranks.

Pretty soon we again found evidences of a village. The field-glass distinguished fallow ground in a distant valley on our left; and there were fawn-colored Abyssinian cattle—always with humps and big horns—grazing among the hills. A yoke of oxen dragging a forked stick—the plow of antiquity—was seen, through the brush, coming from the field. The breech-covered driver did not observe us for some time, and, with cattle ahead of him, he leisurely ascended a knoll. But when he did discover us, he rushed his yoked cattle down the road, and disappeared in a jiffy over the hills. We passed through an extremely narrow defile, formed by the terminating rocks of two converging ranges of hills, which, as we entered the defile and descended, rose into mountains, and opened out to enclose a snug little nest of a valley, with the stone-built village of Kaya-Khor sitting upon an egg-like knoll within. On our right we saw another village resting on the side of the mountain, that cast into the valley early shades of evening. The lowing and bleating flocks, followed by a spear-armed shepherd, were returning thus soon from the hills, browsing and nipping the way. On a little patch in the valley were signs of rude cultivation; but now, out of season, all was parched and dry. The little pile of barley-

straw generally to be found near an Abyssinian village was consumed. The teff and dhurra, if there were any, were buried out of sight. There were no fruits, no vegetables—not even the little tomato or wild-like potatoe sometimes seen in other villages. Raif's troops had been here, and it was evident they had consumed everything in their way. Neither milk nor eggs were to be obtained.

We passed Kaya-Khor on our direct route. In striking contrast to an Egyptian village, not a dog was to be seen; but the people were upon the flat roofs of their huts to get a glimpse of the passing troops. The guide we obtained here preceded Ratib Pacha, and we all followed, mounted, where hitherto none but footmen had been. Into the hills and up the rocks we went, until it became absolutely impossible for our animals to follow the trail farther. Then the Commanding General discovered that we were pursuing the village footpath to water; that the guide had so taken us because the flocks sometimes climbed there. As there could be no farther progress, how to return with the animals—how to turn them round—was now the question. A score of officers had been led by the Abyssinian, perhaps unconsciously, two or three hundred yards into this dangerous path, where every step was of necessity so picked and careful that we were obliged to risk our own heads upon the backs of the beasts to get them along. Fortunately, there were one or two small ledges of rock, on which we could with great care turn a mule, and to these, with fearful difficulty, we backed our animals. Luckily we had not descended one more rock, for up it our animals could never have been backed. We finally extricated ourselves, and with flying colors, as in victory, sped away to select a camp—water to be an after consideration. Here we were again obliged to have roaring fires; and with few exceptions all bivouacked, in consequence of the late arrival of camp equipage. Some of our number had not eaten a "square meal" since leaving Massowah. Their feelings may be imagined, then, when General Loring's last piece of meat—his precious supper, cooked and upon the table—

was carried away by the only dog seen since leaving Mas-sowah. That these two rarities should meet seemed a miracle. The Chief of Staff began to feel that there was a conspiracy to destroy him; and some suspicious characters (who may laugh when they read this), bivouacked close by, suffered for their temerity. We subsisted, however, during the night on hopes of the morrow.

Two places other than the one just left were found, where water could be obtained in very limited quantity. But it came out of rock high up on a precipitous hill-side where it was impossible for animals to climb. A few were watered with buckets, but the rest were left to endure their privation until we should arrive at Gura.

We got an early start, and climbed slowly up the zigzag road, leading to the top of Kaya-Khor Mountain and out of Kaya-Khor Pass. We reached the summit in about an hour, and then turned to take a farewell look at one of the most magnificent sights it was ever my fortune to behold. Language or the canvas can give of it but a faint conception—but an extravaganza, or ragged-edged distorted shadow of distinctly toned nature. One could not look down, down, as it were into this little tomb of a valley, and contemplate the lofty and craggy mountains here around, and beyond enchaining Haala plain, without being impressed with the sublimity of Nature, the grandeur of her power. And now, to see this extensive plain, bed-like, just emerging from night, its peaks like heads of sleeping giants peering through the snow-white covering, which seemed like a great sea that had dashed against the overhanging promontories all its waters into rolls of fleecy foam, and old Sol, in all his majesty slowly rising over the hills to lift the last veil between night and coming day, his glorious progress heralded in golden colors, from peak to peak, was a creation of Him only who can blend in harmonious tone the grand and beautiful. We were all so fascinated that our onward march was reluctantly resumed, and we continued it with eyes to the rear until the enrapturing view disappeared behind the hill as we descended the gentle incline into Gura plain, the beginning of the plateau.

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE PASS—PREPARATIONS TO MEET THE ENEMY—WRONG ROAD—TREACHEROUS BANKS—AN INCIDENT THAT LED TO A DUEL—CAMP IN WRONG VALLEY—WATERING HERDS BY PRIMITIVE METHODS—TREES GROWING UNDER GROUND—TURKISH EMBLEM—AN ABYSSINIAN REBEL—RATIB'S SCARE—ORDERING TROOPS INTO THE FIELD WITHOUT SUPPLIES—THE KING WITH FORCE FOR OBSERVATION—STAFF EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE COLLAPSE OF THE CAMPAIGN.

The head of the column was now through the pass, which a few hundred determined men could successfully have defended against us. Here we waited the ascent of the command. Our glasses distinguished a village on a hill some hours ahead, and a road toward the south up another hill, three or four hours away, at the other end of the plain. But our officers were generally convinced that the crowds of people there assembled were not Abyssinian soldiers—only villagers who had heard of our coming. However, the guns were unpacked from the mules and mounted upon their carriages. Other precautions were also taken, and we were soon lost among the bushes down the middle of the valley. Within an hour of the village our road separated into two branches. This was enough to destroy Ratib's *aplomb*. The command was halted and the guides overhauled, also a superior officer of the staff, by Ratib, who, with his uncouth ideas of military matters, seemed to think it the duty of this officer to remain with the guide as if this would have made the roads coincident. Some of us were for continuing down the valley until we came to water; but for some unknown reason we were taken upon the other branch to the village of Gura.

There were no dogs here to bark us welcome;* but the chickens cackled heartily over our approach, while women and children sought safety in sudden flight. But few men were to be seen. As we neared the place our behavior restored confidence, and the population came out of their human stables into the filthy ally-like streets.

The ruler of this and the neighboring villages—fourteen in all—a kindly-faced old shiek, who lived in the second story—his animals in the first—of the only two-story hut in the place, now, with the inevitable umbrella, and, mounted upon a diminutive mule, made his appearance. He was preceded by a cortege of a dozen or more attendants, and made a good display. Arriving near the Commanding General he evolved a very graceful Abyssinian salaam.† While the head of the column tarried, some of our officers accompanied the sheik and his suite to another valley, eastward, where were watered all his village herds, now to be seen in thousands upon the side of every hill. Majors Durholz and Turnheysen and myself rode into another valley in search of water, of which we found an abundance.‡ Our now almost famished animals, some of them suffering from about fifty hours of thirst, were bent on getting at it. We managed, however, to control our animals; all save one orderly, whose horse rushed in madly, taking the rider down with him. The man was soon rescued, and hurriedly divesting himself of his clothes he went to save his beast, which was, in the Egyptian style, loaded down with articles now fast absorbing weight

* They may have been concealed. For in other parts of Abyssinia are not only the Pariah dog, but a fleet, light-colored dog, resembling the Arabian greyhound, and which, it is said, is used to hunt guinea-fowl.

† There are several kinds of these salutations. The most noticeable is that of an inferior person to one of exalted station. He bends forward three times. On each occasion, keeping his knees quite stiff, he bends over until his head nears his knees, each forward motion being accompanied by a revolution of his arms over his head, and then gracefully falling to his legs. The motion of each hand is somewhat similar to a Turkish salaam; but the backs, instead of the palms, of the hands appear in front.

‡ The porous earth of this and neighboring valleys absorbs much of the rain-water, which is there held by an impenetrable substratum not far from the surface. Water is, therefore, found by cleaning away a few feet only of the overlying sand and earth. And often, as in this case, this labor has been already performed by nature; or, if by man, the denuded reservoir was afterward so neglected as to be taken possession of by the rank vegetation at the water's edge. This latter supposition would involve the belief that these valleys once supported a much larger and more thrifty population.

of water. This lakelet had grass-matted earth projecting like banks over its waters. This had deceived the horse, if not also the rider, and presented itself as our difficulty in an attempt to save the animal. It was soon stripped of everything except the bridle; but, chilled in the cold water, it seemed conscious of its danger, and, almost frantic, again and again reared from the bottom and placed its feet upon the treacherous bank only to fall back, discomfited and discouraged, despite all our efforts. This happened again and again, and in the midst of it, while we were trying successively what looked like the firmer points of the bank, one of the staff, who was exhibiting great interest and prudent zeal in the saving work, suggested, in the utmost frankness and innocence, that, inasmuch as we could never get the animal out by pulling on the bridle, we had better abandon the head and tug awhile at the tail. He was quite vexed that the brilliant suggestion was not adopted. Could anything illustrate better than this ludicrous proposition did, the want of the practical in the officer's military education? By obtaining a promise of secrecy from the only other officer present, I sought to protect the Major from the ridicule of his comrades; but the story followed him to his grave.* The horse was afterward rescued, but in quite an exhausted state. The other party had similar experiences, having lost two or three of their horses.

The valley into which the sheik had guided one party, had an area of from three to four square miles. It was selected as our camp. Part of it was covered with the parched remains of grass, which seems to cure standing like the gramma; but it was readily eaten by our animals. The other part of the valley was just now not in cultivation, it not being the proper season of the year. The people here, depend mostly on their flocks and herds to sustain life. Water at the season we were there, was difficult of access. Notwithstanding that it was considerably below the land surface, and had to be raised, the herds were brought to this valley in preference to others, sim-

* See a future page.

ply because the location was convenient. The water is raised by constructing along the banks, for drinking purposes, mud basins which are filled from a succession of auxiliary ones nearer, just as we see the fellah lifting it in baskets from the Nile. These basins at different levels are filled in turn by the slow process of dipping up the water with a small stone-ware saucer-shaped dish, by a child. As their fat herds were coming here habitually for water, the difficulty of procuring sufficient for our animals was quite apparent. It was unfortunate, therefore, that we had left the other, or principal valley, even if there had been no controlling reasons for our remaining in it.

The people of the country in which we were now encamped, do but little cooking; consequently fuel is not much of an item to them. But the nights are cold throughout the year, and it was one of our cares to procure enough fuel to cook our meals, and warm our chilled limbs after the sun went down. There was an abundance of flat fuel (cattle droppings), which the men gathered in their blankets for cooking purposes; but those of us not fond of the superabundant flavor given our dishes by this sort of fuel, collected what we could of the dead limbs of the few wide-spreading daro* found here. This is the only remaining tree upon these hills, besides one or two varieties of the acacia, which grow smaller and smaller as we rise into these colder altitudes. When the daro limbs were gone we resorted to the roots of the acacia, which grew in inverse proportion to the top, after the manner of the Texas mesquite tree. But in Texas we must dig, and dig, and dig, while in Abyssinia the rains have done most of the work.

On the evening of our arrival, some of us called the attention of the Egyptians to a happy omen for the augury and astrology believing. This was the Egyptian, or, it should be said the Turkish, emblem, which as never before did we see in its full glory in the heavens—in the clearest of skies and atmospheres, a most superb crescent moon, and the brilliant evening star just below, as on our flags,

* Tigré name for sycamore fig, named in Amhara, "worka," I believe.

with no other star near to dim their brightness. Would our emblem remain in the ascendent, or be as transitory as this its prototype, was the question asked. But no enthusiasm could be aroused among the Egyptians on this, or any other subject that savored of war.

Notwithstanding we were in this unsatisfactory position, by mistake, a hasty examination was made of the approaches; pickets were established, cavalry ordered to Gura, intrenchments begun by Osman Pacha, and a battalion was thrown around the Prince. The next day (January 31, 1876), Leige (son of Bérrou), a special friend of Abbé Duflot, arrived with a few attendants. He was the deposed ruler of the burnt village of Addi-Huala, and of the forty-three surrounding villages, and had already received expressions of sympathy from Ratib and others. He now came to give certain information about King John's movements. This, with news brought by a scout, hastened our defensive operations. But it was not wholly forgotten, now that we were upon the plateau, that the ulterior military object of the campaign, as declared in the open instructions to the Commanding General, was to engage and defeat the King in battle. Immediately upon the accomplishment of this, we were to leave the country and fall back to Massowah. Should we fail to bring him into an engagement in this vicinity, the instructions contemplated an effort to do so by marching upon his capital. If both attempts failed, then we were to retire from Adua, take possession of the plateau, and await more definite instructions.

In order to accomplish the main object of the expedition, and at the same time provide for contingencies, our first important duty was to make ourselves as secure as possible here on the plateau, premising that our line of supplies was protected, although in fact it was left open to attack. Our second duty was to prepare for an advance; and our third, to prepare for an occupation of the country, temporary or otherwise, with a view to future military operations.

The engineers were therefore directed to examine the

larger Gura plain—the one we had, unfortunately, turned out of—with a view to defending Kaya-Khor Pass. As no water could be found by them in the pass, nor in its immediate vicinity, the search was continued by digging in the torrent-bed of the valley, in front of and as near the pass as they supposed there were prospects for water. The next day Loring, Field and myself rode to the wells. On our way we met Major Durholz, whom Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick had sent with written and verbal reports of the progress of the work. Water had already been reached in one or two wells, at a depth of only fifteen feet. But General Loring, after arriving at the wells, expressed himself as of the opinion that the prospects for water were not sufficiently encouraging; and other reasons, which he did not disclose, seemed to be repelling him from this location. All of us, including the engineers, then rode about two miles farther down the bed, passing on the way several six-foot wells, from which the Gura people obtained their drinking water. The search was abandoned, in a little while, by the General and all the party, excepting Major Dennison and myself. These two officers, more hopeful than the rest, continued the search, and soon found water. To this place, capable as it was of more complete defense than that already occupied by our army, it was deemed advisable to recommend the army should be at once moved. One of our number,—who always in safety flourished a blustering trumpet,—now that everybody had given their affirmative opinion, declared his mind so vociferously and boldly, that even the gods might hear, he cared not, and would know who dared say nay to the move. However, all preferred this new place as a present encampment. General Loring also preferred it as a site for a permanent fort for the defense of the pass, which the engineers did not.

Although it was decided to move, some of us advised a continuation of the search for water at the point nearer the pass; and that the depot fort should be placed there, because a principal consideration now and here, and which the Khedive so much dwelt on, was the security of our

communications. Indeed, to be definite, it was desirable that the fort should fill, as nearly as practicable, the following conditions :

First, it should be capable of defending the pass.

Second, it should be a depot for the army's supplies needed, now and in the future, for an advance.

Third, it should answer as a nucleus for the present camping of the army.

Fourth, it should be constructed in view of the contingent occupation of the territory, and of future military operations.

It was merely a matter of construction, that a fort, near enough to the pass to defend it, should also fill conditions two and four, providing it was on a knoll and out of the way of rain floods ; and merely a question of water for a large command that prevented this from filling also number three. But as the position where wells were being dug would not conveniently meet the third condition, it was desirable that the army should, for the time being, camp lower down, where we found water convenient at the surface ; and that a fort answering the first three conditions, if not the fourth, should be built close to the pass—in it if possible.

In the evening, after returning from our ride, the Commanding General—who seemed quite upset by the news brought by Leige Bérrou and the scout—after consultation with General Loring,* sent orders direct and in terms unknown to me, that we should be joined in front by Rachid Pacha's command. This force consisted then of 5,426 infantry, two field batteries (394 men), and a few squadrons (566 men) of cavalry, and, with the exception of a few men on the road as escort, was stationed near Massowah. The Commanding General no doubt felt the necessity for this, fearing as he did the approach of the King's army, for a scout and Leige Bérrou had given him information which forced him to this conclusion. By the close of the campaign,

* The General sought the advice of Colonel Field. I cannot account for this officer of experience and mature judgment lending his assistance to such a move only on the supposition that he was hasty—gave his opinion without reflection, without knowing the facts—a conclusion without a premise.

however, His Excellency's experience with Abyssinians as scouts doubtless taught him that it is only the "simple that believeth every word," and that "the prudent man looketh well to his going."* In issuing this order it might be supposed that Ratib justified himself, seconded as he unfortunately was by his Chief of Staff, by believing that supplies for this additional force would be found in the country,—although prior information gave us little hope of finding them, except in limited quantities, and prudence demanded delay and more knowledge on the subject,—were it not that he gave special directions, for some reason inexplicable by himself even, that one thousand of nearly two thousand transport animals between Bahr-Reza and Gura should be mules and ponies instead of camels. This, notwithstanding we had this water as well as the forage question to deal with—a difficulty of huge proportions in the case of mules, but of much less consequence where camels were concerned. That is to say, besides the six thousand four hundred men (in round numbers), there were nearly two thousand five hundred additional animals to be unnecessarily added to our force to be provided with food and water. Such thoughtlessness and ominous lack of foresight seems almost like criminal design when it is known that although our transport animals did their own share of eating, they, as burden-bearing beasts, were equivalent to only about one thousand five hundred of the best or two thousand medium camels. This number was sufficient, only with the closest calculations and the greatest care,—the animals carrying only boxmat, salt and ammunition—to accumulate at Gura, before the rainy season, not more than about twelve day's rations for all that force, and with our manner of doing things could not feed the men, to say nothing of the animals, let alone an advance. Discovering that opposition was of no avail, some of the staff, including the supply officers, took the initiative and informed themselves of the prospects of purchasing the needed supplies, and zealously urged the absolute necessity of

* It was a scare.

taking immediate measures to procure them if they were to be had. This zeal was dampened at the very outset by the intelligence that old Mohammed Bey, of the Intendance Department, had exclusive charge of this business and any suggestions would be considered simply as a desire to interfere, and would, besides, enhance the price of supplies and lead to confusion. This would have been good argument, only that it was subterfuge and that it was practically impossible to awaken the "Old Rip" of a paymaster out of his Sleepy Hollow indifference.

Believing that the news from the front (particularly in a country like Abyssinia, where lying is the normal condition of the native mind) was not such as to warrant Ratib hazarding a movement so disastrous as the loss of a battle, threatening even the success of the campaign, I very delicately broached the matter again to the Chief of Staff. I said that it should not be forgotten that the men of the attenuated line which the King had, at this time, thrown across the sixty-mile front of Adua, were such as had been hastily gathered in the vicinity, the body of his army having yet to be assembled from the distant provinces, and was designed, no doubt, simply to observe our movements. I added that it was my great anxiety for the success of the campaign that induced me to venture upon another allusion to the subject; that instead of doing so with an indifference to his cares or those of the Commanding General, he could in the future, as in the past, depend upon my doing all in my power to assist in lightening his labors and anxieties. But with all deference, "if supplies are not in the country," I said, "or, what is worse, if we do not buy what we can and thus deprive the King of them by our friendly treatment of the peasant, but instead wholly rely upon our transport trains, would it not be prudent, General, to keep this force back, at least a few days, and rely principally on camels instead of mules for the work between Bahr-Reza and this place?"

This suggestion not being heeded, I reverted again to the subject on the 6th, in an official communication to the Chief of Staff, and a copy of which I sent to General

Stone at Cairo. In this paper I called his attention to the deplorable state to which we were fast arriving; that only one-half day's ration of flour for the army had been purchased in nine days; and that the success of the campaign was seriously threatened—that we were ruined if something was not done, and that immediately, to undo our mistake.

CHAPTER XXXII.

CHANGE OF CAMP—RUMORS OF THE KING'S ADVANCE—
TRANSPORT ANIMALS UNDULY TAXED—CAVALRY
WOULD HIDE IN THE FORT—A BATTALION SURROUNDS
THE PRINCE INSIDE THE INTRENCHMENTS—THE ARMY
DEPLETED WHILE THE KING IS ADVANCING—ARTIL-
LERY TO REPLACE RETURNING INFANTRY—ELEPHANTS
—A BATTERY JOINING THE FRONT UNCEREMONIOUSLY
SEIZED AND TAKEN TO THE REAR—WORK ON ROADS
AND INTRENCHMENTS—COLONEL LOCKETT'S ARRIVAL
—ABANDONMENT OF THE IDEA OF THE DEFENSE OF
THE PASS—FORT AT CAMP—BLOCK-HOUSE AS A TOY—
HOW TO TURN THE TABLES ON THE ENEMY.

We changed camp on the morning of February 2d. Picket and signal stations were established on the surrounding hills; and, as at the last camp, before there could be concerted action by the engineers, the men pitched in like beavers, and threw up, under direction of some of the line officers, irregular intrenchments around their position—the camp rumor being that the King's army was coming, and that a regiment of cavalry had already arrived, and was hovering around. The order regarding the movement of troops to the front was fast going into effect. The rumors about the enemy were winged and spurred; it was as if every organization and administrative branch of the Egyptian army had been resurrected, and seemed somewhat like a stampede of mummies. The transport animals were unduly taxed,—forage and other supplies with troops arriving daily from Massowah; and the many thousand rounds of surplus ammunition, especially that for mountain artillery, stupidly sent to Bahr-Reza. There were in all about five hundred rounds per gun, and for much of the infantry seven hundred rounds

per man, a great superabundance, those of us thought who apprehended a single battle would settle matters one way or the other. The cavalry arrived and made strenuous efforts to enter the intrenchments; and the remainder of the Prince's retinue, with scores of additional animals, soon reached the camp. Once more a battalion surrounded his quarters, even though he was inside the intrenchments, so determined were the Pachas that the enemy should not get at this precious representative of royalty, even should they take the fort.

Stampedes were now in order, and occurred frequently. To express in a few words the condition of affairs, it is necessary only to quote from a letter written by me to General Stone at this time. "I don't think," was written, "I ever felt discouraged in all my life; but I do think that our last few days' work—ordering up Rachid's command, transporting supplies, etc.—has been the work of Sisyphus—carrying stones to the top of the hill, only to see them roll down again."

The troops already assembled by King John had, as before stated, sallied out from Adua on the several roads which enter it from the north. They now occupied from Gundet to the east a front of sixty or seventy miles. As Abyssinians travel over these mountains sixty miles a day, on foot, and relays at the rate of two hundred,* the King was no doubt well informed about the daily acquisitions to our force, battalion after battalion arriving as escort to coming trains.

But, all the trains as yet at our disposal—including a few more animals arrived within a day or two—could not, as conducted by the Arabs, more than supply our original force at the front (and slowly accumulate a prudent margin of supplies). There was, therefore, no other alternative than to deplete our force, now daily being increased in the manner indicated; but to do this while King John was advancing required uncommon circumspection; therefore no change was made in the intrenchments, which had been enlarged to admit Rachid Pacha's force, and troops

* Girard says two hundred and forty miles.

were as secretly as practicable distributed among returning convoys, agreeably to the orders of the Commanding General, who, now pressed by General Loring (now become exceedingly anxious), sanctioned their return. But no change whatever was made in the order affecting the relative disposition of the mules and camels, perhaps, because we had by this time, the 9th of February, begun to buy daily at the market, a one-half ration of forage for the animals, and Ratib may have looked upon the damage as an accomplished fact, and irremediable. Notwithstanding the Commanding General seemed to see the necessity for and directed the return of Rachid's troops to Bahr-Reza—not to Massowah—it was only a partial success; for native officers immediately under him, and whose duty it was to do all in their power to intelligently carry out his orders, did everything which secrecy, duplicity and intrigue could do to thwart their execution, while in sweet and gushing strains professing a purpose to faithfully follow their directions. For instance, when a battalion was ordered to return, the brigade commander would detail one with a limited instead of one with a full number of companies; if companies were ordered, fractional ones were generally detailed; in fact, beginning as we did, by calling for a battalion, then for a specified number of companies, we ended by designating the number of men, only to fear our duty was neglected because we had failed to designate them by name.

Yet these antiquated children continued to keep at Gura about one-third of Rachid's command, the rest going to Bahr-Reza, and attempted to conceal their doings by refusing, at Gura, to furnish the Chief of Staff any returns, we learning this fact—of the retention of part of Rachid's command—from the returns of other commanders, and from an actual count made some time afterward. Further, while depleting our infantry command in front, the Chief of Staff and, I believe, the Commanding General, were satisfied with the prudence of replacing the returning infantry with artillery of equal power, which there were fair prospects could be provided for. The Krupp

battery, which was about to arrive at Massowah, would be just the thing for the fort, then being constructed.* Major Dennison was therefore directed, with this in view, to make a reconnaissance from Addi-Rasso to Arkiko, to determine the practicability of bringing the battery by this route instead of by that of Bahr-Reza, the object being to avoid Bamba Mountain. When Rachid Pacha's command came to the front, the steel battery was left at Massowah, and the bronze pieces at Bahr-Reza. Hence the Major was also instructed, if he should find the Ali-Guddy route no better than the other one, to come by Bahr-Reza, and bring with him the field-pieces at this place. Dennison came to the conclusion from his reconnaissance that the Bahr-Reza route was the better of the two, and he therefore set out with the *bulbuls* (or nightingales), as the Arabs called them. But meeting Rachid at Bamba Mountain, on his return from the front,† the battery was unceremoniously taken from Dennison, without order or writ, so far as I know, and marched back to Bahr-Reza. But Rachid had, as yet, little conception of the proper relations of the Etat-Major to the line, and argued no doubt, correctly, if so, that if he was without secret orders from Ratib to do as he had done, he could at least justify his conduct in the eyes of His Excellency; for the battery was a part of Rachid's paper command. Indeed, he at once wrote to Ratib that he feared some injury would happen the battery on the rough road, under Major Dennison's management. It is true that the engineers did not begin repairing the road a second time until between the 14th and 20th—after this incident—but it was a flimsy excuse when the battery had already passed over the rougher portions of the road, that is to say, over the defile, without any serious breakage. Besides it was

* There were also six elephants at Suez, a present to the Khedive from the Prince of Wales. It was believed these were intended to carry artillery over the mountains; but as it was thought in the field that the mountain difficulties could be overcome without them, and were so overcome, it has since been denied that they were intended for this service.

† As the order directing Rachid's return to the rear met him between Addi-Rasso and Kaya-Khor, while he was on his way to the front with the last of his infantry, he personally did not reach Gura.

rendered still more flimsy in view of the fact that the Pacha again dragged the battery over this rough road back to Bahr-Reza, only to prepare it for a third passage.

We retrieved ourselves from disaster only after a loss of perhaps two or three weeks of precious time in the campaign; and we were then obliged to present to the advancing enemy a smaller force than we had when we were out of his reach. This tendency to get the cart before the horse—to use the fingers for forks and dung-forks—is characteristically Egyptian and prolific of many woes in their endeavor to run parallel with civilization. But under the efficient management of the engineers—especial credit being due to Ali Effendi Sameh, the Egyptian Major in charge, and his men—the full length of the road was now fast becoming practicable for artillery; and the intrenchments, in charge of Derrick and Irgens, were receiving some regularity in form, including, through the fortunate perversity of one of our number, a little hillock as a key to the position, and which hitherto had been left for the enemy to occupy. But General Loring was uneasy under the responsibility he had taken to ignore the unanimous report of the engineers, and to advise the Commanding General to establish a depot fort here instead of nearer the pass, as recommended by them. Fortunately for him, therefore, some days previous to this time Colonel Lockett, with a special engineering party, had arrived at Massowah with ministry instructions contemplating, specially, the collection and working up into digestible form of military information about the country in rear and upon the flanks of the army, in view of future contingent military operations. It was this officer whom General Loring, for some personal reasons, asked the War Minister to detail, against General Stone's wishes, as a member of the expeditionary force. Whether it was because he wanted to circumvent General Stone, or because he was dissatisfied with the views of the other engineers, I know not, but he caused Lockett to be ordered to the front, his party being left in charge of his assistant, Major Dulier, a Belgian. On Lockett's arrival the Chief of Staff lost no

time in communicating to him his own views regarding our position. Whatever these may have been, there is one thing certain: the General, having seen their effectiveness at river fords, etc., had "block-house on the brain," to such an extent in fact, that some of us would have been very little surprised had we been ordered to "doff" our equipments and stop somewhere upon a prairie to practice block-house building. Against much protestation Loring and Ratib suffered the troops digging wells some two and a half miles nearer the pass to dwindle down from six to one company. No interest whatever was taken in this work. The result then of Lockett's examination of the problem was quite expected. Work was abandoned at the wells. The fortified depot was not to be there, but near Gura, six miles away from the pass where a block-house for one company would be built.

In order that the reader may see at once the futility of all this, I will say that at the point selected for the block-house the ground was so broken and the hills around, up to within a few feet of the proposed structure, were so covered with immense boulders, that one man or an army could securely pass within a few feet of it without being under its fire. On either side, a few hundred yards away—as secure by position and surroundings as if on another continent—was a constantly used foot and bridle path leading down into the Kaya-Khor Valley. I did not then believe, nor do I now, that this was the mature engineering judgment of an officer of Lockett's ability and experience. I have sometimes thought nothing else than his kind heart, his desire to please, and his aversion to contention, suffered him to be wheedled or bamboozled into it; for not only could it not protect the pass, in the most inconsiderable degree, but it could not protect even itself, being subjected as it was to fire from all directions. Even could it protect itself there was no use in having so small a body of men at the pass, except as a picket in case there was a fort within supporting distance (there was none); or to protect a signal party, for which it was not built, and which could certainly do better service elsewhere.

However, the block-house was decided upon, and Durholz was charged with its construction, the quartermaster being instructed to supply him with *one thaler* to buy necessary material! The Major partly if not fully realized the futility of the work before him, especially when constructed with the only available material, and spoke to me on the subject at the time—notwithstanding which he has had ever since to bear more than his share of the responsibility and opprobrium of this work. But he, as well as others, may in a manner have forgotten that the efficiency of such a work is quite special—the object being to give temporary protection, to an important point, from a greatly superior force of men; and that the first requisite in its construction is that it shall be secure from the ordinary attacks of a menacing force—for he built it of rubble-stone—a stone-house instead of a block-house—as there was no other material, not even for the roof, thus leaving the men subjected to a plunging fire from the overhanging rocks. So our block-house turned out to be four connecting stone walls, in a rectangular form, and which an obstreperous mule might easily have backed over. Notwithstanding Durholz was, with all the other engineers (Lockett not included), in favor of a fortified depot near the pass, yet as the builder of this house (although forced to do so much against his judgment) he has shared the opprobrium with Loring; and I should say with Lockett, did it not do violence to my heart—for I feel that the latter is not only one of the best of men, most affable and kind, but has rare talents, which he always uses with extraordinary industry, even at the expense of his health.

The line of the fort to be built at Gura was laid out, and some of the intrenchments worked into it. But instead of being for three thousand men, as was at first ordered, Colonel Derrick afterward wisely reduced its size, so that it might be defended with little more than one-third of this force—and yet it had capacity for our stores, the magazines being underground. This reduction in its size was recommended not only because uselessly large, but especially because the present position of the fort was

looked upon as temporary—the site could not be occupied during the rains—and in its new form it would, so far as mere size was concerned, have answered all purposes of the campaign. It was also believed that on second thought the location of the fort would be changed to a point nearer the pass, when it should become absolutely necessary, if at all, to consider the permanent protection of the pass. A fort nearer the pass, at the point where the wells were being dug, would have answered all requirements. Nevertheless its position (near Gura) was not at all satisfactory; and the mistake in selecting this site instead of the other one as a depot became patent to all, even the most obtuse. But the blunder was not acknowledged nor remedied, and our only possible compensation for the loss was in rendering the selected site uncommonly strong, and of this it was susceptible. The work was well defiladed from infantry-fire save in one place. This was an elevated point, on which was placed a battery, subject to reverse fire, and against which it was proposed to protect it by a traverse. This was objected to by an officer (who should have known better, but had, as authority, the example of a battalion guarding the Prince inside the fort) on the grounds that a traverse, as suggested, would enclose the battery—a work within a work—and if the enemy should get possession of it, the whole fort would be at his mercy. To quiet this officer's fears it was jokingly proposed, and with good effect, that we should adopt the tactical master-stroke suggested by a military cadet, who when asked what he, as commander of a besieged work, would do as a last resource, were the enemy about to capture it, at the end of forty days, in which time he was taught the work should (theoretically) succumb, answered:

“Turn the tables on the enemy—march out; let him enter, and then besiege him!”

With this expedient at hand should we not, it was asked, feel secure?

CHAPTER XXXIII.

DUPPLICITY AND INTRIGUES—STAFF OFFICERS ON THE LINE
—PROPPING UP TRANSPORT ANIMALS—ENGLISH EXPERIENCE—THE DESTRUCTIVE FLY—DISABLING TRANSPORT SERVICE—SOMETHING UNUSUAL IN THE EGYPTIAN CHARACTER—BARBAROUS CRUELTY OF THE EGYPTIAN—RATIB'S INDIFFERENCE—HIS SEARCH FOR A LIE—CAVALRY ORNAMENTAL—THE CHIEF OF STAFF DISHEARTENED—THE STAFF—THE MARKET, AND ABUSE OF ABYSSINIAN HUCKSTERS—KILLING AN ABYSSINIAN—LORING'S SERVANT WHIPPED—NIEB MOHAMMED AS CHIEF OF GUIDES AND SCOUTS—CHIEF OF STAFF DEPRIVED OF MESSENGERS AND MAIL—THE COMMANDING GENERAL AND HIS SECOND IN COMMAND NOT AGREED AS TO THE ROUTE—NIEB SUPPLANTING LORING AS RATIB'S ADVISER—A MYTHICAL ENEMY.

At this time, when we were straining every nerve to get up our supplies, and finally the army, from the rear, those of us who were entrusted with the management of this part of the business could obtain hardly any information of the troops and trains in the rear and en route, nor indeed of the army here, except through officers of the *État-Major*. And this was but meagre, as every obstacle was thrown in their way to prevent their obtaining correct information or executing their orders. Osman Bey, at Bahr-Reza, and other officers, still insisted on sending their reports directly to the Commanding General (or his clerk), who tolerated, if he did not authorize, this dereliction of duty. Thus the true condition of affairs was unknown in the office of the Chief of Staff, nor did we even know what reports were lacking. What few General Loring did receive second hand, through Ratib's clerk, often came so late that the information conveyed was stale, and the op-

portunity lost to make good use of it. Meanwhile, however, ill-considered orders were too often based on it and issued by Ratib without the sanction of the superior judgment of his second in command, and, indeed, without his knowledge. In this emergency there were detailed, with the sanction of the Commanding General, two of our most energetic staff officers—an Inspector and the Chief of Transportation—to go along the line with full powers, absolute and advisory, to regulate matters. They had such detailed instructions and memoranda as to supplies and the movement of trains as would enable them to accomplish the purpose for which they were sent, without the delay of referring each little detail to headquarters. The Inspector selected was Lieutenant-Colonel Möckeln, who had just returned to headquarters from Yangoos, where, under his watchful care, the trains were arriving and leaving with much regularity and in good condition. A single Norton (American) pump furnished water for about one thousand mules and other animals, which passed almost daily. Indeed, Möckeln reported that three thousand five hundred animals and two thousand five hundred men were watered by it in one day, the twenty-five wells having given out. Colonel Möckeln, while en route at Bahr-Reza and elsewhere, where the condition of animals and of the transport service generally portended evil, gathered for us through careful observation much useful information, and made some very practical and valuable suggestions regarding that service.

Major Loshe, the other officer entrusted with this important work, had also recently made strenuous efforts by recommendation and personal intercession to improve his department. He had recommended that soldiers be substituted for all the worthless Bedouins, also smaller trains, more officers and men for the service, etc., etc., in order that there should not be such great loss of time as there was, which exhausted the strength of the animals; and in order that officers might be enabled to personally supervise all the details of the transport service in their respective trains when en route as well as when in camp.

Only a few of Loshe's suggestions made any impression in quarters where remedies could be ordered or applied. On the contrary, he was only a major, and the two native lieutenant-colonels were yet deliberately retained over him, if not purposely to thwart him, certainly such could be expected as the natural result. Envy, jealousy and intrigue were aroused by such a flagrant violation of rules, which the necessity for subordination and discipline has established in all services deserving the name of military.

However, one of the three battalions of soldiers selected for this service soon arrived from Cairo; and Ali Effendi Ruby, an excellent officer, was installed on duty at headquarters to look after the incoming and outgoing trains. This officer, who was an anomaly among the natives, supplied the Chief of Staff with reports, which, with those sent in by others, especially by Captain Sormani, enabled us to keep ourselves tolerably well informed as to what was going on, at least prevented immediate ruin. We calculated at this time that if all Rachid Pacha's command should return, and transportation should be used at all economically, all of our supplies should be up by the 22d of February at the latest. The staff not being ubiquitous, there were stereotyped phrases in our orders regarding the care of animals, removal of saddles, feeding, marching by moonlight, etc.; also looking to the preventing of men and officers from riding the animals. With a few noteworthy exceptions, the officers were as culpable as the men, with whom they more than affiliated the moment their superior's back was turned. They rode even the heavily charged animals, not always singly either. I have seen two hundred and fifty or three hundred pounds of living freight astraddle of a rat of a donkey which was punched along with a sharp-pointed stick until it dropped dead in its tracks.

It had also been ordered that the artillery ammunition, which was in heavy boxes, should be carried on camels, to avoid breaking down the mules and ponies with four hundred and twenty-five pounds dead weight, which the best of these inexperienced officers insisted on putting upon

animals only too often unable to bear up under such a heavy load. Indeed, they were often actually held up—moving stiff-legged—and steadied by men alongside, (until the plucky little beast's further usefulness was utterly destroyed. Then, seemingly without a single reflection on the beetle-headed stupidity, the load would be transferred to another animal, if there should happen to be one near by. The intelligent reader, much less the experienced army officer, need hardly be told that this load, put on as it was by irregular, inexperienced packers, was double, even treble, what the mountain-charge for poorly fed and abominably cared for little animals, under tropical beams, should have been. The English mule charge in their Abyssinian campaign was only one hundred pounds and four pounds of forage, except when carrying two boxes of infantry ammunition—the former about one-quarter and the latter one-half the Egyptian load. But notwithstanding all our watchfulness and earnest efforts to ameliorate the condition of our transport animals, to make their destruction less easy, progress but dragged its slow length along. Mishaps came as meteors sometimes do, in showers; the very air seemed to be impregnated with catastrophies.

Möckeln, Loshe, and other officers whose duty connected them with the transport service, were of course not ubiquitous; but wherever they went animals got at least temporary relief. Their sore backs and other injuries were washed and cared for, sand removed from the saddles, ropes readjusted, etc. One night, finding a train in camp with saddles on, orders were given for their removal. The commander replied: "Tieb, tieb," (Very well, it shall be done), this with a salaam, and much more of pretentious splutter. The officers returned later in the night to find that nothing whatever had been done to relieve the poor tired beasts. Only by applying themselves vigorously to the task, and, Egyptian-like, with the rod, going from camel to camel, did they finally succeed in having the saddles removed. It is pertinent to say here that the English had a similar experience during their Abyssinian campaign, with both

their Persian and Egyptian transport men, and at once turned them away. It was estimated that in that expedition one in every three animals was used merely as a riding animal until these muleteers and cameliers were replaced by Punjaubs.

Another serious aggravation which our animals had to endure was the *tsaltsalya*. This fly is larger than the gad-fly, and is nearly as large as the drone-bee, which it resembles very much in color, and has an adder-like head. It is this pest which Bruce tells of as changing the character of entire districts of people by making them migratory to save their beasts. It soon destroys all animals that are left unprotected from its sting. Without our knowledge, or, at least, without mine, the veterinary hospital was removed to Bahr-Reza from Massowah, and presently at this sickly spot were found some one thousand three hundred disabled animals. It is true the Egyptian officers reported less than four hundred and fifty sick, but Loshe and Mœckeln reported nearly thrice that number to be in a "most deplorable condition." Here there was nearly one-third of our transport force laid up at Bahr-Reza and serviceable animals constantly employed in carrying them forage from Massowah,—near where they really should have been,—although the only excuse that even a visionary could find for this transfer was that it had been done to get them into a brousing country and thus save forage. By the 22d of February the number of disabled animals had increased to one thousand nine hundred. Our total number of transport animals, of all kinds, now used during the campaign, was barely six thousand on paper—the dead and disabled being included.

One difficulty was hardly overcome, before we were dragged into another. Within a few days more than eleven hundred of our animals were uselessly put to carrying forage, tents, baggage, etc., none of which was needed. This, notwithstanding we were crying aloud with pen and tongue, "Send us nothing but ammunition, boxmat and salt." Even to Gura did they send forage—all the way from Massowah—at a time when we were buying plenty

of it. Other incidents of the wanton use of our transport service might be mentioned. For instance, one day a simple-minded employé at Bahr-Reza, connected with the telegraph service, was desirous of communicating with the Commanding General at Gura, which could easily have been done by letter. He procured from the Commander at that place three fine Egyptian camels and one horse, the former for his baggage and the latter to ride, in order that he might travel in style. The trip was not at all necessary, but even if it had been he could have made the round trip in two days on horseback, carrying rations in his pocket. A major, whose full allowance of baggage was already at Gura, was furnished with five camels. A regimental commander, named Kurchid Bey, managed to have one hundred and thirty tents not needed brought to the front on camels; and these charged with only one tent each, which was but half a load at best. At Bahr-Reza, one day, an artillery officer from Gura, who had been provided with all the transportation required, including Prince Hassen's mules, demanded of Rachid Pacha, who was then in command at that place, two hundred more animals to carry certain stores to the front. Luckily Möckeln heard of it, and his opinion was interposed to prevent this unnecessary sacrifice. "The Commanding General directs that only such and such stores shall go," said he. "There are now at the front all needed stores, excepting so and so; and here is the order!" "Yes, yes; but I have other orders" (secret or later) said the pachas, beys and effendis, "from the Commanding General that these stores must go;" and go they did.

"Would it not be better, General, in the army's straits for transportation," said Möckeln to Rachid, "to send your artillery animals back to Massowah for their own forage, since you will not permit them to go to Gura, where forage is now accumulating? And the veterinary hospital, should it not be returned to Massowah or to Yangoos? And these men going to Gura, should they not each carry, according to orders, five days' rations and

one hundred rounds of ammunition, instead of only ten rounds, upon his person?"

Acting upon this last-mentioned suggestion, boxes were taken off the camels, the ammunition distributed, and then the caravan was started on its way. But on each camel were the empty boxes, to be refilled once the column was out of sight. Möckeln suggested this and that, and the Pacha, in his confusion of thought and orders, tore his hair and threw his tarbouch (fez) into the air, but not with Hibernian delight—when it reached the ground he rushed at it like a bull at a red rag, and jumped upon it, vociferating loudly Mohammedan maledictions upon the authors of his troubles. This, bad as it was, was a hopeful sign for Möckeln; it was something unusual in the Egyptian character, and Rachid did become more reasonable. But valuable time had already been irrevocably swallowed up in the manner described, or in the "Boukra! boukra, Inshalla!" to Möckeln's suggestions.

With Rachid's consent the contagiously diseased animals were shot, and arrangements made for the removal of the inferior animals to the comparatively easy route between Bahr-Reza and Massowah. Among these diseased animals, whose condition was due, for the most part, to neglect and carelessness beyond the ordinary wear and tear of the service, there were many whose condition arose from a more extraordinary cause. The voucher or evidence of the death of an animal in this service is the production of the brand. Among a people who, from habit, concentrate their feelings upon sacred animals, there is found little instinctive feeling for life in itself. We were, therefore, not surprised, though shocked more than I dare confess, to see living animals, brave little animals, otherwise well, which tried to respond to the master's utmost demand, with heavy burdens upon their backs, toiling along, with the skin and flesh from six to twelve inches square cut out of the neck or hip, now twitching with pain. It may be because I have little of the human in me, but I must confess it would have been less repugnant to my feelings to have seen the men who

were capable of this cruelty, in a similar plight. The only thing the arch fiend himself could find in favor of such cruelty would be its simplicity. Quoth he, we imagined, "An officer or soldier who loses an animal, only has to cut the mark from a living one to cover his responsibility!" How simple! How convenient! Among the many convoys which were almost daily arriving and departing, there came one, one day, which had no fewer than ten of these poor suffering creatures in it. Every train had them, and they were seen all along the route, feeding in the hills, and fattening for beasts and birds of prey.

In our extremity, Colonel Field and Major Dennison, two men who combined experience, mature judgment and activity, were sent with complete memoranda and instructions similar to those furnished Möckeln and Loshe, to assist along the line. Meanwhile, at headquarters, the Chief of Staff was still contending against fearful odds. If the Commanding General acquiesced in the publishing of important orders, he too often left the means in the hands of his subordinates to thwart their execution. Urgent orders repeated, were suffered to be disobeyed, and that deliberately, even by pachas under our very noses. Osman Pacha protected subordinates in the unauthorized employ of government transport-animals for their own benefit; also when they neglected to remove from his camp carcasses and other decaying matter. Even the Commanding General himself did little if anything to remedy matters. The Chief of Staff, under his directions, ordered a certain troop of cavalry to report as quickly as possible at the office tent for reconnaissance duty. The order was communicated to the company commander—an adjutant-major—by an Egyptian lieutenant on duty in the office of the Chief of Staff. The lieutenant soon came back with the information that the adjutant-major said he must first see the Commanding General before he could obey the order. General Loring at once called on Ratib to ascertain the facts in the case, who informed the Chief of Staff that he had given no order to the officer to report to him. The

two subordinate officers were then confronted (at Loring's office), in the presence of the Commanding General and his Chief of Staff, whereupon they began stoutly contradicting each other. The adjutant-major denied that he had sent back such a message. The upshot of the whole affair was that Ratib called one a *canaille* (cur), and the other a *cochon* (hog), and, adding that Loring might take his choice between them, left the tent.

During all this time there was never a drill, not a step taken toward habituating the men to the use of arms, and accustoming them to dangers, so that they could learn their extent—which, being very short of imagination's picture, is most important knowledge. This neglect of important work was persisted in, notwithstanding our repeated and earnest efforts to secure frequent reconnaissances and scouts, and against even the Prince's advice, so said. Moreover, the information obtained by the staff about troops and supplies was only approximate—too often obtained by detective observation; by worrying clerks until they disgorged facts; by counting sacks of arriving stores after they had been distributed to battalions and companies. A request for information would frequently be met with the remark, "What business is it to you?"—and this in seeming innocence. Every man's hand was against us; and this, too, while the Prince, Ratib, Osman, their staffs, and other officers and soldiers, were shutting their eyes to Loring's anxiety and daily enjoying themselves at playing base or other games of children. The Prince and Ratib surrounded by fawning attendants, and intriguing advisers seemed, in the warmth of our imagination, to be seated in amphitheatre style within, and enjoying the equable movements of a sphere hewn out by the *État-Major*, and decorated by themselves in Egyptian taste; and the staff confined exclusively to the surface, to clear the machinery of Egyptian sand, and to occasionally pour on oil, only to be thrown off by the increased velocity. This would have seemed the limit of our province, were it not that they would have us near to shoulder responsibility, and go among the moving wheels to disen-

gage them when wholly clogged, through ignorance or intrigue, with the body of one of their number. They were using the Etat-Major only to lead them in their ophthalmic affliction out of darkness. If they did yield in one place to severe pressure it was only to break out in another; just as a liar relies for safety on his mental dexterity and ability to jump out of one falsehood into another.

General Loring became disheartened, although he has a stout heart, and was for leaving the field if I would only consent to take his place, which of course I refused to do, and that several times. Even then he threatened to give up, and would have turned over the whole management of the campaign to the Egyptian officers, as the annoyance, care and responsibility were weighing heavily upon him. He found playing at wet-nurse to be exhausting occupation. He was finally talked out of this notion and renewed his efforts as chief of the staff, saying, "It is to the wheel once more." He had fought bravely but too spasmodically against these pyramid quarriers, who were toiling toward our destruction with a wedge-like, insinuating persistency—inertial, effortless. Their methods were of the past to be sure, without science or experience, but leading only the more certainly to our ruin, and the loss of the campaign. The Egyptian's habit is not so much to resist as to avoid authority. He remains in the old rut to the last extremity, and succumbs only when he sees the rock of power about falling on his head with relentless fury. For this he looks as regularly as for the setting sun—ascribing the lack to weak motives—and measures his honor by traces of the bastinado or kourbach upon his feet or back.

General Loring attempted to improve the discipline of the market which had been established in the immediate vicinity of the camp, to encourage Abyssinians to come with their barley, teff, dhurra, straw, flour (ground between stones, like Mexican *metate*), eggs, chickens, red honey, *tedge* (mead or hydromel) and milk. Our efforts had been of little avail for anything else than barley and straw, because it was a daily, almost hourly, occurrence

that the little sacks of eatables which the Abyssinians toted in for miles on a trot, or their value after sale, was taken from them, and they, of either sex, if expostulation was made, shamefully beaten or otherwise maltreated by some of the soldiers and officers, who drove the Coashtans (as they called the Abyssinians) away in derision. In fact, an Abyssinian was one day killed outright in the market by a black soldier, who was called to account no further than to require him to recite a ridiculous story of self-defense. Negro conscripts from the lawless borders were generally the authors of these outrages. This one was long concealed from all foreigners, who were told that an Egyptian soldier had been killed by a Coashtan. These outrages became so frequent that many Abyssinians were deterred by their fears from coming into market; nor could we expect to procure much food from them under existing circumstances. The Chief of Staff therefore obtained the consent of the Commanding General to send an officer of the Etat-Major daily to the market-place. This remedied matters, but it did not fully answer the purpose. Without authority themselves to inflict summary punishment upon the offenders, these staff officers had the poor satisfaction of learning afterward that certain men who had been sent under charges to headquarters were shielded from punishment, and this without investigation, by such officers as Kurchid Bey, and other commanders of the culprits. In such cases, where justice could not be obtained, Loring and I dried up many a tear by paying the Abyssinian the value of his or her stolen property. In justice to Ratib it should be said that he and perhaps one or two other superior native officers were now beginning to have—or at least it seemed so—a realizing sense of the injury this maltreatment of innocent Abyssinians was doing our trade with them. When discussing the matter, what seemed to be revolving in his mind was, doubt as to guilt—arising partly from indecision, but mostly from the Mohammedan's reluctance to take the word of a Christian when antagonized by that of one of his own faith, and particularly when the latter was shield-

ing a co-religionist. The perpetrators of some flagrant outrages were promptly punished when the injured Abyssinians were Mohammedans, as many of them living along the border are, and the offense observed exclusively by some of the more appreciative Egyptian officers. But, in the case of Loring's servant, who was a Copt, and who alleged that an Egyptian major, on duty in the market, had wantonly beaten him, his word was not considered as worth anything, although he exhibited several fresh welts, made with a cudgel, on his head and back. It was not for several days—not until after a thorough investigation was made of the matter by one of Ratib's personal staff—that the Commanding General deigned to notice the complaint. Even then he did not act on the report—the author of it being a foreigner; for before it was handed to him he ordered the punishment of the officer simply because of the persistent pressure of General Loring, who was in a towering passion, resulting from his belief that this affront was a premeditated disrespect to him personally; and if suffered to pass unpunished or unnoticed by the Commanding General would weaken, if not wholly destroy, Loring's influence and authority. Ratib reluctantly wrote the order of punishment, which was no less than the dismissal of the offending officer. Then Loring, after having exhausted his voluminous vocabulary of vigorous epithets, relented, saying that he was satisfied with the Commanding General's expression of displeasure.

This, however, was not all of Loring's trouble. Nieb Mohammed, chief of the guides, messengers and scouts who congregated around Ratib's tent, was bent from the first on leading the army through the friendly province—by the Ailet-Asmara-Gundet route, where his brother led Arrendrup. He employed guides especially for that purpose—men who knew or were instructed to know little if anything of the other roads. Further, all the guides, messengers and scouts who were originally under the control of the Chief of Staff, Nieb alone excepted,* were one after the other, and mail-carriers included, absorbed by

* He individually was with the Commanding General.

that Nieb until not a man was left at Loring's office. Even the further control of his official and private mails was taken away on the 25th of February.* Thus, step by step, they continued to encroach upon his privileges, rights and duties; which, of course, tended to impair his power, curtail his authority and lessen his influence. The Commanding General had fallen into the clutches of this designing fellow, and took little interest in roads other than the one selected by him. Not only did Ratib's feelings bend affectionately toward Nieb, but his own ignorance and weakness left him in the common Egyptian category, where ignorance precludes decided positive ways, and all grades of intrigue are allowed to come around, like varieties of beasts around their prey, and battle for the truth, which often escapes in the tussle.

General Loring felt keenly the necessity of learning something about the country before he made choice of a road; the necessity of knowing all the paths which could be used either by ourselves or the enemy. In order to avoid a high mountain we had preferred the Gura-Godofolassie route to that by way of Asmara, and notwithstanding his seeming preference for the other one, Ratib, against the wishes of Nieb, approved of the one we had chosen. But now that we were at Gura, should it become necessary to move on Adua, there were two or three routes by which it could be done. Captain Irgens' reconnaissance (see future page) was undertaken for the purpose of aiding the Chief of Staff, if not the Commanding General, in coming to a decision as to which was the more practicable one, the maps of the country being entirely unreliable. Loring was opposed to the Godofolassie route. But we well understood, as did the Abyssinians, that the Commanding General was in favor of having the army led by Nieb over this more difficult Godofolassie-Gundet route.

* When the general mail was taken from the Chief of Staff's care at Massowah, and there was a distinction made between foreigners and Egyptians unfavorable to the former, General Loring, by his failure to take a decided stand, suffered the entering of the first wedge which was to destroy his and the Etat-Major's influential connection with the army. The wedge could then have been extracted; but not when it had once gone out of sight; and to start a wedge is all that these time-ignoring quarriers need. Their indolence keeps it there and gravity gradually does the work.

To counteract the advantages to the enemy, given them by this disclosure, nothing was left for the Chief of Staff to do but to confuse the King's mind by the employment of other guides—natives who were acquainted with other roads and from whom we could obtain information which could not be got out of Nieb's well-drilled followers. Ratib, whatever may be said of those around him, was not yet ready for an open rupture. He understood temporizing, as what Oriental does not? He finally gave General Loring permission to engage a few Abyssinians who knew something of other paths, and could without fear of detection go among them in search of information;* men whose loyalty to our cause could not be so readily suspected—they being in rebellion, having just refused the tribute to the King—as that of scouts and guides without known history would be. But when employed, it was observed they were all from the Okuleh-Gousai—the Catholic and rebellious faction of which province was controlled by Abbé Dufлот. The Abbé was frequently seen at the quarters of General Loring, who was also a Catholic, and with whom the priest took his meals when in camp. It was believed by the Egyptians that these guides had been recommended by the priest, and that he himself was doing more than giving important information about the country he was so familiar with; that, in fact, he was endeavoring to lead the army, with its thalers, through his Catholic province. Besides, the antagonism of the line against the Etat-major, and of the whole native element against the foreigner, there was then a covetous interest, a religious opposition of one section represented by Nieb to that of another represented by the priest. At once suspicion was aroused in the Mohammedan mind, and every covert effort was made by those immediately around Ratib from the moment these guides were taken into the service to badger and drive them out. These guides in their own country ranked above the common soldier. They were chiefs of ten and of twenty; but it was with the greatest difficulty that Loring could obtain for them that badge of authority which cus-

* Blood feud limited the range of any guides or scouts we might employ.

tom had taught them to expect in their new office—the many-colored silk shirt, such as the Nieb guides, every one of them, had been clad in. Being from the little republic (as the priest delighted to call the province) of the Okuleh-Gousai, they were as free as the air they breathed and were easily annoyed when coming into and going out from the camp. Some were arrested and their arms taken away, while others were deprived of their passes, many kinds of indignities being heaped upon them. This continued until their complaints, coming as they did upon the top of many other annoyances, exasperated and discouraged the Chief of Staff to such a degree that duplicate passes were refused those guides, and they were ordered to remain at home (some hours away) or near by, where they could be found when wanted.

Under these trying circumstances Loring maintained his equilibrium uncommonly well for one with his warmth of temper. But his office, which should have been, as we were trying hard to make it, the office of the Commanding General for the transaction of his business, was now looked upon more than ever as a rival establishment by those near Ratib, whose conduct was calculated not only to aggravate the Chief of Staff, but to destroy, (if they were not deliberately endeavoring to destroy) harmony of feeling and unity of purpose among officers. Notwithstanding this clashing of efforts (which has been related perhaps too often), it was seldom that any unpleasantness was discernible in official or private intercourse. On the contrary, the greatest urbanity was displayed by the Commanding General; and when advising with and receiving suggestions from Loring he seemed to be in full accord with the latter. But Loring occasionally detected certain sly winks and blinks directed toward Ratib, by Nieb, whenever that artful counselor conceived a tendency toward invading those precincts held by him with the Commanding General's assent. While Nieb was struggling to gain his ascendancy over Ratib there was a painful obsequiousness on his part toward the Chief of Staff, but the moment he was secure of his hold on the

Commander, although never losing his suavity with Egyptians, he became imperious and disrespectful toward Loring, sometimes failing even to notice him. This naturally discomfited Loring considerably, as he never could put up with discourtesy or disrespect from any source. He was, very properly, not pleased to find himself supplanted, even only partially, as an adviser to the Commanding General by a black Abyssinian of Turco-Egyptian education and proclivities. Nieb had also a baneful and direct influence on the command, for he was the first to tamper with the scouts and reveal their undigested stories to the army. There soon arose a daily cry from the highest to the lowest that the King was coming to attack the fort. It was these rumors in part that influenced the cavalry to persist in entering the fort; and the Commanding General himself was so much under their influence that in one of his orders to the commander of a fort at Bahr-Reza he directed that no man should be permitted to go outside the fort, although the enemy was nowhere near that place. Such an order to new soldiers in the field was like forbidding children to enter the water until they learn to swim. He added, however, in the same order, that "the fort must be held to the last gasp." These things of course conspired to create camp rumors, and kept the command in a state of nervous disquiet. We were not surprised, then, to hear a mythical enemy announced almost every day.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

SEVERAL LINES OF SENTINELS POSTED TO FIRE INTO EACH OTHER—PROPS FOR THE EYELID—EXPLODED WAY OF TREATING DISEASE—A COW STAMPEDES THE COMMAND—A STIFF ENGAGEMENT WITH A MYTHICAL ENEMY—LUCKY DAYS OF THE KING—DEDJATCH WELDA MIKAEL—FAG ENDS OF SEMI-BARBAROUS LIFE—ENTERTAINMENT—EVIL EYE—DRESS AND CUSTOMS OF AN ABYSSINIAN PRINCE—HIS EGYPTIAN RANK OF PACHA PROCLAIMED—RATIB HOBNOBBING, AND INVOLVING HIMSELF IN THE POLITICAL AFFAIRS OF ABYSSINIA—MIKAEL'S INTRIGUES—LEIGE BERROU—THE EFFORTS OF THE PRIEST AND LORING—THE PRIEST AND EGYPTIAN RULE.

A strong guard was picketed on the neighboring hills which encircled three sides of our position; and a large fraction of the command was from the inside, night and day, guarding the line of breastworks. But this was not enough, for a few yards in front of the abattis, which was just in advance of the ditch, there was a battalion, also on duty night and day, scattered around the line in the shape, as I suppose, of a forlorn hope. The saying of Herodotus that the Egyptians "observe their ancient customs, but acquire no new ones," is still pertinent. Nothing in the way of argument could convince Ratib that, should the enemy appear, the lives of these men in front would be unnecessarily hazarded, if not sacrificed, as the men were under the immediate fire of the other line from the parapet, and had no hope of escape, cut off as they were by the abattis, the ditch, and the parapet. With all new soldiers stampedes are always in order at any time; and now to have the existing danger magnified to the utmost as plainly as acts could do it, what might not be expected from our men? Besides, there was no immediate danger, as the enemy was

known to be at least two days distant by all means of transport here, outside the imagination. Moreover, the keeping so large a proportion of the men on guard—with utter ignorance of rules for the economical use of men—defeated the objects aimed at; for it was wholly impossible for a soldier to properly perform such duty continuously, as they often were expected to do for days and nights together. For weeks together these patient and laborious men were on guard four days out of every six, the fifth being devoted to hard labor on the fortifications, and the sixth to regimental, battalion or company labor. Under such circumstances a part of every sentry's equipment ought to have been props for the eyelids, instead of knitting-needles which they so often make use of when on post.

The Commanding General and his superior subordinates did not realize that while they were exaggerating the danger and thus frightening the poor children into their holes, they were fighting a disease under old and long since exploded methods—depleting the system when it should be supported or stimulated—in our case by drills and scouts, which would have enabled the men to acquire confidence in themselves, in their arms, in each other, and in their officers. To this should have been added an occasional incitement to emulation, in the way of rewards bestowed for cause.

One day quite a stampede occurred. A cloud of dust arose from the road on our line of supplies—precisely in the opposite direction from which the enemy could by any chance be expected. This was the signal for an alarm at one of the constructing batteries, and an instant afterward a column of approaching dust, still farther away, produced the impression at the battery that the Abyssinians were coming down upon us in full force—that the dust first seen was raised by the advance guard, and the second lot created by the main body. The parapet being for high-wheel guns in barbette, was quickly torn down to permit the fire of mountain artillery. These guns were hurriedly shotted, and their discharge only prevented by the opportune ar-

rival of an officer, with a cool head and quick eye, who discovered that the front object was a cow, and the more distant one was one of our daily-arriving caravans.

One night we were awakened by the enemy's ghost, to find the whole line, with loaded Remingtons at full cock lying upon the parapet trembling for the signal, while the battalion guard—or at least, that part of it which had not already run away—was directly in their front. Luckily no shot was fired; but a few nights afterward, a single gun was let off, perhaps accidentally, by one of the outside sentries, whereupon the inside force, along an entire front opened up, in the dark, such volleys on the objects of their vision as would have done them credit in a stiff engagement. The outside guard fled in every direction, over tearing abattis, in, and a few over, the ditch and blazing parapet even, and others threw themselves imploringly upon their faces. By the time that Dr. Johnson and myself had reached the ground all signs of battle had disappeared, except one grievously wounded soldier who was being hurried away in the arms of men, who were talking cautiously in a low tone of voice. Not a foreigner ever knew the damage done that night, although it must have been considerable. The subject was always avoided by the Egyptians, who in such matters take to concealment as instinctively as a native prince does to capricious tyranny. If, however, the wound of this one man was all there was to show for such loud pretensions, if no miracle had been concocted, so much the worse for us, we thought; for dark as it may have been, and stampede firing, too, the chances were certainly against us if this was a sample of what we were to expect.

King John believes that his lucky days are Tuesdays and Thursdays, the days of his greatest successes. Tuesday was the day of his latest victory—that over Colonel Arrendrup. This fact was well known in our army; consequently if the cry, "Coashtan! Coashtan!" had been heard in the night of one of these days the result would have been indescribable, and the confusion com-

plete. But our next stampede, agitating as it was, did not, fortunately for us, happen on one of the lucky days. These stampedes were so much alike that it will be sufficient only to tell something about the interesting cause of this one. The approach of Dedjatch Welda * Mikael of the Hamaseen, with a string of followers, was announced. So soon as quiet and a sense of security had been restored somewhat, a guard of honor was sent under Osman Pacha to escort the Dedjatch within our lines. Accompanied by a band of just such stirring music as might have fired the souls of the Crusaders, he made a grand entry into our encampment. His three hundred followers, who were also on horseback, might have been, judging from their dress, arms, etc.,—the *tout ensemble*,—the fag end of all conditions of semi-barbarous life: rebels, deserters and thieves were all represented, as was proven by the lack of hands and feet among our visitors. Leaving his party encamped near the market-place, the Dedjatch, accompanied by his two sons, a nephew, and several other members of state and their servants, entered the intrenchments. After paying their respects to the Prince and Ratib, they were shown to Loring's tent, where they met other officers of rank. Prince Hassan very considerably sent over his service of silver with coffee *à la Turque*. This was handed around to us as well as to our guests; but the latter cautiously awaited our drinking. One of the sons in particular noticed very inquiringly the effect on others, while he trembled as he sipped what he feared might be a poison potion. As none of the Central Abyssinians smoke, cigarettes were not passed around, but the old Prince took his snuff and offered it to others. He also spoke to a servant, who immediately opened a small sack and an enclosed leather case, from which he took out two cut-glass, bowl-shaped goblets, which he filled from a jar with tedge, one of which was passed around, while he himself drank the other twice empty. It was Abyssinian etiquette to drink this number, so Father Duflot informed us, and he (the priest) observed it religiously. He also

* *Welda* (son of) comes from the Arabic *wald* (boy or son).

took good care while drinking to observe the Abyssinian custom of hiding his face from the evil eye behind his *kouari*—a sort of toga about three meters in length by two in width. It was of white cotton, home-made, with a red stripe, twelve to fifteen inches wide, running through the middle.* The entire population wear this *kouari*, and, as a rule, not much of anything else. But soldiers, rich people and the chiefs also wear close-fitting cotton trousers from the low waist to the middle thigh. The chiefs also wear the shirt of authority. This shirt is of foreign make. The native substitute for this is a ferocious animal's skin, or part of it, thrown over the shoulder. The lion furnishes this vestment for the higher chiefs. It was noticed that when Dufлот neglected to hold up his *kouari* himself, his servant held up his own between the priest and the outer world—outside the tent. Before drinking the tedge handed him by his servant the Dedjatch, or old Prince as he was sometimes called, required the latter to first pour some of it in his hand and taste of it; and at the close to drink all the dregs in a similar manner.

At this time Welda Mikael had hardly reached sixty years of age. He was of medium height, compact build, Jewish features, and, for an Abyssinian, was of quite a light color. Soldiers' trousers and the *kouari* were his only attire. He not only acquired much confidence after guzzling the two quarts of mead, but assumed the majesty of an Abyssinian prince. On either side were his officers of state, one of them busy at picking vermin from his body and throwing them alive on the ground. Behind him stood his arm and shield bearer holding a scimitar which rested in an elegant scabbard, and a brace of antique pistols highly ornamented with inlaid work of precious metals. On his well-shaped and richly-tressed head he wore a crown ornamented with gold and silver. His *kouari* fell in a respectful manner (according to Abyssinian etiquette) from his left shoulder, and his bare feet were held in the lap of a menial, who at a signal from the Prince had seated himself for that purpose on the ground. As is the

* With some of the Gallas this stripe is blue.

custom in his country, he presented Loring with a finely-equipped Abyssinian mule ; but it was unmanageable, and became so terror-stricken at the sight or smell of camels that the General loaned it (permanently) to the priest, who on accepting it observed that presents in Abyssinia were not sacred, but business.

This visitor was, so the priest said, a fratricide and a parricide. A descendant of Mikael, the Governor of Tigré and Ruler of Abyssinia nearly a century back, he had hereditary political claims, and was formerly Governor of Hamaseen. During this time he rebelled, was imprisoned by King John, and after several years' incarceration was released on his promise to lead his Hamaseen followers against Arrendrup. But the Abyssinians accused him of intriguing with the Egyptians during the Arrendrup expedition ; and claim that not until he saw that officer defeated did he sally forth to capture about fifty Egyptians, whom he carried as prisoners to the King. However this may be, he and Ratib seemed to understand each other very well ; and he was soon invested by the Commanding General with the rank and pay of Ferik Pacha, which corresponded to that of Ras in his own country. His two sons received titles one grade lower down in the scale, while all his principal followers were given rank of some kind. They were all dressed up in their appropriate garb of authority, and their horses gaily caparisoned in glittering paraphernalia. Then the investiture and promotion were proclaimed from our market with loud sounds of drums and trumpets, as is usual in Abyssinia.

After a few interviews with Welda Mikael, with Nieb as interpreter, Ratib came to think himself so well acquainted with political affairs in Abyssinia that he personally undertook, in part, their management. But he showed himself a novice in this untried field (among this wily people), and his hopes were soon blinded in their own glare. To communicate with distant provinces he would select the most common of Abyssinians, pay him prior to the performance of the service, fondly embrace him, then send him on his

way rejoicing to accomplish—nothing. Indeed, it was only the interposition of a word from another officer which prevented Ratib, one day, from giving, and this in advance, to a common Abyssinian servant five hundred Maria Theresa dollars—the wealth of an Abyssinian Cræsus—to perform a dangerous undertaking.* Ratib managed these things almost exclusively, and his method was unsuccessful in each instance. In Abyssinia all letters begin with set phrases, such as “How are you?” “Are you quite well?” and other inquiries after the health of the one addressed, precisely as if the writer was personally accosting the recipient of the communication. Ratib’s self-satisfaction under these circumstances kept him in a boyish good-humor. He appeared more like himself than ever before. Ignorance was bliss to him, for there was no one to point out to him the breakers ahead. He could not resist the temptation, when one such letter was leaving his hands, to embrace a telegraph operator who just then came in with the ridiculous news that seven thousand additional camels would soon arrive. Ratib opened his arms to receive the man; but, on second thought, promised to do so later on if the news should prove to be true. But this second thought was an anomaly, for truth with the Egyptian is generally as secondary a consideration in the case of news as in a story—he being quite as fond of the one as of the other, both being part of his daily ration of luxury and ease.

Mikael Pacha, as he may now be called, looked upon the Egyptian favors toward him as only the first steps in his expectations. He hoped that the army would be taken by the Hamaseen and he be reinstated as governor, supported by Egyptian influence and power, even if he did not have still more ambitious prospects in mind. Indeed, from the very first he and his friends had urged that the proclamation of investiture should also declare him reinstated in his position in the Hamaseen under Egyptian auspices. But this scheme was too palpable even for Ra-

* Ratib’s manner of doing the business naturally evolved from the government’s manner of rewarding similar service. For several years after the Americans arrived in the country the custom was to promote or decorate officers before going on distant or dangerous service.

tib. It was too public rather than premature, for he seemed to receive encouragement to keep him in hopes that the army would eventually get there, and he be again in place and his sons as chiefs, under him, over subordinate provinces. But this did not dovetail with Loring's ideas. He was of the opinion that Leige Bérrou, another able rebel, should also be conciliated—at least for the time being. However, it was enough to condemn him in the eyes of all those near Ratib's person, that Loring took any interest in him, and that he was a protégé of the priest. Nothing more than this could be said against Leige Bérrou, unless it was that he had claims which Ratib had chosen to ignore in favor of Mikael's sons; for he also belonged to the Hamaseen. He was the deposed ruler of, and still had strong hereditary claims to, the sheikdom of Addi-Huala and its two score and more of surrounding villages; and was therefore naturally desirous that the army should enter the Hamaseen and of course reinstate him in power. The fact of his being a protégé of the priest, although it may have indicated that the latter was seeking to acquire, ultimately, a catholic influence in the Hamaseen (which Mohammedan sheiks would strongly resist), certainly was no evidence that the Abbé was still striving to lead the army through the Okuleh-Gousai; for recognizing and conciliating Leige Bérrou unquestionably was not a step toward the accomplishment of such designs. In fact, whatever mercenary interest the priest may have had originally in getting the army upon the Gura road, none such now existed; the troops were already near enough to Hebo, his immediate home, to scatter their thalers among his people. Be the priest's motives what they may, it certainly seemed that Loring's only object was to conciliate an able rebel who might become a formidable power if driven to desperation. He refused to listen, as he had also refused in the case of Mikael, to any talk about hereditary Abyssinian rights, or to give any promises which he felt could not be fulfilled; but he advised Ratib to follow the precedent already established by him, and give rations to Bérrou and his followers, who had been burned

out of house and home. Ratib refused to say yes or no; procrastination was his trump card in this as in so many other cases. Nieb had through his influence succeeded in having Dedjatch Mikael made a pacha, and had so far also prevented similar honors being bestowed upon Leige Bérrou.

It was not until Loring's guides, from whom we had expected so much, had been driven away, thus inflicting upon him annoyances and indignities one upon the other, and the crisis of the campaign was near at hand, that Ratib listened to the Chief of Staff's now vigorously urged request and the priest's importunities. But a sting came with the honey. It was quite begrudgingly that similar although greatly inferior honors were bestowed upon their protégé; and everything that could be done was covertly done to destroy its value by not publishing it in the market. Ratib was willing to accommodate General Loring, if the former's more intimate advisers could be kept in the dark about it. Believing as Loring did that the priest and Dedjatch Bérrou were powerful representatives of the two disaffected Abyssinian districts—the Okuleh-Gousai and Hamaseen—he was much put out to know that they were so completely ignored by the Commanding General. But, then, Loring was too partisan in this matter when dealing with such a man as Ratib. The Abbé was ever hopeful, and as shrewd as an old Jesuit. He offered Loring his consolation by jokingly inviting his attention to the favorable change in the direction of the wind. "In the Arrendrup expedition," said he, "it was from the south, and now its toward Adua."

Then the priest went on to say that he had hopes of the Okuleh-Gousai yet deriving some benefit from the campaign. Did they not know that after his nine years' experience in Abyssinia, sometimes in prison, often hunted from mountain to mountain by the King's minions, and always under suspicion and ill at ease, he would prefer Egyptian to Abyssinian rule? "We have already practically thrown off the yoke," said he. "Ras-Area has been among us with a few troops, but we have recently paid

him no tax, or tribute, as he called it. We govern ourselves, have a re-distribution of lands every seven years, and other peculiarities of government. In fact we have a little republic here."

"How comes it, Father Dufлот, that you have established a republic, and how is it that there is a rebellion so often in the Hamaseen, and the Okuleh-Gousai?" he was asked.

"Well, there is an Abyssinian proverb to the effect that whoever serves the King churns water for butter; and every man, woman and child in the incipient republic of the Okuleh-Gousai knows it by heart," was his prompt reply.

"You speak warmly of a republic now. Did I not hear you the other day speak as favorably of a French empire?"

"Perhaps. I sometimes do speak so."

CHAPTER XXXV.

CAPTAIN IRGENS IN THE ENEMY'S LINES—SORCERY—THE KING'S MOVE—HIS REINFORCEMENTS—ONLY THREE REBELS AGAINST HIM—PILLAGE AND CONFLAGRATION—JOHANNUS NOT A THEODORE—CIVILIZATION DISPLAYED IN AMPUTATING LIMBS AS PUNISHMENT—BARBAROUS WAY OF CURING BROKEN LIMBS—THE KING'S ADVANCE—ANXIETY AT EGYPTIAN HEAD-QUARTERS—THE TALK OF RETREAT—DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE KING'S FLANK.

We have seen the King's army stretched over a front of sixty or seventy miles. It was in this position when Captain Irgens made within his lines that daring reconnaissance which should receive more than a passing notice. The Captain and Abbé Duflot, both in priestly garb, wearing the kouari, and accompanied by an Abyssinian, all three well mounted, left camp one evening, proceeding directly toward Adua. As they soon entered the enemy's lines, their adventure was filled with many interesting incidents. Although they kept out of villages and away from thoroughfares as much as possible, they were often compelled, in order to learn something about the country, as well as to obtain food and water for their animals, to visit many places where they ran great risk of discovery, and, of course, loss of life if captured. In some of the villages were many of the King's soldiers, who asked very annoying although pertinent questions. But the party traveled four days within the enemy's lines without being seriously suspected, reaching a point only thirty miles from the Abyssinian capital. Often the only water obtainable for their thirsty animals was obtained in small streams, along which hundreds of the King's cavalry were roaming. Yet they made a thorough scouting map of the

country and were fully prepared on their return to give all desirable information as to roads, etc., in view of an advance. When homeward bound, while in the vicinity of large bodies of the Abyssinians, they killed a few chickens, spilled the blood and scattered the feathers in the road, and thus, perhaps, eluded capture, if not the disfiguration common on the border—something that seemed uppermost in the mind of the gallant captain when he set out from Gura. At that time he remarked, jokingly, that the priest had the advantage of him, inasmuch as he was partially protected from such fears by his vows of celibacy.

The King's army was not long held on this extended front. He desired, so we were informed, to advance with his main body along the route reconnoitred by Irgens; but his soldiers and people insisted that the spilling of blood and scattering of feathers, as had been done, was sorcery, and portended evil to Abyssinians should they attempt an advance on this road. Hence the principal force was moved by the King over to the Gundet road. A better reason for this change was that by seriously threatening our communications, as he could from this new point, the Egyptian army might be drawn over to that already ravaged, disaffected and more easily defended country. He had recently been receiving great accessions to his army, which enabled him to do something more than merely observe our movements, as he had hitherto been doing. The Taltals had joined him in great numbers. Troops from Walkeit, along the Tacazzé, after foraging in Shiré, had also hastened to his support, as did tribes of the Wollo and Wornhaimam Gallas. The troops of Ras Woronya of Amhara and Leige Oubié, a former rebel of Gondar, were now foraging in Shiré en route, the Ras and Leige and Gondar priests having already arrived at Adua. A subordinate officer from Ras Addal Desemna, of Godjam, also announced his master's coming, to the King. Other messengers from distant provinces informed His Majesty that soldiers for his army would speedily reach him. Even King Menilek, of Shoa, gave John en-

couragement and sent him a few hundred mules as a present. The priests all over the country were at work, led by the Tchégghi, arousing the population by threats of excommunication. The only rebels to the King's cause were a dedjatch, of Sokota, and the two in our camp,—Welda Mikael and Bérrou,—but none of these, if left to themselves, were at all formidable.

The main body of the enemy had moved over to the Godofolassie-Asmara road, but its feelers and feeders, like the arms of a great devil-fish, extended in all directions over the unhappy country. King John's orders concerning pillaging were quite strict. Cereals might be taken, but herds and clothing must be spared. But in the Hamaseen, and in the vicinity of Gura, many of the people had had relations with Massowah, and these knew their little stores of grain would not be considered a sufficient atonement for the misfortune of living upon the border. Consequently the stores were *cached*, and the men fled to the mountains—that is, whenever the enemy's approach was announced in time for them to do so. Unfortunately, it was too often the case, as we were witness, that the first knowledge of his approach and infernal barbarity was conveyed by columns of dust or clouds of fire and smoke rising in the air; or received upon the winds in the crackling of burning roofs, or in the shrieks and plaintive cries of women and children heralding from village to village.

Nevertheless, Johannus is not a Theodore. It is true he is an adept in Mosaic law, but does he not apply it in Christian mildness? He does not, like his predecessor, order the breasts of women to be sliced off as punishment for fleeing husbands; he simply puts them and their children in chains and carries them away. It is more refined—his cruelty—more in keeping with, and has the flavor of, the old dispensation: if not for us, he shall not be against us, but shall be a burden among his friends. Therefore, when a man is overtaken, his sword hand is, with a single blow, taken off at or near the wrist. Still he might escape the wrath in store for him, so off goes a foot. Not generally the right one; for, with the

right hand gone, he cannot at any rate mount his horse from the usual side—he must go to the left of the horse—and so it is the left foot that offends.*

When the King moved over to the Gundet-Asmara road, he lay in the valley of the Mareb until he received definite information of the movements of the Egyptian army. On the 21st of February he advanced cautiously along by Addi-Huala, keeping his right extended along and up the Mareb; then to Mai-Gorda, Godofolassie, and to Traybeen, where our scouts found him about the 25th of the month—the main parts of his army being at Mai-Gorda, Godofolassie, Addi-Hari and Addi-Magunta. The next day the King himself moved on Addi-Barro, while a cavalry detachment went to Tzazega. His right then reached Addi-Nazzo, where he had an outpost of about two hundred infantry and cavalry. Indeed, on the morning of this day, a pillaging party (a name applicable to his entire army) of twenty men visited Corbaria.

From the moment when the enemy, and the King personally, moved over to the Asmara road (on our flank), the situation was felt to be more than interesting. There was intense anxiety, which was increased from day to day, while he was advancing, with an eye both left and right—on Sanheet and Gura—and hands outstretched feeling our line. The principal officers at headquarters were a unit as to this feeling, but they did not agree upon the method of meeting the King's move, and reducing the

* As the double-edged scimitar, or crescent-shaped sword (of Perseus), used by the Abyssinians to reach over the shield, is necessarily worn on the right side, he must mount, as do the archer Indians, on the right side of his horse. It depends a good deal on whether a victim is a rebel, deserter or thief, as to which limb he is to be deprived of. A rebel also sometimes loses his eyes. If the victim lives through these several inflictions one would naturally suppose it to be simply a prolongation of his agony. But one whom I saw mounted had lost a foot and one hand, and yet he was as gay as a lark. Frequently, when these limbs are cut off, or when a limb is fractured by a ball, in order to save the prisoner's life from the effects of mortification, or to hasten a cure, as already related in a former chapter, the limb is pounded between stones to a jelly up to the next joint. Dr. Johnson (who was taken prisoner, as will be shown further on) says that while in captivity, Abyssinians, who knew him to be a surgeon, often came to him for some professional attention. One day there came to him a soldier who had been wounded through the hand. The Doctor refused to attend to this case, as he did all other cases, fearing that he would be held answerable for the result of operations which he had not the proper means to perform. However, a few days after this the man returned, having in the meantime suffered the Abyssinian treatment of having the bones of his hand crushed, and to Johnson's great surprise the wound was doing nicely.

danger to a minimum. Astounding as it may seem, there was a strong inclination among our generals to retreat. I shall not attempt to fix the responsibility of this inclination upon any particular individual. General Loring did not feel that he was in any way responsible for the situation of affairs, and was willing that Ratib should extricate himself from his difficulty in his own way. All around there was confusion and vacillation, and an evident desire to incur as little responsibility in the matter as possible.

But the proposition was discussed among a few of us. Retreat for what? was asked. Not because of any apprehension of the King's overrunning the Bogos Province; for, as mysterious as ever, not a word was said on that point, about which there seemed to be not the slightest anxiety. The answer was that it was to defend our line of communications between Massowah and Bahr-Reza from apprehended attack, which its exposed situation was now inviting. Against this retreat, it was argued that it was not probable that any large force of the enemy, unorganized as he was, would, when his flank was so exposed, detach itself and climb and descend the rugged Asmara Mountains—which were over 8,000 feet high—through a sparsely populated district almost denuded of food* for the purpose of attacking either Massowah or Bahr-Reza. Therefore would it not be better—having failed to anticipate this move of the King by fortifying Massowah and the Asmara road—to rely for the defense of each threatened point upon the force already there? Rachid Bey's Soudan regiment was at Massowah, having arrived from Suez about the middle of February, for the special protection of that place, although the Commanding General was authorized to use this force elsewhere if he thought best to do so. At Bahr-Reza were Osman Bey and over two thousand men, in addition to the regular garrison. There were also two pieces of artillery at each place. The cameliers, who were constantly going and coming, were available to increase the number of men at each point to upward of three thousand men.

* The Abyssinian army being without supply-trains depends for subsistence on the country in which it campaigns.

Besides, this number at either place could at the expense of the other have been greatly increased; for there was telegraphic communication between the two points, and troops from one place could reach the other in one forced march.

At any rate, it was too late to remedy our neglect to provide for this contingency, if the king intended more than to draw us from the plateau. Again, while the danger was one that should have been anticipated it was not such that the campaign should be sacrificed to escape it. • And this result would certainly follow our abandonment of the plateau. We could not begin the campaign over again, with any prospect of success, confronted as we would be, in all probability, by a formidable army in the passes. Indeed, the motives which brought the army to Gura plain were more potent to retain us there, now that we were there, with a brave and numerous enemy in the field.

In lieu of this move to the rear, it was suggested that our line should be relieved by demonstrations more or less formidable from Gura, upon the enemy's exposed flank—our direct and main object now being to concentrate our army in front, something which had been delayed by an insufficiency of transportation and its wanton use and destruction. For the time being nothing more was said about moving to the rear; but the Commanding General would not yet consent to a demonstration.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCES—THE ENEMY ADVANCING—
RATIB SHIFTS TO LORING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF A
DEMONSTRATION—A DISGRACEFUL STAMPEDE—RATIB'S
FEARS—HIS STRANGE MOVES—THE EGYPTIAN LINE
CLOSELY MENACED—FUTILITY OF THE BLOCK-HOUSE—
TROOPS TO KAYA-KHOR—BATTERIES ARRIVE—OSMAN
BEY COMMANDING AT KAYA-KHOR—THE KING PARALYZED BY THE DEMONSTRATION—STRANGE ORDER
DELAYING TRAINS—RECOIL OF THE DEMONSTRATION
SEVERE—THE DESIRE TO RETREAT RESISTED—THE KING
RECOVERS FROM THE BLOW—TRAINS ORDERED FORWARD
—BAHR-REZA STRENGTHENED—LORING'S ANXIETY—
PACHAS AND BEYS OBSTRUCTING—LOSHE WITH ORDERS
TO BRING UP THE REAR TRAIN—RACHID BEY AND SOLI-
MAN PACHA WITH ORDERS TO PREVENT IT—LOSHE'S
ESCORT DEPARTS SECRETLY WITH OVER SEVEN HUN-
DRED OF HIS ANIMALS—HE IS LEFT ALONE WITH SIX
HUNDRED ANIMALS—EXTRAORDINARY WORK.

It is inherent in the Egyptian's character to yield only inch by inch, as he is compelled to. He never sees things under new phases, never becomes a convert. Hence the effect of the discussion referred to in the preceding chapter was the consent of the Commanding General for the limited use only of the army's eyes and ears. He permitted Captain Sormani to make a cavalry reconnoissance on the 26th of February. This was the first of the kind that was made during the campaign. An outpost was driven from Corbaria; the Captain also learning that the King's right arm was gradually extending toward us, his advance infantry being at Adda-Barro, and the King himself at Abba-Matta. This success inspired us with hope that Ratib's objection to a demonstration might be over-

come, more especially as the enemy was so persistently advancing to a still more menacing position.

I again suggested, and General Loring now urged with great vehemence, that a strong demonstration should be made on the enemy's flank. Prince Hassan also used his influence in favor of it. Ratib yielded, but most reluctantly; he would not assume the responsibility. He consented to Loring's ordering the move, confining the General within certain expressed limits, and throwing upon him the responsibility of any mishap. The move was made on the 27th of the month. The force set out in the direction of Debaroua; but, owing to Ratib's timidity, it was not as strong as it should have been. Yet it accomplished, in a manner, the object sought, and quite as well as could have been expected with the force and under the orders given. The detachment consisted of not more than one thousand or twelve hundred men of the three arms, under the leadership of Captain Irgens (and Dr. Wilson), of the staff.

The purpose of the move was attained; but during the absence of the force our entire command was completely demoralized, and the most shameful stampede occurred that it was ever my misfortune to be dragged into. The charge was altogether too heavy for our calibre and the recoil was as terrific to individuals as would have been the effects of an overloaded elephant gun. The Prince, as well as the Commanding General, showed much anxiety from the moment the force left our camp. His Highness ascended a hill that evening to scan the country in the direction of the enemy and ascertain, if possible, that everything was all right with our absent detachment. He leveled his glass in the wrong direction, on a totally different road from the one on which our soldiers were making a show of force. He discovered some flying dust, or saw something else that he mistook for the smoke of battle, and hastened to communicate his suspicions to Ratib. To the rescue was sounded, and in less time almost than it takes to tell it, a battalion, two pieces of artillery packed, the Commanding General and his staff, the Chief of Staff

and his staff, the brigadier-generals and their staffs, and hundreds of their men following, were flying over the plain in different directions, each particular individual dodging around in search of (or to escape from) an enemy. Not a living soul except the Commanding General had the slightest idea why he was there or where he was going. There was not a "sturdy gander" in the whole flock; a few Abyssinians and a kettle-drum would have put them all to flight.

At dark some of the men were collected, and position for defensive battle taken up in the mountains, Ratib perching himself on an overlooking rock. The excitement was intense, the confusion greater. Staff officers and messengers, cavalry, infantry and artillery, camels and ammunition mules were running in every direction for several hours—indeed until the return of the reconnoitering force. Captain Irgens got back an hour or so after dark, in good shape and condition, but wholly unconscious of the tender care which had been vouchsafed him and his detachment.*

The Commanding General did very little talking on his own account, and it was some time before we discovered why he was so opposed to these reconnaissances. It was stated that, while at all times opposed to sending out detachments, his concern on this particular occasion was because he was afraid that a general engagement would be brought on, something that he was not prepared for. He must have had some foreign assistance to evolve the brilliant notion that a company of his own cavalry on reconnaissance might bring on a general engagement! I say a company of cavalry, for this was about the strength of this arm with Irgens, and it was the only part of the re-

* Afterward the Prince compelled Osman Pacha to assume the credit of discovering the enemy and generaling this bloodless battle.

It ought to be added: Satisfied that it was a disgraceful stampede, for they were of nearly daily occurrence, I remained busy at work in the office until a positive order came to me to have my horse saddled and to join the charge. Seeing that all the superior officers had gone and left the troops, yet in the fort, without commanders, I sent word to the Chief of Staff that, with his permission, I would stay near the fort, and send out on the road where I knew Irgens to be and notify the General so soon as the detachment should make its appearance near the fort. This was done.

connoitering force which was more than a few miles from the fort.

To explain: The Krupps arrived at Bahr-Reza on the 16th of February, where were now concentrated the three field batteries under orders to join the command at Gura. They were to be accompanied by a small body of men; and another detachment was en route from the same place for the front about the same time. One of the principal objects of a demonstration was the relief of these and any other detachments which might be between Addi-Rasso and Kaya-Khor, as the enemy was already threatening this part of our line. But before giving his consent even to the Captain Sormani reconnaissance, the Commanding General waited until he was reinforced by the batteries. They arrived, after much skirmishing with orders, on the 25th, and on the following day Sormani made his scout. Nor was Ratib's consent obtained to the Irgens movement until after the arrival at Kaya-Khor, on the 26th, of Osman Bey with twenty-two companies. He risked these separate commands, on distinct days, being surprised or ambuscaded en route, and yet feared to make a diversion in their favor.

The enemy now threatening our line between Addi-Rasso and Kaya-Khor were in considerable bodies, and were gradually working toward it. The Commanding General and his chief of staff were relying on the so-called block-house to protect the pass. The former even instructed Rachid Bey, who was escorting the last train of supplies from Mas-sowah to Gura, to leave one company there when he came along. But it was not long before Loring discovered that this precious toy afforded no protection to our convoys crossing Haala plain. He succeeded by persistent warnings in prevailing on Ratib to send a force on the 24th into the valley of Kaya-Khor to watch the roads leading from the west into the plain. This body consisted of three troops of cavalry, three mountain guns, and two rocket-stands. As Rachid Pacha arrived there at the same time with the three batteries, their escort of one battalion and the five companies of engineers were joined to the other force—the engineers to work on the Kaya-Khor Mountain

road. It was on the next day (the 26th) that Colonel Osman Bey arrived with his companies. These several detachments were now joined into one command under Osman. His instructions had in special contemplation the relief of convoys arriving from Addi-Rasso. He reoccupied, extended and renovated the intrenchments on the Kaya-Khor knoll thrown up by Major Raif during the Arrendrup expedition. He placed his guns in position to cover a road entering the valley from the west, and employed his cavalry on the plain of Haala, to prevent, if possible, a descent upon our convoys.

This made us at the front less anxious, but farther in the rear affairs were not so satisfactory. The main object of a demonstration being, of course, to give temporary relief to our line and enable us to push up supplies, General Loring and myself hoped for and urged this result. Yet, strangely enough, orders—based, it is presumed, on a lack of confidence in the utility of the move against the enemy's flank—were issued by Ratib on the same day this move was taking place, for a delay of trains in the rear. They were directed to concentrate at Bahr-Reza, eventually to be escorted to Gura by Rachid Bey's battalions on his arrival with the last train under Major Loshe, from Massowah. This was not all. The recoil itself was great. There was not even a reconnaissance on the 28th, the day following the stampede. We were longer recovering from it than was the King from the direct effect of the demonstration. For, notwithstanding the result was as hoped for, the King, having drawn in his outposts along the Mareb to the Village of Teramni (and so far as known also his detachments elsewhere), and remained himself with the nucleus of his army near Abba-Matta for two or three days awaiting further developments, yet he was in motion once more by the 1st of March, and advanced again as far as Tzazega. Indeed, so threatening had his attitude now become that Ratib himself seemed to realize the situation—his eyes protruding in the new light as those of a harem lady just out of the dark. He would have hastened to retreat had he not been prevented. General Loring

now strenuously opposed a movement, which was undoubtedly the real object of the King's menace; and he urged Ratib to act confidently, as if the line were reasonably secure. Further, so I was given to understand, he suggested that a more decided demonstration be made. Irregular hordes are easily surprised, confused and put to flight, said Loring; and only by counter-moves against the King could we hope to concentrate our army at Gura. That accomplished, we could compel His Majesty to risk a general engagement or fly to save his capital and crown.

At one time we thought to have again succeeded. My concern for our line was so great that I expressed, to the Chief of Staff, my willingness to temporarily vacate my duties at headquarters and accompany such a force. General Loring gave his consent to this; but when informed that the force was ready, to my surprise and chagrin, I found only two companies of cavalry, and they much depleted. All this seemed like child's play, so I immediately abandoned the attempt. But another officer made an ordinary reconnaissance with the squadron. After this it was impossible to prevail upon the Commanding General to permit another such move. Much was said about prevention being better than cure, no war without blood, etc., etc.; but Ratib intimated that his head would be used for a foot-ball were he to lose any men in such a move. Perhaps he was right.

Although the Commanding General should have anticipated the effect of our demonstration upon the King's force, he knew nothing about it until two or three days afterward. Then he sent several letters to commanders, thirty miles away, authorizing the trains to proceed to the front. By this time the King had somewhat regained his confidence, and matters were about the same as they were before our show of force on his flank. He was now suffered to pursue his designs, although Loring momentarily grew more and more anxious. By his advice the importance of carefully watching Haala Plain and assisting convoys across it was deeply impressed upon Osman Bey at Kaya-Khor; and the regular garrison at Bahr-Reza was

strengthened by the increase of two companies, which, with the three others and thirteen escort companies at that place, gave the commander a defensive force of about two thousand men, not including the artillery. General Loring relied greatly on the vigilance of Colonel Field and the staff officers with him at Bahr-Reza; and was now daily expecting to hear of the arrival at that point of Rachid Bey's battalions with the last train from Massowah. Indeed, these dispositions and the watchfulness of the command fortunately thwarted any designs the King may have had beyond drawing the Egyptian army from the plateau.

Nevertheless, Loring felt that the general effect of suffering King John to quietly pursue his own plans without molestation would (as the sequel will show it did) keep our entire line from Massowah to Gura in a constant state of alarm, paralyze our efforts, and derange whatever plans might be agreed upon. The greater the efforts he made to forestall such results, the more it seemed that obstructions were thrown in his way. Rachid Pacha and Osman Bey, while together at Bahr-Beza, were filled with mutual jealousy and intrigue; but were a solid unit in obstructing the efforts of the *Etât-Major* officers along the line who were zealously and ably trying to execute the Commanding General's orders as given them by his Chief of Staff. And now the moment they got to the front the delectable business was renewed. Osman Bey began by disregarding the Commanding General's written instructions as communicated through General Loring, and would not obey them until they were repeated to him by Ratib personally. Although there was not a single word that required explanation, or which was changed, his disobedience passed unrebuked.

The relieving of the Chief of Staff, on the 25th of February, of the custody of the mail was naturally connected with the arrival of Rachid Pacha, who, when at Bahr-Reza, was overwhelming the Commanding General with complaints and charges against the *Etât-Major* officers who were on duty along the line of our communications.

After being deprived of the general mails at Massowah, the Chief of Staff was permitted to send and receive his own staff correspondence. But on and after the 25th of February he was without the means of sending orders, letters or messages, and he could seldom be sure of their going, or know when they were answered, as most of the letters and orders passed through the hands of Ratib's clerk, as did the replies thereto. Letters and orders on the most important matters—as, for instance, those to the staff officers along the line who were striving to regulate affairs and keep their chief and Commanding General properly advised—were got through only by resorting to an expedient of some sort. When such orders reached their destination,—now that Ratib's personal attendants were in charge of the mails,—it was generally after other orders, purporting to be also from the Commanding General, had already reached them. These orders were consequently often conflicting, and too frequently one modified the other. When they were simply duplicates, they were generally accompanied by a private letter changing the whole tenor of the instructions. For instance, in a consultation between the Commanding General and his Chief of Staff an understanding would be arrived at, and the latter officer would give directions that an order be issued in the premises. Meanwhile Ratib would return to his tent and dictate another order to his clerk, as similar, perhaps, as his memory and understanding served him. This was, of course, but a mere continuation of the conflict and confusion, which, subsisting from the first, had gradually grown to such dangerous proportions. Conciliation and tact, on the part of the staff, were to no purpose. I would have said patience, also, but this is a peace, not a war, quality. What was needed was physical rather than moral power to immediately and absolutely destroy the whole web of duplicity, intrigue and such like.

All the native superior officers were, more or less, engaged as weavers of this web, and all guided by one instinct against the intruder, as the foreigner is looked on to be.

Even the influence of Prince Hassan was at this time used secretly against the Etât-Major. He said that Egyptians were not expected to obey foreigners; that the latter had no right to give orders. He had not learned the distinction between a staff officer communicating his Commanding General's orders and enforcing his own.

Major Loshe, who was at Massowah, was provided with memoranda detailing the needs of the army at Gura in the way of supplies and transport-animals for a further advance should it become necessary. Loshe and the Etât-Major were the only officers along the line who knew the army's wants. He, as transportation officer, was, at the time I write of, under special written instructions from the Commanding General to bring the rest of our stores in a last train; and Soliman Pacha (of the Intendance)—the Commander there—and Rachid Bey, the immediate commander of the troops, were directed to give him all the aid in their power, as it was of the utmost importance that this train should reach the front in the shortest possible time—before the King could make a descent on our line. Loshe showed them his orders, and they had similar ones from the same source. But for all that, every obstacle was thrown in his way to prevent his executing them; notwithstanding it was the crisis of the campaign, and every moment's delay threatened disaster in front. The Major exhibited such great anxiety to execute his orders that Rachid and Soliman both finally told him that they had private orders conflicting with his. But Rachid had been instructed, by an order sent direct by Ratib, to escort the last train which Major Loshe had been sent to Massowah to prepare. He therefore arranged personally with Loshe and by telegraph with Colonel Field, who was at Bahr-Reza, to send six of his companies with a part of the train from Massowah, on the 2d of March, and to remain with the other companies of his two battalions (the other battalion had already gone forward to relieve the garrison at Bahr-Reza and Addi-Rasso) and accompany the rest of Loshe's train when it left later on. Notwithstanding this arrangement, Rachid left with his entire command on the

1st of March, or one day before the set time.* He seized from Loshe, without his knowledge, seven hundred and twenty-five animals which with the utmost difficulty had been collected there. He loaded them very capriciously—only one hundred and eleven with hard bread and salt, the rest with what Field, Mœckeln and Loshe all three denominated useless stuff, or with such articles as these officers had already provided and sent forward in abundance, agreeably to instructions received from the front. On his way he met one hundred fine Egyptian camels going to Massowah to assist Major Loshe, and these he seized, replacing them, however, with some of his own worst animals. To make matters worse, if such a thing were possible, Rachid loaded his new acquisition with but half burdens—with two boxes of infantry ammunition, whereas elsewhere on the line were little mules propped up by men to carry two boxes of artillery ammunition, which was more than double the weight of the others. Yet, in such quantities did he load his animals that his men would, contrary to the Commanding General's instructions, conveyed by Major Loshe and others, have had nine hundred rounds per man—double the quantity required, and impossible to be transported in justice to the needs of the service and without dangerous delay. He arrived at Bahr-Reza on the evening of the 2d of March.

This was not all. Rachid had abandoned Loshe with more than six hundred animals unloaded, three hundred of which had just arrived and were to be put in order, and without a man to load them or look after their welfare. Major Loshe was left in such a helpless condition that it was only by almost superhuman exertion, by pressing in sick, civilians, and Abyssinians—women and children—that the Major succeeded in loading his trains. After do-

* Perhaps it is due to Rachid Bey to state, in connection with his assertion that he was merely carrying out secret orders received by both himself and Soliman from the Commanding General, that Ratib had a few days before telegraphed to Cairo for three more battallions to replace Rachid at Massowah, who was ordered to the front. Ratib was expecting this additional force to arrive about the 1st of March, but Soliman, who had later information, did not expect them until the 3d. It was said that the latter officer, who is no soldier, feared an attack and threw obstacles in the way of Major Loshe's getting away with the train and troops until he learned definitely that the battallions to replace them were on their way from Suez.

ing so, he immediately set out for Yangoos, where Rachid Bey had met orders compelling him to leave several companies to help the Major along. It was due almost solely to Loshe's indomitable energy and pluck that, in spite of all these harrassing obstacles, the convoy arrived at Bahr-Reza, forty miles from Massowah, at eleven o'clock at night on the 3d of March, and the delay caused by Rachid's unaccountable doings was thus cut down to a minimum. It would not have been at all wonderful had these staff officers become completely discouraged—having, as they so clearly manifested, such great interest in the success of the campaign—to be thus thwarted on every hand in the most important as well as in the most trivial matters.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

COLONEL FIELD IN COMMAND AT BAHR-REZA—TRAINS TO ADVANCE—LORING RECOMMENDS TROOPS TO ASSIST THEM ACROSS HAALA PLAIN—RATIB DISAPPROVES—THE COMMANDING GENERAL'S DISTRESS—THE ENEMY ONLY A FEW HOURS FROM KAYA-KHOR AND ADDIRASSO—LORING DISHEARTENED—HIS THREATS TO SURRENDER EVERYTHING TO THE EGYPTIANS—RATIB WRITES HIS OWN ORDERS—LORING ADVISES TRAINS STOPPED AND THE ARMY TO FALL BACK—RECONSIDERED—COUNCIL—LORING EXCLUDED—RESULTING PLANS A MYSTERY—LORING WORKING IN THE DARK—PLAN DISCOVERING ITSELF STEP BY STEP—THE ENEMY ONLY THREE HOURS AWAY—HE LEAVES THE ASMARA ROAD AND MARCHES AGAINST THE FORCE NEAR GURA—WHAT SHALL BE DONE?—RATIB'S DUPLICITY AND SUBTERFUGE—THE PRINCE'S INTERVIEW WITH LORING—LORING A CONVERT—RATIB'S COMPROMISE—THE PICKETS WITHDRAWN BECAUSE OF DANGER.

Let us turn our attention again to the Gura end of our line. Ratib Pacha had affected the belief that the King would certainly attack us in our intrenchments, and this immediately. He then ordered the whole army to the front, with no supplies to feed them. They were necessarily ordered back. Later, when the King moved to our flank, the Commanding General would have abandoned the key to our line of operations, and rushed to the rear, had not strenuous opposition been made to his doing so by the Chief of Staff. He kept the convoys far in the rear, when they should have been hurrying forward, while the demonstration was being made against the enemy's flank, or if not then, certainly before the King had recovered from the effects of that manœuvre. His concern was paroxysmal, always too soon or too late; but an Egyp-

tian's eyes are so bad, mentally and physically, that few see beyond the "back sights." We had, therefore, on the 1st of March, after the King had recovered and was creeping back to Tzazega and other advanced positions along our line, to send out the following letter under authority of His Excellency the Commanding General :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF EGYPT, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF, }
CAMP NEAR GURA, March 1, 1876. }

Colonel Charles W. Field, Inspector General :

SIR : His Excellency, the Commanding General, desires that you be informed that the enemy on yesterday were near Tzazega. He has for some days been gaining our flank and rear, threatening our communications near Kaya-Khor ; and now, at the same time, still farther in the rear—perhaps by Guinda. He is foraging on the Bogos country and threatens Keren. His Excellency desires you to continue sending along the convoys, under the small escorts which it is believed are with them, and to keep the regiment from Massowah at Bahr-Reza until you have sent forward the convoys and the danger has passed.

He also desires that you may have entire control of matters there, and that you may rely upon your own judgment. He will send instructions to the senior officer there to obey your orders implicitly. Please keep Osman Bey informed.

Respectfully, etc.,
(Signed.) LORING PACHA.
[Letter No. 2 of this date.]
Official—W. MCE. DYE, Colonel, etc.

General Loring felt that he was late in obtaining this concession from Ratib. The King was again on the move. The Chief of Staff therefore recommended, at the same time the foregoing letter was forwarded, that a regiment of troops be sent on Haala plain to assist the convoys across it. This the Commanding General would not consent to do. The next day, that is to say, on the 2d of March, he came to our office with a distressed look, and calling out the Chief of Staff revealed to him the cause of his present anxiety. The enemy had arrived at Demba. "There is a large outpost there," he said, "only three or four hours from Kaya-Khor, and the same distance from Addi-Rasso." In brief, the King's army was now stretched from near Gura to beyond the Asmara road, and was once more threatening our entire line, especially between Addi-Rasso and Kaya-Khor. Disheartened, as Loring was at this time, in consequence of Ratib's refusal to send aid from Gura to help convoys across the menaced plain be-

tween Addi-Rasso and Kaya-Khor, because of the general disagreement in their ideas, and because of the many obstructions thrown in the way of staff officers who were at the rear performing the duties expected of them, he felt anything but in the humor of urging his better convictions on the Commanding General. He not only thought it useless to try to do anything, but did not care to share the responsibility of all Ratib's views. So it was he one day said to me that he believed he would "turn everything over to the Arabs, and let them run the d—d old thing themselves."

Hence, on this day, when called out and asked his advice, I can well imagine him disinclined to contend for his own opinions with Ratib, and that he assented readily to the last-named officer's views, or modified his own to suit those of his commander. However this may be, when the Commanding General had departed, the Chief of Staff directed the following note to be sent, which threw upon Ratib the responsibility of his own acts :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF EGYPT, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, }
CAMP NEAR GURA, 3 o'clock, P. M., March 2, 1876. }

Colonel Charles W. Field, Inspector-General :

SIR: His Excellency, the Commanding General, directs me to say that the orders which have been written to-day, for the guidance of all concerned, have been written by himself, in order to remove any possibility of mishap. The news which the General has received appears to necessitate caution, and he has sent orders to Osman Bey, etc., Just received your two letters, of 10:30 A. M. and 12:30 P. M. of the 1st inst.

Respectfully,

(Signed.) LORING PACHA.

Official—W. MCE. DYE, Colonel, etc.

Private.—Have not seen orders, therefore cannot tell you anything about the extraordinary case.

DYE.

After this letter had been forwarded, he said that he had advised the trains to be stopped at Bahr-Reza, the cavalry at Kaya-Khor to be sent on Haala plain toward Addi-Rasso, and that we should leave Gura with our army for Kaya-Khor and Addi-Rasso. He at once added: "Am I not right?"

Just here I wish to say, parenthetically, that in justice

to everybody there must be more of particularity and personality in the succeeding pages than is at all to be desired. The position occupied by me kept me in the very midst of these discussions, and I naturally became involved in them. Indeed, Ratib seldom acted in more important matters without first consulting Loring, who, in his turn, almost always asked me for suggestions. Detailing, then, my own connection therewith, although distasteful, is certainly the surer and in some cases the only way I have of producing a correct impression. If it be found that I went astray—if I did in any way fail to sacrifice all personal interests and to stand loyally by the real interests of my sovereign—let the burden come upon me, and not upon any of my comrades.

Notwithstanding this interrogatory of Loring's disclosed an entirely new phase of affairs, they seemed clear. It was evident that Ratib was extremely anxious. The King had reappeared on our line, and revived in the Commanding General's mind the idea of rushing to the defense of the point threatened. Ratib had chosen to personally issue the orders, if Loring would only countenance and give his assent to this plan. Hence the compromise, and the General's query, "Am I not right?" He had previously procured from the Commanding General the order for the moving of the convoys to the front, but he failed to get any sort of protection for them from Gura. Rather than be held responsible for this state of affairs, he preferred to give his sanction to Ratib's plan. But he desired that I should state frankly what I thought about it. We were alone. It is always a very unpleasant task for a junior officer to express an opinion where his chief has already advanced one. But it was my bounden duty to comply with this request. Not to be offensively positive, I first said I could give no definite opinion without having more of the facts placed before me.

General Loring said: "You have all the facts that I am aware of."

I rejoined that the contents of the orders referred to in the

letter last quoted were wholly unknown to me,* and that I was ignorant of the information the General had just received from Ratib; that under such circumstances an opinion of any value could not be expected. But, from what I had learned elsewhere of the King's movements, I continued, I did not think the danger was so imminent that matters should be precipitated. However much I might like to do so, it was impossible to agree to the Ratib plan. The road from Bahr-Reza to near Addi-Rasso was well protected on either side, but more especially on the enemy's, by the inaccessibility of the mountains. From the last-named place to Kaya-Khor it was similarly protected from the enemy, excepting at two points which need to be considered. One of these was near Kaya-Khor, and was supposed to be defended by Osman Bey's command; the other was near Addi-Rasso, where the path from Demba débouched from the high mountains. But this path was so nearly impracticable that no large body of cavalry—the favorite arm of the Abyssinian service—would attempt to pass along it, to say nothing of the utter lack of water from Demba to Addi-Rasso, and of its scarcity even at the former place. Indeed, it was not certain that the trains would be any safer at Bahr-Reza than when coming across Haala Plain, under the protection of such force as could be sent from Kaya-Khor and Gura. These facts, taken into consideration in connection with the advanced positions taken up by the enemy, it was thought did not warrant a continuance of that already heart-sickening, see-saw policy of go and stay alternately as regards the convoys. Much less did it warrant the Commanding General in abandoning the plateau and the control of the Kaya-Khor Pass. In lieu, therefore, of the Ratib plan, I suggested that the Commanding-General should hold well in hand, until further developments, that part of his army at Gura not needed to defend the fort against a *coup de main*—indeed to make no precipitate move, so long as

* On application to General Loring for a copy of them or their substance, for the office file, Loring, after seeing the Commanding General, informed me that no copy had been kept. This, doubtless, was only a screen to hide behind.

one could be avoided without jeopardizing the convoys in the rear. Meanwhile, careful communications, as advised by the Chief of Staff, should be maintained, by means of cavalry and other force under Osman Bey, with Kaya-Khor and Addi-Rasso, where they should keep themselves well advised of the enemy's movements. Above all, said I, in conclusion, let the convoys hasten to the front. Any large force Osman might find it necessary to despatch to assist them across the plain could be replaced temporarily from Gura. With a numerous and continually advancing enemy hanging on his flank, the Commanding General could expect to find no more favorable time for this purpose.

General Loring listened, most of the time in silence. He was subsequently absent from the office several times during the day in consultation with Ratib, and no further allusion was made to the subject until our tea was brought in. Then it came up again, and the Chief of Staff referring to the order, said:

"It was reconsidered, and the trains are not to be halted."

But Ratib had other strings to his somewhat discordant bow. He was determined to carry out his own views, but lacked the temerity to assume the responsibility of acting alone and upon his own judgment. He was anxious to involve others, and have them share it with him. Believing, seemingly, that in the multitude of counsellors there was safety for himself, his next move was to call a council of war at which only natives were to be present, including Prince Hassan. I am still ignorant of the resulting plan and orders then agreed upon. Indeed, I only learned of the council incidentally and after its dissolution. It is most extraordinary that the "second in command and Chief of Staff," from whom opinions were expected almost every hour of the day, also should have been ignorant of the views expressed at this council, or of the determination of the Commanding General after it. The Egyptian as a soldier is like himself as a sailor, who when once turned toward port, is content in the contem-

plation of every mirage, as if it were land, and forgets the helm, and at the first glimpse of the beacon's dazzling light he would discard the pilot at the very time he is needed most. But this council was called ostensibly for the edification and guidance of the Commanding General, and his after footprints, seen here and there, enable as to follow his course which may or may not (it is unimportant which) have been influenced by its action.

As early as the 26th of February, when the King first advanced upon the Egyptian line, a telegram was sent by Ratib to the palace at Cairo to the effect that the enemy intended attacking his position at Gura, and at the same time his line of communications. This indicates what was then the general bent of Ratib's mind, which continued the same after the King had returned to his former menacing position. All seeming vacillation or concessions to other views, or modifications of his own he may afterward have made were made conformably thereto, as will be shown further on. About sunrise the morning after the day of this native council, (that is to say, early on the 3d of March) Osman Pacha arrived on horseback at the office of the Chief of Staff, whom he called out. He said he was en route to Kaya-Khor, whither he had been ordered to bring away Osman Bey's command. He was to leave only two hundred men at that place. General Loring was perfectly astounded at the move. He strenuously opposed it, advised against it, and turned Osman Pacha back on the Commanding General. Shortly after this, news came that quite a large body of the enemy had the night before reached Dungal, only three hours from Kaya-Khor. This was followed by other news indicating that the King had taken in the military situation—had heard of Rachid Bey's leaving Massowah, and was now hastening toward Gura to try a bolder, and, if successful, a more effective move than the capture of detached trains. He was determined to prevent the concentration of the Egyptian forces, and to cut off the rear.

It became necessary to take immediate steps to thwart these designs. The Chief of Staff, in his conversations

now with the Commanding General, had learned enough of his present views to know that they still differed materially from his own. In order that he might be enabled to combat arguments sure to be encountered in defense of any plan other than the one which had been agreed upon by the pachas and beys in council (whatever it might be), Loring desired to learn every phase of the subject, and indulged in discussions whenever we were alone. On one of these occasions, when the General desired my views, the following suggestions were made in response to his wish:

(1) In lieu of the present disposition of the force in the Kaya-Khor valley, send five hundred of the men to guard a certain pass—which we were informed could be defended against any force by two hundred or three hundred men—not far away, on the path which the fort in the valley was intended to command, and which leads to the vicinity of Dungal.

(2) Bring the remainder of the force upon the Kaya-Khor mountain, and there intrench it for the defense of the pass.

(3) Let everything be got ready at the Gura fort to enable so much of the force as is not necessary to defend it against an assault to move out at any hour to make junction with the force on the Kaya-Khor mountain.

To meet one of the many objections constantly being urged against taking any force from the intrenchments near Gura, (the wily King was creating the impression that his immediate objective was the fort), it was added: Until the enemy develops his intentions, this disposable force can be held on the Gura plain, between the two roads which open to it from the King, and within supporting distance of the Kaya-Khor force, which it is proposed to put upon the hill.

To these suggestions General Loring replied that there was no water on the hill at the Kaya-Khor pass, the engineers having so reported.

“They reported, General, that there was not sufficient water near there for a permanent work in the pass. But the problem has now assumed this phase: Are the means at the disposal of Ratib sufficient to enable him to main-

tain the Kaya-Khor force on the mountain until battle, which cannot be delayed much longer. That they are there is no reason to doubt, even were there not a drop of water near by other than that generally known. But there is other water, General, in an out-of-the-way place known to Major Durholz and others."

Having thus expressed myself to my superior, Major Durholz was at once sent for, and he confirmed the statement. The water question, then, would have seemed satisfactorily settled, in view of only a temporary occupation of the point, had not Loring immediately asked for the alternative of this proposition. Apparently he was aware that the pachas and beys were fully arrayed against these views, and had decided on some course of action which as yet could only be guessed at.

"If they will not do this, Colonel, what would you next propose?" asked the Chief of Staff.

"I cannot think," said I, "of abandoning these suggestions and acquiescing in what seems to be Ratib's plan, so long as there is any hope of convincing him that his ideas in development would surely lead to the loss of the campaign and the destruction of the army. Something allied to the views I have just expressed seems to me best, and I prefer not to incur the responsibility of encouraging antagonizing ones. If the Commanding General has determined upon carrying out a plan suggested by the council, but conflicting with my judgment, should not they alone be responsible for it? However, in the end, whatever may be the plan adopted by His Excellency, if I am made acquainted with the fact, you may rest assured, General, that I shall do what is in my sphere and power to assist him and you to carry it into successful execution."

Shortly afterward, the Chief of Staff had another interview with the Commanding General. On his return to the office he said something which led me to think that but little headway had been made toward converting Ratib to his views. The Pacha's replies and arguments all manifested a determination to let no large force leave Gura intrenchments for any purpose. Still later, the

Commanding General entered the Chief of Staff's office, and engaged with Loring in further discussion, during which he made a remark that convinced me my name had been connected with the conversation just concluded between them. Indeed, Ratib endeavored to draw me into the conversation, without, however, distinctly asking for my opinion. His views differed from those of his Chief of Staff, yet he had not the temerity to execute them. Notwithstanding that I had decided views as to what was absolutely necessary to do in the emergency, I failed to engage in the conversation. This was because, first, I did not desire to appear as differing from my immediate chief so long as it could possibly be avoided, as, on the contrary, I wished, for the sake of harmony, to express through him, as I had invariably done hitherto, any views which I should be asked to give; secondly, it would have been imprudent for me to engage in a discussion over the most important matters at a critical time, in the presence of irresponsible persons, several of whom were within hearing. Nevertheless I listened to what was said by Ratib in opposition to the views now advanced by Loring. Against the General's advice to hold all the available force near Gura not needed to defend the fort from a *coup de main* in readiness to move out at a moment's warning to thwart prospective moves of the King, His Excellency could only reply:

"But the Krupps are too heavy; they can't be taken."

One would naturally suppose from this remark that the Krupp battery was our only salvation.

In a former interview between these two generals, when Loring suggested, among other things, that one prospective move was the King's crossing the Gura plain to the East, thus turning Kaya-Khor and getting at the open side of the Egyptian line, Ratib's reply, according to General Loring, was:

"Let him pass, and go to hell!"

As noted then, he was for leaving our divided forces in the rear to the mercy of the enemy, who, if enterprising, would certainly destroy them and close up the campaign. An argument used by Ratib against the suggestion to hold

the available force at Gura fort ready to go to Kaya-Khor was that in such an eventuality the fort would fall by assault. To this it might have been replied that if Ratib was to choose between losing the Gura fort in the way indicated and losing the command at Kaya-Khor, together with the convoys, (which would certainly be the case if the concentration at the mountain pass was not effected), would it not be well to place them in the balance? One-fifth the combined force of Kaya-Khor and what was yet at the rear ought to successfully defend the fort. Another reply equally good would have been: You are master of the situation; you, as Commanding General, have the means at hand to render the fort invulnerable, if it is not already so, to such an attack. But this talk of Ratib's was all subterfuge, and quite transparent too, as the sequel will show. There was a ditch seven feet deep and fourteen feet across the top around the fort; the parapet was high, the enceinte generally well defiladed within rifle range, and the guns had a clear sweep over the surrounding plain, provided only that a few obstructions near the fort were removed. This would have been a task of only two or three hours for a battalion of men; and General Loring had been insisting for some time that the work should be done. If the troops could not defend this fort from a *coup de main*, what under heaven would they do in the open field? Surely nothing in the fighting way could be expected of such soldiers! If we were to accomplish anything it was on the supposition that our men would fight somewhere if properly handled. There was no place more favorable for them, as new soldiers, than in such a work.

Nothing more need now be said as to Ratib's motives for not desiring to leave the fort—as to whether he was moved by the belief that the King's immediate objective, under all circumstances, was to be the fort; or whether by lack of confidence in the fighting qualities of his men, or by his extreme anxiety for the safety of the Prince. But it may be observed that his every reply to General Loring rendered it more conclusive that he had thus far resolved not to go to Kaya-Khor with the main command.

“I am willing to let them fight King John on that side and we will fight him on this,” said Ratib finally. And this was the modification he now proposed in his (or the council's) original plan of withdrawing his forces, excepting two hundred men from Kaya-Khor. This change, or apparent concession, was not due to the late discussion between the generals. Shortly after their previous interview the Commanding General had determined upon it, in another discussion with the members of the Egyptian council. Rachid Pacha came right from there and engaged the Chief of Staff in conversation relative to the situation. When Loring alluded to the necessity of leaving the troops undisturbed at Kaya-Khor, Rachid seemingly acquiesced in the former's general ideas—gave utterance to precisely the same views repeated by the Commanding General. Then, as now, Loring combated them, saying “No!” most emphatically.

Whatever may have been his individual views—for sometimes he seemed to be endeavoring to arrive at an understanding rather than at a plan—he tried to create the impression, when we were alone, that he did not look favorably on Ratib's general plan, and that he was doing what he could to combat it and substitute his own. He was very anxious, but the manner of pressing his points in the conversation with the Commanding General indicated either that he was not quite sure of his ground or that he was somewhat inclined to give way before the full array of Egyptian influence. From this fact alone His Excellency, the Pacha, gleaned a hope that he would eventually gain over the General to share, or perhaps bear in full, the burden of responsibility which he himself shrank from shouldering. The young and inexperienced Prince was then placed in the arena, armed with a name and position. During the day of March 3d, Hassan had a warm discussion with Ratib Pacha about the situation, but whether there was any material difference in their views it is impossible to say. Nor is it of much moment; for, practically, he ranged himself alongside of His Excellency. The evening of the 3d Hassan

came to the office tent of the Chief of Staff and engaged him in a long private conversation, during which I purposely absented myself from the place. On my return to the tent after His Highness's departure, General Loring came to my bedside and repeated the substance of their conversation.

If pressure should be brought to bear on "these people" to get them against their will out of the fort, His Highness was of the opinion that they might leave it, but if so, it would be with sullen hearts, and they would not fight. Rati Pacha had learned this, continued the General, in a council with his higher native officers; and he for his (Loring's) part thought the best thing to do under the circumstances was to agree with His Excellency. Now, as the Chief of Staff could originate no order, and had merely expressed an opinion, which he was in duty bound to do when called upon—the Commanding General being at full liberty, of course, to act as he pleased—there could be seen in such arguments only a determination to remain in the fort, and if possible, to gain over the General's acquiescence to it.

As to the men's fighting, if they were not to be relied on under any circumstances, such as the advantage of cover, then certainly the campaign should never have been undertaken. But as this view of the case must have been considered before the campaign was inaugurated, and the question settled for us by those in authority at Cairo, it was not for us to spring it anew, especially after the army had penetrated so far into the enemy's country—into such a position that, if we remained to protect the Gura fort, the commands at Kaya-Khor and en route would, by Rati's and the Prince's own showing, be uselessly destroyed. For there was no reason to suppose that the last described force would fight any better than the troops in the fort.

"Shall we then, right here, abandon the campaign and sacrifice the commands in rear to save ourselves?" I asked.

Even thus we would not have saved the command near Gura, for its capitulation, if nothing worse, would cer-

tainly have been the sequel to the destruction of their line of communication. If self-preservation was to have such weight in the problem, there was no surer way to accomplish it, as well as to secure the success of the campaign than for the disposable force at Gura fort to make the concentration with the other troops, and to fight. Up to this time there had not been, to my knowledge, any views discussed as to how much of a force should be left in the fort; for the proposition to go to Kaya-Khor would not be entertained at all, being combated in every direction. But, to meet the objections already made that the King, coming by way of Corbaria, would attack the fort, I suggested that the enemy could not seriously engage it without drawing the army at Kaya-Khor pass into battle. If the junction as proposed should be made, then any attempt of the King's army could be encountered by corresponding moves of the concentrated Egyptian army.

The result of all this discussion was that the troops at Kaya-Khor were not withdrawn, as contemplated by the Commanding General's order to Osman Pacha. His Excellency consented even to re-inforce that command with three more pieces of artillery. This was done on the morning of the 4th of March. Our own picket line was strengthened and all energies redoubled to obtain prompt and exact information of the enemy, whose outposts were now swelling into little armies. But so far the interchange of views had accomplished nothing in the way of removing the command from the valley to the pass upon the mountain. Indeed, Osman Pacha, who had assumed command in the valley, withdrew, on the 3d, the signal station that the army headquarters had already established in the pass, where it was desirable that the troops should also be put. The enemy being in such close proximity, the Commanding General and, especially, his Chief of Staff, were anxious to get prompt information of King John's movements. For this purpose it was desirable that signal communication should be kept open at night, as well as during the day, with Kaya-Khor. Some of us at headquarters labored all through the night of the 3d to reopen the sig-

nal service communication ; but we did not learn until the morning of the 4th that it had been severed by Osman's transferring the signal party to the command in the Kaya-Khor valley below—because, as he said, it was dangerous to leave them where they were. We could but wonder why he had not for similar reasons withdrawn at the approach of night all his pickets—if he had any out—for the signal station guard, consisting of one company which had been strongly posted and fully concealed, served also as a picket to Osman's camp. It was fortunate for the Egyptian army that the Abyssinian King was not yet ready to advance.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

RACHID BEY PRESUMES TO COMMAND FIELD'S FORCE—
RATIB'S COMPLICITY—HIS DESIRE TO STOP CONVOYS
BY SECRET OBSTRUCTION—HIS OPEN ORDERS TO BREAK
UP ADDI-RASSO AND SECRET ORDERS TO ENLARGE ITS
GARRISON—FIELD FORTIFIED WITH ANOTHER ORDER
AS COMMANDER AT BAHR-REZA—HE IS INFORMED THAT
A BATTLE IS EXPECTED ON THE SEVENTH—HIS AR-
RANGEMENTS TO ADVANCE—OSMAN BEY PREVENTS IT.

Returning to the rear, we find that Rachid Bey, on his arrival at Bahr-Reza, on the 2d of March, met the Commanding General's instructions alluded to in the Chief of Staff's letter of the 1st to Colonel Field, and which has already been quoted. These were contained in an Arabic letter which Loring's advice and Ratib's fears caused to be written to Rachid, who was directed to put himself under the orders of Field, upon whose experience and mature judgment more reliance could be placed for the care and safety of this part of the line. Rachid insisted, contrary to Colonel Field's opinion, that he was to remain there permanently, and was not to accompany the last train from Bahr-Reza, which would be under Field's orders. It might have been believed that the little ambiguity in this order which generally drops from the pen of one who does not understand his subject, was sufficient to enable Rachid to try to thwart in this way the spirit of the order, were it not that on the morning of the 4th of March, after Major Loshe's arrival from Massowah with the last train, and when all was ready to start for Gura, he did even worse—showing that he was not so much impelled by the nature of the order he had received as by the condition of his own mind. He practically assumed to himself the command of the assembled force. On the 3d,

Osman Bey, who was at Kaya-Khor, addressed a letter to Colonel Field advising that the trains be permitted to come no farther than Addi-Rasso, as the enemy occupied a menacing position only three hours away. This letter was intercepted, opened and acted on on the morning of the 4th by Rachid Bey (although Field was present), who immediately ordered a convoy of 500 camels, which Field had started that morning for Gura, back to Bahr-Reza. Had the Colonel seen the letter in time, the convoy would have continued at least as far as Addi-Rasso; and the unfortunate delay caused by Rachid's act, would, of course, not have occurred. But the last-named officer would improve even on the advice—bad as it was—of Osman Bey who was nearer the danger, and therefore returned the trains to Bahr-Reza, where, in consequence of the proximity of the enemy and of the large number of animals still there to be protected, they were in more danger than en route, especially between Bahr-Reza and Addi-Rasso. As to the part between this latter place and Kaya-Khor, General Loring was at this very time advising that troops be sent on the Haala plain to assist convoys across it. But the fact that the Commanding General would not consent to this; that he personally was in communication by signal with Osman Bey when the latter penned the letter to Field, and that Rachid in his foul proceedings was sustained by Ratib, shifts some of the culpability for his offence from the shoulders of the bey. Had he not been inspired from headquarters, Rachid's conduct throughout the campaign—for he was always pre-eminently an obstructionist—was so reprehensible that no punishment would have been too severe, when the army's difficulties of transportation and the evil effects of such conduct upon the campaign are taken into consideration.

But there is another fact pointing to Ratib's complicity in all this; another indication that there was on his part a determination to stop the convoys by secret obstruction, as he did not now dare assume the responsibility of doing it by open instruction. On the 2d of March, when he sent instructions directly to the Arab commanders in the rear, as

described in the Chief of Staff's letter of that date, one of the orders sent, and the only one whose contents are yet known to me, was to the commander of a passing escort to furnish two additional companies as an increase to the Addi-Rasso garrison. This, too, when the last train was daily expected to pass Addi-Rasso,—in view of which Field had orders, as early as the 26th of February, directing the breaking up of that post when he came by. Instead of practicing such duplicity, had Ratib informed his Chief of Staff that he was determined to pursue his own military course, it bears repeating that Loring and myself would have done everything possible to secure the success of plans for which he would thus have assumed the responsibility.

So soon as the Chief of Staff learned by courier from Colonel Field that Rachid construed the order of the 1st as directing him to remain there permanently, he prevailed on the Commanding General to remove the false impression by another Arabic letter, which instructed Rachid to accompany with his troops the last convoy under Field immediately it was ready. Field received a copy of this letter sometime before two o'clock on the afternoon of the 5th, but the convoy was not yet ready to start.

The Chief of Staff was not yet fully satisfied. His letter of March 1st to Field, and his commander's letter of the same date to Rachid contemplated that Field should be the virtual commander at Bahr-Reza; and this, as will be seen from Ratib's letter, even after the Bey's arrival there. But Rachid had not only failed to defer to the judgment of Field, but assumed the functions of the commander. On the 5th of March, when Loring heard of this, he urged that the Commanding General's only hope of getting the rear up in order, and without unnecessary delay, was in giving Field full, absolute and unmistakable authority over all. This was the only hope of getting these rear troops and supplies up in time, as the King was rapidly gathering his army and approaching our front. Accordingly a letter, of which the following is a copy, was sent out:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF EGYPT, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, }
 CAMP NEAR GURA, 3 P. M., March 5, 1876. }

Colonel Charles W. Field, Inspector General, etc. :

SIR : His Excellency, the Commanding General, directs me to say that you will assume command of all the forces and convoys at Bahr-Reza, and on receipt of this you will at once leave with the entire force (excepting, of course, the men and guns already ordered to permanently occupy the fort at Bahr-Reza) and convoys for Addi-Rasso and this place. Addi-Rasso you will, as already ordered, break up, and bring with you the force, etc., now there. The officer commanding at Kaya-Khor will be ordered to communicate with, and assist you according to circumstances. Your letters (2) dated the 3d and 4th (the last nine A. M.) arrived at half past two o'clock P. M. to-day. I am, etc.,

(Signed)

LORING PACHA.

Official—DYE, etc.

To the foregoing official communication I added a private note for Field's benefit, telling him that a battle was expected on the 7th of March. The Commanding General also sent Arabic letters of similar import to the one just printed to both Field and Rachid. These were all received by Colonel Field sometime before three o'clock on the morning of March 6.

We are now prepared to follow the movement of this command under Colonel Field. As late as the 1st of March, after Field had arranged with Rachid Bey and Major Loshe to leave Massowah on the 2d, he calculated that they would arrive at Bahr-Reza on the 3d, and that all would be able to depart from there the next morning. Accordingly he wrote to Osman Bey, who was at Kaya-Khor, to meet him at Addi-Rasso, with a force, on the morning of the 4th. On this day Loring, who had been advised by letter from Field of his contemplated move, sent a signal dispatch, by authority of the Commanding General, directing Osman Pacha (now in command at Kaya-Khor) to send all his cavalry out on the Addi-Rasso road and to march until they should meet Colonel Field. But so soon as the latter learned of Rachid's strange conduct with Loshe—as he mildly called it—he realized the impossibility of departing at the time set, but hoped that the last convoy and troops would leave Bahr-Reza on the 5th for Gura. "They shall go," he wrote, "if possible, as I am heartily sick of the eternal stench here." However, on

second thought, he feared he would not be able to do so quite so soon, but wrote: "The supplies must be sent up, and I shall rely upon the forces at Gura to keep the way open and safe."

It was in conformity to this determination that Field started the train, which Rachid Bey unfortunately turned back. Although the colonel was greatly vexed over this, and assented to it very reluctantly, still, after seeing Osman Bey's letter, which caused it, he did not feel authorized to depart anew until he should again hear from Osman, and the way was reported "clear." While awaiting, and before three o'clock P. M. of the 5th, he received the Arabic letter, informing him that Rachid's regiment should escort the last train. This indicated that the way was "clear," so he determined to divide his convoy, send four hundred animals in the morning, and move out with the rest the next day, that is to say on the 7th. His letter informing the Commanding General of this determination was received by the Chief of Staff at seven o'clock P. M. on the 6th of March.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

THE ENEMY GATHERING FOR BATTLE—A LARGE FORCE RETIRES FROM A HANDFUL OF EGYPTIANS UNDER DERRICK—EGYPTIAN'S FRIENDS LEAVING THEM—A RAS IN EGYPTIAN LINES—BÉRROU AND WELDA-MIKAEL WISH TO GO AGAINST THE KING—THE WILY KING CREATING THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WOULD ATTACK GURA FORT—RATIB FALLING INTO THE SNARE—LORING VAINLY URGING HIM TO PREPARE FOR ALL CONTINGENCIES—LORING HESITATES AGAINST INCESSANT OPPOSITION—COLONEL DYE OFFERS HIS AID—COUNCIL AT KAYA-KHOR.

Meanwhile there were unmistakable evidences that the King was fast gathering his army together. All the villages in the west neighborhood which had not been burned by the enemy were thronged with his forces, the villagers escaping into our lines. At Dungal were about two hundred cavalry, and ten times as many infantrymen. These, however, all retired on the approach of a handful of cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick. A considerable number of the enemy were also at Demba, and they were now assembling in large force all along the near points of the Mareb.

Another evidence that a battle was not far off was this: Dedjatch Bérrou, who had been decorated in dress, and pensioned, and furnished with a field-glass and umbrella (the insignia of rank, as the colored silk shirt is of authority), had for several days, in gratitude and friendship, been almost constantly seated upon the top of a high hill, scanning the thither side of the Mareb valley, and bringing the Chief of Staff information of the movements of the enemy. But on the 5th of March his conduct was such as to indicate that we were not to see him soon again. In order, however, that his loyalty to his new

friends might not be questioned, he presented the Chief of Staff with the remains of exploded rockets from the battle field of Gundet—not as mementos, but, in his simplicity, for use. He also reported having seen certain tents on the Mareb, which he took to be those of the King. His manner and language indicated a consciousness that the occupation of the Black Prince was gone, unless permitted, as he desired, to gather men and assist in the coming battle. This the Commanding General would not consent to, whereupon the Dedjatch retired into the mountains with his few followers, saying, however, that he would not go far away.

Welda Mikael Pacha departed before the 5th. For some days he, too, had been enjoying our hospitality, listening to the mellow-sounding Krupps and the noisy and fussy rockets, eating good dinners and drinking fine wines; but he would now remain no longer. He also asked permission to go against the enemy, but his request was refused. He then retired with his followers to Kaya-Khor, with the Bahr-Reza road to the rear of him, and where he was near enough to the anticipated battle-ground to take advantage of events.

The priest must also hurry away. Not being under pay, he felt little like further exposing himself unnecessarily. Entrusted with General Loring's valuables, which were imprudently given him in public, the Abbé departed, saying he would go to a hill where he could view both armies and the battle.

The King had learned the situation at the farther end of the Egyptian line; now he was finding it out around Gura—tampering with the Sheik of this and other villages, introducing Rases even into our lines—and exercising the wily talents so characteristic of low latitudes, in endeavoring to create the impression that a battle would be fought on the 6th of March, he arriving at Corbaria on the 5th and moving from there against the fort the next morning, and thus causing the Egyptians to develop their plans. From nearly all our sources of information came this rumor. Even the Okuleh-Gousai guides believed it

and came in armed for the fray. And General Loring would not be caught napping—on the night of the 5th he prepared himself for all contingencies, sleeping on his saddle and putting on his battle-boots at an early hour of the morning of the 6th.

And Ratib, who from the very beginning, especially from the 1st to the 4th of March, inclusive, insisted that the King's point of immediate attack should be the fort, pressed this notion as each succeeding day arrived. Indeed, on the 5th, he said his information was still more definite, and that the attack would certainly be made on the 6th. He continued trying to make everything bend to this hallucination, stratagem or whatever else it should be called—imprudently ignoring all other considerations, and showing indirectly a continuing determination to keep the force and intrenchments at Gura intact. The northern parts of these intrenchments were utilized, and being converted into the fort (at this time occupied) which we have been designating as the fort at Gura. In order to give its guns full sweep, and leave no covering for the enemy, Loring repeatedly advised the Commanding General that these intrenchments be cut down and that all other covering which the enemy could make use of in an attack upon the work be removed. This wise advice was unheeded and no such precautions taken until the 5th, when His Excellency made up his mind, apparently at least, that an attack would be made there on the 6th. He did not, therefore, cut the intrenchments down and prepare the force within for removal to the pass, as was desirable—he merely made a pretense of complying with Loring's vehemently-urged views by permitting a portion of the parapet in front of a battery to be cut down, and stupidly left all other existing cover for the enemy around both fort and intrenchments, cutting away only the shrubbery within the latter.

In order that the Gura command should be foot-loose and ready to march against the enemy (trusting the fort, or fortified depot, to its own garrison), the Chief of Staff had urged, as far back as the 25th of February, and daily

thereafter, that our ammunition, rations and forage be removed from the intrenchments to the fort. But Ratib practiced his dilly-dally tactics upon the General, in this as in all other things, until the 4th of March, always remarking that should it be found necessary to do so they could be removed within half a day. On this date Loring urged this with the energy almost of despair, arguing that in any case—even if the intention was to remain in the intrenchments—the stores were more secure in the fort. Then Ratib permitted the work to begin in a half-hearted way, and the sound of battle found men still at work, half the stores being left outside—even the daily-arriving trains depositing their loads in the intrenchments instead of in the fort.

So widely separated were the opinions of Ratib and Loring now as to the conduct of the most important parts of the campaign, that each was disinclined to accept the responsibility of the other's acts and orders resulting from his peculiar views. The former was willing, even preferred, to communicate his orders direct through his clerk, when he saw his way clear; but when there was a prospect of danger, or any doubt in his mind, he shifted upon the Chief of Staff the responsibility of acts and orders, especially those necessary to carry out his own peculiar ideas, which Ratib seemed at the time to approve of, but really only assented to, hoping for a more favorable opportunity, or relying on mental dexterity, to thwart their effect. Realizing this in its full extent, Loring felt that he had been unnecessarily assuming of his own volition a too great responsibility, in so vehemently urging upon the Commanding General the substitution of his own for this officer's views. The full weight of this burden was pressing upon him just now, more particularly because he had been only partially successful in substituting his own. He had rendered himself responsible for the change in the plans of the Commanding General, without causing others, in which he had more confidence, to be substituted in full. For instance, he had prevented the withdrawal of the Kaya-Khor force, without succeeding

in convincing His Excellency of the further necessity of having the disposable Gura force ready to join it.

It is only in this way that I can account for Loring's renewal of the discussion with me on the 5th, and his asking the question :

“Why not bring the force up from Kaya-Khor?”

I do not wish to believe that the Chief of Staff agreed with His Excellency ; but that he had doubts as to the practicability of convincing the Pacha that his views were wrong, or of inducing him to change his plans. In view of the good sledge-hammer work recently performed by Loring, and of the fact that he had given me many good reasons for believing that our views were one about the Gura disposable force going to Kaya-Khor Pass, this remark somewhat staggered me at the time. But there were only two ways to account for it. Either the General had in substance not changed his mind since his interview with the Prince, on the evening of the 3d, when for reasons best known to himself he was inclined to agree with Hassan and Ratib, or he was now merely wavering under the incessant opposition, the intrigues and duplicity, of the Egyptian phalanx. Loring was in doubt whether to abandon the whole thing to them, and no longer oppose the withdrawal of the Kaya-Khor force, or else to make further endeavors to induce the Commanding General to adopt the rest of the plan he had been urging ; that is to say, to prepare the disposable force near Gura to move to the Kaya-Khor Pass. After repeating to Loring, in answer to his question, that the withdrawal of the force from Kaya-Khor would be the virtual abandonment of the campaign, there was but one thing left for me to do in either case. Believing that the campaign was about to be sacrificed, and noticing that Loring was under great mental stress and trouble, that he needed bolstering up, I felt it to be my duty to my chief and to the Khedive to assist in trying to avert the threatened calamity. Desiring to support the General, to relieve him of some of his anxiety, if not of part of his burden of responsibility, I said that Ratib had called upon me to express an opinion in the

premises, and that I was only waiting his (the Chief of Staff's) permission, as my immediate superior, to give it. "If we fail, General," said I, "we may at all events feel ourselves relieved of responsibility in the matter, and I will then sacrifice myself to the views of Ratib." No reply was made to this remark, and nothing further was said that day (the 5th) on the subject.

About ten o'clock in the forenoon of the next day, I was asked by Loring to accompany him on horseback. Not a word had been said about this ride, nor was I aware where we were going. Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick and Major Durholz were also ordered to accompany us. We soon joined the Commanding General, and rode with him to the valley of Kaya-Khor, picking up Osman Pacha on the way. Arrived at Osman Bey's camp, we were all—with the single exception of Durholz—called into council.

CHAPTER XL.

RETROSPECT OF SITUATION—MILITARY FEAST FOR THE KING.

Before entering into details of the council proceedings let us take a retrospect of the situation. The Egyptian side of this may be summarized as follows: The staff doing their utmost to concentrate the army in front, covering Kaya-Khor Pass, and to give battle to the King; while the result of the Egyptians' efforts was to keep the army divided.

After our own purposes, the most important elements entering into our calculations were the immediate intentions of King John. For the protection of his country from an invading army he had open to his choice, from the beginning, the alternative of a purely defensive, or of an offensive-defensive campaign. Had the first seemed to him the more inviting, he could have waited, with favorable prospects, to encounter the Egyptian army in the mountain fastnesses, should it attempt to reach the interior of his kingdom. In this case he would have had to meet the united army, and be compelled to subject the homes of his most devoted followers to the devastation of opposing armies; and meanwhile, with unfavorable prospects, would have had to temporize with his impressionable subjects, and to struggle to retain impatient soldiery in the face of an advancing foe. Or, if he feared to risk all in a decisive battle, even then it would have been expected that he would make more enterprising efforts than he had been doing to delay the march of the invader by operating on his line of communications, in the hope that the army would be caught in the mountain gorges by the overwhelming torrents, which may occur in the month of May, as well as in succeeding months. Although in a

successful issue of this he could hope for no better result than a postponement of the campaign until the next season, his movements sometimes created the impression that he intended relying upon these partisan efforts and delays until he could accomplish among the defiles and natural fortresses what he had not the temerity to undertake elsewhere.

Although each coming day bore to us some interesting news of the King's change of position, if not of his advance, it was not until about the 5th of March, just after he had received an accession to his army of about one-third his aggregate force, that the boldness of his movements indicated that he was not to be satisfied with partisan warfare, but aspired to strike a blow so decisive as to effectually stop any farther advance into his country, end the campaign, and drive the invading army over the border, if not destroy it.* To thus rid his territory of the enemy he was surrounded by a vast horde of men, educated individually in courage by the ferocious beasts that from time immemorial have, by day as well as by night, prowled about their homes. This mass of beings, cemented by superstitious fears and religious fervor, influenced by the prospects of plunder and military glory, armed to the teeth with such implements of attack and defense as with their impatient daring they are fond of handling, was trembling in expectancy, eager for the fray. Confident in this prodigious host, this mighty man of war, resolved for battle, had moved down to where his presence alone tended to drive the probabilities of a further invasion farther away—into the regions of the possible only.

On the 6th the situation was favorable to the King's general project, whatever enterprises he may have had on his programme to carry into execution. The landscape presented to his eye from the Kaya-Khor mountain on the west, called Zuban, which looks down on the surrounding

* The information had at headquarters, of King John's movements, when carefully sifted, indicated to the mind of the author that a battle would take place on the 7th of March.

hills, was inviting in the extreme. Behind, from Demba to Dungal, and from Dungal to Corbaria, two hours away, were to be seen the scattered cantonments and bivouacs of his intolerant and chafing followers. The intermediate valleys were wild with their turbulence; and the bestridden hills resounded with their martial ardor.

To the right, below, extended Gura plain, running north and south some seven miles, with a breadth varying from one to two miles as one goes from the southern to the northern extremity. It is thickly covered with a growing shrub, large enough to conceal infantry, but sufficiently scattered to enable troops to pick their way anywhere, when not prevented by the torrent-bed which winds along the plain. It is enclosed by hills, some of which on the east are quite elevated, though not inaccessible to infantry, but with openings here and there, in this elliptical contour, through which wind bridle-paths that communicate with the villages of the surrounding country. A half-dozen villages also dotted the higher points of the southern part of the plain. In their midst was intrenched the main body of the army of Egypt, aggregating some seven thousand seven hundred men, and which included several small companies of cavalry, the Krupps, the steel, and four guns of the brass battery, besides two and a half six-gun batteries of mountain artillery, and seven rocket-stands. Adjoining these intrenchments was a fortified depot, about completed. At his very feet lay Kaya-Khor, three hours in the rear of this part of the Egyptian army, in a valley closely invested by mountains, with an entrance, however, on the north from Haala plain, through a narrow gorge; and on the south left by a broader pass with a steep acclivity of several hundred feet to Gura plain. Rising in the midst of this valley is the hill on which was now intrenched a defensive force, consisting of about two thousand five hundred infantry, three troops of cavalry, two rocket-stands and six pieces of mountain artillery, some of which were in position to command, as was supposed, still another opening to the valley from the west. This, the principal part of Osman Pacha's com-

mand, was cut off by the topographical features of the surrounding country from any possibility of relief or escape, should the King close the passes from the plains of Haala and Gura. It is true that there could now be seen a part of Osman's command on the mountain, where they had selected a position supposed to obstruct the passage to Kaya-Khor from Gura plain, and had begun to strengthen it by a wall of such stone as they could find on the ground. Nevertheless, the situation of Osman's command at the time of the meeting of the council—indeed, on the evening of that day—was really enticing to an enemy less enterprising than the King.

To his left and front King John could see, stretching away toward Addi-Rasso, the plain of Haala, along which he knew Colonel Field's command was to advance. This force embraced not only about one-fourth of the entire Egyptian infantry and two guns, but also stores and transport-animals indispensable to the column should it become necessary to search for the enemy. These three or four commands were so isolated that the King might well have gloated over the prospect, in a choice of a direct attack on one of them. The fears expressed at headquarters that the command at the southern end of Gura Plain would be selected as the immediate point of attack, were nothing less than chimerical when such a military feast elsewhere presented itself to his Majesty—for had he made his dispositions for such an attack we should have expected his army to emerge on the plain by one or both of the Corbaria roads, whose *débouchés* were within range of the Krupp guns that mounted the work for the defense of the depot; in fact, the entrance to the plain by the more southern of these roads, known as the Godofolassie one, was right under our guns. But from the position he was occupying this could not be done without a detour, necessitating the surrender of an attitude which was so effectually menacing our communications. His forces would, then, naturally be expected to enter the plain by the Demba-Amhoor and Arato roads, and these would bring him so much nearer Kaya-Khor than to the com-

mand beyond, near Gura, that we could not expect or hope he would pass in sight of a place so vulnerable on every side to attack a position immeasurably stronger by nature,* rendered still more so by art, and defended by six-fold the force,—considering the power of artillery,—secure from a *coup de main*, while the King was without the patience, knowledge or means requisite to besiege it. Even with these facilities he could not hope to accomplish anything within a time at all reasonable, when the procuring of supplies in the vicinity was to him an element of such moment in the problem.

On the 6th of March, then, I anticipated, nay, predicted, that if the King attacked on the 7th his forces would débouch into Gura plain by the Arato and Amhoor roads, whatever might be his point of attack. And of this—the enemy's point of attack—my mind tolerated no doubt, for His Majesty's advantages among his own people for acquiring information were such that we could not help crediting him with a full and perfect knowledge of our forces, position and movements, if not often of our ideas and determinate purposes. Nor was it at all more likely that he would cross the Gura plain between these two forces at its either end, ignore the one and the other, and pass to the east, whence he could strike Colonel Field's command on the march. I say pass to the east, for the branch roads from the enemy's position on the west, which enabled him to threaten our communications between Addi-Rasso and Kaya-Khor, were of such difficult passage that when once studied we discarded (at least I did) all fear of any serious mishap here—the trails from about Demba which intersected the rear of our line near Addi-Rasso being so nearly impassable for cavalry, even Abyssinian cavalry (their favorite arm), that we had less cause of anxiety here than we had near Kaya-Khor. Even at this latter place there was need of very little anxiety, for after careful examination, made on the 6th, it was ascertained that the roads were

* While the boulders at Kaya-Khor Pass would afford protection to a large defensive force, they would cover the advance of an enemy against a small force.

impracticable for an army. Once our apprehension of attack here had vanished, there was no need of further fear of direct attack from the west on any point between Addi-Rasso and Kaya-Khor. But, however feasible it might seem, it was not likely that the King would waste his opportunities in such a movement with his entire force,—if at all, with more than enough to prevent a junction—for by it he had so much less to gain than he had by an attack on Kaya-Khor, whose fall would be the mere prelude to the destruction also of Colonel Field's command, the isolation of the main body near Gura, and, unquestionably, its eventual capitulation or destruction.

Notwithstanding the belief could not be cherished that Kaya-Khor could successfully resist an assault, still, admitting that it could, it may be remarked that during an attack, however prolonged, the King had the means, aided by the topographical features, of preventing the junction of any of the three or four detached bodies, and as a consequence, of destroying the campaign, if not the opposing army. This should have been the ground-work of the Commanding General's fears; and I believed it was necessary to arrange for such an attack, and, at the same time, to be prepared to foil or meet any of the other movements which were creating so much apparent solicitude—the provision for defense to include an adjustment for the assumption, on our part, of the offensive at any desirable moment.

CHAPTER XII.

OPINIONS IN COUNCIL—TO CONCENTRATE FOR BATTLE—
THE REAR TO MOVE FORWARD BY FORCED MARCHES—
THE TROOPS IN KAYA-KHOR VALLEY TO TAKE POST ON
THE MOUNTAIN IN THE PASS—THE FORCE IN THE GURA
INTRENCHMENTS TO JOIN THE FORCE IN THE PASS—
THE COMMANDING GENERAL DESIRES AN OPINION IN
WRITING, AND CERTIFICATE RELIEVING HIM OF RE-
SPONSIBILITY—LORING'S OBJECTION TO THIS EXTRA-
ORDINARY DEMAND—RATIB'S OILY WORDS—SEEMING
FINAL AGREEMENT—NAPOLEON'S CAUSTIC VIEWS OF
COMMANDERS WHO RESORT TO COUNCILS.

The council, as has been already stated, was attended by Ratib, Loring and Osman Pachas, Osman Bey, Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick and myself. The only officers called upon to give an opinion upon the situation were the last two above referred to. Derrick's views upon points, where that gallant officer expressed any, were in substance the same as my own. Therefore, as those expressed by myself are best remembered, and are perhaps somewhat fuller—coming, as my opinion did, after his—they alone will be given. I suggested the importance of Colonel Field's command not only being saved, but of its reaching the front—that its march should not be arrested, but on the contrary should be hurried up. Knowing that the prevailing notion at this juncture was not to leave the fort, I took particular pains to represent upon the ground all the neighboring roads, etc., in order the more clearly to demonstrate the necessity of joining Osman-Pacha's force, and overcoming opposition to the junc-

tion. The more important suggestions were these: To transfer that part of Osman's command which was in the valley of Kaya-Khor, under Osman Bey, to the more defensible position upon the summit of the mountain, and join it to the rest of the Pacha's force in fortifying a position selected to control the passage from Gura plain, and thus protect our communications in general, as well as the advance of Field—this, with the exception of one company of cavalry, which should remain and picket the mountain roads, and furnish intelligence of any movement of the enemy. This force was not sufficient to defend the broad, irregular pass. Moreover, as there were no fortifications there, and, in consequence of the rocky nature of the position selected, and the lack of means, could not be on the next morning more than such a wall or breastwork of stone as could be piled up during the night, it was not strong enough to defend its own position, and it became absolutely necessary to remove to its support, from the intrenchments on the other end of the plain, that part of the force not necessary to the defense of the adjoining fort.

Independent of these considerations, this junction became compulsory in the anticipation of a general battle. In order, however, to cover our intentions until the enemy should develop his purposes it was proposed to halt this force en route, temporarily, in front of and between the *débouchés* of the Demba-Amhoor and Arato roads, which enter the Gura plain just to the right and right-front of the position selected to guard the pass. The first of these roads was within a few hundred yards of, and the other about two miles from the pass. The Gura force occupying a position between them would, therefore, have been within such easy supporting distance of Osman Pacha's command as to render the move susceptible of being denominated a junction, in view of the enormous proportions of the enemy and his relative position. From this location the movements and developments of the enemy could be more readily learned, and the absolute junction of the forces effected in a manner so as best to cover our rear, conceal

our intentions, and be at the same time in a condition and situation to accept or give battle.

It was said to give battle, for it might have been obligatory on the Egyptian army to hazard it to save a vital member approaching under Colonel Field, had the enemy attempted merely to cross the plain and strike him from the east. And it was impracticable to reach him in any other manner without battle, because the time expended among the difficulties of a more circuitous route would perhaps have enabled Field by forced marches to reach Kaya-Khor. That is, the mere holding the pass did not protect our line on the east. This could not be accomplished directly, but could be equivalently, by detaining the enemy while Field was moving up. To fall upon the enemy the Commanding General would have had—excluding the force which was to remain in the Gura depot—about ten thousand men in hand, strengthened by forty pieces of artillery, including the rockets equally as large a force, unincumbered by *impedimenta*, as it could be hoped ever again to have in the campaign—in fact, considering everything, an opportune moment, independent of covering Field's advance, to drive the enemy into decisive battle.

When I suggested the removal of the disposable Gura force to Kaya-Khor, the Commanding General immediately demanded to know what force I would leave in the Gura fort. The reply was, one thousand or twelve hundred men, besides the convalescents, the Krupps, and two or three pieces of mountain artillery.

His Excellency quickly replied: "I shall take the army and give you the fort, if you will give me this opinion in writing, and a certificate that you will take all the responsibility."

General Loring spoke up warmly against this effort of the Commanding General to dodge responsibility, and was saying, "This is not exactly——" when I touched his arm, meaning thereby that he should offer no objection, and said: "I accept; I do not fear to give my opinion in writing. I rather prefer doing so." His Excellency, however, did not call upon me to do so. Then I continued my sug-

gestions, saying that whatever might be the King's intentions at this time, water and provisions for man and beast in his army were important factors which could not be ignored in his calculations. Water was to be obtained near by, for such a host as was following him, only by crossing Gura plain to the east, over its hilly barrier, into the smaller plain. It was therefore incumbent on us to consider the crossing of the plain by His Majesty as a contemplated move, in importance to him second only to a victorious engagement. The position would also enable him to procure barley—subsistence for man and beast—from the Okuleh-Gousai country, the home of our friends, from whom we were continually drawing supplies. As the Abyssinian soldier lives from hand to mouth, this was a consideration for the King of vital consequence, and to us of an importance not easily exaggerated, as it would uncover the whole of the Okuleh-Gousai province to pillage and devastation.

In a word, the acme of my wish was that the Commanding General should gather his forces before King John could make any serious aggressive manœuvre, and that he should cause a delay in any such attempt until our forces should be so concentrated as to be able to give the King battle under the most advantageous circumstances to us; not forgetting, meanwhile, that the condition of the Egyptian army should be such, if he then and there failed to draw the enemy into battle, as to enable the Commanding General to execute with celerity such offensive moves as might be considered necessary in pursuit of the object of the campaign. This was to be accomplished, it was believed, as suggested. Providing the substance of these opinions was in harmony with those of other members of the council, and were the views to be executed by the Commanding General, battle would be successful, it was believed, and the army united.

To one unused to Egyptian ways there would have seemed to be great unanimity of opinion at the close of the council, His Excellency remarking, "We all seem to agree." He signified, there and then, his acquiescence, if not ap-

proval of, the proposed disposition of our troops. He was intimately affable, even going so far as to leave his chair and place his hand upon my knees.*

I am not unmindful of the fact that the greatest soldier of modern days was of the opinion that "a council of war is resorted to only by a weak or cowardly commander"—is never summoned except with the notion of some cowardly proceeding, to diminish the blame by dividing it among several persons, or shifting it altogether. The only commendable object there can ever be in a commander's assembling such a council is to ascertain the views of other officers, from whom he hopes to form in his own mind, and for his guidance, a more decided judgment on a doubtful point. This, and nothing more; for the officers of such an assemblage have done their duty when they have delivered the opinions called for—then the whole matter, with opinions and suggestions, rests in the hands of the commanding general, the responsible executive who alone can order.

After the council no determinations or opinions were expressed, at least in my hearing, by those in authority; for why should they make themselves "overwise" and destroy themselves. The real intentions of the Commanding General were unknown, and will be learned now only when we have the battle and all its attendant facts before us. It was not until the next morning that I learned, and I believe Loring also, that Ratib had personally given instructions for the removal of the forces in the valley, under Osman Bey, to the pass, as suggested. They joined Osman Pacha there during the night. But he dispatched no orders to Colonel Field to come on by forced marches; at least the Colonel never received any.

When the council had dissolved, all its members attached to headquarters set out early in the afternoon on their return, all riding hastily, excepting Derrick and myself. We were desirous of observing the military features of the country in the vicinity of the pass.

* "The words of his mouth were smoother than butter, but war was in his heart; his words were softer than oil, yet were drawn swords."—Psalms lv., 21.

CHAPTER XLII.

NO ORDERS TO PREPARE FOR A MOVE, OR FOR BATTLE—
RATIB IGNORING THE KAYA-KHOR COUNCIL—SOUND
TO ARMS—BATTLE WITHOUT PRELIMINARIES—BATTLE-
LINE AND MARCH—RATIB'S LINGERING HOPE THAT
THE KING WOULD ATTACK THE FORT—THE HALT—
THE MARCH RESUMED—SEARCH FOR A BATTLE-FIELD
—COLONEL DERRICK'S HANDFUL OF MEN MISTAKEN
FOR THIRTY THOUSAND ABYSSINIANS—HIS NARROW
ESCAPE—A COURIER ANNOUNCING THE ENEMY—THE
ENEMY MOVING ON KAYA-KHOR—STILL SEARCHING
FOR A BATTLE-FIELD—THE STAFF INFORMS THE COM-
MANDING GENERAL OF THE ENEMY'S MOVEMENTS—
DESCRIPTION OF THE FIELD.

There had been no discussion in the council as to the time when the movement from Gura fort to Kaya-Khor should take place. But as there was reason to look for the enemy from and after day-break of the following morning, the staff all expected to move out during the night. General Loring had been urging for days that the command should be held in readiness for a sudden move, night or day. However, Ratib Pacha was content with the mere opinions of others, and now relied entirely on his own mental resources for the execution of his individual views. The staff waited and waited during the afternoon and night for some sign of preparation for the move, but no order came. Nothing special was done by Ratib in view of the impending battle. Routine duty was performed as usual. The approaches from the enemy's position were picketed during the night, and again after nine o'clock on the morning of the 7th. This tardiness alone was convincing that His Excellency did not realize the situation, although he stood from early dawn with a field-glass, on

the most prominent point in the fort, awaiting the approach of the King. He was in hopes that it was His Majesty's intention to attack the Gura fort and intrenchments. He seemed determined that it should be so. However, should the enemy move out into the plain on the roads, as I predicted that he would do, he would be within half a mile or so of Kaya-Khor, before the fact would be known by Ratib, and the Gura army six miles away.

Believing that artillery was destined to play the emphatic part in the approaching struggle, some of the foreign members of the staff, during the night of the 6th, made themselves so well acquainted with the guns and ammunition as to be able, if necessary, to render essential service in this arm.

The camp, with but few exceptions, lay down as usual that night; but many could not sleep, as they momentarily expected to be aroused, if not to arms, at least to hear the preparatory orders. These, the staff were destined not to know. The night of restless expectancy lingered through; and it was not until after ten o'clock on the morning of the 7th that the *Etât-Major* heard the first mutterings of the approaching storm. Afar off the rising dust near Kaya-Khor announced the King's army in motion. The clarion notes of the bugle, from battery to regiment, and from regiment to company, sounded the summons to arms. This was at once an expectation and a surprise to members of the staff. It was the culmination of harassing anxieties, disagreeably protracted; yet it was to be a battle without preliminaries—without careful study on the part of the Commanding General of the topographical features of that part of the plain where the conflict of arms, it was anticipated, would take place; in a word, without knowledge of the problem. The enemy had risen with the morning sun. The rising dust signaled his approach; but there was no such understanding between Ratib and his commanders and the staff as would lead to that concert of action so necessary to success. We were destined to move almost precipitately against the enemy, not only without that knowledge and mutual understanding which inspires

confidence and obviates delay, but with fearful apprehensions occasioned by our own tardiness.

I was busily engaged in office duties at the time the call to arms was made, and was not personally aware of it until Prince Hassan and his secretary entered the tent, with the information. Their flask was pulled out and they asked for water. Having given directions that at the sound of the first gun in the coming battle the office-tent and contents should be taken into the fort, I mounted my horse, and, accompanied by Dr. Johnson [see future page] and Testaferrata,* hurriedly made my way outside the intrenchments and through the fort.

The infantry and artillery were forming line just in front of the work, facing the direction from which the enemy were expected, though yet out of sight—only their dust being observable. The left of the line had assumed a condition of order, and the arriving troops formed on the right, seemingly under direction of the Commanding General, who, surrounded by cavalry, was near by with his personal and general staff. My egress from the fort, through which it was necessary to pass in a short cut, brought me near to the left, where I found Hassan Pacha and his secretary seated in seeming tranquility. I spoke to the Prince wonderingly and inquiringly as to the meaning of all that was taking place, and asked if it was proposed to wait for the enemy there. The Prince assumed a cold and haughty demeanor, which caused me to at once suspect that, notwithstanding the council, all was not as it should be as to the place of meeting the enemy. But the response came from both—"I do not know, but suppose it is in order that the troops may not start out pell-mell."

I next rode over to the right, where troops were still arriving; but we did not have long to wait to see the column file out. I cannot but wonder now how calmly, or it may be demurely, they wended their way along, when it is remembered what a little band it was, going, as they believed, to the aid of comrades—to engage in deadly combat with a barbarous foe, overwhelming in numbers,

* Telegraph operator, used as interpreter, etc.

and as terrible in battle as he is bloodthirsty in victory. Knowing neither their own weakness nor their strength, they marched along in the faith of their religion. The enemy's strength was their weakness; his imperfection their power. Although numbering scores of thousands, the enemy had not the cohesion of discipline or even that of organization; whereas our force, numbering little more than five thousand men, relied upon their unity, the excellence and superior range of their arms, and the power of their artillery. All of the artillery save the Krupps sallied from the work, but the steel battery was immediately returned by the Commanding General.

The fort was about midway between the hills on the east and west. The troops on leaving it moved (in the direction of Kaya-Khor) right up the longer axis of the elliptical plain, often in and to the right of the frequently passable torrent-bed which extends along it. In its winding the column cut off several of us staff officers from our chief and from the Commanding General, both of whom were over on the right somewhere. Those of us so cut off rode to the left of the dry torrent-bed, to its higher bank, whence could be seen the dust in a direction a little west of northerly, toward Dungal and Demba. Ratib, however, was on lower ground and could not now see this rising dust. About this time, while we were a mile from camp, a mounted messenger arrived from Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick—who was making a reconnoissance in the direction of King John's army—to inform the Commanding General that no enemy was to be seen from his position on the Arato and Amhoor roads. Now a considerable length of time had elapsed since that messenger had left Derrick, and heavy clouds of dust could be seen in the direction of Kaya-Khor; but, for all that, Ratib had a lingering hope that the King would still move against the fort.

The column was therefore halted and remained stationary until the hesitating Commander-in-Chief was suddenly struck with another idea. Then the column was obliqued to the right, away to the base of the hills, to get into a road which is traveled when the plain is one vast flowing

lake, and which leads one high and dry between Gura and Kaya-Khor. Along this road, as if feeling its way, slowly moved the column, with the Commander, surrounded by his staff, at its head followed by cavalry, a battery, battalions of infantry, and other batteries and infantry farther in the rear.

Attracted by the increasing clouds of dust, which were certainly approaching nearer and nearer, I had unconsciously passed a few steps beyond the head of the column, which, unknown to me, had again halted, when a staff officer brought me word that General Loring wished to see me. I retraced my steps and found Loring, with other staff officers and the Commanding General, surveying the military features of a rocky hillock which stood off from the hill range, perhaps a couple of miles from the fort. They were considering the propriety of occupying this knoll with a battery. This was the first intimation I had that a battle-ground was being looked for. Without discussing the military aspects of the immediate locality as a battle-field, in order to condemn it it was enough to know that its relative position would enable the enemy to cut us off not only from Kaya-Khor, but from the fort as well; for the flying dust raised by the enemy beyond the hills, which concealed him from view, was already unmistakably proclaiming his continued advance along roads that would admit him to the plain in the immediate vicinity of the force at Kaya-Khor. This was virtually getting in between our force and that commanded by Osman Pacha; and if he should choose to sally from the hills out upon the plains at the same time from the Arato road, what was there to hinder the King from holding us in this spot? Its isolation alone was an invitation to move against it.

One of my first thoughts on arriving at the knoll was that these soldier-children could not, certainly, from that conspicuous position, hope to scare the King when he should appear from behind the hills, by crying boo! Believing we had left the fort not merely as a sortie, to show our teeth and return growling, but to help Osman Pacha's command

and, as a consequence, ourselves and the army, out of a critical situation, I asked myself why should we not move on toward Kaya-Khor? Therefore, when General Loring remarked, "Here is a good place for a battery, is it not?" it flashed through my mind that he had perhaps fallen into the views of Ratib, and that they were determined not to get out of reach of the fort. However, I replied that I thought we should go farther on; but no immediate decision was made on the subject, and I left him discussing the matter with Ratib. Several of us staff officers then rode on, the column following us a few minutes later, the cavalry leading. Pretty soon we heard a loud noise behind us, and turning we found the army once more halted, and a battery being trained on Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick's little body of scouting cavalry near the *débouché* of the Arato road, now nearly opposite to us. We all hurried to the battery, an officer in front of each gun, to prevent it being fired. It was only by strenuous and prolonged exertions on our part that a mishap was prevented, and that our army was not hurriedly formed in line of battle. I finally succeeded—apparently, at least—in convincing Ratib that it was our own men on whom the guns were trained. The battery was made to limber up, and we officers again rode on.

But we were obliged to return and go through the same performance a second time. I then noticed that Major Durholz, who, although an extremely zealous officer, had very defective eyesight, was trying to convince the Commanding General that the little force which I knew to be Derrick's men, was the enemy. Believing that it was jeopardizing the safety of our army, under the peculiar circumstances, to permit Durholz to remain longer at the front, I assumed the painful responsibility of ordering him to the rear. The person bearing this order found the Major close beside Ratib. He replied to the order that if the object on which the battery was trained was not thirty thousand of the enemy he would go back as directed, and that willingly. But this apparent determination to fire on our own men was not our only cause of alarm. The dust was rising in such dense masses just west of and near the

Kaya-Khor command, that it behooved us who were yet several miles away to prevent these harassing delays and move forward with all haste. Still more did several of the staff feel the emergency of the occasion a few minutes later, when we saw a courier leave Derrick's cavalry and gallop rapidly toward us. The Lieutenant-Colonel had discovered several thousand of the enemy coming from the direction of Dungal. After this there could no longer be any doubt about this handful of cavalry not being thirty thousand of the enemy.

Attracted by and absorbed in the changing motions of the dust we officers continued slowly on our way, while there arose from the compact body of dust on the Demba road a branch column gliding far along toward the Kaya-Khor command ; and still another, which we believed to be on the Dungal approach, lengthening down and apparently parallel to the long line of the plain. Our army had again moved, and was coming falteringly along behind us—a battle-field was still being looked for. Surgeon-Major Wilson was sent forward by the Chief of Staff, who was at the head of the column, to look for good ground for that purpose. The Doctor passed in a gallop the several staff officers who were a little in advance of the column, and soon returned, saying that he had found the ground "all right."

Not far from the extreme point attained by the Doctor in his ride in search of a battle-field, on a spur which projects from the range of hills to the road, stood a captain of Ratib's personal staff also examining the surrounding country. These significant circumstances increased our anxieties and only intensified our desire to have the army hasten along, instead of dilly-dallying by the way. Just beyond this spur we came to a prominent place commanding a view of the surrounding country and from which the enemy and his developments could soon be distinctly seen. Here with our field-glasses we began a search for the Abyssinians in the vicinity of the ever-increasing dust, with the purpose of advising the Chief of Staff of the King's movements. The column had meanwhile again halted a short distance to our rear.

We all were now on a narrow plateau extending out from the high range of hills which forms the eastern inclosure to the plain. In front and below us, running to the edge of the plain, was one of the tributary torrent-beds, generally of difficult passage for cavalry at this point and farther down, but above gradually shallowing out to the plain's level at a place several hundred yards farther along, near where it originates in a large gap which conducts through the chain to the rear of our position. For some distance south, up to this opening, the general direction of the range is from south to north; but from the other side of the gap it starts farther out in the plain, thus making a mouth to the gorge, and winds elliptically toward the northern extremity of the plain's axis,—a couple of miles away,—where Osman Pacha's command was to be seen in a crescent form upon the gently sloping hill-side, fronting the plain and guarding the passage to the rear. Both branches of the chain are quite inaccessible to cavalry—one from a point just north of Gura village to the opening just referred to; the other from this latter-mentioned place to a point near the northern end of the plain.

There was every indication now that the hesitation, or whatever it may be called, in our army's movements was chronic, and that some determined effort was necessary to avert the danger of awaiting the enemy at that particular place. I requested Captain Irgens to go back and point out to the Chief of Staff a prominent battery spot just to our left, which we had observed when coming along, and to suggest it as the left of our line. The right of the still halted army rested near the spot indicated. This point, although on the average level of the narrow plateau, projects broadly out some yards beyond its general line of front into the plain, in such manner that artillery upon it would have a commanding sweep of all that part of the plain within its range,—not only of the point, but right and left,—more than the entire one hundred and eighty degrees, as the natural line of infantry would be a little farther to the rear. This point stands in full view, like a sentinel over the plain and its approaches. Below its steep

sides, passing along its front and continuing down the plain, is the same torrent-bed which is first seen at the gap. Its banks are more forbidding and become more and more difficult of access as one descends its course.

The sight presented to our view following the range toward Osman Pacha, induced the belief that in extending our line from this battery position along the base of the range to the right, a favorable battle-field would unfold itself to our view, and that on reaching the right of this ground, should it be found prudent to move farther on, it could be done by letting go the left—not forgetting in doing this, that by our keeping control of the gap the King would be prevented from crossing the plain at any place other than near Gura village under the fire of the Krupps which mounted the fort. However, should the right be discovered to reach sufficiently near Osman Pacha's command to act in concert with him, and to cover by cross-fire the unoccupied ground in the northeast—in the angle made by the two commands—we should feel that this commanding point must play an important part in the anticipated battle.

Our tardy arrival on the ground, and the fact that King John had at this time already shown his hand, absolutely forbade further delay en route. It was time for us to be in position. With the left at this battery point and the right stretched away to the north along the base of the chain of hills, the Commanding General could have opened communication with Osman, whose fire should have controlled, if the force itself did not occupy, the ground between Ratib's immediate command (in its new position) and the King. Here Ratib could have awaited further or newer developments of the enemy, or have effected immediately, if necessary, close junction with the force at the pass.

CHAPTER XLIII.

THE ENEMY GATHERING—THEIR BATTLE-CALL—A BATTALION ON A WILD-GOOSE CHASE—THE ARMY MOVES OUT TO JOIN OSMAN PACHA—IT IS SUDDENLY HALTED—AWAITS THE KING—VAIN EFFORTS FOR LONG RANGE GUNS—THE ENEMY IN COLUMNS MOVES AGAINST THE EGYPTIANS—GAUDY APPEARANCE OF THE CHIEFS—STIRRING MILITARY BANDS—INTO BATTERY!—BATTERY SUPPORT—HURRIED PREPARATIONS—THE BATTLE OPENED ALONG THE LINE—THE FOE MOVES ON—FLANK EXPOSED—BATTERY SUPPORT USED FOR ITS DEFENSE—NO OFFICERS—THE COLONEL ARRIVES—DEMAND FOR TROOPS—CHARGE UPON SABRY'S BATTERY—A WELL-DIRECTED ROCKET SAVES IT—BOLDNESS OF THE ENEMY—DRIVEN AWAY FROM OUR LEFT—DESPERATE CONDITION OF THE RIGHT—THE PLAIN ALIVE—THE ENEMY IN THE JAWS OF THE BATTERY—LAST LOADED GUN FIRED—CAVALRY LEADER KILLED BY A CARBINE—CHARGES REPULSED—CHARGES RENEWED—CRITICAL CONDITION OF THE FLANK—ARTILLERY POSTED TO AID—THE FLANK TURNED—PRINCE HASSAN LEAVES THE FIELD—THE ARMY FOLLOWS HIM—THE ENEMY CONCENTRATES—COLUMNS DASHED AGAINST THE EGYPTIANS—A BATTALION DESTROYED—BATTERY OVERTHROWN.

Captain Irgens had no sooner gone on his mission than field-glasses were brought into requisition in their work of search among the masses of dust, which were gradually assuming a different aspect. The column of dust that had at one time been reaching out toward Kaya-Khor was now receding and fast disappearing in a line which lingered along this Demba-Kaya-Khor road,* while the Dungal and

* Before this column turned back, an Abyssinian chief was seen to ride ahead of it within a few hundred yards of Osman Pacha's force and to make a reconnoissance of the position.

Demba-Amhoor clouds became denser, and from our position appeared to lengthen out and continue their approach, when all at once these thick clouds subsided and there were to be seen only irregular gusts, as if raised by solitary horsemen. They had retired from Kaya-Khor, but where had they gone? Were they marshaling for the fray, or were they off the road? were the questions we asked ourselves.

Soon our glasses discovered objects like stationary men, mounted and afoot, beyond the plain, on the side of the nearest hill. Ere long, a few degrees to the west, in an opening between and just beyond this hill and another one to the south of it, were seen Abyssinian cavalry, not to be mistaken, with their glittering spears, hurrying and huddling on. They stirred up but little dust, and we supposed them to be off the road, when suddenly they disappeared behind the northernmost of the two hills.

This had the semblance of a rendezvous, as the continuing streams and crowds of men, a-horse and on foot, hastened behind. Multitudes climbed to the crest, vibrated for a moment, then rushed frantically down to the plain. From Dungal and Amhoor they came; from the south, from the north, from out of the west, in countless thousands, infantry, cavalry and artillery, men, women and children, armed as their wont, pell-mell they came for the fray. In ravenous swarms, with feverish haste, they dashed to their battle-call, over and around the hill, to settle for an instant in the plain. Here the mass of men was concealed from our view by the bushes, but one or two columns were soon discovered reaching out toward Kaya-Khor. At intervals, within say an hour of time, I sent to our chief, by some members of the staff, full information of the enemy's doings, with a hope that it would awaken the Commanding General to a realizing sense of the danger, and of the necessity of moving on. But care was taken not to impart this news in such a manner as to create any undue alarm and paralyze our movements.

Observing no indications of an advance—on the con-

trary, having been informed during our labor here with the field-glass that a single battalion had been detached, to be posted under my direction,—it was readily concluded that if there was not perturbation of heads, there was a disposition not to go any farther. This became more evident to those who saw this battalion return before it reached its destination, without being seen by the officer to whom it was sent, and without receiving any orders from him. The extraordinary and unaccountable character of this move can be realized only when the fact is recalled that from the immediate head of the column the enemy's developments could not be seen, and that there was no disposition for battle other than this one. The battalion was evidently sent out on a wild-goose chase.*

Anxious to have the gap between our army and Kaya-Khor closed, I rode back with a view to learning the intentions of the Commanding General. I found the head of the column at rest a few hundred yards back, not far from the halting point. After I had informed the Chief of Staff of what I knew about the movements of the enemy, I accompanied Ratib Pacha to the battery point, where His Excellency's attention was called to it as the place pointed out by Captain Irgens. Looking out, I noticed that the most southern of the two hills concealed the opening along which the enemy for so long a time had been passing. I therefore repeated to His Excellency the information already imparted to Loring, about the Abyssinian movements, and personally endeavored to persuade him to go ahead and make the junction with Osman Pacha.

The Commanding General inquired whether there was good ground for the line and batteries farther along.

“Yes, Your Excellency,” was my reply. “Shall we not go on and form the junction?”

“Form the junction with Osman Pacha?” said Ratib.

* Captain Sormani, one of the staff officers who informed me that a battalion was coming with orders to report to me, was sent back to ascertain for what purpose they were placed under my orders. He did not return; nor did the battalion arrive.

"Yes, General," was the reply.

At first I thought myself successful, for the column was ordered to march, and I was directed to ride at its head. We had advanced but a few paces when Ratib said the column would be halted by the bugle sound, and ordered me to advance no farther after the bugle was sounded, as the line would be formed upon the ground where halted. We marched on, and presently arrived at the point whence we of the staff had been making our field-glass observations, when suddenly the bugle sounded the "halt." This precluded all hope of getting the army to move farther along toward Osman Pacha.* The company of cavalry in the advance filed out of the way, to the right and rear, forming line, some yards in front of the chain, in a recess between two spurs which jut perpendicularly out from it. Convinced that this was to be our position for battle, I was extremely anxious to cover by our fire all the unoccupied ground between us and Kaya-Khor. I was informed by Major Sabry Effendi, chief of artillery, who was in immediate command of the forward battery, that his were mountain pieces, and that there were no long-range guns to be had. His guns were hurriedly put into position and battery, beyond the road in front of the cavalry, at the only commanding point available for artillery in the vicinity.

The battle-line was formed on ground where the column halted, one battery being on the left and the other and extra pieces at the Irgens point. Our arrangements were not yet completed, but the enemy were fast coming down upon us. While we were preparing, they too had been busy. The clouds of dust in the distance had passed away, and the hill, a few moments since alive with beings, had lost its ant-like appearance, and organization in the plain began. The scene of disorder had in part disappeared from the fermenting mass, which now, for an instant tranquilized with a semblance of unity and restrained by authority, was launching forth divergent

* "Though thou shouldst bray a fool in a mortar among wheat with a pestle, yet will not his foolishness depart from him."

columns of cavalry, with accompanying infantry concealed among the bushes. One column issued from the enemy's left, striking off toward Kaya-Khor; a second moved out in a direction such, that, by a slight deflection of its head to the left or right, it could go to the attack on Kaya-Khor or fall on us, as desired; a third was seen headed for the right of our line; a fourth was advancing toward the centre, and a fifth against our left. Each column was led by a Ras, bare of head and foot, bedecked in all the paraphernalia of barbarous warfare, mounted on a gaudily caparisoned horse, presenting a *tout ensemble*, at once fantastic, wild and fiend-like. Following the Ras, at the head, and with each Dedjatch and under-chief throughout the column, were martial bands, consisting principally of *nagariths* and *aimbellas*. The former of these instruments is at once a tambour and tambourine, having in its sound the volume of the drum and the clattering of cymbals, while the latter instrument has the range and flexibility of the trumpet and the shrillness of the clarionet—a mingling of deep, hurried and ominous tones, hiding both past and future, and arousing their barbarous souls to fury and combat.

We could see well-mounted men advancing, the lance and javelin of each gleaming in the meridian sun. On either side was a scimitar or pistol, and a buckler hung on the left arm. They were all alive with the pride and confidence of Gundet, nerved and stimulated by the native tedge,* as well as the martial din, they, with their King in their midst, were borne and led on to battle.

About the time we were putting the guns into position, Testaferrata—the only person of the staff at that moment with me—was sent to request that the right (the nearest) battalion should be moved up to support them; but he did not succeed. I then galloped over to the battalion and begged this favor of one of the officers, who, however, referred me to the colonel. The enemy were so close upon

* This I state on what I believe to be good authority; but, I must confess that I learn elsewhere, on equally good authority, that the Abyssinians rarely drink when going into battle.

us that there was no time to run to the Chief of Staff or Commanding General, both of whom were some distance away. After much effort on my part and many anxious moments, the colonel acceded to the request, and the battalion moved to the right and filed to the rear in support of the battery. This left between the battery and the nearest troops in the line to the left a distance equal to the united fronts of a battalion, a company of cavalry and a battery of artillery. This distance was not afterward filled, the battery, cavalry company and battalion on the right being completely isolated.

When the Abyssinians began to move, there were two miles of level plain separating them from us. They bore down upon the Egyptian position as steadily and compactly as the squadrons of a great military power. Nothing was heard along our entire line but that busy hum of preparation when all is intense anxiety. Boxes of ammunition were removed from camels and mules, and conveniently deposited. Meanwhile our gunners were getting the range. The air was still, as if hushed in contemplation, and the enemy came boldly on. More than half the distance first separating us was now passed, and their appearance became more imposing and terribly suggestive.

Suddenly was heard the opening boom from the guns in the centre and from others on the left of our line. The former, being at the obtuse angle of a triangle whose sides connected the three batteries, gave this line a considerable convexity, the centre guns standing out nearer the enemy. The shells from these guns burst over the right of the advancing foe, the shot from our left also reaching the enemy. Ismail Sabry's guns on the right at once chimed in on the Abyssinians in their front.

Rising abruptly out of the small plateau on which Sabry's battery was located was the rocky point we had been using as an observatory. It obstructed fire from these guns against the right advancing columns which were nearest our line. It was just large enough for two pieces, and no more. Accordingly, two guns were quickly taken from the left of the battery, thrown up on this rocky

point, and at once brought to bear on the enemy.

Boom after boom was now heard along the entire line, and far over the plain went the echoing shell. Rockets, too, from the right and the centre, in awful concert, began their terrific flights. Battalion after battalion fired volley upon volley from right and left, sending death-dealing missiles at long range upon the swift-advancing foe. With steady tramp, the Abyssinians closed in upon the Egyptians. Riderless horses bolted their ranks in response to exploding shell; yet on the army came.

So soon as matters seemed favorable with Sabry's battery, I looked to its battalion support, which stood between the spurs, on ground of the same level as that occupied by this artillery. It could do little execution there, as its fire and view were obstructed both in front and on the right—in front by these guns, and on the flank by the spur overlooking the pass through the range. The battery defended besides our front, a little of the right front, but this gorge on our flank could not be reached by it. The spur, covered with large boulders, stood boldly up on the right and a little in the rear of the battery position, like a guard over it and the pass to our rear. Once in possession of this, our flank, as well as the artillery, would be protected.

The enemy had already reached the gorge and this rocky hill and were assailing our flank. Riding over to the battalion I found the troops apparently without officers—perhaps the latter were dressed like the privates and out of sight in the ranks. At any rate, there was no one to whom to give orders or make appeal to have the men take possession of the crest. However, their left flank was soon thrown forward, and by dint of great exertion I induced them to advance somewhat and extend themselves to the right a few paces, in a direction nearly perpendicular to the general line of battle. But the poor fellows moved up like lambs to the shambles, only to halt at the foot of the spur. When the battalion threw forward its left I found myself in the rear, but while in this position I coaxed and begged the men to ascend the hill, and to do

so quickly—but all to no purpose. As the troops in their curiosity, or anxiety, were standing six or eight rows deep along in the centre of the battalion, and were still congregating, it was with great difficulty that I forced my way through them to the front. I then rode up to the crest, and there, with less trouble, succeeded in getting the men up and into position behind the rocks. Here a few Abyssinians had already collected, and the position was now assailed. Three soldiers fell dead at my side on the first discharge of the enemy's guns, and before we reached the summit two more fell.* When this small party of men were posted, it was with much delight that, on turning around, I saw only a few yards away a part of this battalion, with bated breath, hurrying to the spur, led by their colonel, so soon to become of heroic fame.

They were quickly posted on the spur, to the right and in continuation of the battalion line up toward the crest of the mother chain. Descending the spur, I found nearly a company of men not yet in position. These were at once pushed to the left of the battalion line, in a direction giving them both a clear front and a flank fire. From the crest held by our men we could see down into the broad mouth of the gap only a few hundred yards away, and I felt that, notwithstanding the position was strong in itself, it was the key to our entire line, and was imperiled by a prospective concentration of force against it. Its fire alone was to protect not only itself in front and flank, but also the flank and rear of the whole line. It was desirable to have troops to the right of the battalion, close up to the crest of the range, and in sufficient numbers to prevent, by their fire, the flank from being turned. The situation was reported, and more troops were called for; but they did not come.

Columns one and two of the Abyssinian force which a while since were moving toward Osman Pacha, had now changed direction and were converging upon our position. Our line was already savagely assailed, yet here came thun-

* The same volley also wounded several others, including myself, who was shot seriously through the foot.

dering along, with a terrible show of force, this additional host of Abyssinians. Not a sound was heard from the Krupp guns over in Gura fort ; not an encouraging echo came to us from Kaya-Khor.* What were we to do? Another effort should be made, I thought, to procure long-range guns to bring under fire more of the ground over which the enemy must come, between us and Kaya-Khor. Captain Irgens, having now arrived at the battery, was requested to hasten away and procure them. He failed, however, to do so, Ratib Pacha not only refusing to let him have them, but expressing his sorrow that there were none upon the field. He subsequently failed, also, to obtain the Commanding General's permission to procure some from the fort.†

We turned to the battery, all our energies being redoubled. Only a couple of hundred yards now separated these pieces from the column in their immediate front, while fusiliers, spearsmen, and men with knobbed clubs, from bush, ravine and rock, on our front and against our right, rushed madly on. Shot after shot now pealed from our battery, intermingling with angry rockets, the fire of our few cavalry and of infantry. But still the Abyssinians continued their advance. Dauntless of heart, with "faces like the faces of lions," and "swift as the roes upon the mountains," they charged up the gentle incline, driving artillerymen even to their carbines. A rocket, leveled low, was fired into them, and, ricocheting, tore savagely right into the head of the surging column, overwhelming it with consternation and confusion, and beating it off in file to their left.

Meanwhile, the columns directed against our centre and left persisted in their course in the face of converging shell and rockets falling in their midst. But, as they neared the line, shot and shell thickened around the van, driving despair into the lead, and they, too, filed off to

* At the beginning of the battle, seeing something like exploding shell among the enemy clear across the plain, some persons thought Osman Pacha had opened with his artillery. But it was afterward ascertained that this appearance was due to the discharge of the enemy's artillery, of which he had a few pieces.

† There were at this time four field-guns upon the field and six in the fort, besides the Krupps.

the left, leaving this part of our line comparatively free.

Fearing that our flank would be turned, Testaferrata and others were separately dispatched by me to the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General, with information as to the condition of affairs, and the request for more men. They did not come. But it was impossible for me to leave at this crisis in search of troops, for every moment of my time was intensely occupied, and I feared the consequences of my leaving the place, even for a few moments—for the troops with whom I was acting were not only isolated, but out of sight of the rest of the army.

We now looked into the plain, and behold! the cavalry so recently driven from our left had re-formed around King John, and the columns near Kaya-Khor were pressing forward. All, horse and foot, were swiftly advancing. Where a few moments before were only thousands of shielded infantry, shooting, darting and dodging in their brave efforts to gain the spur, were now tens of thousands jumping from behind bushes in the plain, on the right and left of the columns, and filling the spaces between them. One glance showed us the entire host, wild in their fury, tambour and trumpet mingling their tones with infuriated cries and yells, the harsh air-grate and fearful hiss of the rocket, bursting shell, the roar of artillery, and the clang of small arms—the very plain was in tempestuous agitation; yet, in defiant answer to the din, the enemy pressed on, their brandished weapons glittering in the sun.

I rode to the crest of the hill, which was now fiercely assailed. I saw Captain Sormani in the recess below, between the spurs, and called to him to hasten to the Chief of Staff or Ratib and again urge the need of aid. But he failed, seemingly, to understand me, and rode away. Officers and interpreters all had now gone. There was no one near, no one in sight, whom I could send on this important errand, and I dared not leave myself. The columns were fast closing upon the battery, and I rode back to the guns. One of these columns was just in front, and another was on the right flank, coming boldly up the

slope, while myriads of Abyssinian infantry charged over the plateau, which separated us from the plain below, to seize the crest. An unremitting fire poured down upon these daring fellows, and they jumped behind the rocks upon the front slope, only, however, to renew the charge.

The well-handled artillery, and the cavalry too, threw against the dashing foe an incessant fire of rockets, shell and shot, which went crashing and searching into their ranks; but there was no abatement to their progress. They came to the very jaws of the battery, driving for an instant its gallant commander unconsciously to his revolver, and some of his men again to their carbines.* The moment was a critical one. Another jump through the cannon's smoke, and the Abyssinians would be upon us.

"Now is the time. Quick, quick!" was cried; and the last loaded gun was discharged.

Amid this battery, only one with an unbounded faith that the end of his days had not been reached could now have had further hope; for this discharge was against the column advancing immediately in front of the gun, and the flank column was still pressing on only a few yards away. There was no time to reload, and the artillerymen seized their carbines. One soldier stood an instant between the two guns upon the knoll, watching his opportunity (as the smoke cleared away) against the latter column. At nearly the same moment that the last gun was discharged, this soldier took deliberate aim with his carbine at the daring leader (perhaps twenty-five yards away). He fired, and Dedjatch Hegous, chief of cavalry, from Shiré, fell dead. His horse reared and danced frantically for an instant or so over the dangling body, and then dashed away to the rear.

Their leader was now no more. The columns, shattered and bewildered, wheeled and sheered off toward our flank. But they were immediately replaced by others, who rose out of the chafing and frenzied mass now but a few hundred yards away on our right and front. Column after column of horsemen now charged the battery,—simultane-

* Hurriedly I cautioned the commander against thus helping to demoralize his men.

ously its front and right,—while irregular masses of infantry were continuously hurled upon our flank against the battalion in position; but they were repulsed in confusion, and followed up with a withering fire until again lost in the multitude. The columns once repelled from the left of our line, those withdrawn from Kaya-Khor, and those first hurled against our right, all this redoubtable cavalry, some fifteen thousand or twenty thousand strong—supported by the infantry hosts—tried their hand once, twice, and again, against the battery, only to be battered, disorganized, down the slope to the mouth of the gorge, into the pelting hail of the battle's storm, there falling thick and fast from rifle, cannon and carbine into the perplexed and writhing body of the enemy.

We had thus far defeated the enemy, but our position upon the flank was becoming more critical every moment. The tension was too great to last long against the persistent foe, who again massed his countless numbers on the right for a last desperate effort. Only after recoiling again in a repulsed charge did each column of Abyssinian cavalry now turn our right, pass through the gap (though under the battalion fire at close range) and gain the rear of the mountain chain, while the remaining infantry was ready to be thrown once more against our flank. During all this trying time not a messenger whom I had sent for reinforcements or other purposes returned to the right. These were Turnheysen, Johnson, Wilson, Porter, Irgens, Sormani, Testaferrati, and several Arabs. Testaferrati was killed or captured. The others, I suppose, were retained under the orders of the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General.

Not a soul was seen other than those already mentioned, until Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick appeared in the flat between the spurs. I was standing on the crest, whence I attracted Derrick's attention by a halloo, and requested him to report to the Chief of Staff that our flank was turned, and to advise the seizure of the heights just in rear of our right. Derrick was also requested to first take two pieces from the battery, which was now playing on the mass of the enemy,

remove them just to the left of the spur and the battalion, and nearly in a line with the latter. The slope to the right front of the section, and just in advance of the right half of the battalion, was thickly covered with boulders which concealed thousands of Abyssinian riflemen. I advanced the pieces until their fire could not only sweep much of the battalion front, but reach the bottom of the gorge as well, through which the enemy's cavalry were now huddling. The reinforcements of infantry were desirable just now, specially to occupy the higher ground to the right of the battalion, to assist in dislodging the men behind these rocks, and prevent their attaining the commanding ground to the right rear—in a word, to secure what we had gained.

But we were to be grievously disappointed. When Derrick gave the message to General Loring, the two rode at once over toward the left in search of Ratib Pacha, whom they found near the centre of the line. The message was repeated to him; but scarcely had he heard it when, without giving any orders on the subject, he rode away in a great hurry along the line toward the Prince, who was now, and had been during the battle, on the extreme left. Here Ratib advised His Highness to take his body-guard of cavalry and make his way to the fort as quickly as possible. The Prince took the Commanding General's advice and started for the fort; and the army naturally followed him.

“A Prince does naught, or regular or rude,
But followed straight by the gaping multitude.”

Concentrated as Ratib's thoughts were upon the safety of the Prince, the army was of course neglected, and no troops were sent as requested to occupy the heights to the right of the battalion.

A few of the enemy had gradually worked their way from rock to rock up toward the heights, until they could see the main body of the Egyptian army when it began to follow the Prince in the direction of the fort. These Abyssinians signaled this fact to their comrades below, the

greater part of whom—all the cavalry but two or three hundred—had already passed through the gorge. Many of the infantry immediately returned and concentrated for another effort on our position. Hours had already been spent by them in daring attempts to capture the battery and dislodge the battalion; but hitherto all their efforts had been frustrated. Now, however, notwithstanding all the strenuous, heroic exertions of the men in battery and battalion, they were unable any longer to stem the tide which, rising to its flood, poured in dense masses against the battalion, the tempestuous wave carrying one through our centre, and another by the right flank higher up the spur toward the spine of the parent chain. Here on the right not a man was to be seen to dispute their progress to the rear between the range and army.

Not for one moment did these nimble-footed warriors halt. Flourishing their weapons, onward they sped through thick and thin. Their figures lean, lank and lithe, and charred in their nudity like Pluto's angular hosts, on they dashed in triumphant glee, reveling in their element, one column across the open space to the next spur which was unoccupied, and the other along under the crest of the chain.

Only a few minutes elapsed after their passage to the rear when the whole battalion line was overwhelmed in position. The struggle was hand-to-hand and for an instant only; for, pressed as were our men, and partly surprised by such an irruption, when they thought themselves so near victorious, they had failed to fix bayonets. But had they done so it would only have added a few more painful moments to the unequal contest. They did all that men (with their limited advantages in the past) could do. They found at the onset of battle the key to the army's position, and faithfully held it for hours, barring the door against a succession of daring charges made by a formidable host. They lost it at last, with their grip upon it, while at their posts, with their arms in their hands and faces to the foe—only in a tremendous battle-wave which swallowed all. I saw no

man attempt to leave his post; each and every one remained in his place till all was over.

Near the close of the tragedy, I was on the left of the battalion, where I was able to superintend also the battery and note the effects of the shot of the two guns. At this time not a sound was to be heard from the pieces which had been posted specially to aid the battalion by playing along its front. Being high above the guns, which were obstructed from view by large boulders, when their fire ceased I rode around the rocks and descended. But they, too, had succumbed, and not an able man was to be seen. The ground around was strewn with the wounded, dead and dying. I rode to the other part of the battery to aid two or three remaining men who were struggling to turn a piece to the flank against the charging foe. But it was too late—the Abyssinians were upon them in hot haste. A few more shots were heard and then all was over. The flood had passed. There was left naught of battery or of battalion. Of the latter none were left to tell more than is told here of their tale; and of the former every man was killed outright or wounded.

They fought the army's battle, did this handful of less than half a thousand men, and their story has now been told just as it occurred.*

* The company of cavalry had run away long before; when, I know not.

CHAPTER XLIV.

THE FARCE AFTER THE TRAGEDY—EGYPTIANS FIRING INTO EGYPTIANS—THE ABYSSINIANS CLOSE IN—NO EGYPTIAN OFFICERS TO BE SEEN—DISORGANIZATION—A FUNERAL PROCESSION—RACHID PASHA'S CONFLICT—THE ARMY BLOCKED IN A GORGE—A SLAUGHTER—DEMORALIZATION—FIRING UNCONSCIOUSLY—A FLANKING FORCE—PRINCE HASSAN LEADS THE VAN—THE PRINCE IN A DILEMMA—THE PRINCE ESCAPES—BEWILDERED MEN TO THE HILLS—WORDS OF PRAISE.

After the tragedy comes the farce; but this one has a serious dénouement. After leaving the battery I rode beyond the next spur, in the direction the Egyptian troops were moving. The enemy had already crossed it. From the very beginning of the battle, two prominent points on the crest of the range, in rear of the right-centre of the army, were occupied by a few of our men. These soldiers were now in desperate conflict with the column of the enemy, which had passed under the crest, and who were assaulting their position. The rear of the Egyptian army was several hundred yards away, in slow motion, following the Prince. Men near the rear began at this time, without orders or officers, a desultory discharge of arms against the enemy passing along the hill-side. It was a sad sight seeing this fire, passing high over the heads of the clambering enemy, smiting our own men with consternation and driving them from their stronghold.*

These Abyssinians on the hill-side, by rapid strides and leaps among the rocks, soon gained the left flank of the moving column and poured into it an incessant fire. On the other flank, galloping down the plain from the gorge,

*The base of the chain here was from seventy-five to one hundred yards, and the crest say three hundred yards, to the left of the column.

now appeared the head of a small column of the enemy's cavalry, which, doubtless, had been allured back to the field by the success of the infantry, if not by the same signal which recalled them. The Abyssinians who had cleared the spurs were also upon our heels. Our troops were so disorganized, and so few officers could be found, that it was impossible to either form or stop them. I succeeded, however, by persistent efforts, in inducing them to keep up a constant fire against the foe, now within a few yards of both our flanks and rear. Now and then a few men were persuaded to stop long enough to deliver their fire and thus attempt to arrest the progress of the enemy. It was only by these occasional volleys that the savages were prevented from rushing on the rear of the column and destroying us *en masse*. Our men were not alive to the dangers and necessities of the situation, and could not be halted and formed; yet there was no flight, at least by the infantry. That negative quality in their nature which stifles inspiration to deeds of daring, now protected them and gave them, as a body, an appearance of cohesion and resisting power which they did not possess. The column moved along like one grand funeral procession, sad but resigned, the enemy sounding the dirge in fitful notes from Snyder and Remington rifles.

When I overtook the rear of the column I found Dr. Wilson with it. He was the first officer I had seen since leaving the destruction on the right. The only line officer to be seen anywhere was Rachid Pacha. He was near the base of the range afoot, struggling manfully, sword in hand, with an Abyssinian soldier. Near by was Rachid's orderly, contending with another Abyssinian. But instead of using his bayonet or clubbing his rifle he was trying to strike his antagonist with the muzzle of his gun, while the man was spearing him. Both orderly and officer went down before one could fairly take the situation in. I saw no other officer until I arrived near where the left of our battle-line had rested, at the deep, perpendicular-sided torrent-bed, through which the road passes for quite a distance. I had been with the rear, that is to say

next to the enemy, until now. Seeing the men halt, I at first thought that they were, in response to our constant urging, disposed to make a stand and drive the enemy back. But this was not to be.

The rear soon passed down into this deep and narrow way, where, crowded in, in inextricable confusion, vieing with each other, might and main, for passage, were hundreds and hundreds of officers and men of both staff and line, surgeons and sheiks, infantry, cavalry and artillery, riderless horses and transport animals, struggling camels and floundering mules, loaded, ridden and riderless, stung with wounds and frantic with fear, some with loosened girths and dangling saddles, or heavy ammunition boxes swinging frightfully in the air—all struggling to the death in suffocating dust, amid curses and invocations both loud and low, blows and shouts, the clash and discharge of arms, rumbling of wheels and groans of the wounded and dying. The human tongue was lost in this din. No power of man could have extricated these fated people. Naught could save them—the enemy were upon them, with brandishing weapons, thirsting for blood.

Seeing this passage so blocked up, I turned aside, and soon found myself in the rear of Loring and Möckeln. I passed above the road, on the right bank of the torrent-bed—which, turning here to the right, led away from the rear of our column into the plain toward the body of Abyssinian cavalry—and my horse sliding down its steep sides, at the imminent risk of its neck, crossed the ravine and brought me to the other end of this wedged-up gorge.

Striding along, closing from behind upon the doomed Egyptians, came the thin-visaged men of blood. Their eyes flashed fire above their shields, their mouths were in hot breath and foaming with fury, their lances were poised and their clubs uplifted.

From the hills came swooping down, as one great avalanche, hewers of men (one may call them), with brandishing swords, and fusiliers by thousands, with ready weapons of war, all gathering around like fiends to dance in defenseless blood. From the banks, right above this

pent-up mass of men, barbarous slaughter soon began. A few minutes sufficed for the horrible and damning deed; for mercy was less known there to these infuriates than to the helpless beasts trampling to the earth the wounded and fallen. Prayers for protection and cries for mercy were alike unheeded.

When done, there were to be seen—not, as candidates for military honors may imagine, gallant soldiers strewn here and there (faces all wreathed with smiles of victory and glory), plucked by the war god in the shock of battle like flowers from the field of Mars, but—one unsightly mass of crushed and disfigured forms, dragged in the dust and trodden under foot; struggling animals with appealing eyes; mangled human remains as if just from the jaws of beasts of prey; naked and bleeding bodies, features distorted with pain and fear; eyes protruding and glaring; dismembered trunks, cleaved and gasping heads and quivering flesh, all ghastly in human gore—victims, by hundreds, of Ismail's unholy thirst for glory and of "man's inhumanity to man!"

When I had crossed the ravine, the men wedged in the pen were already cut off by the Abyssinians, and I joined the rear of the troops that had already emerged from the place. We succeeded in prevailing on a few of these soldiers to fire occasionally on the enemy, but not a man could be halted.* When one discharged his piece it was now usually over the arm, shoulder, or in whatever other position the gun chanced to be. The trigger was pulled mechanically, without look or thought, jeopardizing the lives of comrades (especially horsemen) even more than those of the enemy. At this time we were but little concerned about the enemy's fire, as the minds of officers were chiefly occupied in efforts to have the Egyptian soldiers fire at the Abyssinians and not into their own companions. But this labor was quite futile, as they in their bewildered state lost all conscious self-control.

* The soldier whose life and horse I had assisted in saving from drowning on our first arrival at Gura, and whom I now chanced to see, was so rude in his disobedience that his life was spared for the moment only because it was thought an Abyssinian would soon get it.

I rode along the rear and presently came up with Ratib Pacha, at the knoll on which it was proposed before the battle to put a battery. The Commanding General had already succeeded in stationing a score or more of men among the rocks to keep off the little body of two hundred or three hundred cavalry which was now galloping down the plain and gradually nearing our columns. I stopped to assist him. Only a few shots were fired when the men abandoned their post ; but the Abyssinians hurried along toward the front of the retreat where Prince Hassan was leading. A few moments after this, overtaking His Highness' secretary at the rear of the column, I appealed to him to assist me in trying to do something with the men ; but he said it was useless to try, and rode on. I remained at the rear, which was now being less sorely pressed—an occasional shot from our ranks preventing spearmen and men with scimitars from attaining effective proximity.

The Prince, with a large part of his suite and all the officers, excepting a few of the *État-Major* who were at the rear or scattered among the men, had now passed Gura village and was leading the column toward the fort. But the bold appearance of the little body of sable horsemen galloping down the plain, brandishing their scimitars and spears, as if to cut off this column from the fort, created consternation at the head. Therefore, with the Prince still leading, the column changed its direction, as if to escape, around the left of the hill lying between Hassan and the haven he was seeking after. Helping to this result was another party, of five or six Abyssinian horsemen on the hither side of this hill, some eighty yards away. The Prince thought these men were thrown across his route by the body of cavalry now not far away, which was charging down upon the retreating Egyptians. The head of our column, paralyzed by consternation, halted and began a fusilade against these few horsemen among the boulders on the hill-side. My eye being drawn toward this firing, I noticed among the strangers a person on foot whom I took to be Abbé Duflot trying to attract the attention of some one in our lines, as well as to reach the head of the

column. I hurried toward the front hoping to save his life. So soon as I arrived near enough to make myself heard, I, and two other staff officers at the same instant, called the Prince's attention to the fact that it was the priest they were firing at.* Much of the firing ceased and the Prince and those around him moved on again. I remained a few minutes to see the result, but instead of the priest's party coming to us as they at first intended doing, the fusilade drove them away up the hills among the rocks.

The last of our men seemed now to have passed, following His Highness; but when I turned around to satisfy myself whether this was so or not, I noticed that a part, mostly infantrymen, had broken off from the column and were making their way also to the left, among the Gura hills. Perhaps they were frightened by the movements of the body of cavalry along the right flank, and the halting of Prince Hassan by what may have seemed to them an engagement in front. The principle of least resistance must then have caused this move, as at this time the firing was such only as comes from a scattered enemy on the flanks and rear, as the great number of leading Abyssinian infantry had stopped at the slaughter-pen in the torrent-bed. Had it been advisable to go with this body of men rather than with the other, it was impracticable now to run the gauntlet alone to them.

All that now remained of our army was two disorganized bodies, having no fight in them, separated, and each heading for the hills, without object apparent to me. I—cognizant of the fact that the great body of the enemy, indeed, all of his cavalry but the handful on our right flank, had turned our right through the gorge, and passed to our rear into the smaller Gura plain—thought the Abyssinian cavalry might at any moment rise up from behind the intervening hills. Up to the time of this sep-

* Afterward the Abbé Dufot would talk but little about this matter. He denied being the man we saw. I was told later on that the person taken for the priest was a French servant of his who had a similar form and dressed precisely like his master; that he with these few Okuleh-Gousai horsemen had ventured on the field in search of booty, as is the people's custom.

aration I had seen nothing that might be called a flight, although there was complete disorganization. The men had kept in one body and moved along slowly, if not deliberately. Consequently, by this occasional discharge of arms, they presented to the enemy the appearance of what might still have been a formidable force. We were indebted, therefore, for our lives mostly to what we seemed to be, rather than to what we really were. The head of the forward body was fast disappearing round the hill when I started to overtake them. When I reached the rear, as the hill was rounded, I saw the Prince's fleet charger turned toward the fort. A few horsemen, projected from the head of the little column of the enemy's cavalry, now appeared on His Highness' right front, from the other side of the hill, and were hastening to prevent his escape. I sent three officers of the staff, namely, Porter, Sormani and Turnheysen, one after the other,—for they had to run a gauntlet,—to call the attention of the commander of the fort to the fact that it was the enemy's cavalry which were coming down the plain, and with the suggestion that a few shots would relieve that part of the column in the rear going into the hills. It seemed to me that ignorance of this fact alone was the only reason which the commander could advance for not using his artillery. One shot only was fired, and then Ratib Pacha, who had entered the fort, gave orders to fire no more.

Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick and myself rode together at the rear, during which time we in vain exerted ourselves to have some of our cavalymen fire upon the horsemen on our right front. Instead of doing this they took to flight with the mass of our men, making a *saue qui peut* dash for the fort. The Prince says that most of the cavalry fled disgracefully ahead of him. They alone, had they stood their ground, were enough to have completely wiped out that part of the enemy menacing his right.

I soon found myself alone, unable—on account of my wound and loss of blood during several hours—to ride very fast, and was driven by the enemy's fire somewhat

from my objective point,—an opening in the intrenchments,—which, however, I finally reached just before 5 o'clock in the afternoon. The watch giving me this time had also marked the time of the firing of the first gun upon the field as 1:30 o'clock P. M. The distance from the field being only about three miles, the retreat could have consumed not more than from three-quarters of an hour to one hour's time, the former being perhaps nearer the truth. Hence the battle, excluding the time taken in this retreat, must have lasted from two and a half to two and three-quarter hours, the preference being given to the longer period.*

A few words here about the gallant Major Ismail Efendi Sabry and the intrepid Colonel Mohammed Bey Gabir, who commanded respectively the battery and battalion on the right of the Egyptian line of battle. They

* This battle well illustrated the power of the breech-loader. Battles between Abyssinians, led by rival chiefs, last usually not more than a half-hour. This is in consequence of the fact that the weapons with which this people are so generally supplied compel a hand-to-hand contest, and the time required at close quarters to deliver an effective stroke with the scimitar or thrust with the spear is only a small fraction of that necessary to deliver, even with the breech-loader, an effective ball. The muzzle-loader, with which a fraction of one or both combatant parties is commonly armed, fails to keep the soldiers apart; whereas on "Gura Plain" the fire of about four hundred breech-loaders, in the hands of Egyptians, successfully resisted for nearly three hours the assaults of tens of thousands of Abyssinian infantry.

But the battle failed to verify the prediction, ventured by one of the greatest captains of the age, that battles with this arm would be short and decisive. It was one step, however, toward demonstrating that rapidity of fire from long-range guns has a contrary tendency. Theory should already have taught this; for, when breech-loaders were introduced, courage and tactics accommodated themselves to this change by breaking up masses into lines. Indeed, the culmination of war is an assault upon courage. Courage, in the problem of battle, is a fixed quantity—average courage in an army (for a given danger) being measured after battle by the number of killed and wounded. But the assault or amount of danger to which a soldier's courage may be subjected in battle is as variable as is the storm of assailing missiles thrown from muzzle and breech loaders, from short and long range guns; and courage during battle may be formulated with space and time—space being the distance from danger, and time the duration the soldier's courage is exposed to it. [Physical endurance is not made an element of the problem, for courage, generally, first gives way.] Danger being variable, time and space, especially space, become variable. When danger increases, the distance separating the soldier from it increases, the number of killed and wounded remaining about the same; and battles are not shorter nor more decisive. On the contrary, the distance between combating armies now becomes such that cavalry loses, in some measure, its effective power of inflicting decisive blows.

There is reason to believe that improvements in offensive weapons—by separating combatants and gradually substituting strategy for battle, imminent danger for actual destruction—tend toward the elimination of war as the arbiter of national disputes; for nations, like individuals, generally calculate the chances of success or escape before engaging in armed contests, and the advantage that the offensive has over the defensive is the very keystone to the world's progress.

did noble service, having, with their commands, almost exclusively fought the battle of Gura plain. Near its close, their commands having been swallowed up by the battle-wave, they, too, fell upon the bloody field,—the one, Colonel Gabir, noble fellow, to rise no more, and the other with four severe wounds, only to suffer still more the agony of capture by a barbarous foe. The officers of the staff whose duties brought them in contact with me were: Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick, Drs. Johnson and Wilson, Major Turnheysen, Captains Porter, Irgens and Sormani, also Testaferrata, a civilian. Suffice it now to say that they were calm and collected on the field, ever ready and willing to do whatever was asked of them. Only a staff officer myself, I had no reason to expect to see, at my position where chance had placed me, any of these individuals, save the civilian only. But all made themselves useful and agreeable, and during the terrible engagement some of them performed most important service.

CHAPTER XLV.

CONFUSION IN THE FORT—THE WOUNDED COMING IN—GHASTLY WOUNDS—NO WATER—AMPUTATION—ABYSSINIAN EXULTATION—FIELD'S MARCH—OSMAN PACHA'S SELF-CONGRATULATIONS—THE DESIRE TO ATTACK THE KING—THE FORT BESIEGED—VOLLEYS IN REPLY TO SHOTS—THE PARAPET—NEGRO SUPERIORITY—KAYAKHOR THREATENED—SPOILS OF WAR—EGYPTIANS FIRE INTO THEIR OWN ANIMALS—AMATEUR SOLDIERING BY THE PRINCE'S SECRETARY—SPOILERS' INCREDIBLE BRAVERY—SORTIES—HAND-TO-HAND CONTEST—WOUNDED ARRIVING—BADR EFFENDI'S UNIQUE EXPERIENCE AS A CAPTIVE—STRANGE CUSTOMS—SISTERS OF MERCY.

I found things inside the fort in a sad state of confusion. There was no particular place to go to. The Chief of Staff's office with the records and personal effects had not been transferred to the fort as directed. At the sound of the first gun all was abandoned by the persons in charge. I rode on, and soon found myself in a comparatively open space, but one which, being near the cavalry horses and hospital tents, would hardly be selected under other circumstances. Here I threw myself down upon a horse-blanket, but later in the night was taken care of and made as comfortable as possible by Captain Porter, who had accidentally come upon me.

The wounded men began coming in, and many of them with such terrible wounds! Some of us had seen fields of slain in other lands, their dead commonly with but little spots of blood in view—only an occasional shell-disfigured corpse. But here by the hundreds came as if for burial, limping, tottering naked forms, blood from head to foot,

and the blood still flowing from such ghastly wounds as are elsewhere seldom seen even in the grave. Many of these poor creatures had first been shot, and then overtaken, lanced and speared and speared again, only to finally have their hands cut off, after receiving from the cavalymen several double-handed strokes of the scimitar which left great gashes on the head, neck, and shoulders such as were too horrible to be described. Yet these poor suffering creatures were alive! Where else, or under what other circumstances could men thus hacked and cut almost literally to pieces have lived? Men only of the finest physique, with blood in pure condition, and with peculiar phlegmatic temperament, enjoying bracing mountain air, could recover from the nervous shock and endure the pain long enough to build up systems so depleted by loss of blood as were those of these men.

A very large negro, with three frightful gashes that had almost severed the neck, and suffering from numerous wounds on other parts of his body, was looking at and making, as he thought, for the hospital tent near by. But the cuts severing the chords seemed to have turned his head half-way round upon his shoulders. His steps wandered, his frame tottered toward me, and in another instant he fell fainting with his full weight resting across my body. Other poor fellows crept upon the edge of the blanket to bleed their lives away, and others still, only half conscious, so near unto death were they and so pitiable, were tugging at it for cover. Similar naked, bleeding bodies, shivering with cold and pain, and shattered nerves, arrived at every hour of the night, staggering into and around the crowded hospital tents, falling among and upon the dead and dying. There were no fewer than one hundred and nineteen of these sufferers piled together in one common-sized hospital tent.

There was no water to be had, and the only care shown these poor creatures until the third day thereafter was the dragging each morning of the dead from among the living. They cried and prayed for water all night, all the next day, and that night too; but only a very few of them received

any.* I can still hear their mournful cries to Abdallah ! Abdallah ! or other friend for water, which I then heard for two days and nights, or until their feeble voices were hushed forever. But no pitying man or angel responded to that cry, nor was one drop of water lifted to the parched tongue. All the principal surgeons were missing or disabled, and it was not until the third day that this pile of sufferers received surgical attention. Even then all operations were performed without the aid of anæsthetics ; and some of the wounded had to suffer two, and even three, amputations at the hands of overtasked native butchers. And after all their agonies, only about two hundred, out of sixteen hundred wounded, lost their lives.

The officers of the staff endeavored to have the stores, tents and baggage brought in from the abandoned camp, and the booths and intrenchments leveled, in order that they might not be used by the Abyssinians as a cover, should they attack the fort. They also tried to have the camels brought into the ditch and a ravine which separated the fort from the intrenchments, and there tied down by the knees ; and to have traverses constructed with sacks of hard bread—but all to no purpose. Everything was in confusion. Men in authority were muddled, and Ratib Pacha was quite overwhelmed. The Chief of Staff, by his personal exertions, succeeded only in causing the transfer of his office and its contents to the fort.

A desultory discharge of fire-arms near the battle-field and in the smaller Gura plain was heard during the entire night of the 7th. It was heaviest up to 10 o'clock ; but it was only the discharge of guns by Abyssinians, who were exulting over their individual captures. This was done by pacing up and down and around their camp-fires, exhibiting their booty and prisoners to their chiefs. These they extolled in fulsome flattery while pointing to or throwing glances of pride at their captives, or maltreat-

* Below the fort not more than one hundred and fifty yards away, was a pool of water, and there were two or three wells just outside the work. But those whose duty it was to obtain water considered themselves cut off from the pool, and the wells did not furnish enough.

ing them, at the same time brandishing their weapons and recounting their own deeds of daring and glory in stories which were clinched with yells and a discharge of arms.*

Some time after midnight, General Loring came to me and said that Colonel Field's command had arrived at Kaya-Khor. It will be remembered that on the evening of the 6th the Chief of Staff received a letter from the Colonel saying that he would leave Bahr-Reza with the last convoy early on the 7th. Nothing further from him reached the General before the battle; but now we had word from him again. The order of the 5th, directing him to leave Bahr-Reza at once, was received by him at or before 3 o'clock on the morning of the 6th. He therefore changed his mind, and set out about noon on the 6th, reaching Addi-Rasso near 10 o'clock in the evening. Here he found Majors Dennison and Loshe, who accompanied the preceding convoy and had been ordered to await him there. The convoy itself had gone. The Lieutenant-Colonel in command, on his arrival, received word from Osman Bey to go on to Kaya-Khor. He did so, and arrived there before the battle. Had not Rachid Bey turned the convoy of four hundred animals back to Bahr-Reza, a couple of days before, it would have been Field's immediate command which now entered Kaya-Khor instead of his advance convoy; for then there would not have been the same necessity of dividing his command as there was afterward, in consequence of the large number of animals. Osman Pacha, who was at Kaya-Khor, would have had the benefit of his advice and assistance, with that of Dennison and Loshe, which would have been invaluable if accepted.

Colonel Field made an early start, the rumbling of the earth, which to his experienced ears sounded like artillery firing, arousing him in the early morning. His command traveled all day, finally reaching the village of Kaya-Khor between 8 and 9 o'clock in the evening. During the after-

* Most of these captured men made little resistance. The form generally was: *Marakouni*, or "Your prisoner," "This is your gun," and many of these poor prisoners were killed with their own guns.

noon his men were inspirited by the sound of our guns. It had been supposed that if the Commanding General approved of the suggestions made in council, he would at its dissolution send orders to Field to come on by forced marches. But the Colonel received no such orders. That injustice may not be done Ratib Pacha, however, it is suggested that the letter which the Lieutenant-Colonel in command of the convoy had received at Addi-Rasso from Osman Bey was written by direction of His Excellency (after the close of the council at Kaya-Khor, on the 6th), who may have intended it for Colonel Field's command. The private note saying that a battle was expected on the 7th, which I appended to the Chief of Staff's letter to Field, seems not to have been seen by him until about 10 o'clock on the morning of the 7th. Had he noticed it when reading the letter at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 6th, when he was only thirty miles away, he alone can say whether he could have forced his whole command into Kaya-Khor in time to participate in the terrible battle that was fought thirty-four hours afterward. It was unfortunate that Osman had not Field to counsel with him at Kaya-Khor, while the battle was in progress. As it was, the Pacha kept out of it,—not firing a shot,—with his command of nearly five thousand men (including the battalion with Field's advance convoy), eight pieces of artillery and two rocket-stands, although the King's army, for nearly three hours, was within range of his artillery, and a great portion of the time within range of his Remingtons. Hours later, even on Field's arrival, he did not yet realize the enormity of his military crime, and congratulated himself on not having engaged the enemy; "for," said he, "we would have shared the same fate."

After Loring had informed me of Field's arrival at Kaya-Khor, he was for discussing the situation with me. He asked for suggestions, and when I made them they did not seem to differ from his own views. Knowing, as we did, that the main body of the enemy was around the water in the plain, east of Gura village, and believing them to be greatly elated over their success, it was thought ad-

visible to make an effort to retrieve our fallen fortunes. The opportunity to do so was a rare one, and my suggestions—afterward given in substance to Ratib Pacha by the Chief of Staff—were: Move the convoy at Kaya-Khor quietly and rapidly on the western side of Gura plain to the fort, under protection of the Kaya-Khor troops, now about seven thousand strong, with twelve pieces of artillery—this protecting force moving down nearer the middle of the plain, and forming junction before daybreak with the spare force in the fort, and attacking, from the west or southwest, the King in his camp.

It is not known what Ratib thought about it; but certainly nothing of the kind was executed. He did, however, on that night signal Kaya-Khor for three battalions for purposes of defense, although our position was immeasurably stronger than that place. For not complying with this order, Osman made all sorts of excuses to Field and the other two staff officers, all of whom repeatedly urged him to join Ratib's command at Gura.

Early on the morning of the 8th, the Abyssinian sharpshooters surrounded the fort, protecting themselves behind our vacated intrenchments, in the rear of the pile of stores which Ratib had neglected to have removed to the fort, and behind elevations of earth left by the floods around the roots of the acacias which dotted the plain. They began a very annoying fire, which was kept up all day. Each shot was replied to by such heavy volleys of both artillery and small arms that the officers of the staff became greatly concerned lest our ammunition should be uselessly and speedily exhausted. To keep the line of men at the parapet filled, a few energetic native staff officers, who realized the situation, were engaged all day, some with heavy clubs, beating men out from the midst of animals and the wounded, or such other places as afforded them a hiding place. But all the men, instead of being divided into reliefs, were made to stand up in line, and were as thick as they could be crowded together. The negro, although, like the fellah, undisciplined under fire, here showed his great personal superiority when in

actual combat. His individuality asserted itself and kept him at his work. There was excitement, interest in it for him; whereas the Egyptian had to be driven to and held at the parapet like sheep at the slaughter. The former fired with some deliberation and precision, his better eyes giving him an advantage in this respect. The attention of the troops in the fort, as well as that of Osman Pacha's command, was diverted all day—the former by the firing and an occasional sight of detachments of the enemy threatening to throw themselves from the overlooking hills upon the fort; and the latter by similar sights and demonstrations, while the enemy continued to gather the spoils of battle, to remove their wounded and to bury their dead.*

Our camels and beeves, which were inside the abandoned intrenchments, were driven away by our own fire upon a few spoilers, who were pulling down and dragging off tents, right under our guns and within less than two hundred yards of the fort. These men, women and children, who followed the army, took all the chances in their struggle for existence, only crouching under the protection of a twenty to twenty-four inch circular shield when fired at. A single instance will illustrate their daring. Mr. Zorab (called Bey by courtesy), Prince Hassan's secretary, was doing some amateur soldiering on the line. Within one hundred and fifty yards of the southern front of the parapet, on which were lying some four hundred or five hundred Remingtons peeping through improvised loop-holes, he noticed a tent suddenly fall to the ground. Presently an Abyssinian appeared from under it and began to drag it away. The secretary took deliberate aim with his carbine, and simultaneously with its discharge the pillager fell. The whole front, who saw it, rejoiced, and the secretary turned his attention to other pot-shots.

* These are often buried during battle by the family who follow the army. The bodies are thrown into shallow holes, covered and all traces obliterated, and then the family moves on. Among the first Abyssinians to seize the rocks in front of the right battalion in the battle were families—some of them children of not more than ten or twelve years of age. Some were without shields, but they made their way across a broad open space, only four or five score yards away, under heavy fire.

But, naturally pleased with his work, he soon looked again toward the fellow he had knocked down, when he was greatly surprised to see the tent move and the spoiler spasmodically dragging it and himself backward on his hands and feet. He fired again, and the Abyssinian straightened out and rolled over. This entire performance was repeated a third time, but the irrepressible finally got into the ditch, fifty or sixty yards off, and escaped with his booty. Those who admire gallantry and persistency will not deny that the fellow deserved his spoil.

After considerable urging on the part of General Loring and others of the staff, several sorties, on a small scale, were made during the day. One made by a company of blacks was quite successful. Another was made by a single individual. He was a Galla, a servant to Major Durholz. The morning of the 7th, he had been left with the Major's luggage in camp. He had not seen the Major since the battle, and, believing him killed, resolved, under the blood feud law, to revenge his master's death. He left the fort apparently to get water. Suddenly he spied an Abyssinian concealed near by, and made for him with only shield and spear. They encountered each other, armed alike, and thrust and parried with determined effect. But our representative knight, powerful and alert, was the very impersonation of manly courage. He soon dispatched his antagonist, and then unfortunately decapitated him. Several of the staff urged that the body should be buried at once; that it should be put out of sight lest it should be the cause of the enemy's exasperation and lead to more barbarous deeds. The sequel will show that there is no certainty that it was done.

Through the night of the 8th, the wounded kept coming in. At early dawn on the 9th, Badr Effendi, the Prince's physician, who had been mourned as dead, returned to us. He was badly wounded and entirely naked, as were all the wounded as well as the prisoners of war. When following the Prince from the field of battle, Badr passed with the troops through the ravine in the road, was wedged in and delayed, and finally knocked off his mule by two or three

scimitar cuts upon his head and upheld hands; then speared, captured, stripped of his clothing, bound, and taken to his captor's camp. Here he was kept under guard, without food or water, for some time. Being captured in war, he became the slave of his captor, making more singular the peculiar hospitality offered him and others by the women, who, like the Scythians, share war with their husbands. It was such hospitality as one sees only a glimpse of on the borders of Mexico, or reads of as occurring among the Bisharrin or other Bedouins bordering on Abyssinia. It is said to be a rule of life here that males and females,—young and old,—of all conditions of society, shall not sleep apart from each other. A well-informed writer on Abyssinia says: "It is an indispensable law not to pass a day without paying homage to Venus." The women are very exacting. But it is strange that these dusky females should make sincere and appealing love to the prisoners, which it is notorious they did. The motive is questionable, if indeed there was anything further than the simple injunction of custom. The Mosaic records furnish instances where the chastity of daughters was sacrificed to hospitality. Strabo also refers to a similar hospitality of maidens. The best existing representatives we have of the people named Troglodytes by Herodotus, are the Tigréens. They answer his description very well. They are fleet of foot; and many of them have a peculiar rising inflection at the close of their sentences and on certain words which we may well believe caused the historian to say of their ancestors, that their language was like no other, that they screeched like bats, etc. He tells us that the Troglodytes had their wives—rather women—in common. The later influence of civilization on this custom, though for the better, has been very limited. The lack of chastity among the Abyssinian women may then be ascribed to the commonalty of the female person among their ancestors—the custom being entailed—and the want of later refining civilization. But there is something more in their character than their mere lack of chastity as exhibited to captives. When Abyssinians battle among themselves the women do

not carry arms as do those of some other African tribes. During battle they go among the wounded of either side, like sisters of mercy, and minister to their wants. In their action toward Egyptian prisoners, there was something positive, whether it was debauchery and inspiration of hospitality, or a means used to content captives in slavery.

It was a female who in the dark unloosened the cords which bound the Doctor. But she first put him through the severest, as he says, of all his trials. Before she would release him, she compelled him to repeat for about five hours the words, "Anna Coashtan," his translation of which is, "I am a Christian"—a pretty severe infliction upon a Mohammedan, it will be admitted. Major Ismail Effendi Sabry, who was wounded four times on the field of battle, could not be taken farther than Gura village by his captors. Here he was left, harbored by an Abyssinian woman, who cared for him and afterward assisted him to escape. Soldiers who dragged themselves in from the field said they had been given water, and sometimes a bite to eat, by Abyssinian women. After he had been set loose by his female friend, the Doctor, without her knowledge, made his escape, wandered among the hills until there was sufficient daylight to enable him to locate the direction of the fort, and select a proper course to reach it. The Prince was much affected with joy by the return of his friend and physician.

CHAPTER XLVI.

THE FORT SAVAGELY ASSAILED ON THE NINTH—MURDEROUS FIRE AGAINST A BATTERY—THE ENEMY'S ARTILLERY—TRAVERSES CONSTRUCTED—STAFF OFFICERS SHOULDERING PICKS AND SHOVELS—THE DEAD NEAR THE FORT—BRUTALITY OF EGYPTIANS—DISINTERRING MUTILATED BODIES—MASSACRE OF EGYPTIAN PRISONERS—THE KING RETIRES—HIS CAMP A DREAFFUL SIGHT—BRINGING IN THE WOUNDED—MALESH!—THE WOUNDED AMONG BEASTS OF PREY—RESULT OF THE BATTLE—STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY—HIS LOSS.

Early on Thursday (the 9th), the favorite, after Tuesday, of the King's days, we were surrounded by the Abyssinians. They took advantage of every little cover they found, and commenced firing around the entire line, particularly as sharpshooters against the artillery. Masses of the enemy were seen partly concealed near the crests of the surrounding hills, ready and anxious to be hurled against the fort should it exhibit weakness, or the men become demoralized under the effects of the fire. As the stimulating sound of cannon and small arms increased, the Abyssinians, greatly excited, ran from hill to plain, and back to hillocks, in order to gain yet stronger positions to strengthen the attacking force and close upon the work under this cover we had so unwisely left, or so unwittingly constructed, it may be said, for their use. From two thousand five hundred to three thousand men surrounded the fort, the rest of the King's army peeped over the hills, and the fire waxed warmer and warmer. Our men had by this time learned something of defensive warfare and stood up better to their work. Against one battery of three guns, protecting a weak salient, hundreds of the enemy occupied a part of

the old intrenchments and delivered their fire within seventy-five to one hundred and fifty yards; controlling, besides, the main water supply, leaving to us only insufficient though less exposed wells. All the battery officers and non-commissioned officers and two of the staff, including also an aide-de-camp of General Loring, were either killed or wounded here as they successively took command. As each one went down another stepped forward to take his place, until finally no fewer than fifteen had succumbed to the murderous fire.

About ten or eleven o'clock the enemy also opened a plunging fire on us with artillery from a captured battery. They had erected and masked these guns during the preceding night. The guns were on an overlooking hill one thousand two hundred or one thousand five hundred yards to the eastward. Only three or four shells were fired, however, and these failed to explode. Our Krupps upon the knoll soon obtained the proper elevation and range and destroyed this battery with a few well-deposited shells. Hearing their own artillery, the sharpshooters redoubled their efforts. A shower of balls of chloritic schist fell upon the knoll where the Prince was camped, and several men, including a member of his suite, were shot down. This aroused the people at headquarters and they began to build the traverses which they had been advised to do on the night of the 7th. After a few hours that part of the work not defiladed was comparatively well protected by sacks of hard bread. After this but few casualties occurred, excepting among the animals, although a hot fire was kept up all day long.

During the attack, anxious Abyssinians thronged the surrounding hills. An occasional Krupp shell very unceremoniously dispersed them or kept them on the *qui vive*. The King himself did not wholly escape although he was among the farthest groups. He was under a wide-spreading daro, which protected him from the sun's rays, and was enjoying his success when a shell exploded close to him, wounding one of his suite. The fire slackened somewhat toward evening. One or two sorties were then

made and the enemy were driven away. Another effort was made to have the covering which had been used with such damaging effect against us destroyed; but it was not until three of the staff,—Derrick, Irgens and Porter,—with implements on their shoulders, had gone to these intrenchments and begun the work of demolition that a fatigue party was detailed to this work. The officers found nearly three hundred of the enemy lying near the fort, the greater number in the adjoining intrenchments by the water's edge. These were all dead, the slightly wounded having escaped. Several of the bodies had been mutilated in one way or another. Some had their hands cut off, and straw had been burned on the breasts of others. These revengeful brutalities occurred, very likely, during the last sortie. It is quite probable that all the wounded who were unable to escape were then dispatched by the Egyptians. An unusually intelligent Arab (a major), prompted, no doubt, by his own humane feelings, early informed me of this barbarity. He exhibited, Egyptian that he was, most uncommon concern. The information was immediately communicated to the Chief of Staff, who procured orders to have the bodies buried. We feared the consequences to our men who were in the hands of the enemy. The party who received this order, and who were cutting down the breastworks, succeeded before night in burying in the ditch two or three dozen men, including the mutilated—this despite the very great dislike that Mohammedans and Christians have for burying each other. However, during the burial the spleen of the party was shown by an Arab lieutenant, who jumped on the bodies while they were in their rude grave and hacked away at them with his sword. Some of the soldiers followed his example with their bayonets. This same feeling was exhibited against hucksters and other friendly Abyssinians, several of whom barely escaped with their lives.

During the night of the 9th, one of these maltreated bodies was disinterred, and thereby hangs a tale. The Abyssinians had been there, had carried away and buried the bodies of their relatives and comrades found above

ground, and no doubt had dug this body up, thus discovering the mutilation which we had been so anxious to hide from them. Early on the morning of the 10th, clouds of dust were seen rising from the King's camp. His red tents, and nearly all the other tents, also, had disappeared. Soon afterward some escaped prisoners returned to our lines. One of these, an Amharic captain of the staff, informed us that a massacre of prisoners was taking place in the Abyssinian camp. He himself was severely wounded and left for dead. Besides his other wounds, his body had been badly scorched by the burning of his shirt, which was set afire by the very shot that wounded him.

It was urged by all the staff that cavalry should be sent out to look after our wounded. Loring had now lost all influence with Ratib Pacha, and could not prevail on him to follow these suggestions until late in the day—although they were communicated to him through the Prince. Ratib did not then show any of the finer feelings of humanity, but ordered out the party especially to recover one or two pieces of artillery that were yet on the field. Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick and Captain Irgens started with the detachment, but were so hindered and delayed by the stampeding of the men, within a mile or so of the fort, that they cut loose from the party. The Egyptians went on in search of the guns, but the two Americans proceeded alone to the enemy's vacated camp. Derrick judged from the size and other appearances of this camp, which had filled the plains and was scattered in the valleys and over the hills, that the part of King John's army in the plain alone must have numbered more than one hundred thousand men. The fires were still burning when these officers arrived there. Derrick said that the sight which he and Irgens saw there "was dreadful beyond the power of language to describe. The entire plain was covered with the dead and dying victims of King John's brutality, who were stripped and violated with every conceivable indignity; their bodies burned,

stoned, clubbed, hacked with swords and pierced with lances," and then a farewell *coup de grâce* in the shape of a bullet was commonly given, which only too often added to, instead of ending, the misery of our friends and comrades. They had been guarded in the enemy's camp nearly three full days, naked, chilled to the very marrow at night and scorched to the quick by day; bound hand and foot, the glands swelling with pain; without food to eat or water to drink; and then thus remorselessly slaughtered in cold blood. To make it more diabolical, often was it that a victim was partly unbound,—to give him hope of freedom and thus lay the foundation for disappointment and intensified ultimate agony,—told to run for his life, speared to quicken his flight, and then shot down, as it were, on the wing. Was this humanity? Is it Christianity, in this advanced age, to put into the hands of these children of barbarism the laws of Moses as their guide?

In one part of the camp were the pools of water already referred to. Here, poor fellows, with fevered lips, had dragged themselves, only to die at the brink in aggravating sight of the water, or to tumble in, one upon another, and drown. In the course of time, Derrick and Irgens returned to the fort and represented the condition of matters on this field of massacre. They were then given some cavalry and went back to bring in a hundred or more yet living victims of this fiendish atrocity. Many died on their way to the fort. Among others, died an old major of cavalry—in whom we all took special interest—just as he completed the journey and felt that tender arms were around him. Nieb Mohammed was among the slain, but nothing could yet be heard of Mohammed Ali Pacha, Dr. Johnson, Major Durholz or Testaferrata. One thousand of our men were butchered here by these people, who wear blue strings around their necks to denote that they are Christians.

The body of cavalry which first left the fort brought back from the field of battle one of the enemy's cannon that had been presented to them by General Napier, com-

mander of the English expedition ; also one or two of the fourteen or fifteen that we had left on the field and which the King was unable to take away with him. They also brought in the naked corpse of Rachid Pacha. An examination of his body showed that death had been caused by a ball wound through the breast. From which direction it came could not be told, but the Abyssinians with whom he and his orderly were struggling were armed only with spear and shield. From surrounding circumstances it is judged that he was there at his post like a true soldier, because some of his men were still occupying the two points upon the crest. His body was still lithe, nor was it yet bloated by decomposition. The poor fellow must have suffered much during those three days and nights of alternate sun and cold, without food or covering. Some days after this two pachas and several beys, intimate associates and friends of Rachid, visited the office tent of the Chief of Staff, whom I had rejoined on the 11th. General Loring alluded with much apparent feeling to their friend's death. The simultaneous reply of all these officers was : "*Malesh!*" ("It is no matter.") They exhibited not one particle of sympathy, regret or feeling of any sort, unless it was one prompted by selfish considerations.

There is no telling how many of the wounded died upon the field from exposure and privation, and whose warm blood dripped from the lapping lips of beasts of prey. The enemy drove away with them only those who could walk—not all these even ; for at the beginning of their success in battle, while there was yet much for them to do, some of the Abyssinians merely cut off a prisoner's hand (one or both) and passed on to the next. These kept coming in for as many as twelve days after the battle, which, it will be remembered, took place on the 7th of March. One who came in on the last day was surrounded during the intermediate time, among the rocks, by hyenas, wolves and jackals, and escaped only because there was food elsewhere, near by, for the thousands of prowling beasts. He crawled to the road, he said, and lived, as

others did, upon the excrementitious matter gleaned there.

The night of the King's departure, Osman Bey Galib's regiment arrived from Kaya-Khor, in compliance with the signal orders made to him on the 7th. The enemy having retired, we had more leisure now to count noses; and it required time, for our native friends used every possible means to prevent the *Etât-Major* from learning anything definite about the result of the battle, in relation to our condition, or about what was going on. The approximation we obtained was almost veritably by counting noses. On going out to battle, Ratib had left about two thousand five hundred men in the fort, excluding from one hundred to two hundred convalescents. Of the five thousand two hundred men taken to the field, about four hundred, mostly mounted men and officers, returned armed to the fort. Nearly one thousand six hundred wounded men, unarmed,—in a double sense, some of them,—also came in. There were killed outright or left to die and rot upon the field about one thousand men. This includes the battalion on the right, the dead of the battery, those slaughtered in the ravine, and all others in the line of retreat to the fort. The remainder, say two thousand two hundred, were taken prisoners and carried into the enemy's camp. On Friday morning, the 10th of March, one thousand of these prisoners were massacred. The others were taken away to be tormented, tortured or butchered, according to the caprice of their captors, who did it on the march, for we were able to follow the route of the King's army for twenty or thirty miles by the corpses of Egyptian soldiers. But with all this cruelty it deserves mention that, contrary to the fears of our men, Major Sabry's Galla servant, who followed him upon the field, was the only one among the Egyptian wounded that became a contralto by the knife. When the King had completed this march of thirty miles, he had with him as prisoners a few of the rank and file and only the following-named officers: Dr. Johnson, Major Durholz, Riffat Effendi and an adjutant-major of the line.

A recapitulation of casualties gives us as the result of the first day's work the following:

STAFF.

Killed:—Mohammed Ali Pacha, Testaferrata and Nieb Mohammed.

Wounded:—Colonel Dye, Badr Effendi, Dr. Wilson, Majors Durholz and Johnson, one captain, two lieutenants and a sheik.

Captured:—Dr. Johnson, Major Durholz and Riffat Effendi (Ratib's clerk).

LINE.

Killed.....	1,000
Wounded.....	1,600
Captured.....	2,186

The total is one thousand and three killed, one thousand six hundred and eight wounded, and two thousand one hundred and eighty-nine captured by the enemy. On the 8th and 9th, the staff lost one killed (Raif Effendi) and one wounded (Lieutenant Riffat Effendi), and the line seventeen killed and seriously wounded. The number slightly wounded is not known, but the greater part of the seventeen were killed outright. If we say ten were killed and seven wounded, we have as Egypt's casualties during the three days of fighting:

	Staff.	Line.	Total.
Killed.....	4	1,010	1,014
Wounded.....	9	1,607	1,616
Captured.....	3	2,186	2,189

Of the wounded two hundred died; and of the captured only one hundred and thirty were subsequently returned to us, the rest being massacred. In other words: of the five thousand two hundred men we took into battle, three thousand two hundred and seventy-three were killed or fatally wounded, one thousand four hundred and sixteen were wounded, and five hundred and thirty escaped. If the nineteen killed and seriously wounded in the fort were all taken from the original number, the five hundred and thirty who were left unhurt would be reduced to five hundred and eleven. The enemy also captured thirteen pieces of artillery, all the small arms of the killed,

wounded and prisoners, and all the unexpended ammunition on the field.

Now as to the strength of the enemy and his losses: We were unable to learn before the battle anything very definite about the number of King John's troops. Those of our scouts in whom we had most confidence always pleaded blood feud as an excuse for not daring to enter the enemy's camp, no matter how valuable the consideration offered them. One, however, ventured to guess for us, with the remark that if we counted women, children and horses, there were hundreds of thousands. Abyssinians estimate heads that eat, rather than arms that fight. The population of Abyssinia is believed to be about three millions. Several well-informed residents of that country estimate that an army of three hundred thousand men can be raised in the four states of Tigré, Amhara, Godjam and Shoa. But as to supplying so large a number, that is another question. It is generally conceded that in the battle with Colonel Arrendrup, King John had an army of seventy thousand, including spearmen and men with clubs—mostly people of Tigré. Major Dennison, who, from an over-looking hill, saw their camps and fires in the valley, estimated their fighting fire-arm force at fifteen thousand. To swell this force, in order to oppose Ratib Pacha, the priests stirred up the people all over the country. Men were drummed from the most distant provinces, except Shoa alone. We should expect, then, a very large force. Not wishing to seem desirous of magnifying the enemy's strength, I estimated, during the battle, that the fighting force proper upon the field was forty-five thousand to fifty thousand strong. This may be below instead of above the mark; at any rate, it certainly is by far the lowest estimate made by any one who was in a position to judge. Kirkham said the King could bring into the field fifteen thousand to twenty thousand cavalry, thirty thousand fusileers (including those with matchlocks), fifty thousand to one hundred thousand infantry with spears and lances, and the rest of the population carrying clubs, and all with shields.

One Hassan, an intelligent foreigner, who, in 1876, had resided about twenty-five years in Abyssinia and upon its borders, calculated at the beginning of the campaign that the King could collect to oppose Ratib eight thousand good cavalry, six thousand well-armed fusileers, and fifty thousand other infantry, besides pillagers. This was furnished as an approximation of what Ratib might expect to oppose his progress, taking into consideration the condition of the country, and the object of the war, rather than an estimate of the fighting force Abyssinia is capable of furnishing for a short campaign. Major Durholz, who was forty-eight days in the enemy's camp, estimated that the King's army and its followers numbered four hundred thousand. Derrick, from an examination of the plain where a great part of the enemy had encamped just after the battle, was of the opinion, as I have already stated, that that part numbered at least one hundred thousand. The priest, after close investigation, put the King's fighting force at ninety thousand men.

We are better prepared now to make some estimate of the King's loss. Ismail Effendi Sabry reported that he fired from the battery he so gallantly commanded on the right about five hundred and forty shell and shot from the guns and about one hundred rockets—that there was not a moment's intermission in the firing. The battalion, which was under fine cover in a commanding position, was also obliged to keep up an incessant fire from the beginning to the close of the tragedy. To give some idea what they accomplished it may be said that it has been calculated that in the recent Russo-Turkish war one Turkish infantry ball in every sixty-seven was effective. This excludes artillery. It is perhaps a very high estimate, but it gives one some notion what this battery and battalion should have accomplished in nearly three hours continuous firing. It is true the battalion did not number many, if any, more than four hundred men, and that some of the shots at the opening were wild; but the men soon got down to their work, and they, as well as the artillery, had the superior advantage of firing into dense masses

at a distance of one hundred to five hundred yards.

During the time the King's army was turned against our right, there was perhaps one hour when acres and acres of ground within a few hundred yards were so thickly covered with his confused masses that it seems almost impossible that a ball could have entered the area without smiting an enemy. It is calculated, then, that there were of killed and wounded of the Abyssinians not far from four thousand men. The battery and battalion could not have maintained their position so long unless they were doing very effective work. On the priest's arrival at Gura some days after the battle, he informed me that the Abyssinians acknowledged a loss, notwithstanding their habit of depreciating it publicly and obliterating all appearance of burials, of three thousand five hundred to four thousand killed, and over one thousand wounded, as the result of Tuesday's and Thursday's fighting. This included, on the first day, five Dedjatches, and on Thursday the Gura sheik. This, with the information that I afterward received from officers who counted the dead around the fort, satisfies me that I am not far wrong in my estimate, notwithstanding the priest ridiculously modified this afterward—at a time when the Abyssinians were making their best exertions for peace on favorable conditions; when they were desiring to conceal the fact that they had been weakened in battle; and, when he was endeavoring to obtain an interview with the King to personally make his peace with him, as Ratib Pacha did not wish to have any intercourse with him, and his Catholic friends of the staff had deserted him, even Loring being obliged to give him the cold shoulder.

The number of dead counted near the fort was less than three hundred. An Abyssinian soldier's bones being generally leanly clad with flesh, and his muscles and nerves being at exceptionally full tension in combat, a Remington rifle ball in the body is almost sure to prove fatal. Moreover, it is the upper part of the body, above the shield, that is mostly exposed, and their surgical attention is quite limited. We must therefore invert the general proportion between battle dead and battle

wounded.* Considering this fact, and making a liberal allowance for undiscovered bodies in the hills, the killed and wounded would not, perhaps, exceed five hundred in the aggregate. Taking this in connection with my estimate of the enemy's killed and wounded upon the field, it agrees very fairly with what was first acknowledged by the Abyssinians. Afterward, when they arrived in Adua among their people, scarcely a word of truth could be got out of them. They were full of self-praise and depreciation of the enemy; there was no massacre of prisoners; no Abyssinians had been killed; none of the King's army had deserted, and so on. Yet it was well known that the King lost nearly one-half of his forces in the three days' fighting, in killed, wounded and missing—principally, of course, by desertion. This was one of the causes of his precipitate retreat on the 10th of March, and I wrote so at the time; for I noticed that on Thursday there were very few Remingtons being used against the fort, although not far from five thousand fell into Abyssinian hands two days before. And this could be well accounted for when it was known that these soldiers war for booty alone, and, once getting it, leave for their homes. Afterward, during the King's negotiations for peace, it became still more probable, from the stand he took about the delivering up of these arms. It was for a while the *sine qua non* of peace; yet, anxious as His Majesty was for it, he continued replying, "It is impossible."

* At Gundet one hundred and fifty Abyssinians were killed and one hundred wounded.

CHAPTER XLVII.—CRITICISMS.

NO UNITY IN THE ARMY—BAD MATERIAL—NO COHESION—
UNDETERMINED RELATIONS BETWEEN LINE AND STAFF
—ATTENTION OF THE ARMY CONCENTRATED ON THE
PRINCE—LACK OF TRANSPORTATION—LINE OF COM-
MUNICATION OPEN—RATIB'S NEGLECT—WRONG SITE
FOR DEPOT—LACK OF TELEGRAPH LINE—NEGLECT TO
DESTROY THE INTRENCHMENTS—RATIB'S FAILURE TO
JOIN OSMAN PACHA—HIS MOTIVES—NO SEEMING UNDER-
STANDING BETWEEN RATIB AND COMMANDERS AT FORT
AND PASS—FAILURE OF COMMANDERS TO ASSIST IN
BATTLE—BATTLE-FIELD NOT RECONNOITERED—NO
SIGNAL PARTY ON FIELD—NOT ENOUGH MEN TAKEN
INTO FIELD—NOT TAKING STEEL BATTERY INTO
FIELD—HESITANCY OF RATIB—NOT FOLLOWING UP
HIS FIRST SUCCESS—NEGLECT OF HIS FLANK—AD-
VISING PRINCE HASSAN TO FLY—THE ARMY FOLLOWS
—THE PRINCE TAKES WRONG ROAD—FAILURE OF FORT
COMMANDER TO USE HIS GUNS—EGYPTIANS FIRING INTO
THEIR OWN ANIMALS—FAILURE TO UNITE THE FORCES
OF OSMAN AND RATIB ON THE NIGHT OF THE SEVENTH
AND TO ATTACK THE KING—FAILURE TO SEIZE THE
HAMASEEN.

The belief that more may be learned by a study of fail-
ures—when the road to success seems plain—than from
successes impels me—with the narrative as a whole in
mind—to point out in a succinct manner, for the pos-
sible benefit of some of the younger Egyptian officers,
some of the more prominent and general causes of the
army's failure to accomplish in the campaign under con-
sideration all that was desired by the Khedive.

The ultimate military object of the campaign was to
encounter King John of Abyssinia in battle and to thor-
oughly defeat him. To do this it was absolutely neces-

sary that the entire Egyptian army, cohesive and harmonious in all its parts, and directed by a single mind, should be brought into the field against the King.

I. There was no unity of command. The language used by Chancellor Kent and Chief-Justice Story is applicable to this point. The former says: "Unity increases not only the efficacy but the responsibility of the executive power; every act can be immediately traced and brought home to the proper agent. There can be no concealment of the real author, nor generally of the motives of public measures, when there are no associates to divide or mask responsibility. There will be much less temptation to depart from duty and much greater solicitude for reputation when there are no partners to share the odium or to communicate confidence by their example." Chief-Justice Story observes: "Of all these cases and concerns of the government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. Unity of plan, promptitude, activity and decision are indispensable to success; and these can scarcely exist except when a single magistrate is intrusted exclusively with the power." He further says that "even the coupling of the authority of an executive council with him in the exercise of such powers, enfeebles the system, divides the responsibility, and not unfrequently defeats every energetic measure. Timidity, indecision, obstinacy and pride of opinion must mingle in all such councils and infuse a torpor and sluggishness destructive of all military operations." This unity was violated, first, by the Khedive's associating two general officers as commanders of the expedition; and, secondly, by the real commander thereof assembling councils. If a council is ever called for other purpose than to shift responsibility, the only legitimate object is to arrive at a conclusion regarding a military operation under advisement. After hearing the opinions of individual members of the council, the commander may accept his own conclusions or those opinions formulated by the council, as he himself may determine—the council itself having

neither executive nor advisory powers. The military council not being constituted by law, its existence indicates a worse condition of affairs. The officer calling it exhibits his own inability to command. If he accepts its conclusions, having no executive authority its responsibility begins and ends there; their execution depends on himself. The only way to avoid such a state of affairs, which sooner or later is sure to lead to disaster, is to put a fit man in command. Bolsters may save the weak fellow's life, but cannot put another head on him.* If there is no fit man to be found, then it were better that weapons of war were beaten into implements of husbandry at the earliest possible day and war attempted no more.

II. The material composing the army was not all His Highness, the Khedive, supposed it to be. To remedy the defect the staff did as much as ever they could to give the new soldiers—many of them, it is true, mere boys—the advantages of position and the protection of artillery to temper the first blast of battle and open the way for confidence and vigorous combat.

III. There was no cohesion among the parts of the army. This was due to the want of individual interest among the men in the campaign, a general need of good officers, and a lack of discipline—combining field experience and an equitable system of rewards and punishments. To substantiate the point that the officers were not well qualified for their positions, it is not necessary to insist here that there was anything more than ignorance and neglect, for their baneful result was certainly as positive as if it sprang from the root of insubordination. Notwithstanding the men are bred in obedience, in order that what they do be done intelligently and properly, the line officers who give direction to this force should, in a degree depending on their respective positions, be capable by knowledge—theoretical and practical—of appreciating the responsibility resting on themselves and associates. And by education

* We are reminded how strenuously the Duke of Wellington, in the Peninsula campaign, resisted the home government's foisting upon him such a nondescript as "second in command." Second in command to an able general is, indeed, physio to a strong man.

(if not by nature), they should have that ambition, pride or vanity, sense of duty, *esprit de corps*, or whatever else it may be, which in a high state of discipline impels officers toward a realization of their military ideal, through a full development of their own powers. However, were their experience and education all that could be desired, there would have been needed, to make them effective and to maintain this condition, a well-organized system of rewards and punishments not depending on the caprice of individuals. This need becomes more apparent and more imperative in an army such as the Egyptian, so full of distinct nationalities, cliques and conflicting interests, whose disorganizing intrigues are rendered more and more intense by the increasing possibilities, even probabilities of success.

IV. The army not having been educated to the needs and uses of a staff, on the contrary, having always fought successfully against it, it should not have been expected that the staff would in so short a campaign be able to get into position where they could exert their proper influence,—when there was constant resistance to this—certainly not without an immense amount of friction. Presuming that all the officers who held important positions in the campaign worked with all their ability and with genuine heartiness toward its success as they saw it, and that they were not primarily responsible for the lack of system,—a defect which precluded important good results,—it is only their methods, not their motives, that can be criticised, when a full measure of success was not obtained with the means at hand. An army born and bred almost wholly without a proper staff was suddenly thrown into an important campaign while wanting in an essential, if not the principal, element to a successful issue. It is true that a body of competent staff officers accompanied the army; but they did not join it with that impetus, that power for good, which flows from mutual confidence gained from former relations and reciprocal understandings. Such confidence would have enabled them—line and staff—to unite all their systematized energies against the common enemy.

But their energies were frittered away in collisions among themselves, in an endeavor on the part of the staff to establish on an intelligent, firm and harmonious basis, a mutual understanding as to what were to be the military relations between the general staff and the line of the army—in fact, what was to be the status of the former. This lack of a recognized status lay at the very foundation of almost every untoward event which occurred in the campaign. Whatever may be the experience and knowledge of a staff, they are non-effective without well oiled and tried machinery to disseminate them. And this machinery must be supplied by the government; it cannot evolve of itself from a resisting line led by the common commander of both line and staff. Indeed, intelligent opinions should not have been expected from those of the staff in this campaign who were not honored with confidence sufficient to give them access to all the current and necessary data to form such opinions.

V. The Prince, a young man of two and twenty years, with the pride of birth and obstinacy of ignorance, should never have been sent to the army to divide its attention between himself and the enemy; certainly not, unless he came as the responsible commander. This presupposes ability to command, wisdom enough to accept advice from those more experienced than himself, and the willingness to throw off the garb of a prince, put on that of a soldier, and share the toils and dangers of his troops—remaining with them to the end; thinking of his command and the campaign, rather than of his own personal safety.

VI. The transportation was insufficient. Although the English, in their Abyssinian expedition in 1868, early discharged as worthless the Egyptian (and Persian) cameliers and muleteers, and substituted Punjaubs, they lost by disease a large proportion of their animals. As their army was (excluding servants) about the size of the Egyptian army under Ratab Pacha's command, there should have been in the latter army (judging from the experience of the former) not far from ten thousand transport animals—not coming in driblets throughout the

campaign, but in great part ready at its opening. All the animals—camels, mules, ponies and donkeys—coming to the army from the beginning to the end of the campaign, on the 7th of March, 1876, did not reach the number of six thousand five hundred; and they were strung over four months' time, in detachments, mostly to replace animals broken down by overwork, cruelty and want of care. Of the total number nearly one-third were mules, ponies and donkeys, one-third were Egyptian camels, and the rest were frontier, or, as the Egyptians call them, Abyssinian, camels. The power of this entire transportation was less than that of three thousand good Egyptian camels. Nevertheless the Commanding General was urged from Cairo to begin the campaign at the time he did so. This lack of transportation, therefore, necessitated a division of the army, thus affording the enemy an opportunity of destroying one part after the other. As it was practicable to move the army into the enemy's territory only by piecemeal, so to speak, it required circumspection—unusual in an Egyptian—to prevent this destruction and to make the concentration in front in face of the enemy. The concentration was delayed by the mismanagement of the transportation, as it was by other causes. To say nothing of the need of organization in the transportation department (everything in this respect had to be improvised on the spot), positive cruelty, lack of care, wanton use of transport animals by insubordinate officers, and the heedless manner, in the face of well-timed advice, of distributing along the line the camels and other animals so as to render the transport of forage necessary, caused much delay. While we were yet at Massowah, enough was known of the country over which we were intending to advance to satisfy a prudent commander that our varied transportation would be best utilized, for a time at least, by keeping the mules and ponies on the first part of the route, where they could obtain forage, and the camels on the farther end, where was to be found an abundance of browsing food. In order to husband our limited transportation as much

as possible, it would have been judicious to advance farther than Bahr-Reza at once, which was not done, and to establish another depot for temporary purposes. Camels could then be carrying supplies into the second depot, which, if not then and thus performed, would have to be done afterward at much disadvantage, in great part by the forage-eating animals,—that is to say, by putting the whole force on the line in consequence of accumulated supplies in the first depot. Moreover, it was the Commanding General's duty to economize transportation in every possible way. He should have thrown his supplies as far forward as they could be covered—say as far as Addi-Rasso—before King John should make any serious advance; for it would be much more difficult afterward to bring supplies to Gura in the face of the enemy and supply a competent protecting force. Had he been able to advance at once to Gura, as contemplated in Cairo, the transportation could have been disposed of to advantage along the line. But the condition of the transportation forbade an advance then so far from his base of supplies, and yet he felt it necessary to move. Its condition did warrant an advance as far as Addi-Rasso, which, in any event, it was necessary to hold temporarily.

It occurred to me that the objection to this was that our route as far as Gura would thus be disclosed to the enemy; but this thought was soon dispelled by my belief that the King's attention would be divided between this move and one on the Asmara road—if not from Sanheet to Asmara, from Massowah or Bahr-Reza to Guinda—and by the knowledge that King John's Gundet army had been disbanded, and that time enough would elapse before he could assemble another, to enable the Commanding General to get his work well under way. Indeed, our operations would have been better covered with both Guinda and Addi-Rasso occupied, than if neither of those places had been. With such numbers as the King had, it could have been of little moment to him whether an advance was made on one or on the other road, or simultaneously on both. Should he desire to inflict a blow in the passes,

both roads could be watched quite as easily as one, and the objection to moving on to Addi-Rasso was equally potent against a partial advance at all, against anything less than a march to Gura; for no doubt the moment Osman Pacha moved from Massowah to Bahr-Reza, the King began his definite preparations. At a time when to economically utilize our transportation was a matter of such moment, I am yet curious to know why Addi-Rasso was not at once taken possession of, particularly as the idea that its occupation would be a disclosure of our proposed route of advance (the only objection which could have been urged against the move) did not prevent a strong reconnaissance of the place being made, although the objection was as valid here. Nor was the reconnaissance relieved by any move on the other road. More than two weeks' time elapsed from the establishing of the depot at Bahr-Reza to the occupation of Addi-Rasso. This preceded only a day or so the seizure of Gura plain, where supplies had now to be carried from the rear. Not only was the advice given in this matter not heeded, but, in continuation of the suicidal policy, the rest of the command was almost immediately ordered up from near Massowah, and the greater part of the transportation animals moved upon the line between Bahr-Reza and Gura, of which one thousand were to be forage-eating animals—this in addition to the cavalry. They began at once to carry forage a distance of eighty miles. One mule or a pony could carry but little more than its own ration for the round trip. The result was nigh producing a collapse of the campaign. A reconsideration of the order a week later was all that saved it; but the time lost was never recovered. Not that the original order caused or excused the wanton disobedience, positive cruelty, or lack of care, by which with want of food the beasts were used up; but it made all this possible. It furnished the occasion and gave rise to the conditions, by unnecessarily requiring an impossible task of the animals and their masters. It is true that by dint of great exertion quantities of short forage finally came in, but only after the transportation had been

irremediably depleted, the animals killed, weakened and wounded.

It may well be said here that, notwithstanding these forage-eating cavalry beasts were ordered to the front, no reconnaissances were made with them until a few days before the battle. But little was learned by actual survey of the roads in the immediate vicinity of Gura, or of the by-roads between Bahr-Reza and Gura, save what was acquired there of some roads on the west, in watching the King's movements. How unwise it was to place all the transportation matter in the hands of the young Governor has been fully considered already.

VII. The effect of leaving Massowah unprotected and a great part of our line open on the right instead of closing it at Asmara or Guinda, was to keep the Commanding General and the whole line from that port to Gura in a constant state of alarm and nervous anxiety, and to delay the concentration of our forces at Gura, by visions and vacillation in orders. The Sanheet force was in a cloud of mystery, and everything else in uncertainty. Ratib Pacha knew but little of war, and his mind seldom got beyond the reach of his eyes, or beyond present danger. When he arrived at Gura, at the first intimation that the King was on the move, he ordered nearly his entire army to the front almost without supplies. This caused a delay of two or three weeks in the concentration, although the greater part of the troops were returned. Then, the moment that the King threatened our communications from the Asmara road, His Excellency was for abandoning the plateau and rushing back with his entire force. Again, when His Majesty's army extended from the Asmara to the Gura road, threatening our whole line, Ratib apparently did not know where to go or what to do. He was confused between the possibilities of attack at both Bahr-Reza and Gura, and wanted two armies—one concentrated at each point. His vacillating orders at this time caused much delay. The trains were stopped, and the King was suffered to pursue his plans, with his flank resting right in Ratib's face. Indeed, both commanders were playing on

the same side. When the Commanding General was prevailed on to reconsider these orders, to permit the troops at Kaya-Khor to remain there, and to order up the rear, as the enemy was showing signs of concentration near Gura, his mind was again confused between an attack on Kaya-Khor (and the approaching rear) and at Gura. He would have had—in fact, did have—an army at each place.

VIII. As the concentration of the Egyptian army could be facilitated by delaying that of the enemy near Kaya-Khor, there was inexcusable neglect in Ratib's not trying to accomplish this purpose.

IX. Having to provide for the contingency of sallying out in search of the King, of going even to Adua to draw him into battle, the establishing of a fortified depot near Gura for purposes of the campaign became an important consideration. The data for its construction were: To be impregnable; its proximity to Kaya-Khor Pass such as to best defend the pass; its dimensions to answer if practicable not only the purposes of the campaign, but any ulterior contingency such as a permanent occupation of the territory. The engineers of the expedition selected a point in Gura plain nearly in front of the Arato road, about two and one-half miles south of, and facing what was on the day of battle, Osman Pacha's position, guarding the passage. Colonel Lockett, who disagreed with the other engineer officers, says in his report that this position was not so much nearer Kaya-Khor than was the site of the fort near Gura that it could have given much better protection to the pass. A fort there would have protected both the Arato and Amhoor road. Its artillery would have swept nearly the entire plain. The pass itself would have been reached by the Krupps. One who has already learned the movements of the King and the Egyptian commander on the day of battle needs nothing further said to him on this point. Another reason given in Lockett's report for not selecting that site was that there was much shrubbery in the plain surrounding the position. This, if it had any bearing at all, was valid against any point upon the plain, which was entirely covered with shrubbery.

But when a site was otherwise suitable, the objection was of no weight where there were men, picks and shovels. But the Colonel's principal objection was that the indications for water were not satisfactory.

It is not to the purpose here to enter into what would have been the difficulties of having a temporary depot answer for a permanent fort as well, or the converse of this proposition; for, independent of the fort's size, this point was selected by the engineers as its site. There was plenty of water to be obtained here by wells and pumps for a depot, although it was not so convenient nor so abundant as it was farther down the torrent-bed, at the point finally chosen. The plains and valleys thereabouts are natural basins for the rain-water which falls during the rainy season. Each has a water-holding stratum—argillaceous or micaceous—not far from the surface. There is a difference of level in the Gura plain, which descends from its head at the pass toward the fort at Gura. Here the impenetrable stratum is near the surface and the water is exposed to view. A mile or so farther up the torrent-bed, the water is six feet below the surface, and a few wells here supply Gura people with drinking water. A mile and a half still farther on,—at the site selected by the engineers for the fort,—one would expect to find water—with the existing change of level—in fifteen-feet wells. Such was the fact. It would have been far better, however, to have suffered any temporary inconvenience in this, if it were necessary, in order to have had a position reliable in time of a crisis—to have had our forces together instead of divided—for the most obstinate ignorance or imbecility could not then have gotten the army into the sad predicament into which it was actually dragged.

Many of the mistakes already alluded to were remediable; their effect was not fatal to the campaign, nor immediate on the battle. But, as we approach the day of battle, the consequences of current mistakes became more apparent and more disastrous. The fruits of ignorance, self-sufficiency and obstinacy, of general neglect

and disobedience without punishment, and oftentimes without reproof, were bound soon to be plain to the vision of the most obtuse.

X. A proper appreciation of the military value of a telegraph line was greatly lacking. Sufficient interest was not taken to cause its early construction, consequently there was great and unnecessary delay in putting the wire up to Bahr-Reza. More than this, an order, dated the latter part of February, put a complete stop to the work between that place and Gura. There was at all times much slowness in the transmission of orders and official correspondence. This fact alone will show the military reader that much of the delay in concentrating our forces and supplies at Gura was brought about by lack of a completion of this telegraph line. A single wire from Gura, from Kaya-Khor, or from Addi-Rasso, to Bahr-Reza, three or four days before the battle, would certainly have enabled the Commanding General to make the concentration before that terrible engagement, notwithstanding his vacillation.

XI. There was an unnecessary delay of a week or ten days in removing the stores from the intrenchments into the fort—in fact, a great part of these were not disturbed at all, and afforded shelter for the Abyssinians during their final attack on the fort. A further neglect was in not fully destroying the intrenchments, vacated by the army, adjoining the fort; for these afforded the Abyssinians additional cover, from which they made a desperate attack on the 9th of March. Indeed, their attacks made on both the 8th and 9th were rendered potential by our previous neglect.

XII. Now that the battle has been fought, the intentions of the King on marching out on the morning of the 7th of March are known, and the momentous mistake the Commanding General of the Egyptian forces made, in failing to make the junction from Gura with the forces at the pass, is now obvious. Nothing further need be said to make this fact clear. But two other questions arise: Was it the intention of His Excellency, after the council held

at Kaya-Khor, to join Osman Pacha? If not, then what were the reasons controlling him? Ratib Pacha always contended, prior to this council, that the King's immediate point of attack would be Gura fort. There is no reason to believe that he afterward changed his opinion, real or affected, whatever his pretenses. On the contrary, all his subsequent moves were made in harmony with it. All deference to General Loring's advice, or concession to his views, by His Excellency, prior to this council, involves this notion and the determination that Gura (the fort and intrenchments near) should remain intact. Some of the facts indicating his purpose were:

1. His warmth in the council when I proposed that the fort should take care of itself, and that the rest of the force should join the command at the pass, indicated very plainly that this opinion did not suit his views or determinations.
2. He made no examination of the features of the country near Kaya-Khor, which a prudent commander, momentarily expecting a battle there, would have done. This neglect might, however, equally have followed from ignorance.
3. After arriving at Gura fort, he did not move out during the night to form junction with Osman Pacha, made no preparation to move to the pass for this purpose, and made none to move at all, with a battle in view, until about 10 o'clock in the morning of the next day, when the King had already arrived near Kaya-Khor. This was not from thoughtlessness, for His Excellency watched for the enemy from early morning.
4. His forming battle-line just in front of the fort, and moving out only when urged.
5. Halting for quite a while about a mile away, in search, apparently, of a battle-ground.
6. Halting again for some minutes not far beyond this last place, at the knoll, and discussing the military features of the ground around, and the knoll itself, as a favorable position for a battery.
7. Halting the fourth time, about two and one-half miles

from the fort, and making persistent preparations to engage the enemy in the wrong place.

8. Halting again within half a mile, and leisurely waiting nearly an hour for the King to develop his force.

9. When urged to move on from the last stopping-place toward Osman Pacha, halting a sixth time within a few minutes, and there awaiting the enemy's advance. All his loitering along and moving out only when urged (and then, no doubt, for the purpose of covering the intentions of his own mind) indicated that he was waiting for the enemy, or was undecided what to do, and did not desire to get beyond reach of the fort and intrenchments, his place of retreat. Had it been his intention to join Osman Pacha, and had he been kept from doing so by the King, before battle,* he would naturally have had his eyes on the pass instead of on the fort during the battle, and have moved gradually in that direction when the King was being driven from the field, and he would have joined Osman's command for further operations in either victory or defeat.

10. To these might be added many more, such as the Pacha's disinclination to remove the stores from the intrenchments into the fort, and to cut down the intrenchments; his leaving such a large force in the fort, etc., etc. His possible motives or reasons for desiring to remain within reach of the fort rather than to get within support of Osman Pacha were:

a. The belief that the King's immediate point of attack was the fort; or, that he could be enticed by Ratib to attack that place.

b. He had no confidence in the troops and feared to engage the enemy in battle elsewhere than from behind the intrenchments. This ignores Osman's position and Colonel Field's, *en route*, and the fact that cover could be got for the men elsewhere.

c. His great concern for the safety of Prince Hassan.

It is not necessary to proportion the weight of these considerations in bringing His Excellency's mind to a de-

* This was not the result, tardy as Ratib was.

termination. But it may be added that if the first of these points (*a*) was the controlling reason, it is certainly plain enough now, with all the facts before us, that he was wrong. If he failed to make the concentration because he had no confidence in the troops, the reply to this would be: if his offensive campaign had dwindled down to a mere effort to save the army he had two ways of doing it, neither of which did he follow. That is, by disbanding it at once (Indian style), every man for himself, but under instructions to rendezvous at Massowah; or else, by making the concentration. In fact, such lack of confidence in the men would have made it more urgent that the junction should be effected, and at Kaya-Khor in preference to Gura fort, and thus save the army and campaign as well as the Prince, instead of sacrificing them to a delusion. Indeed, His Highness could be saved only by saving the army. If Ratib's concern for Hassan's safety was one great cause of his seeming vacillation and eccentricities, we can now but bewail the imprudence of imposing the Prince on the Commanding General's care while he was trying to handle an elephant. In any event, as the government had confidence in the men and means they gave him to accomplish certain things, it was a soldier's duty to do what he could to further the objects of the campaign. My individual notions on this subject were given at the time in letters to General Stone. They were then what they are now, as disclosed at the beginning of this book. Nevertheless, it was the duty of every officer, especially those in high position, to do everything in their power to create confidence, and to try and quiet all suspicion of the soldiers' capacity. A young soldier, like a child, has little confidence in himself, and needs encouragement. He certainly cannot be made to fight by constantly repeating in his ears the assertion that he cannot be relied on. I did in the field (as said elsewhere) what I could to give the new soldiers (immediately under my care) cover, and other advantages of position, and protection of artillery to temper the first chill of battle, and open the way for confidence and vigorous combat. They responded with a de-

fense at which the Arabs themselves marveled. Why the Commanding General hesitated and halted between two opinions—that is to say, leaving the fort without joining Osman Pacha—may not be further known than described in preceding pages until Ratib Pacha renders his final account for the resulting torrent of blood and disaster to his arms. Of course, the secret council there referred to came to some conclusion. Its plan, or Ratib's, after the meeting, differed from the views expressed in council at Kaya-Khor. His Excellency was, perhaps, determined to carry out in the main his own views (or the conclusions of the Arab council); but, always fearful of responsibility, he dexterously used this Kaya-Khor council as a shield to cover his retreat in case of disaster.

XIII. There should have been a definite understanding, in the way of providing for contingencies on the day of battle, between His Excellency, Ratib Pacha and the commanders at Kaya-Khor hill, and at the fort near Gura. The action of these officers indicates that there was none, unless, indeed, they had orders to remain on the defensive. If there was such an understanding, it was ignored.

XIV. The failure of both these commanders to assist in the battle. The enemy marched along the whole front of Osman Pacha's command, as if in review, without receiving from him the compliment of a single shot. Whatever may have been the orders of these officers, the circumstances unfolded during battle were such as not only to have warranted them in using to a degree the forces at their command, but demanded it of them as officers of intelligence and discretion. If such action would have been reprehensible in a lieutenant or a corporal in the United States or British army, what was it not in a pacha? A few shots from Osman, directed against the enemy's flank at the beginning of the battle, or in their rear at any time thereafter until the overthrow of the battalion, would have secured beyond all question the results of a victory needing then only to be crowned. At the opportune moment, a few shells from the fort against the enemy in the valley,

would, perhaps, have saved the majority of the infantrymen who were captured, to say nothing of the service they might have rendered during the battle in protecting our flank. It is no excuse to say that there was a *melée*, or that our troops could not be distinguished from the enemy; for at no time, from the beginning to the close of the battle, was there an Egyptian soldier in the plain occupied by the Abyssinians. The enemy was beneath the Egyptian army, which was on a narrow plateau. There was not the least difficulty, in the clear atmosphere of that day, for an ordinarily good naked eye to distinguish the enemy, even beyond the distance in question.

XV. Failing to make a reconnoissance of the vicinity, with a view to its immediate effect on the approaching battle.

XVI. The Commanding General, by failing to take out with him from the fort the signal party, deprived himself of his only quick communication during battle with the commanding officers at the pass and fort. Had there been such a signal party on the field, these two commanders could have been ordered to engage the enemy during the battle. If this was not gross neglect, it is another indication that His Excellency had no idea of getting out of reach of the fort.

XVII. Another not unimportant mistake was in not taking more men along from the fort. There were left in it more than double the number necessary for a defense of the place against a *coup de main*, so long as a relieving army was within reach of it.

XVIII. Still another: Not taking the steel battery into the field. It would have been a powerful addition as a battery to our force; and its superior range would have enabled us to cover more ground over which the enemy were to come, and perhaps have prevented the enemy's turning our flank.

XIX. Hesitancy and tardiness in moving to the position where the battle took place.

XX. When, at the beginning of the battle, the right of the King's army was beaten away from our left, and our

whole front cleared, the grand opportunity was neglected of following up the success by making a corresponding move to the right, instead of leisurely and with apparent unconcern suffering the enemy to concentrate his whole force against the right. When the enemy disappeared why did not His Excellency look around for him?

XXI. A gross mistake was Ratib's general and persistent neglect of his right flank, the key to the position of his army. He failed to increase its offensive and defensive power by men and artillery or by either. The flank could have been strengthened and victory assured at almost any time up to the last moment, as the enemy had hitherto been defeated—all his cavalry and much of his infantry driven from the field. Indeed, most of the former and a large part of the latter had passed through the gorge to the rear of the range.

XXII. The neglect of the Commanding General to profit by the information I sent him through Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick (and the Chief of Staff); also his neglect of my suggestion that troops be sent to take possession of the heights to the right rear of the Egyptian line, that is to say, to the right of the battalion, on the spur. It should be explained how several companies of troops did, as referred to in the narration, get upon two points of the crest in rear of that part of the line to the left of the position occupied by the isolated battery and battalion. At the beginning of the battle, or before it, these troops had been posted there by a staff officer, in compliance with instructions from the Commanding General through the Chief of Staff. As to their position with reference to an enemy passing through the gorge, it was like stationing infantry soldiers upon the dome of the Capitol at Washington to prevent an army from passing along Pennsylvania avenue. The mouth of the gorge was the place where the fire should have been concentrated. As to the time of occupying it, it was a waste of force and energy to put troops there before battle and provide for a contingency which should not have occurred, and against which the Commanding General should have concentrated every

possible force in his army, his full determination and skill. The preventing of our flank from being turned would have been a victory for us. Our failure in this particular was a great disaster to us, for the enemy swept over the hill like a hurricane. These points upon the crest were places for a few men to be stationed to observe the enemy, and a possible place to which those guarding the pass might retreat in defense of their lives—not, however, until after every man had been brought to the pass to defend it and had failed in doing so. Then an enemy which could make his way through the pass against this defensive force could afterward do what he liked with such force. The companies upon the two points were where they could do no good during battle. What was needed was to have the ground to the right of the battalion leading up to the crest occupied by a sufficient force to hold it, and whose fire, with that of the battalion, would have prevented the flank being turned. After it was turned our only hope lay in taking advantage of whatever mistakes the enemy might make. Had the Egyptian commander seized the ridge, as suggested, the enemy could not have destroyed the battalion when he did. Our men could then have held their position for a time. Meanwhile His Excellency could have thrown the Egyptian left forward, placed his artillery in position playing into the gap, and, with his back to the Kaya-Khor Pass, seized the other side of the gorge and gradually withdrawn his right. If defeated he could have retired safely on Osman Pacha, who may be considered as not in the contest.

XXIII. After the overthrow of the battalion and the loss of the first spur, a consummation of our victory was still in reach had the second spur been held by a competent force; or, if not yet occupied, by hastening one or two battalions to the place to defend it while the army was moving to their support. It was criminal carelessness or inexcusable ignorance to leave this prominent point on our line unoccupied by even a lookout. To say that the enemy's movement was so sudden, so much like

a whirlwind, that there was no time to meet it, that the first intimation had of it was its accomplishment, is but begging the question at issue. For this spur, after the first one, was the most prominent point on the line from which to observe the enemy, to overlook the field, "feel the pulse of battle," and give orders necessary to meet the rapidly changing condition of affairs. As it is again *apropos*, I am impelled to add that notwithstanding the enemy had long since been driven from the front, there was no general effort of our forces, as an army, to counteract the enemy's movement on the Egyptian flank and rear. In justice to all concerned it may be said that the topographical features of the position concealed the extreme right from the view of the rest of the army, thus virtually isolating it, and it so remained until overwhelmed. But to this I must add that it was known what was going on; lowering clouds were in view and thunders were heard; nor should it be forgotten that the whole line could have been seen from the second spur already alluded to, between the extreme right and the rest of the army. Excepting those named in my official report, and at the times mentioned, not a soul went near the extreme right to give aid.

XXIV. Not the least of the gross blunders was Ratib's conduct when Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick and General Loring communicated to him the important message I had sent by the former. He failed to pay any attention to it, hurried to the Prince on the left of the line and caused His Highness and the army to begin the retreat. Notwithstanding all the previous mistakes, the victory was ours until that moment, when King John himself could not have succeeded better in scattering the sheep by smiting the shepherd. These are only some of the facts which may help one to comprehend the swaddling stupidities connected with the battle of Gura plain, which are so anomalous and extraordinary to those who could see the solution of the campaign centred in a junction with Osman Pacha. Believing that he would be overwhelmed without our assistance, he became Ratib's objective point the mo-

ment we left the fort ; and it was the Commanding General's duty to make his way there to prevent the Egyptian army being destroyed in detail. Having neglected this before battle, all His Excellency's movements with the army under his immediate command should have had this in view during battle—his eyes and thoughts should have been fixed constantly on Osman Pacha. A proper appreciation of the importance of this junction would have kept Ratib in positions which commanded a view of Osman as well as of the entire field, and at several distinct periods during the engagement have brought his army to the right by abrupt change of front or gradual concentration. No one can now doubt the issue had the enemy's moves been watched from the spur by intelligent officers, with the authority and means of meeting each varying emergency. Up to the moment Derrick delivered his message it was practicable to form junction with Osman Pacha in the manner already outlined. It must be said that when troops go to the field under command of officers who have not learned these fundamental rules, they go on a forlorn hope. A campaign may be a "promenade," may become a frolic ; but a battle is sure to be a butchery and they the victims.

After retreat began and disorganization followed, the reins of the army were lost. But could the commander have relied on his line officers there was no time during the retreat when the army could not have been re-formed, and the part of the enemy hanging around it defeated.

XXV. Prince Hassan's failure to pass to the right of the hill near Gura, and the failure of the fort commander to throw shell into the enemy's cavalry as it galloped down the plain, caused the loss of many hundreds of men. Misled by the Prince's movements, they also bore to the left and into the hills. There was no part of our force in the line of fire to prevent the fort commander from thus using his guns.

XXVI. During the night of the day of battle it was urged that our camels should be brought under cover into the ditch and torrent-bed near the fort, there tied down by

the knees and the barley outside brought in for their use. But nothing whatever was done to save any of the animals outside the fort. They were lost during the next two days, driven away by our own fire. Pen would be powerless and language come with diffidence were I to attempt to do justice to this and other points in relation to this campaign.

XXVII. The failure—whether the responsibility be with Ratib or Osman—of uniting the forces of these two officers on the night of the 7th—after Colonel Field had joined the latter,—and attacking the King in camp as advised. That is, for Osman to move his convoy quietly and rapidly down the western side of the plain, under the protection of his command which should move in column on the flank toward the enemy. The fact that the King occupied another plain to the east, and that the battle was fought on the east side of the large Gura plain, rendered it practicable to get the convoy safely in, as the news of the movement could not possibly reach the ears of the King in the other valley, four miles away, until too late for him to obstruct it. And there were fair hopes that, with the aid of the experienced staff officers with Osman Pacha, the King could be partially surprised and routed from his camp. The circumstances were all favorable to it. In fact the Krupp guns in the fort, with slight elevation to clear the intervening hills, reached in range the valley occupied by the King. It was not a decided objection to this move that Ratib Pacha would thus release his hold on the pass and open up his communication to the King's undertakings, because it was already turned by the whole force of the enemy. Their crossing the plain to the east accomplished this, and our line there was at their mercy. Moreover, it had already answered its present important purpose, and it could, in case of necessity for any permanent object, again be seized from the Gura plain, with our united force, quite as readily as we could defend the two points with a divided command. And overpowering all other considerations purely military, was the necessity still of a junction in view of continuing operations. This could be done more advantageously at Gura fort than at Kaya-Khor, in

consequence of the scarcity of water for a large permanent command at the latter place. Whereas, at the former plenty of water was to be found, and the bulk of the army's supplies protected by a fort already constructed. Besides, Osman Pacha, with his transportation, was already in condition to move. During the fore part of the night of the 7th, some of the enemy were burying their dead, looking out for booty, prisoners, etc. ; but all this was on the east side of the plain, and could be considered—if at all—as affecting only the practicability of surprising the King. The convoy had but six miles (five in air line) to go ; indeed, only three until they came under protection of the guns of the fort. Until under this protection it would have marched at no time nearer the King's camp than four miles, with a high range of hills between, and a fire upon one of these hills at Gura village, which, being nearer the enemy, disclosed his doings, while it would have covered our own. This was one of the most favorable things for Osman Pacha's move ; yet he wielded it, unconscious of its double edge, as an argument against the move, when urged to do so by the staff officers with him at the time.

There were some secondary considerations, such as the demoralization of the men in the Gura fort, which might have been urged against undertaking an offensive move. But this did not apply to Osman's command, which had only smelt battle afar off ; nor did it apply in any manner to such a move as had in view simply the junction of his force with Ratib Pacha's immediate command at Gura. The enemy were supposed to hold many of our men captive. Whether this should have had an important influence in the formation of a judgment as to an attack on the King, it is not believed necessary to take the extreme ground that during war military considerations generally swallow up pure humanitarian principles—the limbs must often be sacrificed to save the body—for it is quite probable that we would thus, at this early hour after the battle, have saved quite as many prisoners as the barbarous foe permitted to live eventually. There was no objection at all urged to this move that I have ever heard of. The notion—the germ—

simply fell on unproductive soil. The Commanding General had failed here, as he had done everywhere, to arouse the army from its lethargy, to shake off its demoralization, to assume boldly the offensive, to recover what was lost, and pursue the objects of the campaign through a thorough defeat of the enemy. The next most obvious expedient which presented itself to secure the results for which the campaign was undertaken was (as was contemplated at the palace in a similar emergency) to retain our hold here, and occupy the Hamaseen as well, at that point to be fortified, on the Asmara road, which would best cover the country between there and Keren and between there and Massowah. This would have enabled Ratib Pacha to dictate terms of peace. Not such an immediate peace, perhaps, as the re-establishment of prestige, influence and authority, by a complete victory, would have commanded; yet such a durable one as prudence and reflection, rather than duress, would have imposed on the King. Independent of considerations not purely military, the feasibility of this as a mere branch of the campaign was certainly equally as manifest, as a successful issue of the campaign itself, when it was known that the whole army from Gura to Sanheet, fourteen thousand strong,* was available for the purpose, and not more than one road, if any, blocked by the King's forces. But here, as elsewhere, the army was to be moved by tardy effects alone, not by causes; its inclination was to deplore rather than to resolve. It had ignominiously presumed itself defeated, and without question prostrated itself to fate. Floundering in demoralization, it insanely and criminally abandoned the campaign and irresolutely resigned itself to a palavering, if not a submissive, defensive.

If in these remarks enough has not been said to indicate that no intelligent foreigner should ever serve under an Egyptian, I wish here to state definitely to those having an interest in the progress of the country that an intelligent foreigner can accomplish little in Egypt unless he has unlimited power intrusted to him.

* Since the accession of Ismail Pacha's command (see future page).

CHAPTER XLVIII.

HEALTH OF THE COMMAND—CHANGES OF WEATHER—FOOD OF EGYPTIAN SOLDIERS—LION HUNTING—CARE OF THE SICK—MOHAMMED ALI PACHA—EGYPTIAN AND FOREIGN EDUCATION—A CONTRIBUTION TO THE ART OF SURGERY—SURGEONS *HORS DE COMBAT*—BADR EFFENDI'S NOBLE EFFORTS IN CARE OF THE WOUNDED—GRAVES AND DRINKING WATER—TRANSPORT OFFICER IN CHARGE OF HOSPITAL—YAWNING GRAVES—CARELESS BURIAL—NEGLECT OF THE SLAIN—CARRION BEASTS AND BIRDS—NO HUMANITY.

A few words about the health of the command. It is during the rainy season that sickness mostly prevails in Abyssinia. The rains in the central part of the kingdom are preceded by a general disturbance of the atmosphere, the usual winds converging in that direction from the coast. In the northern part this disturbance began, with us, several weeks before the rains. The regular winds veered round from south to north, bringing from the Egyptian deserts an increase of temperature, accompanied by great whirlwinds which carried up all loose camp articles, making the very air, filled as it was with forage, sacks and clothing torn from their places, seem like a flying camp in the disorganization of battle. A few days after this the winds became regular, as they also do yearly, near the close of February. The rising temperature then lifts the Red Sea clouds over the mountains, and they make their way south, dissipating as they go. On Gura plain, the wind, beginning just before midday, would continue to rise—one great mass of clouds after another, coming of course from the Red Sea, but apparently gathering at Kaya-Khor. These masses moving slowly along, hugging the surrounding hills on the west side of the plain, would

next strike the range at the other end, eddy round and round as they hovered about our camp, depositing their heavy dews in the night time, and then rise again and scatter in the morning sun. This continued for weeks, the dews increasing nightly, until the rains came gradually on us, beginning daily about 2 o'clock in the afternoon and continuing with little intermission during the night. With all these sudden changes of temperature,—hot days and cold nights, heavy dews and rains,—there was no appreciable change in the sick report. The sick at all times (excluding the wounded) were about one and one-half per cent. of the entire force while on this plain. As in Lower Egypt, dysentery headed the list, claiming most of the deaths and nearly one-half the sick, more particularly among the black soldiers.* In order of prevalence came fevers, imported ophthalmia, and injuries.

Although heading the list, the proportional number of cases of dysentery at Gura was very small indeed, as compared with the ravages of the same disease on the lower Nile. In the Delta, dysentery is not only aggravated by, but is in great part due to, warm nights and cool mornings—the sleeper tossing in profuse perspiration the fore part of the night is caught naked by the chilly morning air and quickly catches a certain and often severe cold. Up on the Abyssinian plateau, however, six thousand five hundred feet above the sea-level, the entire night is cold enough to require the use of two heavy woolen blankets. The cases of ophthalmia were all Egyptian, brought along in its incipient stages by the men. This disease is scarcely known in that part of Abyssinia where we were campaigning. The natives have splendid eyes, reminding one very much in this respect, as in many others, of the North American Indians. What were called injuries, by the Egyptian surgeons, arose from marching, rough labor and abuse from the rod and kourbach. Gun-shot accidents were as entirely unknown as

* When the viceroy Mohammed Ali brought negroes from what is now called the Sudan, and introduced them into his army in Lower Egypt, this disease carried them away by thousands.

an Egyptian soldier going out with his rifle to kill an antelope or other game. The only one of the kind treated at the hospital during the entire campaign was that of an Abyssinian who, when shooting at a lion, had his own hand blown off by the bursting of his overcharged match-lock.* Will the Egyptian never learn that to make of the fellah a soldier capable of "blood and thunder" the door to gun-shot accidents must be open? Of course, these should be reduced to a minimum by careful discipline; but individuality is destroyed in the army just as private enterprise is destroyed among the people by the fatherly but ophthalmic-sighted care of an absolute government.

This was an exceptional state of health, especially as the meat ration of these vegetarians had been increased from three to about sixteen ounces, and, as the men were without sugar, vinegar and coffee, or the five ounces of vegetables, which, during peace, supplies the sweets and acids craved by their systems. It was not entirely due to the fact that the men were in tents, or covered by houses constructed from acacia shrubs. Much was due to the efficient management of the medical department by Badr Effendi, assisted by Surgeon-Major Wilson. Badr Effendi was educated abroad, and in Europe he gained greatly improved ideas of the official and social relations which should exist between officers of the medical department and other officers in an army. His influence as an Egyptian and the physician of the Prince did much, therefore, to elevate his comrades, dignify their profession, and establish proper relations between them, the line and the rest of the staff. His exertions were especially beneficial in establishing amicable relations between the young surgeons and their line commanders, who had habitually given them far less consideration than a hospital steward receives in the United States army. Notwithstanding the officers of this department are intellectually superior to the officers of the line generally, they have, like most

* The lion had been making himself so disagreeable in the neighborhood of Kaya-Khor that this man tied a cow as a decoy in the hills and placed himself in wait, with the described result. If he had wanted to decoy a leopard he would have used a goat or a sheep.

staff officers a social inferiority. To elevate this part of the staff in the Egyptian army the officers should enjoy an equality of social and official position with other branches of the service; and they should have more freedom than now to perform their professional duties without unnecessary military restrictions. This superiority in general intelligence and social acquirements of the medical officer educated abroad, over the average Egyptian line officer, is quite marked, and indicates what civilization might do for these people if they would only think of the Giaour as other than an unclean thing. But there may be some excuse for this state of affairs when the leader in civilization, as England claims to be, sets such a poor example in her army.

Badr Effendi and Dr. Wilson were joined a few days before the battle by two other able members of the medical profession. One of these was Major Johnson, of Tennessee, a genial person, who entered the army at Cairo only a few days prior to Dr. Wilson's entry into the service; and the other was Mohammed Ali Pacha, Medical Inspector and Chief of Surgeons. Being a man of seventy years of age, Mohammed Ali remained at Massowah when the army advanced. Bred, however, under the vigorous reign of the Viceroy Mohammed Ali, he still had aspirations, possessed the remains of lusty belief in the power of the crescent, was superstitious, thought his earthly end was near, and desired to die in defense of the faith. Influenced by the many rumors which always circulate at the rear of an army, he made known his desire to come to the front. With delicate consideration for his age, the Commanding General directed the Pacha to be informed that, as chief surgeon and medical inspector of the army, he could go to any part of the line where it might seem to him his presence was most required; if in the exercise of this discretion he should come to Gura the Commanding General would be much pleased to see him. As an invitation or permission from a superior is generally taken as an order in Egypt, it was not long before we saw the smiling face of the old gentleman who inspired the hope that his de-

partment would continue to be carried along in the light of knowledge and experience. Some of the younger Egyptian surgeons also had European medical education. We had a confidence, therefore, uneasy as it may have been, that if we did fall into their hands we should probably lose our limbs agreeably to the latest rules of the science, to say nothing of our gratification in thus being the means of contributing to a knowledge of the art of surgery.

But these four named surgeons, and all but two or three of the regimental surgeons, either fell into the hands of the enemy or were disabled; and so it happened that for the two or three days immediately following the battle, the wounded received very little attention. It seemed providential, therefore, when Badr Effendi escaped from the enemy and returned to our lines. The reorganization of the hospital department now devolved exclusively on him, and most nobly did he respond. Wounded as he was, he took hold and worked like a Trojan. He was much more amenable to advice in the interests of humanity than most other Egyptians, and whatever care the wounded received must, almost wholly, be attributed to him. The fact that only two hundred of the sixteen hundred wounded died was owing in great part to the care and watchfulness of Badr and one or two assistants. Of course the climate was peculiarly favorable to healing, and the wounds, though many and severe, were in large part external, therefore easily attended to. Nature and time were the principal remedial agents. He found the wounded begging for sugar which their systems craved. A quantity was obtained from Prince Hassan's supplies and distributed in lumps, with proper directions to his assistants; but only a very little of it reached the wounded. Discovering this fact, he dissolved the remainder in vessels of water, which the surgeons or attendants could not very well make away with by the wholesale. He also obtained other delicacies from the Prince's stores—when the time for Hassan to remain had been definitely fixed—and judiciously distributed them to the wounded and sick in and out of the hospital, not forgetting the foreigners.

With the commendable assistance of some officers, who made but a sorry show on the field of battle, he also provided the men with such clothing as could be borrowed, or improvised out of bread-sacks. His hand and heart were also seen among the dead. In the confusion and hurry, carcasses, corpses and amputated limbs had been shallowly buried within the fort, or just outside above our wells and pools of water. When the rains presently began the putrifying flesh was uncovered, producing a stifling stench. It was feared that it might be typhus-breeding, especially as the water in both wells and pools was also impregnated by washings from this decomposing flesh and blood. It was only by the Effendi's personal exertions that such carelessness and thoughtlessness were corrected. These matters are mentioned here specially to show his superiority over the large body of native officers, and to prove the influence that foreign education may have even on an Egyptian. His assistants not having his full confidence nor the time to do all the necessary work, the administrative charge of the hospitals was given to Ali Effendi Ruby. From that moment their condition began to improve, although the only knowledge he had of such business was that acquired as a transportation officer among diseased animals. The improvement was due simply to his superior practical care and energy in seeing that surgeons and attendants did their duty to the wounded. He was a native and he had never been abroad. His superiority, therefore, was entirely practical and without sentiment. He selected a place for burial, in order that the water should not be polluted; but he kept at all times forty or fifty yawning graves. There were no military honors, not even the ordinary funeral honors of an Egyptian. One is led to wonder whether their wounds were considered a sufficient passport to the Prophet. The bodies of officers and men were usually wrapped up in whatever might be serving as a blanket, and carried to a grave, where they were laid down on the brink. The porters, being alone at the grave, then improved the occasion to idle in the vicinity or engage in any amusement

which happened to occur to them, the body remaining exposed the while. These unworthy descendents of that people who preserved their bodies as if for resurrection would return to the grave at their leisure, but out of no respect for the corpse. The body was then rudely grasped, dumped into the pit with a thud, and then shoved to one side into a sort of shelf, the whole being covered afterward. No attempt whatever was made to mark these graves in order that each might be identified as that of any particular soldier or friend, nor of any person at all. Thus was generally performed the last sad rite to humanity. What a caricature of a soldier's exodus and upon that posthumous glory which inspires daring deeds and leads on brave hearts to victory or to death. Who would not be a soldier—that is to say, an Egyptian soldier?

While on this subject more of similar neglect may be mentioned. It was nearly three weeks after the battle before the most persistent urging could accomplish anything toward the burial of any of the bodies of our men out on the battle-field. The burden of disaster resting on Ratib so completely overwhelmed him that he simply "folded his arms together and ate his own flesh." What terrible thoughts of mangling and suffering a knowledge of this neglect now revives as I recall the fact that our wounded kept coming in from the field of carnage for twelve days after the battle, and that the entire vicinity of plain and hill was thronged with beasts of prey, which filled the air night after night with their dismal voices! Mingling with snarling yelps, often did the poor sufferers hear the deep, majestic and terrible, though melancholy, roar of the forest king rise on the still air far up on the mountain side. When mourning over the fate which befel so many of our wounded, starving, feverish comrades, we would believe that, as the strands of life were loosening, their sufferings gave way to enchanting visions, produced by the imagination, like a goddess of mercy, as a foretaste of eternity for the parting soul. Only the frequent importunities of the staff induced Ratib to finally yield a point on the burial question. The bodies in the

slaughter-pen were then covered ; but perfunctorily only, just where they lay in the traveled road and torrent-bed. In consequence, at the very first rain, the limbs were exposed and the bodies soon after washed out and down the ravine, and no further effort was afterward made to inter them properly. Some two thousand or more, most of them lying within three or four miles of the fort, were left for carrion beasts and birds to prey upon. Long before the army left the vicinity, the plains were strewn with bleached and bleaching bones of our ill-fated men. Even Dr. Badr, kind, considerate and obliging as he was, did not fully realize the demands of humanity. He often reasoned with his people about this and that ; but when appealed to regarding the proper burial of the bodies of the massacred men, he said there was a range of hills between them and the fort, and he thought there was no danger to the health of the garrison in consequence of the exposure of the bodies. It will be seen that the principal, perhaps the only, Egyptian reason for covering the bodies in the ravine was a fear of the generation of plague or some other fatal disease among the men. Other Egyptians informed me that the reluctance of the authorities to show proper respect for the dead was due to the fact that the former believed them unworthy of common interment, much less unusual honors, as they failed on the field to meet the expectations of the commanders.* That is, they failed to make their escape, as some more fortunate ones succeeded in doing. Whatever may be the cause of such neglect, its influence can but be extremely demoralizing on an army. Egyptians held that it was not so, as the fatalistic faith indoctrinated among their people prepared them for such scenes. But all ennobling, inspiring sentiment is certainly dulled thereby. The tendency of such faith is negative rather than conservative. It adds to endurance, inflexibility and resignation,—veritable antagonisms to an offensive campaign,—but it does not impel to action.

* Is this a relic of the ancient Egyptian custom to have the satisfactory testimony of the forty judges as to the character of the deceased before interment across the river ?

CHAPTER XLIX.

ABYSSINIAN SCIENCE AND ART OF WAR—WHY THE KING DID NOT DETACH A FORCE TO ATTACK FIELD—WHY THE KING RETIRED—HE INITIATES PEACE NEGOTIATIONS—ABYSSINIAN COMMISSIONER—HIS ENTERTAINMENT IN THE EGYPTIAN CAMP—QUIXOTIC KNIGHTS—MOHAMMEDAN PRAYER—HIS MAJESTY'S FEARS—AMMUNITION SECRETLY CONVEYED AWAY—THE COMMISSIONER'S FEARS QUIETED IN EGYPTIAN STYLE—PRELIMINARY OF PEACE—PRESENTS TO THE COMMISSIONER—PRINCE HASSAN LEAVES—ADVICE TO HIS FATHER—HOPEFUL OF PEACE—ENEMY AND EASTER FESTIVAL—BERROU'S MESSENGER—STAMPEDE—LUDICROUS ESCAPADE OF AN OFFICER—WELDA MIKAEL AND ROYAL LIONS—HIS DESIRE TO POUNCE ON THE ENEMY.

Abyssinians know much of the art and understand the rudimentary principles of the science of war. Among them, where armies are generally mere instruments in the hands of rival chiefs, and a single battle usually decides between them, one of the most essential and comprehensive of these rules is to keep an army together. Habituated as King John was in this school, it is not surprising that after crossing to the east of our line on the 7th of March, he feared to detach a force for the purpose of attacking the line and preventing Colonel Field's command from joining Osman Pacha. There are also other reasons to be given. He, no doubt, would have had the usual Abyssinian difficulty of first compromising the jealousies of aspiring chiefs. He had fears of losing such an independent body, whose cohesive force is principally hopes of plunder. More especially did he have this fear subsequent to the fighting, as his army had become much demoralized, whether we reason

from victory or from defeat. The causes suggested for his not detaching this force are, however, not apposite for the detention of his entire army. This can be accounted for only as an effect of the demoralization. Bad as the result otherwise was to the campaign, from an Egyptian standpoint, the battle doubtless saved the rear and the army. Had he been able to do so, it was obviously the policy of the King to remain where he was, or in the vicinity, and cut off the supplies of the Egyptian army which would then have been at his mercy. But he retired almost precipitately on the morning of the 10th and began the massacre of his prisoners. Of the probable causes of this move on the part of the King, the principal ones were these: The failure of his attack on the fort; and Field's arrival at Kaya-Khor, when Osman Pacha's position was strengthened and the King's hopes of successful assault on it vanished, and he had reason to fear a concentration of the Egyptian forces and the surprise of his army—being, as the Abyssinians habitually are, even in their offensive warfare, without system of protecting guards, and lying, as they did, less than two and a half miles from the fort and within range of the Krupp guns. Indeed, shell from these guns, on the 9th, reached the vicinity of his camp and thus warned him of the insecurity of his position. The want of food was another cause. Abyssinian soldiers do not generally carry with them more than three days' provisions. Dating from the first day's fighting, their food was, therefore, about consumed on the 10th, and it became necessary to move to a place where water as well as food could be conveniently obtained. But one of the controlling causes was the demoralization of his army, and his heavy losses by desertion—not into our lines, but back to their homes again. Realizing that he had no further immediate prospects of success against the fort or Kaya-Khor, and that his position was untenable, he packed off with his army to where supplies could be obtained, and left the Egyptian line of supplies intact. Swinging round the Egyptian front he passed over to our right, to the southwest, going about thirty miles. A few of his tents remained in sight on a

hill beyond the plain until the 16th of March, when their departure was probably hastened by the arrival of Ismail Pacha at Kaya-Khor from Suez, with reinforcements numbering nearly as many men as the Egyptian commander had lost in battle. It is barely possible that King John's design was to recuperate his forces and then begin anew unless the peace terms dictated by himself were agreed to.

The day after his departure, that is to say on the 12th, a courier from His Majesty arrived in camp with a message to the effect that the Egyptians had invaded his country for the second time, for what purpose he did not know; that the armies had again met in combat, and many lives had been lost; and that he desired peace. He further said that he would receive or send a person of distinction with accredited powers to arrange terms satisfactory to both nations. Ratib was suspicious, and acted very warily throughout the subsequent negotiations. But he requested the King to send in a person, and, accordingly, Lico-Manquaus-Worky arrived at our headquarters two or three days later, with a suite of ten or a dozen attendants, including his son-in-law, Perkyns, the reputed son of Lord Perkyns, who sojourned in Abyssinia many years ago. The Commissioner was of the light-colored, ruling class. He was rather above middle age, a worker in gold at Adua, and an influential counselor to the King. Negotiations now began between the King and the Khedive, in true Eastern style, conducted through His Excellency, Ratib Pacha, and Lico-Manquaus-Worky, the Abyssinian Commissioner. Everything possible was brought to bear on His Majesty's representative which could in any wise affect the Egyptian cause to good purpose. He was shown all the hospitality the circumstances afforded, with much peculiar consideration. His tent, large enough to contain himself and suite, was pitched close to the one occupied by General Loring, and quite convenient to Prince Hassan's larder and Ratib Pacha's kitchen. From early dawn until late at night, day after day, those of us who occupied the Chief of Staff's tent sniffed the fumes of the

slaughter* and kitchen, and relieved *ennui* by counting the corks as they popped, or bottles as they were broken, of ale and cognac and cognac and ale, which were as grateful to the Abyssinian palate as Cambyssian wine to that of the Macrobian King. The Egyptian brass band discoursed its best music, its notes mingling on the still air with the enchanting tattoo of assembled trumpets, and the camp-muezzin's sonorous call to prayer. And a mettlesome Arab steed—white, as an emblem of peace, and caparisoned in gorgeous trappings, the whole a present from the Prince—capered and pranced in his very best style up and down in front of the Commissioner's tent, as if to honor his new master.

But the following was a more curious spectacle to those of us who knew the persons engaged: There were three quixotic knights—who might have been dubbed Osman the Wise, Abdul the Magnificent, and Kurchid the Terrible—who often paraded near the Commissioner's tent, and throughout the camp, glorying, apparently, in their feats of war. The first was Osman Pacha, who had so skillfully concealed his large command by firing neither gun nor musket, or doing anything else to attract the attention of the King, as he moved out to the attack on the 7th of March. Thus he saved his entire command, although the enemy were so near that it seemed they might have been passing in review. The second knight was Abdul Bey, the lieutenant-colonel of the Commanding General's personal staff, who had just returned from Sanheet where he had been serving during the campaign. He was now in full toggery, his unruffled feathers plumed, and was strutting around with the magnificence of a peacock treading on a nest of eggs laid by its mate. The third great warrior, Kurchid Bey, deserted his regiment on the field of battle. Now he was followed by two trumpeters and one infantryman, fully accoutred, and presented in his pompous promenade a quaint appearance with an eighteen-

* The beef of these gormandizers was slaughtered at the very door of their tent. It is highly proper in Abyssinia to thus slaughter an animal for a guest. The uttermost limits of this custom is, when the guest is seated at table, to feed him with the delicious morsels of raw meat.

inch yataghan on his left side, dangling under the oscillating motions of his portly person, or more often losing its equilibrium, the handle depressing and the point taking mechanical pains to lift the skirt of his short blouse high into the air. One might have supposed, from the looks of this terrible cleaver, that its use was to cut up the enemy; but such a custom is now heard of only in Egyptian story. But Kurchid Bey was only one of a class who, as if they had been shot out of the first gun fired in the battle, did not recover consciousness until safe inside, and under the genial influences of the atmosphere of, the fort. It is no wonder, therefore, that the little which they remembered of the battle was quite as much mixed as one's recollections of a dream.

These unusual parades and demonstrations may have been due in part to the favorable reception the King had given recent peace propositions. But the doings of still another officer must have been a riddle to the Commissioner. Major Ali-Ruby Effendi, who had escorted King John's representative into our lines, was to be seen daily with his prayer-mat making his way to the threshold of the Commissioner's tent, and there going through the usual evolutions of a Mohammedan prayer.* But the Commissioner accepted everything as got up in his honor.

After Lico-Manquaus-Worky was quite at ease he was "interviewed" as to the massacre. He frankly stated that King John had had some apprehensions at first that the massacre of captives would be a great obstacle to the conclusion of peace; "but," said he, "His Majesty's fears have been quieted by these attentions to his Commissioner, and are accepted by him as an earnest of good will and a harbinger of an early peace." The Commissioner was anxious to produce the impression that the massacre was with-

* He faced nearly north, and not toward the southeast, as a recent author on Egypt says is habitual. Facing in this southeasterly direction, without reference to the location of Mecca, can be habitual only among the uneducated and desert people who have learned the direction in which to discharge their prayers by the rising and setting sun. Within the limits of Egypt proper, southeast would seem to be near enough the direction to answer every purpose. But I have seen Mohammedans from India and Persia with compasses in hand taking bearings for prayers.

out the King's specific orders. In reply, however, it may here be stated that massacres were still occurring, although on a smaller scale, throughout King John's army, and even while his representative was enjoying Egyptian hospitality. From conversations with the Commissioner, and several of his countrymen, as well as with Priest Dufлот, it was learned that many Abyssinians alleged that the massacre had been provoked by the barbarity practiced by Egyptians on Abyssinian dead and wounded around the fort. Others said it was in consequence of the blood-feud law; that is, that these prisoners were massacred in revenge for the death of kinsfolk in battle. There is another view. A captive among these semi-barbarous people is a slave to his captor. Without rights, he is at the mercy of his master, from whose caprice or wanton barbarism he can be saved only by the special intervention of the King, or some leading chief.* On the morning of the King's departure, the larger number of captives were weak from the lack of food, and from loss of blood—most of them having been wounded on the field; were they not regarded as burdens rather than helpmates, and in wanton cruelty, therefore, dispatched, as in the case of Mohammed Ali, described hereafter?

Notwithstanding the shower of attentions with which he was honored, the Commissioner was watchful of his master's interests. He called the attention of Ratib Pacha to the fact that ammunition was being secretly conveyed away nightly to the new fort being constructed by Colonel Lockett in the Kaya-Khor pass, in view of a permanent occupation of the territory. An Egyptian of Ratib's calibre found it easy enough to dissipate this suspicion. He informed the Commissioner that what he supposed to be ammunition was stores for the starving animals of Kaya-Khor. But for all this the Commissioner was right. Ratib was warily preparing to evacuate the fort, and was sending away the fifteen hundred or sixteen hundred sick and wounded to Massowah. As a preliminary to the negotiation of peace, the Khedive had demanded the surrender

* See case of Dr. Johnson, hereafter.

of all arms captured by Abyssinia from his troops in battle. The discussion over this demand caused delay, and gave His Excellency plenty of time to transfer the stores. However, on the 3d of April, the Khedive withdrew his demand, just at the time the Commissioner made the discovery concerning the stores. This enabled Ratib to say, in the way of a supplementary excuse, that peace was nearly concluded at any rate ; and that he had the pleasure of informing the Commissioner that the Khedive had by telegraph removed the principal obstacle.

The Commissioner was also very quietly presented with five hundred thalers, and considerable silver plate for himself ; and for his followers three hundred thalers, one hundred crosses, etc., and was sent on his way rejoicing to communicate the status of the negotiations and procure fresh instructions. With the dispatch on the 3d of April, placing the negotiations on a favorable basis, came also a dispatch for the Prince. At the beginning of the negotiations he asked his father's permission to return to Cairo. Fearing, doubtless, that unfavorable contraband stories regarding the campaign would accompany his son, Ismail indicated that he would reply definitely in about twenty days. This 3d of April dispatch was the long looked for reply. It authorized the Prince to return to the capital. Hassan had been chafing much under confinement ; for he took no exercise outside the fort, and was fast losing flesh. When he received permission to return he first caused to be circulated that he would go to Ambatagan and hunt while peace negotiations were in progress. He was given an escort of cavalry, besides his suite. At noon on the 5th of April he left the fort, reaching Massowah, eighty miles distant, the next morning. Here the Khedive's steamer Mahrousa was in waiting for him, and, having boarded her, he in due time arrived at Cairo, by way of Suez. Meanwhile the Khedive had delayed sending out his final instructions regarding the negotiations. What the Prince advised his father can only be surmised. If, however, he ever had any confidence in Egyptian soldiers he must have lost it after the battle. He remarked at Gura that the

line officers should be Turks—"or other Europeans," he added, as there were two or three Europeans present. It is said that he told his father that he had no army, and it was useless to try to hold Abyssinia. At least, this was his expressed belief at Gura, where he also said he would recommend his father to withdraw his army from the country, as it was worthless.

At all events Ratib Pacha received orders only a day or so after the Prince's arrival in Cairo to conclude peace on the best possible terms and evacuate the country. There were questions of disputed territory to be settled. The King desired that the port of Massowah should be open to his people, and that the Egyptian army should be forthwith withdrawn from his territory. Lico-Manquaus-Worky returned and negotiations were resumed. Both parties to the negotiations were now hopeful of an early settlement of all vexed questions. Thousands of the enemy returned to Adua, or to their homes to enjoy Easter festival. On the morning of the 14th or 15th of April, after the Commissioner had come back to us, the most of his suite, with packs suspended from their clubs upon their shoulders, set out afoot on a tramp of seventy English miles over a rocky mountainous country to enjoy the next day's feast at Adua. Dedjatch Bérrou, who with two hundred or three hundred followers had been hanging on the flanks of the enemy since the battle, seeing this apparent disbandment of the King's army, deemed it a favorable opportunity to pounce down on some of the fragments, and sent a courier requesting such permission. This was refused him; but the arrival of his courier at night caused as much excitement in our camp as the Abyssinian army would have caused in the day-time. The signal officer on the watch fired off in quick succession several rockets which many thought announced the advance of the enemy; for it had been the talk of the men that the Abyssinians would, before going to the Easter fête, make one more effort to destroy what was left of the Egyptian army. The garrison was therefore greatly bestirred; and, amidst the confusion, no individual appeared more ludicrous than a

superior officer, within my hearing. Startled from a sound slumber by the rockets, he exclaimed, half unconsciously, and in a low voice while nervously struggling to get into his trousers, "D——n it, they never tell a fellow anything;" and then adding, while stumbling over boxes in the tent, "Yes, by G—d, and make a man's horses break their necks too." With much difficulty he made his way out among ropes and pegs to the kitchen, where, in more choice expletives, he routed every one to take care of his animals. Servants and syces, without time to dress, hurried out with clothes in hand in search of animals which they were so suddenly led to believe had broken loose, and were trampling over unsuspecting sleepers. But the beasts were found quietly asleep, seemingly having heard not a single sound to disturb their rest.

Ratib Pacha was not so distrustful of Dankeel—as he called Ras Welda Mikael—who, also learning that a great part of the enemy were departing, came personally from near Bahr-Reza back into our lines. Being at Kaya-Khor with his followers during the battle, he sallied out from there after it was over and preyed upon the straggling enemy, capturing, among other things, two of the King's lions. He then retired with his spoil for safety to the vicinity of Bahr-Reza, whence he had now come in to obtain the authority and assistance which would enable him to operate against the enemy in the Hamaseen. Judging from his actions thereafter, and his relations with the Egyptian government, he no doubt finally succeeded in obtaining this authority.

CHAPTER L.

FORT GURA EVACUATED—THE ARMY RETIRES—NO WATER—PELL-MELL RETREAT—A BLIND MAN GUIDED BY HIS NOSE—DISAPPOINTMENT—TWO MARCHES IN ONE—GREAT SUFFERING—DEATHS BY THE ROADSIDE—EMBARKATION—PRISONERS' RETURN—RANSOM—THE MURDER OF MOHAMMED ALI—DR. JOHNSON'S SUFFERINGS IN CAPTIVITY—TAKEN OUT FOR EXECUTION—THE COURIER IN THE DISTANCE—ESCAPE FROM DEATH—DAILY TORTURE—ENTERTAINING ABYSSINIANS—HIS PROSTRATION.

A large part of King John's army being absent on account of Easter, and the remainder being distant thirty miles from Gura, Ratib deemed the time opportune for an abandonment of Abyssinian territory. On the 19th of April, having already made every preparation, he suddenly evacuated the fort at Gura and retreated with his army to Fort Hassan Pacha, in the Kaya-Khor pass. Here he, with about four thousand men under Osman Pacha, remained to continue the peace negotiations. The precipitancy of the retreat was caused by Ratib's fear of treachery on the part of the King. Soon after the evacuation, a crowd of Abyssinians leveled the work to the ground. Meanwhile the rest of the army continued their retreat beyond Kaya-Khor, a battalion leading the way to open up the wells en route. At Ambatagan, where water was expected to be found, the facts were these: A fort, on which many weeks of labor had been expended in view of the permanent occupation of the territory, was nearly completed by an Egyptian lieutenant-colonel of engineers. That which should have been known before the work was begun was not discovered until it was nearly

finished.* When he commenced digging wells in the more favorable spots near at hand he failed to reach water forty feet below the surface. At this depth he came upon impenetrable rock. Much labor was lost and Abyssinian fields destroyed in the construction of the work. Finding none at this place, the battalion should have made an effort to uncover water farther down the torrent-bed toward Yangoos; but they failed to do so. At Yangoos there was water sufficient only for the one company stationed there. After the foreign staff officer was withdrawn, the officer succeeding him permitted the pumps to go to destruction, and all but one or two of the twenty-five wells to fill up with sand. Discovering these facts, the battalion made no effort whatever to clean out the wells, but continued their march right on to the vicinity of Massowah.

The troops hurried along, confident that water would be obtained for them by this advance battalion. Finding none at Ambatagan, they started down the valley for Yangoos. Suffering for water and anxious to reach this place, with visions of Abyssinians in close pursuit, was enough to demoralize the men and disorganize the command. The retreat soon degenerated into a flight. Artillery, cavalry and infantry rushed down the valley pell-mell, officers generally, and some of the men, mounted on transport animals, which were, even without the soldiers, heavily charged. Camels, mules and ponies struggled and staggered along under the extra weight of two and often three of these unfeeling miscreants. Only one Arab officer made any pretense of performing his duty under these circumstances, and it is regretted that I am unable to give his name, for he deserves this distinction. While other officers were mounted and vieing with each other to reach the front of the troops, he, on foot, remained in rear with a heavy gad, and drove the men as a shepherd does his

* This is very similar to the case which occurred some years ago on the Isthmus of Darien. A surveying party under a naval officer expended several days constructing a flat-boat to descend a river, only to discover, when it was finished, that a chip from the wood used was utterly lacking in buoyancy, and that the boat itself sank at once to the bottom.

sheep to cover when wolves are near. But when he spoke to them about the impropriety of breaking down the already heavily loaded animals, and when they were quarreling among themselves about a seat upon one of the beasts of burden, one often heard, in Arabic, the abusive expression, "You are a Christian; your father was a Christian; and your grandfather was no better."

Is it to be wondered at that the road was lined with carcasses all the way from Gura to Massowah? There is no exaggeration in saying that a blind man could have traveled the entire distance, guided by his nose alone. The atmosphere was foul with the stench of decaying carcasses, lying within a few feet of each other, often in groups, along the road, and in unburied piles around the camps, and on which carrion birds* and wild beasts† feasted in such happy confusion as to suggest passiveness as the normal condition of well-fed life. But whatever discreditable acts the soldiers may have done on the retreat, they only followed the example set them by their officers. Ignorant, as they were (and for that matter, as most of the officers were also), of what was going on at the rear, their fertile imaginations were constantly on the *qui vive*. Determined, if possible, to keep up with the officers, but laden down with knapsacks and accoutrements, they also mounted animals so long as one could be found, and there was a vacant spot to get on. All could not ride, however, and so it was that hundreds fell by the wayside. The paternal government treats the Egyptian soldier as a child is cared for. As the thinking of our troops had habitually been done for them, they knew not the necessity of keeping some water on hand, and generally drank it all in the morning, at the first symptoms of thirst. Then they hurried along under a blazing sun, supported through the afternoon in their prolonged exertion by distant thunder, which sounded hopefully in the pure mountain air. So imminent did rain seem when the thunders were playing

* Among these was Bruce's Abou-duck'n, or "Father Long-Beard."

† The striped hyena was the most prominent of these beasts. Bruce says, "In a word, the hyena was the plague of our lives, the terror of our night walks, the destruction of our mules and asses, which above all others are his favorite food."

among the peaks, that, when rolling down the far distance even, the sounds seemed to a certain Egyptian major's imagination like those of great railway trains high in the heavens, bearing godly hosts from the coming storm. The rains did descend, but far away on the mountain's southern slope. When the men arrived at Yangoos and found no water, they were sorely disappointed. They had traveled twenty miles, a hurried and exhausting march, most of the time without a drop of drink. Water they must have, and so they were led on toward Massowah, full twenty miles away. There they arrived the next morning with nerves strung to a life-saving tension, only to find water in limited quantities. This was fortunate,—paradoxical, as it may seem,—for when obtained, brackish as it was, it was swallowed in inordinate quantities, both wells and men being without the supervising care of intelligent officers.

All did not reach Massowah, however. Many poor fellows, unable to continue the march, retraced their footsteps, despite their great fatigue, ten or a dozen miles along the road to Bahr-Reza, and wandered unarmed among the hills in search of water, where they were overtaken by night among beasts of prey. Others died suddenly, falling in their tracks from excessive heat, thirst and exhaustion. Passing comrades turned the bodies hastily under the sand, in the road where they fell. More than a hundred men died thus suddenly, en route or immediately after their arrival at Massowah, from the effects of this stupid and criminal abuse of our little force.

Several vessels were at Massowah awaiting the army's arrival from the front, as were orders for the departure of all the line—able-bodied and wounded—not needed for defensive purposes. As fast as transport vessels arrived from Suez, they were loaded with men and sent sailing away. The prisoners, whom the King had released so soon as he discovered that there was a disposition on the part of the Egyptians to relinquish their hold on his territory, were also sent away. The only prisoner not returned

at this time by King John was Nieb Mohammed, who was captured during the Arrendrup expedition. As an excuse for retaining a man whom the King believed to be a troublesome enemy on the border, His Majesty demanded a ransom of ten thousand thalers for him. Subsequently, however, when peace was thought to be established, Nieb was released without ransom.

There were in all only about one hundred and sixty of these released captives. Among the number were thirty blacks, survivors of Colonel Arrendrup's force, who had, since the battle of Gundet, remained (so the Abyssinians said) contented slaves in the country. The rest of the (nearly) two thousand two hundred men who fell into the enemy's hands at the battle of Gura Plain were massacred. Among the Arrendrup blacks was the murderer of Mohammed Ali Pacha. One of the captives, named Riffat Effendi, chanced to hear in the Abyssinian camp that an Egyptian captain^e had killed the Pacha. He made frequent inquiries and finally obtained a description of the negro. He reported the facts on his arrival at Massowah, and presently the negro was charged with his crime. The man then made a confession, saying that he was the slave of an Abyssinian soldier who had also captured Mohammed Ali at the battle of Gura Plain; that the Pacha could not keep up with the King's army when it moved away from the vicinity of Gura; that he was given charge of the Pacha, with orders to kill him if he did not keep up; and that, although he had often delayed for the Pacha, he had finally to kill him because he gave out entirely. This was not all the truth. Lieutenant-Colonel Möckeln, who followed the King's line of retreat from Gura for many miles by the corpses, came upon one which he was confident, judging from the age and delicate, lady-like fingers, was that of the Pacha. The head had been beaten in with cruel stones, which were yet lying around it. The negro was promptly punished for his infamous crime on his arrival at Cairo.

The only officers among the released prisoners were Major Durholz, Dr. Johnson and an Egyptian adjutant-

major. Some idea of the sufferings of these captives may be gleaned from the experiences which the Doctor passed through. At the time I sent him on the field of battle with a message to General Loring, the mule which he was riding balked and he was compelled to dismount and continue his journey on foot. Then came the retreat, and the first indications that Johnson had of the nearness of the Abyssinians was a lance passing him from the rear, but which, fortunately for him, missed the object at which it was aimed. He quickly faced about, just in time, perhaps, to save his life, for the pursuer was now close upon him and aimed his spear so that it pierced the Doctor's leg, and he was soon a prisoner. He was stripped to the skin and his arms tied behind his back so tightly that the pain became excruciating. He was made thus to walk for days, with little meat or drink, under a burning sun, and fully convinced that if he did not keep up with the horsemen he would be murdered. When night came on there was little sleep to be gained, pains and fever and ghastly visions repelling it. He was without covering among mountains where the nights are so cold that two heavy woolen blankets in addition to the ordinary clothing are none too much to make the sleeper comfortable. He saw in all directions comrades and friends forced by the pricks of spears to flee for their lives, only to be barbarously shot or cut down before they had gotten far away, by fiends in human shape. He feared every moment that his own turn would come next. In the midst of this frightful massacre he was seized one day by three or four blood-thirsty Abyssinians and hurried away to a neighboring hill. Part way up the hillside he was halted at a large rock, behind which he thought to say adieu to earth. On this rock two of his guards sharpened their iron instruments, already steeped in blood. The grating sound suggested to him such dreadful thoughts of horrible mangling from dull and awkwardly wielded weapons that he found pleasurable emotions in the sight of an Abyssinian near by who had a gun, and whom he besought to shoot him. They ascended still farther. At every boulder a

similar cruel scene was enacted, agony worse than death was endured, until they arrived near the summit. Here preparations were renewed to kill the captive, and spears and scythe-like swords were ready to do the cruel, deadly work. But when standing near enough the borders between this world and the unknown to have glimpses of the future, when he had, as he believed, looked his last on earth, their bloody hands were stayed. A far-off horseman was seen approaching, riding at speed, and believing him to be a courier of the King, they withheld the blow about to fall on the pitiable head. The sight of the horseman revived a hope within the Doctor's bosom, but it seemed a cruel one. Once more he found himself clinging to life, and yet he suffered as no human tongue nor pen of man can tell. In those dread moments of suspense, there came to him visions of death in innumerable cruel forms, and of the anxious faces of dear ones mingling around in loving efforts to arrest his dreadful doom. Nearer and nearer came the horseman, but, oh! how slow seemed his approach to the agonizing but hopeful mind of this poor American in the hands of merciless barbarians!

The horseman was indeed a courier from the King, who had sent word that the party should at once return with their captive. Thus it was that Dr. Johnson escaped a horrible death in Abyssinia. For two weeks after this he was guarded by boys, none of them over sixteen years of age, whom he was compelled to follow everywhere they went. They delighted, whenever opportunity presented, in torturing him, by threatening motions of knives, with mutilation and death. To be brought up in the luxuries of a wealthy American home, and thus be transformed into a naked Abyssinian slave, living in the tropics during the day and in a frigid atmosphere during the night—to subsist on stagnant water and barley broken between stones, in constant fear of death for forty-eight days—was an experience to which many constitutions hardier than that of the Doctor would have soon succumbed. He finally endured so much at the hands of these boys that his spirit

could brook it no longer, and he determined to sacrifice his life, if necessary, to rid himself of their torments. Therefore, the next time they began to torture him, he seized one of them and gave him a thorough trouncing, which quite surprised and utterly demoralized the rest of the party. This met with the approval of a certain Abyssinian chief, whose friendship had been gained by the Doctor, and who used his influence to save the captive's life and to make his captivity as endurable as possible; then, when it was learned that Johnson was a surgeon, strong efforts were made by the King to induce him to remain in the country. But as his experience there filled the measure of one life, the Doctor declined the proffered place with many thanks for the supposititious honor. Much of the time of the latter days of his captivity was spent in gratifying curious Abyssinians by putting on and removing a pair of kid gloves (which his captors had found in one of his pockets), and in giving practical lessons on the use of pins.* His genial manners and warm heart attracted many Abyssinians to him, and he finally made some staunch friends among them. Presents were exchanged between the Doctor and one of those to whom he felt unbounded gratitude. This one recovered and returned to the Doctor before parting with him a ring, taken from his finger when captured, which he valued highly as a memento, and also presented him with a cup carved from the horn of a rhinoceros. Notwithstanding these efforts to assuage Johnson's sufferings he returned to Massowah with very shattered nerves, and almost completely prostrated.

* Their benighted state is, perhaps, better illustrated by the fact that thousands of dollars in gold taken by them from the Egyptians who had fallen into their hands were thought by them to be of little value. During the peace negotiations, certain Egyptians took advantage of this ignorance by visiting Abyssinian camps and speculating with them for gold. Two Maria Theresa thalers—even one—bought an Egyptian pound, or say five dollars.

CHAPTER LI.

FORT HASSAN PACHA—RATIB AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS—EXECUTION OF OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS—THE HAMA-SEEN LAID WASTE BY WELDA MIKAEL—THE KING SUSPECTS RATIB OF TREACHERY—ALI EFFENDI RUBY'S ESCAPE—NEGOTIATIONS ABRUPTLY TERMINATE—THE ARMY WITHDRAWN—MENILEK ADVISED THAT KING JOHN IS DEFEATED—TAMPERING WITH RAS AREA—RATIB'S PUERILITY—PROPHECY OF CHURCH CHRONICLES—MENILEK MARCHES AGAINST THE KING OF KINGS—LEARNS THE TRUTH—MARCHES AGAINST RAS OF GODJAM—RAS OF AMHARA IMPRISONED—PEACE BETWEEN MENILEK AND JOHANNUS—WELDA MIKAEL RETIRES INTO EGYPTIAN TERRITORY—ABYSSINIAN FORCE FOLLOWS—BOGOS PILLAGED—MISSIONARY KILLED—AILET BURNED—WOMEN AND CHILDREN CARRIED OFF IN CHAINS—PROFESSOR MITCHELL AND PARTY CAPTURED AND CHAINED—THEIR SUFFERINGS—ABYSSINIAN COMMISSIONER IMPRISONED—BRIBERY—BÉRROU CAPTURED—HIS SUICIDE—PEACE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE KING DETAINED IN CAIRO—ABYSSINIAN CLAIMS TO BE ASSERTED.

After the bird had flown, none more clearly saw the advantages to the Egyptian cause of a fort in the Kaya-Khor Pass, or as near it in the plain as practicable, than those same officers who, before battle, opposed even putting a temporary work, with a small garrison, at that point. Colonel Lockett, who was at Massowah, learning that a battle had taken place, thought he might be of service at the front. He arrived at Gura about the middle of March and reported personally to the Chief of Staff. General Loring was at this time greatly disgusted with the shameful treatment he was receiving from Ratib

Pacha and Prince Hassan. He desired to have no personal communication with the former, and instead of going to Ratib personally, and, as the Chief of Staff, obtaining his orders, he told the Colonel to go himself and offer his services to the Commanding General—thus practically surrendering his position. Lockett did so, and the result was he began to build Fort Hassan Pacha—intended for a garrison of three or four thousand men—with a view to the permanent occupation of the territory. The Colonel was indefatigably active and prudent withal, consequently the work was well advanced when Ratib arrived at the place from Gura. It was not, however, exactly what the Colonel desired to build, for Osman Pacha and Rachid Bey, true to their instincts, hampered him in every imaginable way. The laborers at work came from the Bey's regiment, and he often failed to make the detail unless Colonel Lockett made changes in his plans agreeably to Rachid's capricious suggestions. However, it answered as a shelter for the Commanding General and his troops while conducting peace negotiations. And the walls enabled him to hide from the outside world one of those damnable pieces of brutality so instinctive in the Egyptian character—a real specimen of native justice and military discipline. We will turn for a moment from the peace subject to this affair.

A young lieutenant had been beaten with a cudgel for some trifling offense by his Colonel, Osman Bey. The young man, with more spirit than prudence, and more sense of justice than is usual with Egyptians so young, made his way hastily to the Commanding General, whom he found with the Prince. Here he related the story of his ill treatment, but without receiving any sympathy or indication whatever that the matter would be looked into by His Excellency. This fact, coupled with his still burning back, so ruffled his temper that he imprudently divested himself of belt and sword and laid them at Ratib's feet. Then in a respectful manner he said that if officers were to suffer in this way without benefit of appeal, he preferred serving in the ranks, where if he should

receive such treatment he would not at least be disappointed. He was taken at his word, and an order was at once issued by the Commanding General reducing him to the ranks. Here he served as faithfully as other soldiers, without one word of complaint. This fact, in armies of civilized countries, would have absolved his offense, even if he had not already been punished. How astounded the poor fellow must have been when he learned that his confidence had been betrayed and that he had been only lured on to this fitter place, where, away from the evil eye of the foreigner, their capricious souls could wreak upon him to hearts' content their wrath of disappointment in not having a full measure of campaign success. And not only on his head, but on the heads of all who had the misfortune of being at this inopportune moment charged with the commission of any magnifiable offense; though, during the campaign, the weeds of neglect and insubordination were not only suffered to grow and to ripen, but were even cultivated. Cutting off the matured head now was simply to scatter the seed. But this is a lesson in agriculture which the Egyptian generally does not learn in the valley of the Nile, for the yearly foreign deposit covers the annual seed. But so it is. Offenses not being classed, the figure at which they hold human life is so low, provided it is not their own, that the death penalty is capriciously common. Knowing the circumstances, I have not the heart to say more than that the poor fellow was taken out and shot to death. Ratib Pacha claimed that he had received special orders from the Khedive for this execution, as well as for that of another officer, a major, whose case I am about to describe. But if this be true, in all probability the order must have been issued on his representation of the matter, or on that of the Prince after his arrival in Cairo.

The Major referred to belonged to Ismail Pacha's command, which arrived at Gura about the middle of March. On the morning when his command left Bahr-Reza, the Pacha noticed that the Major was not with his battalion. He sent an aid to ascertain the cause of the Major's ab-

sence, who learned that the officer was too sick to travel at that time, but would overtake the troops when he felt better. This being reported to the Pacha, he ordered an examination to be made by a surgeon, who reported that the Major, although suffering from a summer complaint, was able to travel with the command. After these steps, initiated by the Pacha, the subservient doctor would no more have dared to render any other report than he would have dared to put his head in the devil's noose. The Pacha immediately caused the tent to be struck over the Major's head and sent instructions to him to join his battalion at once. This the Major insisted he was unable to do at that time, but again promised to join the troops when he felt able to travel. Two days later he proceeded on his journey and joined the battalion, which was then stationed at headquarters, near Gura. On his arrival he was deprived of his commission, put into the ranks and ordered on duty. This he performed without a word of further complaint being made against him, and in blissful ignorance of the dread fate which awaited him. Conceiving no enormity in his offense, if offense there was, he was quite unsuspecting until taken out to the wall of the fort at Kaya-Khor, where he was butchered in cold blood. With his two knees bound and elbows pinioned behind his back, he was made to sit down on the ground, as were all the victims shot on that day. There was a discharge of guns, and, when the smoke had rolled away, the Major was seen still alive. An eye-witness tells that a sergeant, who had been selected to deliver the *coup de grâce*, observing that the Major was only slightly wounded, stepped up, deliberately pushed him over, then laid his rifle on the officer's neck and tried to choke him to death by pressing on it with his hands and feet. But this would not answer. He then put his foot on the neck as butchers sometimes do to hold an animal down, and, in a very bungling manner (by which moments were swelled into ages for the poor man), he proceeded to take the victim's life with the bayonet, observing at the same time in Arabic, "I think you will not get sick again."

Nine soldiers were shot at the same time for various offenses—the most of them, so it was said, for leaving the fort and returning to Massowah. One, a negro, well nigh made his escape in front of the firing party. He was finally overtaken, brought back and executed.

It was the favorable condition of peace negotiations, as they appeared to the King, that caused him to release his Egyptian captives. Shortly after their release he had reason to regret his hasty action, as something occurred which led him to believe that the other contracting party was not sincere in his desire for peace on the proposed terms. Ali Ruby Effendi, who had for many weeks been passing between the two armies to facilitate the negotiations, and who had thus far performed his work so satisfactorily to the Khedive as to be already promoted to Bey, followed the King to Adua, whither the latter and the body of his troops had gone soon after the partial evacuation of his country. The negotiations were now succeeding satisfactorily, and, at this very time, when the Bey had full hopes of having the treaty signed by the King, the latter learned that Welda Mikael (Pacha), with a large force, had entered the Hamaseen and laid great part of it in waste and ashes, killing many of the people who dared defend their lives and property.* The result of this raid, and of the drouth, was a famine in the Hamaseen. The people had to procure the necessaries of life from Adua. As it cannot be expected that civilization will suddenly evolve from the Abyssinian mind (it is a growth), there are needed on their borders examples of it, instead of rivets of barbarism—certainly if there is a desire for concord and peace on the border and none of conquest.

The King, naturally suspecting this to be treachery of the Egyptian commander, of course Ali Bey Ruby narrowly escaped with his life, and the negotiations abruptly terminated. But Ratib had meanwhile withdrawn his army to Massowah, whence, leaving Osman Pacha in command, he returned to Cairo. Not only did His

* He lost one of his sons in the affair.

Majesty believe that the negotiations for peace, on the terms proposed, were set on foot in order that the Egyptian army might the more easily evacuate the country, but the belief was also expressed that the Egyptian commander supplied Welda Mikael with the means of making his raid into the Hamaseen. Indeed, Ali Bey Ruby latterly believed that Ratib Pacha had sent him to the King as a kind of unconscious hostage, in order to inveigle His Majesty into such a feeling of security as would induce him to permit the body of his army to return to their homes, while Ratib or Welda Mikael informed Menilek of Shoa that King John had been defeated by the Egyptian army, in order to induce him to raise the standard of the so-called house of Sheba and strike for the throne of his ancestors, simultaneously with an attack in Tigré by Welda Mikael from the north. Abyssinians claim to have evidence of Ratib's tampering with the loyalty of Ras Area in the early part of the campaign, by endeavoring to excite in him cupidity, ambition and hopes of displacing his nephew, King John. If such be the case,—and of this there seems little room for doubt,—it is another instance of Ratib's puerility; for Ras Area has no hereditary claim to the Abyssinian throne, nor to that of Tigré even. He was a successful soldier, nothing more, in the days of Ras Ali, Theodore's father-in-law. When Dedjatch Oubié, the Governor of Tigré, marched against Ras Ali at Gondar, Area assumed the title of Dedjatch and usurped Oubié's place at Adua. It was not long after this that Theodore defeated Ras Ali, as well as Oubié, capturing the latter's son, usurped the throne—imprisoning the rightful heir, as well as Dedjatch Area,* who remained in chains from that time until the fall of Theodore, twelve years afterward. He had no right to the throne; and his ambition had no claims, as its wire edge had been worn away by age and years of captivity. Indeed, on his release, when he returned to Adua and was received by the people and King John with open arms,† he refused the

* He invited Area to dine with him and then treacherously had him put in chains.

† Captain Girard says it.

throne which his nephew said he had merely held in trust for him. Under these circumstances it was quite puerile to select him to carry the standard of revolt, when young Menilek of Shoa was not only an independant prince, with all the resources of his state at his command, but had the prestige throughout Abyssinia of belonging to the ancient ruling house.* The rightful heir to the throne was a male. Theodore had usurped his crown. He was without issue, and now is, as already observed, a man of seventy-seven years of age, an imbecile—so it is said—living on the bounty and under the guardianship of King John. Menilek is the elder heir in the female line. He had claims, therefore, to the throne, which only needed for their development a little extraneous assistance. We may well believe Menilek would not have been averse to this,—had he been made to believe in the success of the undertaking,—from his fighting against Theodore as an usurper, and from his action when informed that King John had been defeated by the Egyptians. Although Ratib managed these matters almost exclusively, it may be that he is not wholly responsible for selecting Ras Area as his proposed tool, as it is said he did; for one of Area's companions in captivity, being an able Abyssinian theologian who had espoused the holy Catholic cause, Area himself became sympathetic in, if not a full convert to, the faith.

King John, knowing this and being somewhat of a conciliating disposition, placed him with the title of Ras over the disaffected district of Okuleh-Gousai, where the Catholics have acquired such a hold through the labors of Abbé Duflet. The Abbé believed that Area was not indisposed to give practical form to his sympathy. How natural would it have then been for him to use his influence in favor of Area, and to capture with this idea General Loring, who also claims to be a Catholic. Girard says the

* There is said to be a prophecy in the chronicles of Axum, at Gondar, Ankobar and one or two other places, that there would be a king who would attempt to bring back the country to its old power and influence; that he would fail, but his son after him would succeed. Many Abyssinians see the first part of this prophecy already fulfilled in King Theodore, and expected his son, who has been educated in England, to regain the throne. This young Prince recently died, but there is a younger brother in Abyssinia.

reason the Catholics have no more success must be ascribed principally to the fact that the Lazarists have always intermeddled with the political affairs of the country and have thus attracted the ill-will of princes who are very jealous of their authority. I said that Menilek would not have been averse to the claiming of his hereditary rights; for when informed that King John had been defeated by the Egyptians he marched at the head of his army toward Gondar for the purpose of asserting his rights. He arrived at a point in Begemeder only one day from Gondar and the throne, when he learned the true state of affairs between the Egyptians and King John, and heard that the latter at the head of a large force was marching against him. Moreover, Menilek, who seemed to expect assistance, failed to obtain any from Ras Adal of Godjam, whose friendship was retained by King John. The latter sent him from Debra Tabor, in Begemeder, when marching against Menilek, among other presents a gilded crown made of Maria Theresa thalers. The King imprisoned Ras Welda Selassé (Woronya), who had governed Amhara since the fall of Theodore, and who, the King seemed to think, was lukewarm in his loyalty, indicating as much in the two campaigns against the Egyptians, in both of which his troops arrived late—in the Arrendrup campaign only after the battle, and in that against Ratib a couple of days before the fight. However, Selassé's friends say it was because of his wealth, which King John desired to confiscate. Menilek therefore turned against Ras Adal, defeated him, drove him into one of the many impregnable mountain fortresses, plundered and devastated the country, and then recrossed the Abyssinian Nile and returned to his own country. An understanding of some kind by which peace was preserved was afterward come to between him and the King. However, when Menilek arrived in front of Gondar, Welda Mikael had already made his attack, which proved to be only a raid, although destructive. Indeed, King John's success thus far must be attributed in great part to the mistakes of his enemies.

Welda Mikael, after his raid, retired into Bogos,

and was for a time at the Sanheet fort, where he remained with his followers under the ægis and pay of the Egyptian government as a constant menace to the King. At one time, he there had as many as five thousand followers; and King John had tried many plans to inveigle him into his hands, writing to him as his child, etc. He was followed across the border by Shella-Kan-Allula (chief of a thousand), who retaliated by pillaging and ravaging the Bogos province, killing, among other persons, one of the Swedish missionaries. Having glutted his fiendish instincts in Bogos, he turned toward Ailet. Prof. Mitchell, with a party of ten or twelve assistants, who lay almost exhausted by months of fever, was geologizing near the hot springs of this place. The Abyssinians stole into the vicinity of his camp. The Professor, with his sickly followers, climbed to the top of a hill where he could overlook the doings of the Abyssinians, and determine, if possible, what was the best thing to do. About one thousand five hundred of the enemy then appeared in a valley below, and a party of about forty variously armed came within easy rifle range. It was impossible for the fever-stricken party to escape, and the Professor would not abandon them. He placed his valuables in the hands of two of the stronger ones of his party, and these made their way through the mountains to Massowah. Of the rest, there was but one reliable fellow who could take care of himself, and his name was Bayoumi. He raised his rifle and asked his chief if he should fire; but it was useless to sacrifice the lives of his men, and the Professor replied in the negative. Soon afterward his entire party was captured by the Abyssinians. They were stripped of all their valuables, beds, etc., and not enough clothing was left on them to cover their nakedness. The merciless Abyssinians burned the town of Ailet, near by, and carried away about one hundred women and children. Soon after, these captives were chained in couples, and were driven toward the interior of Abyssinia, the prick of spears occasionally helping them on. The prisoners dared not stop, dared not give up; and the Egyptians could not, as a rule, make their wants or

sufferings known, consequently they were compelled to endure to the last extremity. The Professor himself was forced at the top of his speed, for seven hours, to the summit of the Asmara mountain. His lungs were badly injured; but for all his sufferings, he must continue the march. The prisoners were compelled to keep up with the animals, commonly on a quarter ration of unpalatable bread of teff or barley, sometimes going for days and nights without food or water. In this way they continued along, growing weaker and weaker, and were emaciated as the moments passed by. At night they hugged their bones, or scratched among embers to keep themselves warm in the mountain blasts. On they went, half unconscious from the loss of sleep, and foot-worn to the quick on the rugged rocks, until they could go no farther. Then our friend Mitchell made up his mind to die. His men had so far kept up only under the lash and spear. The Professor threw himself down completely exhausted, with the belief that his time had come. If it was to be the lash or death, his choice was made, and he indicated to his guard that if it must be one or the other they could shoot him then and there. He also felt, no doubt, that life itself was useless longer, and he certainly could go no farther. Learning that he was a Christian, and recognizing by his complexion and decided manner a superiority in the Professor to others of his party,—a case for ransom, perhaps,—his guard refrained from beating him, and permitted a rest sufficiently long to enable the party to finally drag themselves into a village of the province of Hamaseen. Here they remained in prison for eighteen days among rags and devouring vermin—the most prolific and favored products of the country, for they are never destroyed. The Professor and his party were taken from the village toward central Abyssinia in search of the King. Among the thorns of the acacia, over cutting rocks, up steep ascents, and along crags, on they hurried. Thirsty, hungry, and weary, almost charred by the burning tropical sun, they were driven across mountain after mountain, and through a succession of rugged passes and deep valleys, on to Adua. The King was not there. They were

taken in search of him, and, fortunately for them, came upon him four days later near the town of Mecla. King John did not release the captives, but had them turned over to a guard of his own escort, by whom they were returned to Adua.

The Professor's party were there put into a chain-gang and made to work on the roads. No pleading could prevent this, for they were Mohammedans. It was months before they were all released. The Professor himself was, after a few days more of suffering, released and given permission to return to Massowah. But he was too weak to travel, nor had he the means, and the King declined to supply him with any. A party* subscribed to his wants, washed him, healed his sores, shaved him, and clad his nakedness. After two weeks of real Christian care the Professor had regained sufficient strength to ride a mule and return to Massowah. He was in captivity forty-eight days, and returned to Egypt but the shadow of his former self. His friends long believed him among the dead. The Professor has since his release expressed his gratitude for several acts of kindness rendered him by sympathetic Abyssinians. Several soldiers showed him they were human, and many delicacies were brought to him by women.

The redoubtable King discomfited his enemies everywhere. Shella-Kan-Allula, while at Asmara watching Welda Mikael over the border, intercepted letters passing between Lico-Manquaus-Worky, the Commissioner, and the Egyptian authorities at Massowah.† This, taken with the fact that he had while at Gura received valuable presents from the Egyptians, confirmed King John in the belief that the most trusted, after Ras Area, of his counselors had treasonably fallen a victim to bribery.‡ He therefore stripped Lico of what he believed to be his ill-gotten gains, despoiled him of his other property, and sent him and his

* Messrs. Blair, Francou, Moscola, Resegalla, Russ, Madrigal and Mercher, representing, individually, the Scotch, French, Greek, Copt, Austrian, and Abyssinian peoples.

† Abyssinian residents are my authority for this statement.

‡ The code which inspired the King says: "The king by judgment establisheth the law, but he that receiveth gifts overthroweth it."

son-in-law in chains to a natural fortress.* The King also finally captured Dedjatch Bérrou, whom he imprisoned. Bérrou escaped, was recaptured, and after that committed suicide by shooting himself with a pistol.

I said a few pages back that the negotiations came to an abrupt termination. But the King afterward sent Bellala-Gebra-Egsiabeher to Cairo to make another effort to fix the boundary, to secure certain privileges for Abyssinia at the port of Massowah, and to obtain an Abouna to fill the place of Salama, who had long since died. Atanazcos, the Tchégghi, or Abyssinian head of the church, who excommunicated all who would not fight against the Egyptians, had also died just as the King returned to Adua. But the King's representative was retained at Cairo, on one pretext or another, from June to December, when he was released (through the influence, I am told, of the British Consul-General), without having been able to accomplish anything. Soon after this the Abyssinian border fell into the hands of Gordon Pacha, as Governor General of the Soudan, and he came to some sort of a temporary understanding with the King by which peace has since been preserved. But the Abyssinians are greatly dissatisfied with the condition of affairs, and are only waiting a favorable opportunity—as, for instance, a revolt in the Soudan—to re-assert, by resort to arms, their rights and claims.†

* The messenger bearing the intercepted letter was flogged; another with a letter was killed; and two bearing letters for Osman Pacha having reference to Mitchell, were put in chains.

† Since writing the above, revolts have occurred in Darfour and upon the Upper Nile, and King John has had a large force threateningly near the Egyptian border in support of his claims for a port, and of certain country of which Egypt despoiled him.

CHAPTER LII.

TRANSPORTING THE WOUNDED—DIFFICULTIES OF ARMLESS MEN HOLDING THEMSELVES UPON THE SADDLE—OSMAN PACHA TRICKY—ESCORT RUNS AWAY WITH PROVISIONS—BIVOUACKING—MONKEYS PLAYING SOLDIER—RUNAWAYS BROUGHT BACK—MUTINOUS CONDUCT—THE DEFILE—INHABITANTS OF THE WILDERNESS—WEAVER-BIRD—PRAYING BY BATTALION—THE ARMY LEARNS FROM CAIRO WHAT IT DID IN THE CAMPAIGN—PRINCE HASSAN AND ALADDIN'S WONDERFUL LAMP—LIONS KEPT AWAY BY FIRES—SOLDIER SHELTERED UNDER A MULE—RECONSTRUCTING THE DEFENSES—SANHEET EXPEDITION.

The sick and wounded were sent forward, as has been said, before the country was evacuated. They were transported mostly on double saddles, borne by camels, little mules or ponies. This was a difficult and most painful way of transporting men, of whom many only four or five weeks before had lost a limb, and some of them two and even three limbs, and suffered also from other wounds. However, the men themselves, when once out of the stench of the fort and breathing the pure mountain air, had sharpened hopes, and set out with light hearts on their eighty-mile journey. The camels' jerking motions rendered the pains of the wounded excruciating. The very saddle, though with only two sets of bones in it, was a burden that the best of mules could ill support for any distance. It was very trying for these disabled men to prevent themselves slipping over the heads of their animals when on a steep declivity like the Bamba mountain. This the rider did by catching hold of the mane or ear and bracing himself, or by seizing the tail of the beast, the anchorage depending considerably on whether

the man had lost a right or a left arm. They did not always succeed thus, in consequence of the carelessness of the attendants, although the little animals did their duty bravely, struggling among the rocks and clambering up and down, picking their way, as if conscious of their tender burdens, and generally fell or sank, from sheer exhaustion only, when they had reached level ground. However, when one did fall it seemed to be always on the side where most damage would be done the burden.

* A protruding bone had cut an artery in Dr. Wilson's broken leg during the night, while he was asleep, and he bled to the point of death. He was, of course, carried on an improvised stretcher. As I, too, was among the wounded, I will, in order to still further illustrate the character of the Egyptian, venture to touch some of the incidents of the journey to Massowah. From personal reasons I remained in the Gura fort until a day or so before it was evacuated. Then General Loring assured me that all the wounded had departed and that I must leave at once, as the army was about to retreat. Transportation was provided for me through the kindness of the General and one or two other friends. On my arrival at Kaya-Khor, Osman Pacha would permit the transportation to go no farther; nor would he signal, or permit me to do so, to the Commanding General at Gura for instructions. The trickster added, however, that he would consent to my taking the transportation without his permission, as he had no use for it. What was necessary for the occasion was finally obtained elsewhere through the exertions of two friends on the staff. I was accompanied by Major Ruchdy, also of the Etat Major (who was suffering from ophthalmia), six soldiers and two servants. Just before we started the Major ordered four of these soldiers, with camels, baggage, eatables and forage, to go ahead to the foot of the mountain, fill their canteens with water, and remain there until our arrival. When we had descended the mountain they were nowhere to be found. Supposing they had gone on, we hurried forward to overtake them. We traveled, our prospects for getting something to eat or drink growing

provokingly less as night approached, for the only one in our party with a hunter's eye was unable to make his way into the bushes to kill a guinea-fowl or other game. Darkness overtook us on the Haala plain. The Major knew the vicinity.

"Here it was in our retreat from Gundet," said he, "that we lost our way and wandered into the hills. On yonder hill was a fire which made the men uneasy; and when they heard the shepherd's call they fled, dispersed, and were not rallied until we got here."

He led us into a ravine, out of the wind, where we bivouacked in the chilly night, without bed or board for man or beast. We were glad enough to see the break of day and to resume our way over the hills. About two o'clock in the afternoon we arrived at the Addi-Rasso stream, but we yet saw no signs of the runaways. Soon a passing trader, on his way to the front with stores, informed us that he had passed them near Bamba hurrying on toward Massowah. Major Ruchdy sent his servant on a horse to communicate to them most stringent orders to return without delay. We reclined under the shade of a palm awaiting their slow return, and watching hosts of monkeys and baboons play at soldiering in the abandoned fort. The four soldiers returned to us late that evening.

The Major, who was among the best of native officers, called to him the soldier in whose charge he had placed our little caravan. This man was the blackest of the lot, and was put in charge of the party over the head of a corporal—a worthless old soldier who had failed, thirty-five years before under Mohammed Ali, to attain at the military school that grade in studies which would have secured him a commission. But in this, as in other cases, we saw the general distinction between the characters of the Egyptian and the Soudanese. The former needs the spur, and the latter the curb, that is to say, discipline. Major Ruchdy listened to the soldier's story and excuses. As if confident of his position, the man wound up by telling the Major to his teeth that the order received from him was to hurry on to Massowah. As is usual in such cases, probing the mat-

ter with questions stirred up the man's ire, and the time thus spent by the officer enabled the soldier to take his superior's full measure. The more desirous the Major was to know the truth and to do the man no injustice the more determined and impudent did the latter become, until the Major was compelled to strike him with the customary cudgel. The man, with eyes flashing, at once grew more insubordinate than ever. He fell back to where the other soldiers stood, and who were ordered by the Major to seize him. But they had also got the bit between their teeth. Their look, however, was that of fellah sympathy, of timidity, hesitation, rather than of downright insubordination. But they would not raise a hand to assist their superior officer. In another instant the rebellious soldier would in all probability have got the advantage of the Major had I not snatched my revolver and run on my knees (for I was unable to stand or walk) some eight or ten yards, into the midst of the fellows, and aided in preserving the discipline of our little command. Similar situations between officers and men in the Egyptian service are not uncommon. It is because the insubordinate soldier, instead of encountering a resisting medium which foreign officers generally present, finds such a yielding one of words that they are thus often inveigled into disobedience and resistance. This, however, in the case of the fellah is usually passive. It consists of talking, questioning, discussing, and quarreling, without any of that mutinous, bloody defiance which more or less distinguishes northern peoples. As there are two conditions,—motion and rest,—either of which a soldier may enjoy, so are there two general classes of his offenses. One class is due to his positive, the other to his negative qualities. The fellah's military qualities are characteristically negative. His offenses are, therefore, mostly delinquencies,—such shortcomings as are embraced in the well-known military words, neglect and incapacity,—moral and intellectual only, for he has, perhaps, no superior in physical endurance. As the lack of general intelligence prevents the Egyptian from recognizing the fact that rules of hygiene are better than doses of medicine, so

does his lack of military knowledge and training hinder his recognizing the fact that venial offenses are the first steps down the ladder of crime—are the germs of the most heinous crimes. All misdeeds, therefore, which cannot be exaggerated into a degree of culpability deserving, from an Egyptian point of view, the penalty of the bastinado or of death, are generally suffered to go unpunished. There can therefore be little discipline, and the zealous officer, striving for immediate success, who may find himself among them in the field before an enemy, will be able to accomplish but little unless he resorts to the accustomed measures,—the punishment expected by the soldier,—until there shall be established a system of rewards and punishments, independent of favoritism and caprice, such as are recognized in the armies of civilized powers.

Major Ruchdy concluded to suspend the soldier's punishment until after our arrival at Massowah, when it could be made more effective. As the soldier afterward, while en route, was the most obedient and attentive to our wants, the Major's passion cooled, and he even acquired a kind of affection for the fellow. The punishment was, therefore, as usual, neglected because of ignorance of the needs of discipline, and because of the utter lack of a sense of justice.

We traveled until overtaken by fatigue and darkness in the valleys among the mountains. We bivouacked without water under a tall wanza, thick with sheltering foliage. At dawn we climbed Bamba, and with considerable difficulty descended its long and steep incline into the plentifully watered, grassy and swarthy defile. Here perpendicular walls of metamorphic rock ascend so high and twist about in so many directions that we readily found shade under their cover from the noonday sun. Toward evening, we resumed our progress in the direction of Bahr-Reza. When the defile proper began to open out into a narrow valley where the tamarind and several varieties of the acacia spring out from the mountain's sloping sides, there were to be seen also the sour orange, the indigo plant, and other

rare herbage, flourishing in a wilderness of vegetation profuse from the winter's rain. The inhabitants of the region were nipping the leaves, sporting and chattering among the limbs, cawing overhead, or lurking underneath. Almost every tree had at least one hanging nest of the African weaver-bird. There seemed to be several varieties, for they were of various sizes and colors—yellow, blue, and green predominating. As the traveler comes upon the single houses at intervals along the road of a new country, so in these mountain wilds did we come on the houses of these little creatures, greatly scattered however. But at wider intervals in the direction of civilization were villages of a score or more nests to be seen on a single tree. These interesting little birds had already begun to re-occupy their homes, and the entire valley itself, as far as Bahr-Reza, was happy in a chorus of chirrups and marital chats.

We stopped at Bahr-Reza for one night. I had before this seen men go out in squads of ten or a dozen and arrange themselves in line to mumble the evening prayer; but not until we arrived at Bahr-Reza did I see Mohammedan prayers discharged by battalion. Here the religious enthusiasm of the sheik transformed the garrison every evening into a veritable Mohammedan camp-meeting, prayers, singing and shouting all included. There was no such enthusiasm among the soldiers in the front, consequently I was desirous of ascertaining the cause of this daily demonstration.* The evening we stopped at Bahr-Reza the excitement was excessive. I soon learned that there had arrived that same day several thousand copies of an Arabic newspaper which contained a remarkable view, from an Egyptian standpoint, of the results of the campaign, published, no doubt, after Prince Hassan's arrival at Cairo. These papers had arrived by post, and many of them were going to the front for distribution in the army.

The paternal government is as mindful of the subject's mental as it is of his gastronomic food. Why should not the soldier know what he had done and be fortified against

* This is somewhat parallel to the many instances in our civil war when the most patriotic and eloquent ones on both sides were those farthest from the enemy.

the catechising of the curious and impertinent on his arrival at the capital? One of these papers was translated for my benefit. When the officer reading it had finished this extraordinary account of Egyptian valor, which read like a résumé of a new edition of the Thousand and One Nights, I was not sure of being more than a dreamer, until a long breath escaping me awakened me again to consciousness. There was an account in verse, still more extraordinary, which afterward appeared, about the Prince, who, it might be imagined, had carried Aladdin's wonderful lamp around in his pocket.

We passed the next night at Ambategan, where the battalion sent forward to clean out the wells passed us. The next day we journeyed on, resting at noon, without water, under the shade of an acacia, on the hither side of Yangoos. There we witnessed the suffering of the army as it crowded down the valley. The night was passed on the outskirts of Yangoos. Here our party heard the muffled roar of a lion in quest of food, on a hill not far off. The men were told that these beasts were numerous and very bold, and that they must prepare to accompany an officer who desired to have a hunt for the animal during the night. Many were the excuses made to escape this detail. One could not see at night; another had never hunted in his life; the ball would not enter a third's rifle—and so on. But they were told that it was unnecessary to be able to see far, as they needed only the bayonet, and they would be required to charge on the animal only in case the officer missed it or failed to kill it at the first shot. This, however, only excited them the more. A large pile of brush was gathered up and a blazing fire was built; and around this blaze they stood all through the night. Nor could anything less terrible than a lion's roar have driven them from this shelter. Out of curiosity I requested the Major to ask the sentinel what were his instructions. The soldier replied: "To keep my eyes open;" the Major added, "And to look fierce." For this purpose, he also said, that a part of the Egyptian soldier's equipment should be the fierce-looking mous-

tache of Napoleon's old guard. These unimportant circumstances will give the reader some idea of the Egyptian soldier. One other should be noticed. A soldier who had been on guard and was too sleepy to remain standing at the fire, took shelter from the wild beasts under a mule. At break of day he was found lying cosily under the animal, which was careful not to tread on him.

We reached Massowah on the eighth day from Gura. The bulk of the army had already reached that place, as had a part of the staff. Major Dulier remained with the Commanding General at Fort Hassan Pacha ostensibly to complete the works. Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick stopped at Addi-Rasso to reconstruct the fort there, which was again occupied until the garrison at the Kaya-Khor Pass work made its retreat. Major Dennison and Captain Irgens were in the meantime strengthening and repairing the works at Bahr-Reza, which was also held until the final abandonment of the country. Colonel Lockett proceeded to Massowah to construct its defenses. The work of Derrick, Dennison and Irgens was soon finished and they joined the Chief of Staff at Massowah. For a short time after this Derrick was engaged in making a survey for a railroad from Massowah to Bahr-Reza; Colonel Field and several other officers of the Etat-Major made an expedition to Sanheet to ascertain the practicability of a wagon road from Massowah to that place. General Loring and several of his fellow officers patiently awaited at Massowah the arrival of Fate.

CHAPTER LIII.

THE STAFF PROHIBITED FROM RETURNING TO SUEZ—COOKING WITHOUT FUEL—THE SALAMANDER—THE KORAN CURING THE SICK—THE KORAN FOR WAR PURPOSES—FATALISM—CRABS STEALING PORTABLE HOUSES—CORAL AND SPONGE—A TROPICAL STORM—KIRKHAM'S FEARS OF POISON—DRILLING ABYSSINIAN TROOPS—BATTLE OF GUNDET—THE KING'S LIONS—THE KING A MONK—WASHED DOWN THE PASSES—THE KING AS A HUNTER—ELEPHANT HUNTING—CICATRICES AND SUPERSTITION—TURNING THE BLUE NILE—RIFLE BALL, SHIELD AND SCIMITAR—GOURMANDIZING—THE ABYSSINIAN SOLDIER THE CHILD NOT THE SLAVE OF THE CHIEF—THE ABYSSINIAN HORSE—THE ARAB—KIRKHAM'S DEATH—THE WOUNDED OF THE STAFF CONFINED TO MASSOWAH—RELEASE FROM CAPTIVITY—DROWNING A DECREE OF FATE—LABOR OF THE STAFF—TRANSPORT ANIMALS KILLED.

There were several vessels awaiting cargo at Massowah when we arrived at that place, but orders had been issued forbidding any of the staff to return to Suez. We pitched tents therefore, and as many as could do so got under the lee and shadow of the Governor's palace, for the summer's heat had already begun. The narrow stretch of water and the proximity of the mountains which partially inclose Massowah conspired to neutralize the usual land and sea breezes. Ashore, therefore, the burning sands have more influence on the thermometer than does the water. The water itself in a considerable part of the bay is, during this season, too warm for bathing purposes, being so shallow that at ebb tide much of the bottom is exposed many hours to the sun's beams. There is then usually but little breeze. The locality main-

tains almost its ancient reputation for heat given it by Diodorus Siculus, who said of it that cooking could be done here without wood or fire. In the shade, as the summer's heat increases, the thermometer (F.) mounts to one hundred and twenty degrees, sometimes as high as one hundred and twenty-five, and this without a breath of air stirring. At night, as early as May, the mercury falls generally not lower than ninety-five degrees. One must lie at the very water's edge to feel any modification of the heat from the burning sand. Even here the young Egyptian officers were stripped to their linen, night and day, keeping under cover and partaking of scarcely any nourishment or stimulant, excepting coffee *à la Turque* and the cigarette (as a sedative), until they seemed as sere and crisp as the salamander itself; and they are as disappointing as this reptile in their ability to endure excessive heat. The Egyptian's system is without elasticity. He cannot endure great changes of temperature such as excessive heat or excessive cold, although the effects of the first are different on him from what they are on northern races. These lieutenants were all, more or less, under the influence of the temperature. They were lying so near me that I could see their medical treatment of the sick. The officer suffering the least among them was one of the most intelligent of their number, one who had long associated with Europeans. One day I discovered him making up a prescription for one of his sick comrades, when it was suggested that there were a number of Egyptian doctors present, and one or two foreigners, who would prescribe for his sick friend. But the patient's fear of falling into the hands of an Egyptian physician, as well as his dread of the hospital, joined to his superstitious belief, induced him to rely on the prescription of the young engineer. The dose was concocted by the lieutenant's repeatedly dipping his finger in water and writing on the bottom of a plate one or more sentences from the koran. Every lick of this water was carefully drunk by the patient, but with what effect I know not. Soon afterward, however, the young officer who did the prescribing died a victim to

his own faith in the virtue of such doses. Comparatively intelligent Egyptian officers said they believed their soldiers did not fight any better in Abyssinia because some of the enemy had recited passages from the koran against the Egyptians during battle.*

I drew another young officer into conversation on the subject of sickness, in order to find out the sum and substance of their belief. He said, that of several young men who were sick of the same disease, there were two who went to the equator, and were given the same medicine. One died, and the other got well. The former died because his time had come; while the latter's time not yet having arrived, he recovered, notwithstanding the medicine he took. No argument about the difference of symptoms, difference of constitutions, or of external circumstances, could induce him to take any other view of the matter. The fatalism of the koran had been instilled into him by the primary schools of the city.

The staff lay here sweltering in the heat during many long and wearisome days. At the time of the year when we were there, burning beams and crisping air destroy nearly all vegetable life; perspiration ceases to flow, or loses its oily nature, and the skin cracks.† Even the little sand-crabs crawl into ill-fitting, lop-sided shells, which they awkwardly bear around as covering from the burning rays. The only signs of life belonging to the vicinity, besides these, and an occasional gull, was a breech-clad diver, who gathered shell, coral and sponges in the bay. Although there is an interminable variety of form and beauty in the coral he gathered, all that was of a red or other bright tint lost its color after a few hours' exposure in the sun. His best sponges could be bought for one piastre, or one-twentieth the price paid for the same article in Europe.

Days followed each other as repetitions of those gone before. Not a cloud was there to screen the sun's beams, or modify the heat. The tides came and went regularly

* Some soldiers said they did not fight better because their officers deserted them.

† The dripping oil from the negro's hair protects his body.

as the earth rolled round, but the listless waves only served to increase the *ennui*, and lull one into forgetfulness and a sense of security. All was still as the grave, when suddenly, about the middle of May, the atmosphere filled with an impalpable powder. This portended something unusual and unknown to sojourners in Massowah. Quiet reigned during the day; and it was not until toward evening that there came from the mountains a gust, which increased by degrees until it threatened to tear loose the guy-ropes of our tents. The sky was thick with darkness, as if a black veil had fallen before our eyes. But in the cooling atmosphere we could smell the coming storm. Presently there came from the southwest, in quick succession, dazzling flashes, such as can be seen only in diversified and compact mountain scenery. The Amhara and higher mountains burst into fitful blaze, the surrounding spurs grew bright, while from the peaks came clap on clap, crowding along the reverberating ranges, which bore the rolling thunder away. The wind, as suddenly as it came, now veered round to sea, and the contest among the elements was renewed with augmenting vigor, guys giving way, flies flapping to shreds, and tents going down, carrying servants and soldiers with them. The rains soon fell—and such rain! The wind changed again, as suddenly as before. It now came to us right from the clashing clouds. It would hardly be correct to say the water came down in drops, sheets, or even torrents. It tumbled down in huge volumes, as if the heavens had opened, with tearing winds, driving great heaps of this rolling element through and over tents pitched on a declivity, sweeping away nearly everything before it. Men who were laboring manfully to prevent the occupants of some of the tents from being driven by wind and water over the bank, were taken from their legs and themselves washed down. Only by servants and soldiers clinging around some heavy iron boxes was any of the property saved in some of the tents. But there was a good genius not far away, for there soon succeeded a lull, and a hissing, satiated sound of the winds. The storm was

then over, and it had been weathered. But the shipping had all been driven from its moorings—the alternating winds, perhaps, righting the vessels and saving them from total destruction. The next morning the sun came out in seeming apology for the anger of the elements, and in full beams soon made amends for our mishaps.

Some of the tedium of our long stay at Massowah was whiled away by General Kirkham, who came to us and told us interesting stories of life in Abyssinia. He was still confined to the limits of the city, but was at liberty to walk on the island where we were sojourning, accompanied by two guardsmen. He seldom ate at the quarters assigned him by the government, as he was not anxious, he said, to fall a victim to Egyptian hospitality. Speaking about Abyssinia, Kirkham said that Theodore had permitted two or three Frenchmen to drill and attempt to discipline some of his soldiers. It was not long after they began this work that the Emperor made an inspection of his troops. The restraint from the first had been irksome to them; and the discontent was increasing from day to day. They seized the occasion of Theodore's visit to express in a mass their feelings in the premises. They used the most forcible language to show their anxiety lest His Majesty's drill-masters should soon be found hanging on a neighboring tree. This ended Theodore's innovation.

The next effort was made by Kirkham. During his first few years of service King John authorized him to drill about one thousand soldiers. These soon showed great improvement and proved themselves capable of being made the best light troops in the world—said Kirkham. But it required time, as they were impatient under rigid discipline; and this the King did not permit him to enforce. After a few months the men complained of the restraint, and the system was abandoned because the country was too much disturbed for the King to risk his popularity with his troops by supporting the Colonel. The latter insisted that the drill of these few months rendered these men so superior to the common Abyssinian soldier

that the battle which was fought near Adua, for the throne, (after the death of Theodore), between Dedjatch Kassa of Tigré (the present King John) and Goubasié was decided in the former's favor. Indeed, said Kirkham, it was fought by about three hundred of these men whom he had armed with "Brown Bess" muskets and stationed in a commanding position on the hill-side. When Goubasié was wounded many of his troops crossed over and the others fled for safety. Kirkham said he was not in the battle at Gundet, but was two or three miles away. The King's advance moved out before daybreak, and he was not apprised of the move. When aroused by the noise of battle he got up to take a hand in the engagement or to "go in," as he expressed it, although sick at the time; but the fighting was over. I have been told, however, that the Abyssinian women called the "Dedjatch Colonel" an old woman, because of his usual slothful energy in time of battle. This was due, no doubt, not so much to a lack of that impetuosity belonging especially to mountain peoples as to a loss of energy, destroyed by wounds, privations and excesses incident to a military life.

The King, he said, was always accompanied by two to four lions, which he handled and controlled with great tact, at times when even their keeper could not touch them. The King lost one or two of these pets at Gundet, and two at the battle of Gura plain. One of these, an immense one, was afterward stuffed and stood against a tree at Kaya-Khor for the public to gaze upon. An old and very large one, which formerly accompanied the King, had campaigned so long and often that he was not disposed to march any more and had to be humored a great deal. A litter was therefore prepared for him and men detailed to carry it. When the party came to a mountain or hill the old fellow would turn up his eyes and make a survey of the situation, and not until he saw everybody dismounted would he move. Then, with much deliberation and majestic dignity, he would get down and make his way to the summit or foot, and then mount again.

A maiden sister also accompanied the King wherever he

went. In his endeavor to preserve the succession, he keeps his child—a son by a female servant—in one of the ambas (or natural fortifications). The King, having been initiated as a monk and intended for monastic orders, is, in compliance with the customs of the Abyssinian clergy, unable to marry again. Kirkham had many interesting stories and much information to impart, gleaned during his eight years' life in Abyssinia. Speaking of the danger in the passes during the rainy season, he told of the King's losing at one time seven hundred men, and at another time three hundred men, who were swept away by mountain torrents which came suddenly down upon them when in a gorge. He often accompanied His Majesty on his hunts. The King is very fond of the sport and is very successful. He is a superior and daring rider, and takes several kinds of improved weapons with him to the field. Hunting is a natural pastime as well as means of livelihood for the people. Abyssinians who may chance to be without fire-arms do not hesitate to attack all kinds of animals, such as the elephant, rhinoceros and lion, with the spear alone, and often succeed in killing the beast. In one of these hunts, lasting only a few days, seven men were killed in consequence of their reckless daring. Kirkham said that when hunting for ivory the elephant is attacked from the rear with whatever weapon is being used.* This is done in order that the huge beast when overcome may first settle down behind and thus save the ivory from being broken.

The large cicatrices from one to two inches in width, often seen on the arm of an Abyssinian above the elbow, are produced purposely when the fellow is young in the belief that it renders him hardier and more courageous. These scars are often produced by burning; but when they extend entirely around the arm, as they sometimes do, they are usually caused by a strip of green hide which is bound around and left to dry and contract.

Referring to Theodore's scheme for depriving Egypt of

* Russell (p. 308) describes the Abyssinian hunter as Baker does the Hamram Arab. The former is called Agageer, and cuts the tendon of one of the hind legs of the beast with a sharp sword, while the elephant chases a fleet horseman just ahead of it.

water by turning the Abyssinian or Blue Nile, Kirkham said that this river is very narrow at one place, far from its source, where it passes through a gorge in the mountains. It was believed by the Emperor and others that it could be turned from its bed with little labor, and made to create a new channel farther north, and then scatter its waters over the parched deserts along the base of the Abyssinian range. He had frequently heard the matter discussed by King John, who also seemed to entertain a similar notion for turning the river.

Having seen a spherical ball, which had been fired from an old Colt's revolver—army size—only a few paces distant, fall at the foot of an Indian shield (made from the hide of the bison or American buffalo), and having seen, after the fighting near Gura, many shields plowed, as I believe, by the Remingtons, I was curious enough to ask Kirkham the effect of this latter arm on the Abyssinian shield, which is made not alone from Abyssinian buffalo hides, but from several other hides, as of the giraffe, rhinoceros, and hippopotamus, and which is far superior to those used by the North American Indians. Kirkham said he had experimented with them and had discovered that a Remington rifle would not penetrate some of them at one hundred and fifty or even one hundred yards, but would do so at two hundred yards. The rim of the shield is of iron, but covered with the hides. This rim answers the purpose of keeping the shield in shape, and of receiving an enemy's stroke from a weapon such as the sabre—it is not wholly effective against the double-edged scimitar. Also, in consequence of its shape,—turning out and presenting a circular groove,—it often catches balls, especially those of stone, such as are generally used by the Abyssinians, that glance from or plow near the surface (as most of them do in consequence of the inclination presented by the surface to a ball coming from the front), and which otherwise might reach an exposed part of the body.

As to the gourmandizing propensities for which the Abyssinians have long been noted, Kirkham said, in confirmation of what I myself had seen, and what had been told

me by another resident of the country, that he had seen three Abyssinians devour fifteen pounds of meat, besides other dishes, at one sitting, and that he had often seen them after feasting throw themselves on their backs and permit others to tread up and down upon their abdomens. On the feast of St. Michael's day, when the King invites some of his particular chiefs around him to dinner, is when such peculiar sights can be seen oftenest. Meat and red pepper are their principal articles of food, and tedge their drink. Raw meat is considered their most savory dish. At such times a favorite guest is occasionally crammed by a servant (as a good housekeeper stuffs her turkey for Thanksgiving day dinner) with pellets of meat filled with pepper and onions. When the chiefs and guests (the lions) have eaten to their full satisfaction, the soldiers crowd in like jackals for the bones. This, however, is not exactly subserviency on the part of the men. They are by no means slaves. They wish to be treated as the children of their chief, and when thus cared for readily obey him.

The Abyssinian is, as a rule, a fine rider, able to perform expert and daring feats upon his horse, in throwing the lance, attacking the rhinoceros, deliberately riding only a few feet in advance of an enraged elephant, etc. Like the Mexican, he covers his animal with all the trappings his wealth can buy. The stirrup is very small, only the big toe finding a resting-place. Their horses are small, hardly as large as the Arabs; but they are very hardy. Like their riders, they pick up their food very irregularly, and travel all over the rocky roads and mountains almost as sure-footed as goats, going, as they do, without shoes. They are impetuous in a charge; and, being geldings, they are tractable, and never so troublesome as are the Arab stallions which the Egyptians ride. These latter I have often seen fastened with a lariat and picket pin, hobbled, side-lined, and one fore foot and one hind foot staked out—all at one and the same time (everything but the drag chain)—and this not for one hour only, but for twenty-four hours, day and night, for weeks and

months together. If this is necessary to prevent his injuring the animal which may stand near, it is not necessary when there are none close by; for to his master the horse is always gentle, and seldom bites or kicks at him. Under fire the Arabian exhibits very little nervousness. He is cool, steady, almost indifferent to danger, and is very tenacious of life.

General Kirkham died while still under Egyptian surveillance, as he always predicted he would. He believed himself an elephant in the hands of the Khedive, and that it was intended to torture him to death by confinement. Those who are conversant with the customs of the country will hardly consider the General's belief as a harsh one under all the circumstances.

We had been at Massowah nearly a month, and during this time all the line not retained as a defensive force, the wounded, and the released captives, had been forwarded to Cairo—vessels coming and going continually. The military commander at Massowah at this time was Soliman Pacha, the Intendance officer. Both he and the Governor assured us that they had orders from the palace at Cairo to allow no officer of the *Etat-Major*, able-bodied, wounded, or released captive, to return to the capital. This was most astonishing to us. Why should we be kept at that place? Was it because the Khedive feared the truth might be learned through us? The Governor had charge of the wires, and refused to permit a telegram of any kind whatever to pass over them. At Gura, indeed, I had requested that a dispatch of about ten words should be sent to relieve the minds of the families of officers known to have been in battle. This the Commanding General refused to do, and all our letters giving the same information had been abstracted from the mail, not one reaching its destination. Dr. Wilson's own professional knowledge warned him of the danger of longer remaining at Massowah, and he made all proper efforts, as did some of his friends, to induce the Governor to lay his condition before the Khedive. But the Governor, as did also Soliman Pacha, refused this reasonable request; and all our

letters, public or private, were abstracted from the mail by these officers.

The order forbidding us to go to Cairo necessarily involved a few young Egyptians of the staff, but this was the shield from behind which the foreigners were struck. I am, however, taking special exception to the treatment of the wounded of the staff. For instance, Major Durholz had received two very severe wounds, one from a sabre, the other from a lance, on head and face, and was captured by the Abyssinians, at the same time with an Egyptian adjutant-major. The former was prisoner to Ras Area, the severest on captives of all the chiefs, and suffered a great deal; but the other officer was not wounded, and enjoyed the hospitality of a chief near the King's person. These two officers were released by the enemy at the same time, and arrived at Massowah—the adjutant-major in good health and spirits, and Durholz feeble, and with mental faculties seriously impaired. The former was at once provided for, and sent to Cairo; but the latter was detained at Massowah.

The most extraordinary case, however, was that of Dr. Wilson. He was at the point of death from arterial hemorrhage, greatly emaciated, needed an invigorating climate in which to recuperate, and was daily growing worse from the excessive heat and from erysipelas. All this was known to the Governor. That he had hitherto refused to take any steps favorable to the Doctor the following is offered as an excuse: These people hear a rumor in the interest (as they conceive) of the government or of their superiors; as a matter of duty they repeat it over and over until it becomes a part of their belief, or at least until they feel themselves partly responsible for it and in duty bound to protect it as if it were their own creation. One finds the Egyptian, therefore, from the highest pacha in the land to the lowest fellah, to act in such matters as if they all thought alike. Their motives are few and common, all tending to the same end; that is to say, to gain the favor of their superiors which they know can be secured only by truckling ways. Therefore when they hear opin-

ions expressed by superiors they readily fall into line and jump to a conclusion. Hence, if the young Governor did not have specific orders in the case of Dr. Wilson and other wounded persons, he made up his mind from the order he received about the staff that the palace authorities desired that these officers should be persecuted, and that he must do his share or be held accountable for his neglect or obtuseness. When Dr. Johnson returned from captivity his professional influence was also brought to bear on Ahmed Bey. The Doctor's nerves were greatly shattered by his sufferings, but he was able to make a careful examination of Wilson's injuries and condition. He reported the result of his examination to General Loring as well as to the Governor, and said that if they desired to save Dr. Wilson's life he must be permitted to go away from the hot and uncomfortable place at once. To keep him longer, he added, would be nothing less than deliberate murder. Loring's rank, age and long experience had had no influence with the Governor; he had been unable to accomplish anything against the notions of this young official. Now, however, armed with these strong representations, the General succeeded, with the assistance of other officers, after a month's hard work, and with Wilson's life hanging in the balance, in getting through a telegram telling the people at Cairo of the Doctor's precarious condition. Notwithstanding that I personally was conscious of the inhumanity of unnecessarily keeping any one disabled in that insufferable hole, all my efforts while at Massowah were in behalf of Dr. Wilson. But I gave vent in letters to the Minister of War to some honest indignation because of the vile treatment we were all receiving. However, Dr. Johnson (and Wilson), as I afterward learned, insisted that permission should be obtained also for me to proceed to Cairo. This the Governor, or the palace, determined to prevent if a colorable excuse could be manufactured. Two Arab doctors were therefore sent to make an examination and report as to my condition. Both of them were total strangers, but they sought to make me believe that they had merely called

on a friendly visit. Whatever their report may have been, they were unable to overcome Dr. Johnson's more experienced judgment as to my condition, and I was sent away with Dr. Wilson about the last of May.

The only incident of our voyage from Massowah to Suez was this: A black soldier fell overboard. The weather was calm, the sea still and he was soon picked up again. Although yet unconscious, it was evident that he could soon be restored if properly treated. But the officers of the vessel showed no interest whatever in the premises, and Dr. Wilson was not in a position where he could look after the man. I recommended that the usual restoratives be applied; but in spite of all I could say or do the officers laid the fellow on his back, crowded closely around him and watched his life out of the world. The usual word of indifference, "*Malesh*," was heard among the men, who looked on it as the will of God that the man should die, and that it would be derogatory to His functions to resist His decree by an effort to save the poor fellow's life.

Ali Pacha, an officer from the War Office, was at Suez seeing to the transportation of returning troops to Cairo. He showed us great kindness and furnished us with immediate transportation. In due time we arrived at Cairo, where we were met at the station by General Stone, Major Hall and other friends. The other members of the staff remained several weeks longer at Massowah, an attempt being made to disguise the real motive for retaining them at that place by attaching the names of several, for a few days, to visionary schemes such, for instance, as a railroad to Bahr-Reza. These officers had no further connection with the troops, nor with the transport service, as was indicated by the following incident: Notwithstanding the extremely bad treatment our transport animals had received, the army was carried to Gura with supplies sufficient for a campaign of several weeks to Adua, and there still remained in tolerable condition at the time of battle about half the number which had been provided for the army—sufficient for the transport of the army's

supplies on the contemplated expedition. But after these animals got entirely out of the hands of the staff—indeed, immediately after the battle—it was but a short time before there were not enough to transport bread and salt for the few troops yet remaining in the country. Between eight and nine hundred were killed outright soon after our arrival at Massowah, and the rest as fast as it was possible for cruelty and neglect to do the fatal work.

CHAPTER LIV.

THE KHEDIVE'S WRATH AND FAVOR—EXECUTIONS AND PROMOTIONS—NATIVE OFFICERS BETTER THAN CIRCASSIAN—THE WORST FOREIGN OFFICERS THE BEST EGYPTIAN OFFICERS—THE KHEDIVE'S DETERMINED IGNORANCE—OBSTRUCTIONISTS—PRINCE HASSAN REWARDED—HIS HIGHNESS FILCHING GLORY FROM TURKISH BATTLE-FIELDS—GORDON'S FIGHT WITH THE BLACKS—EGYPTIAN SECURITY NOT IN AN ARMY—ARMY CAN ONLY SECURE CHANGE OF MASTERS—NATIVE OFFICERS WHO RUBBED AGAINST THE UNCLEAN GIAOUR—THE PRINCE'S SLANDEROUS TONGUE—THE MURDER OF DURHOLZ—THE MURDERERS REWARDED—INDIGNITIES AGAINST AMERICANS—UNFORTUNATE STIPULATION AND INSTRUCTIONS—RELUCTANT AND UNGRACIOUS BESTOWAL OF DECORATIONS—GENERAL GRANT'S DINNER WITHOUT HIS COUNTRYMEN—THE CHANGES—THE KHEDIVE DEMORALIZED BY HIS TROUBLES AND DESTROYS HIS FRIENDS—HIS SON TOWFIK.

It may be interesting to the reader to know something of the personal results of the expedition to some of the participants. The distribution by the Khedive of his capricious favor and wrath can be epitomized in the words: "The King's wrath is as the roaring of a lion, but his favor as dew upon the grass." For, although he began by shooting many officers and men at Kaya-Khor and Boulak, he ended by bestowing promotions and decorations around quite freely. Instead of teaching and disciplining the soldier, the procedure in his case is based on the supposition that the fellah is born perfect and has all requisite knowledge, not only to do right, but to steer his little life-bark safely among the breakers of ignorance and superstition, envy, jealousy, intrigue and criminality.

He is expected to know instinctively the desires and whims of his superiors, dumb as they may be, or, failing in this, he jeopardizes his life.

Among the Egyptian officers who received promotion or decoration were Ismail Sabry Effendi, Badr Effendi, Ali Ruby Effendi, and Sameh Effendi, all of whom were promoted to beys, as they richly deserved to be.* The obstructionists, Osman Bey Galib, Rachid Bey, Osman Rifky Pacha, and Riffat Effendi, were all promoted one grade in rank. Osman Pacha would, no doubt, have been shot had his inaction on the 7th of March occurred in an army of any civilized power. He would also have been promptly punished in Turkey, in Egypt, even, were it not a fact that he was sent to combat the Staff rather than the King. To save Osman, or perhaps to cover his own tracks, the Commanding General caused his promotion, by telegrams, immediately after his brilliant crime. This whitewashing and forestalling of public opinion was to Ratib and Osman the best defense that could be made of the latter's offense. It justifies the belief that his conduct as represented to the Khedive was approved by His Highness. If there was anything untrue in this representation Ismail Pacha may yet regret that he absolutely refused to hear more than one side of the case, and studiously kept the staff personally and their communications away from him, thus deceiving himself as Louis Napoleon did when he pigeon-holed Baron Stockel's unpalatable truths. Osman Pacha, as has been said, was left by Ratib in command at Massowah. When the Soudan fell into the hands of Gordon Pacha he was relieved from that important post by the latter. Afterward when Gordon reached his headquarters at Khartoum he applied for a commander, not naming any one, for his military forces. Much to his surprise Osman Pacha was sent to him; but he soon got rid of the man again. The Circassian party have lately† placed Osman in power as Minister of War, successor to

* It is a notorious fact that all these officers, also Mohammed Gabir Bey, (who was killed), and Arraby Bey, who were the best of the native officers, were Egyptians, and may be classed with the fallahin.

† August, 1879.

Prince Hassan and Ratib. Others of these obstructionists were given posts under Gordon Pacha which they soon dishonored. The fact that all the notorious obstructionists were rewarded indicates pretty conclusively the purpose for which they were in the army.

Ahmed Bey, the young Governor, although he did his duty to the satisfaction of his uncle, the Mefettish, and, apparently, to that of Ismail Pacha, after his return to Cairo fell into temporary disgrace after the downfall of his uncle, who, if conflicting stories should be harmonized, would be found to have been too intimately associated with his foster-brother, the Khedive, to escape when it was necessary that one or the other should fall.

Prince Hassan, who held the nominal position of a lieutenant in the Prussian Hussars, was, in recognition of his services in Abyssinia, promoted by the Emperor William of Germany to the nominal rank of major and decorated. Once at home he replaced Ratib Pacha as Commanding General of the army, with the ex-commander serving as his aide-de-camp. Upon the fall of the Mefettish, Prince Hussein succeeded him as the Finance Minister. Prince Hassan was then appointed Minister of War, and Ratib was given his old place as Commanding General of the army. During the war between Russia and Turkey, Prince Hassan was given command of the Egyptian contingent. How the Prince and his troops acquitted themselves during that memorable campaign in Bulgaria is now a matter of history, the war correspondents of American and English newspapers having faithfully reported the facts in the case.* If there is any lingering doubt about the Egyptian being a poor soldier the following reliable incident—which occurred at the same time Prince Hassan was filching glory from Turkish battle-fields—may remove it. In the spring of 1877 Gordon Pacha became Governor General of the Soudan. On the 9th of August, 1877, he arrived in Darfour in the vicinity of the Leopard tribe of negroes who were disposed to give him trouble. Gordon had with him

* Lieutenant Greene, of the United States Engineers, in his official report of this campaign, also refers to the misconduct of the Egyptian contingent.

some one thousand two hundred regular troops armed with Remingtons, one thousand five hundred Bashi-Bazouks, and five hundred natives—of the Arab tribes. This was the maximum number of his troops. He had also about three hundred allies armed with muskets; or in all say three thousand five hundred men, two pieces of artillery and a rocket tube. Gordon had made a kind of stockade with bushes, and was occupying a small sand-hill in front of it. The country was fairly open in all directions. At four o'clock in the afternoon two bodies of two hundred and fifty men each, in irregular order, were seen approaching. A rocket was fired into their ranks, but they minded it not. General firing now began, but the negroes, without faltering, advanced to within ten yards and drove the Egyptian force into the stockade for shelter. The Egyptians escaped massacre, it is believed, only because the stockade could not be taken by assault. On their first attempt to carry it by storm the negroes lost seven of their number; and when the attempt was renewed that same night they lost fifteen more. Need anything additional be said about Egyptians undertaking war? These facts were learned from Colonel Gordon himself.

Disinterested advisers would say to the Khedive: Besides a few blacks to preserve order on your frontier, and a few Arabs for city police, you need only a military cadre—regulated by unfettered foreign officers—through which your male population should pass, remaining in it only long enough to acquire the rudiments of education and drill. Why such a large army, when your lands thirst for labor? Your security, whatever that may mean, is not in your army; it exists in the fact that you are a foot-ball for contending nations. Your army can secure for the fellah only a change of masters.

It remains to tell of the personal results to members of the Etat-Major. Several of these were young Egyptians who were so unfortunate as to be assigned to duties which brought them into more or less intimate official association with the foreigners. The young Egyptian looked up to the foreigner to protect him against the whims and cruelties of

pachas and beys. The foreign officer naturally picked his assistants from the most intelligent and active of these. In the distribution of favors these young natives, who during the campaign were most exceptionally faithful and zealous, laboring indefatigably at important work, were quite ignored. Of the foreigners, Major Dulier (a Belgian), as assistant to Colonel Lockett, secured possession of the reports and maps of the several months' work of the last-named officer during his temporary absence. Ratib Pacha, finding Dulier a tool answering his purpose, induced him to construct with the aid of this material a map to harmonize with His Excellency's peculiar report. This service procured Dulier the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and his transfer from the staff, in which he feared longer to serve after sacrificing his honor and uniting his labor and talent with Ratib Pacha's efforts toward the degradation of the Etat-Major. When there was no longer any use for him he was dropped by Ratib and other natives, and was soon afterward discharged. Major Turnheysen and Captain Sormani—the playmates of Prince Hassan—were decorated, and the latter promoted to a majority. Both procured their separation from the staff, the mere requesting of which they knew would please the Prince who desired to destroy the General Staff, and was catering to the influence of native pachas and beys. "The Prince who wanteth understanding is also a great oppressor," is a proverb which His Highness, with their assistance, was now able to verify. He was naturally inclined to repeat anything unfavorable he heard against a foreign member of the staff. Hence he hardly needed these two officers almost constantly at his side pouring into his ears—incited, as they were, by envy—the infamous slander that Durholz while in captivity had commanded King John's artillery against us at Gura. They—Ratib Pacha, and one or two other officers—did, however, in the field add bitterness to the Prince's venom. When His Highness returned to Cairo he was consequently armed as the assassin, and used a weapon as foul as that of the stiletto. His slanderous tongue prejudiced an unscrupulous ruler, who had the power of life and death in his nod,

against one of his most zealous and capable, although unfortunate, officers, who was at the time suffering from wounds and captivity, and ever afterward was prevented from setting himself right with the Khedive until the villains got the poor fellow's blood. From the moment Durholz regained his liberty, with impaired health and mind, he was persecuted by those who thought to thus servilely gain favor with the Prince, the palace clique, and the Khedive himself. Major Turnheyssen, an expert swordsman, was selected as executioner. He kept at poor Durholz for weeks, by repetitions of this slander, taunting him with the story I have told elsewhere, until he finally forced him into a duel. That this was a concocted scheme to take his life and thus gratify the vilest instincts of unregenerated human nature is quite certain. Not only were Count (captain) Sormani and Count Sala—the Khedive's equerry—Turnheyssen's seconds, but the Khedive's master of ceremonies and a court favorite—the especial friends of his antagonist—were Durholz's seconds. He had, indeed, fallen among the Philistines. Of course, inexperienced as he was with the use of the sword, and feeble as he was, Durholz's life was taken in a few moments. The Prince then placed these two officers (Turnheyssen and Sormani) on his staff as aides and took them with him to Bulgaria. More than this, the Prince appointed the fellow who had made pretense of seconding Durholz, and who was not already with the Prince, his chief of staff.

Lieutenant-Colonel Möckeln, the only remaining foreigner of the staff not an American, performed excellent service throughout the campaign. But when he made reports, as inspector, of neglects, etc., here and there, he incurred the hostility—as all did who attempted to do their duty—of those affected, who prevented his receiving any recognition for his many services. He was an appointee of Nubar Paclia, who, when the campaign ended, was no longer in power.

The other foreign members of the staff, thirteen in all, were Americans. These officers, generally, did their whole duty to the army and to the Khedive, in the face of extra-

ordinary opposition. Not only were the services of the larger number of these officers not recognized in any way whatever, but none of them were received at the palace, as is usual in such cases on their return even from a mere leave of absence. The Khedive refused to see or hear any of them, and with ill intent they were studiously prevented from going to his palace, where they had formerly, at soirées, and such, so often enjoyed his extravagant, capricious and hospitable favors. It is a notorious fact that this exclusion was at a time when almost everybody else, many of them of far inferior social position, was invited to the entertainments.* All the officers, without exception, were thus wronged for about a year, and several of them, viz.: Long, Lockett, Hall, Dennison, Johnson, Wilson, Porter, Field and Martin, driven, I may say, from the service in consequence, and by withholding their pay from them. Colonel Colston and myself also asked for our discharge, but it was not granted to us. This persecution and retention of officers without pay when other employées were receiving their money, was continued against the remaining members of the Staff until their final discharge. It was some two years and a half after the close of the campaign conducted by Ratib Pacha when all these officers, excepting General Stone who chose to remain in service, were relieved from their exceedingly disagreeable position by the Finance Commission. The reader must not suppose that these indignities were heaped upon these officers' heads because of any acts of their own. The failure of the Abyssinian campaign to meet the extravagant expectations of the Khedive became a mere pretext in the hands of Prince Hassan, Ratib Pacha, Cherif Pacha and the court clique—composed in part of various foreigners

* This will not seem strange to the reader when it is known that there was a stipulation in the contract which prevented the Americans in service from demanding the aid of their consul to right them in all these grievances. Two or three of us, however, refused to sign this stipulation. The American consul had instructions from Washington which prevented his interposition in such cases. But the consuls of other countries had instructions to use the whole power of their office, their official and personal influence, not only to protect their countrymen, but to advance their personal interests in Egypt, and this, of course, to the detriment of a nationality who had no one to represent them, and who could not demand an interview in the name of their government. The reaction from the George Butler régime was to the other extreme.

—to poison the Khedive's mind against all Americans. The Prince desired to replace them by certain German friends he had picked up while at school in Berlin; and the other pachas had their personal axes to grind. Colston, Long, Ward, Hall and Martin, all of whom did not participate in the Ratib campaign, and Mitchell, who was in Abyssinia at another time, but in another service, suffered equally with those who had been a part and parcel of the expedition. Even General Stone, who had almost daily access to the Khedive, did not escape; for the palace clique did not scruple to resort to the most despicable means to attain their ends. At the very time of the return of the officers from Abyssinia, when it was absolutely necessary for the Khedive's true interests, as well as our own, that he should be made acquainted with the truth, General Stone on several occasions had an hour for an interview with the Khedive given him by the Master of Ceremonies altogether different from that designated by His Highness for that purpose. If no other result was attained by this, it certainly was calculated to annoy both parties concerned and to bring the General into disrepute with the Khedive. Prince Hassan lent himself to all this, and, when Minister of War, gradually stripped Stone of all semblance of authority, leaving him a mere figure-head in the service.

Among those officers who received no recognition for the important services performed by them were Lockett, Graves, Dennison, Loshe, Lamson and Porter. The remaining officers were Loring, Dye, Field, Derrick, Johnson, Wilson and Irgens. Not to do injustice to any one, it should be observed that after a year of involuntary penance, or official and social exclusion, extraneous pressure-obtained for three or four of the twenty-odd Americans then in service in Egypt—including all those not in Abyssinia—an invitation to one of the many dinners which with soirées were then almost nightly given. Further, several months later on, and about a year and a half after the performance of the services in Abyssinia, such pressure was rewarded with five or six very reluctant dec-

orations to the officers just named in connection with myself. Several of these were of the fourth class—including the one given to Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick—and Captain Irgens' was even of the fifth class, while those bestowed on Major Turnheyssen and Captain Sormani were of the third class. These were given the slayers of Durholz doubtless to depreciate by contrast the services of the Americans, although Turnheyssen, in consequence of ophthalmia, with which he was afflicted during the entire campaign, was able to do perhaps not more than a week's ordinary work. And while Sormani did some good service, it was not to be compared to that of Captain Irgens, to whom he (Sormani) was, indeed, wholly indebted for the drawing of his maps, and for aid in making out reports, for which he reaped the reward. This, and subsequent ill-treatment of this gallant and able officer, destroyed his life. The Khedive did not take any one of these decorations and pin it personally on the breast of the recipient, as other sovereign princes would have done under the same circumstances. Ismail did not even send for the officers, nor did Hassan, as Minister of War, do so, and present them their decorations with a few pertinent and gracious words, as the Prince did to native officers and soldiers after his return from Turkey.

From the least to the greatest among them, all were slighted in a manner which utterly destroys the general illusion that honor and dignity are invariably the accompaniments of royal action. The officer highest in rank, a man of nearly half a century's military experience, a general in the Khedive's service for nearly ten years, one who had always done everything that his judgment prompted to sustain the good name of His Highness and his people, and who, as second in command and Chief of Staff in the Abyssinian campaign, did good service (under the most hampering circumstances of duplicity) in keeping Ratib Pacha and the Prince as near the right track as possible—this officer was given his decoration, how? It was handed to him by a clerk, not from the palace, who carried it around with him until he accidentally met Loring,

to whom he handed it, in a public street of Cairo, with the same nonchalance that an Egyptian orderly would have handed the same general officer an unimportant official document. A similar decoration was offered to the writer of these pages, but under such circumstances as impelled him to decline to receive the proffered bauble.

Notwithstanding all this, some one may say, do no injustice to His Highness, personally, for there is none upright at the Egyptian court—"they all lie in wait for blood; they hunt every man his brother with a net." Just as around the mountain's peak there are changing winds, which carry off many genial rays of the King of Day, so around the summit of absolute power, there are always blasts of courtiers to divert much of whatever there may be of natural warmth in the ruler's sympathetic heart. In a word, "if a ruler hearkens to lies, all his servants are wicked." Very good! I would do no injustice. If, however, more were needed to show the lack of spontaneity and graciousness in this matter, it could be told that General Loring succeeded in obtaining an interview with the Khedive, for the purpose of thanking him for the decoration bestowed upon him, in the manner already pointed out. He made the attempt, but His Highness failed to respond, and turning to one or two other officers who had accompanied Loring to the palace, he began talking about other matters. Loring was afterward treated in like manner by Prince Hassan, the War Minister, whom he also called on for a similar purpose.

These indignities were kept up until all these officers left the Egyptian service. At the dinner given by the Khedive to General Grant, when that distinguished citizen was in Cairo, all the American officers—except one or two who were not particular from whom they received invitations to be the guests of others—were shamefully excluded. General Loring was one of General Grant's oldest associates and acquaintances; but he was kept away, much against his wishes. Here was the ex-Commanding General of the United States armies, with old army associates and friends among the officers of the Egyptian

staff—an ex-President among many of his constituents, anxious to show their respect for his official and personal character—a representative American, entitled to the fullest attentions of his fellow countrymen—deliberately affronted by discourteously having all these officers kept out of his presence and company! Many officers thought General Stone's indifference was to blame for it.


When the American officers first arrived in Egypt, they were affably received by the Khedive and his courteous son, Prince Hussein, at that time Minister of War. The glitter and show were so overwhelming that some of these officers soon became demoralized—the tutor became scholar—and affected the indolence, the extravagance, the manners generally of the country. A few were loth to walk; they must have a carriage to go even a square; their houses were called palaces; their movements were pompous, and their language and thoughts most magniloquent.* But within a few short years from that time the varnish had worn away, the rust had stolen into their little bark, the timbers began to creak, the helmsman abandoned his post, and they were carried into unknown waters. Here pirates ruled; the bark was threatened by boarders; its flag went down, and the captain deserted his charge. The crew, borne by unfamiliar currents among breakers, were dashed ashore without friend or money, gloating wreckers rising to fatten upon their disaster. Officers who had families were compelled to patronize the pawnbroker; and the little boot-blacks, who work for one-half cent the job, were heard to say, sympathetically, "*Mafeesh feloos*" (no money), when they saw an American passing by with unpolished shoes.

* Whenever one or two of these officers were seen afoot, the attention of the Prince Minister of War, was called to the fact, whereupon he made inquiries, in great astonishment, to ascertain if it was really true that the Americans walked from the citadel into the city—a distance of less than three miles. This astonishment will be better appreciated when it is known that there are many old and intelligent residents of Cairo, who have lived there all their lives, and yet have never visited the pyramids, only ten miles distant. But within a year after these officers came, after it was discovered by these imitators that respectability could sometimes go afoot, judges even, old cross-legged, crippled Turks, were to be seen toddling from their harems to the place of holding their sessions. And now, in 1879, even the ladies of the harems, when they go to the sulphur springs at Helouan, a few miles out from the city, are often seen walking to the bath.

The brilliant rocket had come down a useless stick. Yet we were told that all this was effected, and continued for two and one-half years without the Khedive's knowledge. But enough! Ismail Pacha had no other such disinterested servants in his military or other service as the Americans. When his troubles came on he began his downward career by sacrificing them, and successively destroying other real friends,—so near him that he could reach them without effort,—in order to escape the inevitable. "Dead men tell no tales," and the state is a covetous and powerful heir. The Mefettish, with all his wealth—and testimony for the Finance Commission—disappeared, as did young Tousson Pacha,—the heir to the Khediveat, after Halim Pacha, in the old line of succession,—two wealthy eunuchs, and others. To accomplish his nefarious schemes, such as inciting the officers of the army to make a demonstration with weapons on the Finance Commission, for the pay that he had himself withheld from them, Ismail employed such tools as Ratib Pacha, as Minister of War—for the Nubar Pacha ministry had removed all the Princes from office. Since Ismail's removal from the viceroyalty, his son, Towfik,—young and inexperienced, though he may mean well,—inspired by the native party, as his father was during the latter part of his reign, has continued the same rule, employing such instruments as Osman Pacha, as Minister of War, to do the dirty work of the dominant party. The result will surely be more absolute interference by foreign governments in the affairs of this interesting but distracted country.

NOTE.—No definite peace has yet been made between Egypt and Abyssinia. Since the war between these countries—described in the foregoing pages—their border relations have been in an unsettled condition. During the year 1879, an Abyssinian army, on the border near Mas-

sowah, threatened to renew the strife if the King's claims for a port and for certain territory of which Abyssinia had been despoiled were not recognized and his demands acceded to. More recently, Egypt seems to have decided that the King can be most readily foiled by fomenting strife and revolt among his chiefs. For several months his special attention has been demanded by internal enemies, who have been doing the work of external foes.



A Map of NORTH-EASTERN AFRICA
MOSLEM EGYPT & CHRISTIAN ABYSSINIA.



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APPENDIX.

The following is a list of the names of Americans connected with the military service of the Khedive between the year 1869—the beginning of their service—and the year 1878, when the last of the officers remaining in the service (excepting General Stone) were discharged. Some of these persons have been named and sufficiently described in the body of the work. Those of this list not so named or described have (so far as a knowledge of the persons enables it to be done) a word or more of their antecedents given here with their names—sufficient, it is hoped, to identify the officers. The grade of their original entry to the service is first given—afterward come the promotions. Hence the anomalous position in the list which several of the names seem to have. Decorations are also given.* While several of these, as well as some of the promotions, were richly deserved, the reader should know that such favors in Egypt depend more on the condition of the Sovereign's liver than on that of his head or heart, and they are often (if not generally) the effects of court intrigues or give expression to certain financial or diplomatic exigencies.

No. 1.—Major-General (or General of Division) Henry A. Mott, of New York, who was also aide-de-camp to the Khedive. Received a decoration.

2.—Brigadier-General (or Pacha) C. P. Stone. Promoted to the rank of General of Division (or Ferik Pacha) and received two decorations.

3.—Brigadier-General W. W. Loring. Advanced to the grade of General of Division and received two decorations.

4.—Brigadier-General C. C. Sibley, of Sibley-tent celebrity. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, and served in the regular United States Army (in Mexico and on the frontier) until he entered the Confederate service—commanding early in the war in Northwest Texas and in New Mexico, where he was finally defeated at Val Verde (New Mexico) by General Canby.

5.—Brigadier-General Carrol Tevis, of Pennsylvania. He was graduated at West Point in 1849. First resigning from the United States Army, he served in one or two foreign armies—going through the Crimean campaign—and next appeared at home as Lieutenant-Colonel of a Delaware regiment; and, near the close of the civil war, became Colonel of the Third Maryland Cavalry. He received a decoration in the Egyptian service.

* As this list is all given from memory, it is possible that the original rank (in the Egyptian service) of one or two of the officers is not exactly as described here. There is also a doubt about one or two officers (who first entered the service) receiving decorations.

6.—Colonel (Bey) Alexander Reynolds, of Virginia, was a graduate of the Military Academy at West Point. After many years' service in the line of the United States Army, he became an assistant quartermaster, in which capacity he was acting in Texas with Lee and Twiggs at the breaking out of the war of 1861-5. He was an actor in one of the many novel incidents of our late unpleasantness. On the surrender of Twiggs in Texas to the self-styled Confederate (or State) authorities, Reynolds, accompanied by his wife, proceeded north as far as New Orleans, where husband and wife separated—she returning to her home and property in Philadelphia, and he remaining south, where he entered the Confederate service with the rank of Brigadier-General. He commanded on the right (Confederate) of the Vicksburg works, in front of troops with whom I was serving. While riding into the works on the morning of the surrender (July 4th), I noticed, some distance ahead, a disconsolate-looking brigadier in Confederate gray, standing near our route, peering among the troops in search of some one he might know. On approaching, I was greeted in jovial accents, with the salutation, "How are you, old boy?" And Reynolds began, first informing me of their misfortune in losing, since last we met, his wife's only daughter, saying that he was deeply distressed about his wife's absence. She had expected him to follow her to Philadelphia. Since he had not done so, he believed that she was entitled to a divorce in consequence of his long voluntary absence, and he supposed she had obtained it. "However," he quickly added (his face lighting up with one of his jovial smiles), "the jig is up, and Grant will parôle me, no doubt, and I shall go around by Philadelphia and marry her again." The next time I met him was at the New Hotel, Cairo, Egypt, just before mid-day meal. We entered the dining-hall together, and sat *vis-à-vis* at the public table, along which many other guests were seated. He began to tell how the world had used him since our last meeting, and was reverting to the subject of his wife, when a voice intervened and spicily contested one of his statements. Recognizing the battery now opened as an old acquaintance, he looked down the table, and with a bland smile bowed and then introduced me to the "Grande Duchesse," as he called his wife—full twenty seats away. At this long range she gave the feminine version of the story, and dashed into it all the fermenting sweetness of her nature. "Yes, he promised to follow me to Philadelphia. But he deceived me," she said, "and entered the Rebel Army, and fought against me through the war. But I had my revenge. One day, after the war, from whom do you think I should receive a telegram (from the New York Hotel) but from this miscreant, saying, 'Will you come here or shall I go there?' Of course he came to Philadelphia," she said, "and he was glad enough to get back." They are both dead. Peace be to their ashes! He died suddenly and alone in Alexandria while yet in the Egyptian service.

7.—Colonel T. G. Rhett, of South Carolina, was a West Point graduate with General Stone, of the class of 1845. After participating (as an Ordnance Officer) in the campaign against Mexico, he served on the frontier (in the Mounted Service) and finally as Paymaster, from which position in Texas he transferred his allegiance to the Confederacy—the close of the war finding him an Ordnance Officer in the Trans-Mis-

Mississippi Department. He became paralyzed in the Egyptian service, was afterwards discharged, and recently died after his return to the United States.

8.—Colonel W. H. Jenifer, of Maryland, the inventor of the "Jenifer Saddle," was a Lieutenant of the Second Cavalry, serving in Texas when he entered the Confederate Cavalry service (as a Colonel) in the Army of Northern Virginia. He died in the United States after his discharge from the Egyptian service.

9.—Colonel Beverly Kennon, of Virginia (now of the District of Columbia), a graduate of the Naval Academy at Annapolis, joined the Confederate service from the United States Navy. He received a decoration.

10.—Colonel Frank Reynolds (son of Gen. A. Reynolds) was graduated from West Point in the class of 1861, and immediately entered the Confederate service. He was a Colonel, and commanded at Yazoo City when an expedition from Vicksburg—just after its surrender—en route for Black River, encountered his torpedoes in the river near the city—the *De Kalb*, the leading vessel, with 13 guns, going down in three minutes after striking two or three torpedoes. There was little time to waste here, raking the river, and the Colonel was looked for, on the chance that he might be kind enough to tell where the torpedoes were, and how they might be avoided; but he was not at home when called for. However, a Captain Brown (I think it was), who was not so fleet of foot, was taken kindly in charge and requested to unravel the intricacies of the torpedo net. It was a very difficult problem for him to handle, and every reasonable assistance was given him. He was placed on the bow of the now leading boat, where he could overlook the water, and was so tied down that he could not fall into it—his life and knowledge were precious to the expedition. He had the whole bow to himself and was not disturbed in his meditations. From this position, as the column of vessels advanced, he seemed to see to the very bottom of the turbid waters and piloted the fleet securely through. Colonel Frank Reynolds, like his father, died suddenly (in New York) while yet in the Egyptian service—his demise (he being an only child) hastening, perhaps, the death of his father and mother.

11.—Colonel Vanderbilt Allen of New York.

12.—Lieutenant-Colonel Sparrow Purdy, of California, was with General (then Captain) Stone, when engaged on the *Sonora* survey. He was in the Northern Army during a part of the civil war. In the Egyptian service he was promoted to the grades of Colonel and Brigadier-General, and received two decorations.

13.—Surgeon-Colonel Edward Warren, M. D., of North Carolina, occupied high positions (medical department) at different times, in the armies under Generals Lee and Johnston (J. E.). After the war he was Professor of Chemistry in the Washington Medical University of Baltimore, and was unfortunately connected, as a witness, with the trial of Mrs. Wharton for the poisoning of General Ketchum. The State seemed to have a clear case against the accused until Dr. Warren, brought to the stand as an expert, involved the conclusion of poisoning in such doubt as to acquit the prisoner. The opposing counsel did not conceal their sore disappoint-

ment or suspicions, and twitted the Doctor for belonging to a profession which buries its mistakes. But the Doctor, with his ready wit, retorted that his profession is not so proud of its errors as the quizzing gentleman's profession, which suspends its errors in the air, to the public gaze.

14.—Colonel R. E. Colston, of Virginia, is a graduate of the Lexington Virginia Military Institute, and, for many years, was one of its professors, with Stonewall Jackson. He joined the army of Northern Virginia as a Colonel, was raised to the grade of Brigadier-General, and participated in many of this army's battles, beginning at Yorktown. He received a decoration.

15.—Colonel Wm. McE. Dye.

16.—Colonel Robert M. Rogers, of Pennsylvania, was graduated at West Point after serving as a volunteer during a great part of the civil war of 1861-5. He was a Lieutenant, of United States Artillery, on leave of absence during his Egyptian service.

17.—Lieutenant-Colonel C. C. Long of Maryland. He was, when quite young, in the Northern Army during the civil war. In the Egyptian service he was promoted to the grade of Colonel and received a decoration.

18.—Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Ward, of Virginia, a graduate of the Naval Academy at Annapolis, left the United States Navy and entered the Confederate service, where he commanded one of the cruisers. He was advanced to the grade of Colonel in the Egyptian service.

19.—Colonel Charles B. Field, of Virginia, received a decoration.

20.—Colonel Samuel H. Lockett, of Alabama, a graduate of the United States Military Academy, entered the Confederate service at once—holding the rank of Colonel. He was one of the Constructing Engineers of the defensive works of Vicksburg and Mobile during the civil war.


21.—Major H. G. Prout, of Massachusetts, served, when a mere boy, in the Northern Army during the civil war, afterward was graduated at the University of Michigan, and then became a Civil Engineer, and was connected with the United States Territorial surveys when he received his Egyptian appointment. He was advanced to the grades of Lieutenant-Colonel and Colonel in the Egyptian service.


22.—Major C. (?) Macomb Mason, of Virginia, a graduate of the Annapolis Naval Academy, entered the Confederate service from the United States Navy. He was raised to the grades of Lieutenant-Colonel and Colonel in the Egyptian service.

23.—Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. W. Dunlap was in the Confederate service during the war of 1861-5.

24.—Lieutenant-Colonel James Bassel, of Virginia, a graduate of the Military Academy at West Point, resigned from the United States Army and was engaged in civil engineering when he received his Egyptian appointment.

25.—Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Reed, of New York, who rose to the grade of Colonel of a New York cavalry regiment during the civil war, was commissioned a Lieutenant of the Fifth United States Artillery at the organization of this regiment. He resigned this commission several years before entering the Egyptian service.





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